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ABSTRACT 
The cho of law dilemma for international contracts 
is the subject of this thesis. In Part A the concept of 
party autonomy is discussed and the traditional English 
approach considered. This involves a critical examination 
of the proper law doctrine. 
1 
Part B considers the 'American Solution' with particular 
reference to the State of New York. Interest Analysis, New 
York legislation and common law are discussed. A criticism 
of the New York approach concludes this section. 
In Part C the limitations on party autonomy are con-
sidered in both the English and New York setting. 
In Part D four alternative proposals are canvassed. 
The lex loci contractus and the lex loci solutionis (the 
law of the place of contracting and the law of the place of 
performance) are briefly considered in an historical setting. 
These two theories contrast with the lex va1idatis (the law 
which validates) which an academic suggestion. Finally 
the European Convention 'on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (1980) is chosen as a legislative proposal to 
resolve the choice of law dilemma for international contracts. 
Its provisions are stated and discussed. 
Parts A to D demonstrate that law to govern inter-
national contracts on both sides of the Atlantic is unsatis-
factory. To date New Zealand has followed the English 
proper law doctrine. However it is submitted that the time 
for change has arrived. It is argued that New Zealand needs 
a law which advances conflict of laws goals, avoids present 
difficulties and which is in harmony with domestic contract 
2 
law. Thus Part E considers such goals and the domestic 
and conflict of laws provisions of recent national con-
tractual legislation. A legislative solution is then pro-
posed and it is argued that if the proposals were adopted 
New Zealand would have gone a long way towards resolving 
choice of law issues for international contracts. 
INTRODUCTION 
"It would be in the interests of those involved 
in commercial transactions ..... to have clear 
rules regarding the scope of party autonomy and 
the exceptions to party autonomy. The current 
state of the law in many jurisdictions does not 
enhance such predictability." 1 
The parties to a commercial contract generally expect 
their rights and obligations to be as well defined and pre-
dictable as possible, and this will be especially important 
3 
when the contract has an interstate or international element. 
If a dispute arises it will be of paramount importance that 
their agreement be interpreted in a predictable manner. 
The subject of this thesis is the choice of law dilemma 
for international contracts. The subject is chosen because 
it is of both academic and practical interest. Little has 
been written on the topic in this country but with expanding 
overseas trade New Zealand will become increasingly involved 
in contracts containing an international element. There-
fore a satisfactory body of law is required to govern such 
contracts. 
Emphasis is on international rather than interstate 
contracts and in general commercial contracts are consider-
ed. However non-commercial contracts are cited when there 
appears to be no relevant commercial contract on the point 
or if such a contract better illustrates the matter under 
discussion. 
1K. Mettala. Governing Law Clauses of Loan Agreements 
in International Project Financing. (Winter 1986) Int'l 
Lawyer 219 at p.231. 
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The concern is with choice of law, however many other 
matters are closely related to choice of law issues. As 
the subject chosen is potentially so vast these other 
related considerations are not discussed but merely noted 
in passing. 
It is argued that the present New Zealand conflict of 
laws for choice of law and international contracts is un-
satisfactory. This country follows English law and has 
always done so. Having stated the defects in the English 
system the problem became one of limiting the scope of the 
thesis into manageable proportions. The subject of conflict 
of laws lends itself to comparisons. Given that the English 
law is unsatisfactory it became obvious to consider how 
other jurisdictions resolved choice of law issues in this 
field. It would for example have been interesting to con-
sider the present conflict of laws pertaining in the South 
Pacific. However Australian conflict of laws although 
different in so far as federal choice of law issues arise 
is basically still the same as English law. For this 
reason the relevant conflict of laws provisions for the 
Australian states are not specifically considered. 2 Other 
non English speaking jurisdictions such as Japan were 
likewise rejected, mostly due to difficulties in obtaining 
recent materials in English. The decision to consider 
the "American Solution" to choice of law issues for inter-
2However where Australian decisions provide unique 
illustrations of matters under discussion they are included. 
See infra at p.37 et seq. for example. 
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national contracts was made on the grounds that this sub-
jecthas always been vitally important in a federation con-
taining so many states with different legal systems and for 
a country engaging the rest of the world in international 
finance and business. 'American' conflict. of laws has 
thus the possibility of having much to of Due to the 
vastness of the United States material it was considered 
appropriate to limit the discussion here in some way. New 
York was chosen as being the American equivalent of London -
both being commercial and financial centres where the res-
pective courts are faced with international contracts having 
no obvious connection with the forum. 
Europe is likewise an area of the world where inter-
national contracts occur daily in their multitudes. Thus 
the proposed European Economic Community law is considered 
in some detail. 
Space did not permit discussion of the conflict of laws 
provisions for any other jurisdictions. 
Terminology 
An international contract is one that has "significant 
elements connected with more than one country".3 An inter-
state contract may be likewise defined as a contract having 
significant elements connected with more than one state 4 . 
The terms choice of law clauses and governing law 
3 
A.J.E. Jaffey. Essential Validity of Contracts in the 
English Conflict of Laws. (1974) 23 I.C.L.Q. 1 at p.2. 
See also G.R. Delaume. What is an International Contract? 
An American and a Gallic Dilemma (1979) 28 I.C.L.Q. 258. 
4Unless specifically stated otherwise references to 
international contracts include interstate contracts as well. 
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clauses are synonymous. S Generally speaking the English 
and Commonwealth decisions and articles use the former term 
whilst the Americans use the latter phrase. 
Likewise the terms 'applicable law'; 'governing law', 
and 'proper law' all mean the same. The phrases refer to 
the lex causae, the law which is applicable or proper. It 
is the law that governs the contract. As with choice of 
law clauses and governing law clauses different jurisdic-
tions tend to favour different terminology. The Americans 
use the term 'governing law', the English the 'proper law' 
and Europeans often refer to the 'applicable law,.6 The 
terms are used interchangeably in the text and whilst it 
an argument of this thesis that there is no inherently proper 
law of an international contract the term is nevertheless 
used when discussing English case law. 
Options open to Parties 
The parties to an international contract have various 
options open to them. These may be briefly outlined by way 
of introduction to the subject. The parties can : 
(1) Avoid the conflict 
(2) Include a forum selection clause 
(3) Incorporate terms into their contract 
(4) Include a choice of law clause 
(S) Ignore the problem 
SOne writer has gone as far as effecting an amalgama-
tion of both terms and refers to choice-of-governing-Iaw 
clauses. See R.C. McCartney. The Use of Choice of Law 
Clauses in International Commercial Contracts. 6 Wayne L.R. 
340 at p.3S9 (1960). 
6As for example in the European Economic Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) discuss-
ed infra at p.410. 
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Conflict Avoidance 
First and obviously the parties can try to avoid any 
conflict arising by complying with all local laws. They 
could also move the entire transaction into one jurisdiction 
thus ensuring that the domestic law of that forum apply.7 
Forum Selection Clauses 
Secondly the parties can include in their contract a 
choice of forum clause. Such a clause specifies that any 
controversies arising from the transaction are to be deter-
mined or resolved in one particular tribunal or court. 
Traditionally choice of forum clauses have been seen as a 
satisfactory means of determining the governing law because 
a choice of forum clause was presumed to amount to a choice 
of law clause. Thus, for example if one chose arbitration 
in London, English law was taken to be the law the parties 
wanted to govern their contract. 8 A forum selection clause 
can exist side by side with a choice of law clause. 9 Whilst 
such clauses are obviously of great importance they are 
7C. E . Maw. Conflicts Avoidance in International Con-
tracts: Choice of Law and Language. Parker School of 
Foreign and Comparative Law (1961) at p.24. 
See also C.E. Maw. Applicable Law & Conflict Avoidance in 
International Contracts. 25 The Record of the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York p.365 (1970). 
8This is no longer so. See infra at p.49 et seq. 
9A similar type 
See R.J. Weintraub. 
Law for Contracts. 
p.290 et seq. 
of clause is a 'derogation' clause. 
Functional Developments in Choice of 
(1984) (iv) Recueil des Cours 243 at 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 10 
Incorporation 
Thirdly, if the parties do not wish to exercise the 
option of inserting a choice of law clause into their con-
tract they can nevertheless incorporate certain domestic 
provisions of a foreign law. 11 It is open to the parties 
8 
to an English contract (subj to any statutory prohibition 
to the contrary) to agree that their rights and liabilities 
shall be determined in accordance with the relevant articles 
of, say, the French Civil Code. The ef is to incorpor-
ate the French articles as contractual terms. It has been 
described as a "convenient shorthand alternative" to setting 
out the French articles verbatim. 12 Whether a particular 
term incorporated in this manner is valid is determined by 
the governing law. It is well established that this right 
10The English and New York law is well summarised by 
Mettala Ope cit. supra n.1. at p.236 et seq. For a more 
detailed general discussion of English law see R. Graupner. 
Contractual Stipulations Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Upon Foreign Courts in the Law of England and Scotland. (1943) 
L.Q.R. 22 et seq. For New York see M. Gruson. Forum Selec-
tion clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agree-
ments. Univ. of Illinois L.R. 133 (1982). 
For New Zealand see A.A. Tarr. Jurisdiction Clauses [1980] 
N.Z.L.J. 461. 
See also D.J. Branson & R.E. Wallace. Choosing the Sub-
stantive Law to apply in International Commercial Arbitration. 
27 1. Virgo J. of Int'l L. 39 (1986). 
11See generally Cheshire and North's Private Inter-
national Law. (1979) (10th edit.) at pp.202-3. (Here-
inafter cited as Cheshire & North.) 
J.H.C. Morris. The Conflict of Laws (1984) (3rd Edit.) at 
p.274. (Hereinafter cited as J.vlorris.) 
Dicey & Morris. The Conflict of Laws (1980) (10th edit.) 
at p.758. (Hereina cited as Dicey & Morris.) 
12Morris ibid. 
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of incorporation may be freely exercised 13 and once incor-
porated they become English terms and are construed as such. 
The main advantage of incorporation is that the terms incor-
porated do not change. The French code might be amended 
but the terms once included in the contract remain constant. 
On the other hand if the parties choose French law as the 
proper or governing law then it is well settled that the 
proper law is a living law and must apply as it is when the 
contract is to be performed and not as it is when the con-
tract is made. 14 
Fourthly parties can include a choice of law clause 
in their international contract. Such a clause specifies 
which law is to govern the contract should the need arise. 
If the parties do not exercise any of the foregoing 
choices then the forum will apply its conflict of laws rules 
to determine which law shall apply. It is these two last 
situations that are the concern of this thesis. 
Types of Governing Law Clauses 
No special language is required. It is sufficient to 
state, for example, that lIany dispute relating to this con-
tract shall be decided according to [English] law ll • lS 
13Cheshire & North at pp.202-3. 
14See Morris at p.274. 
1SIn Euroloan Agreements for example a typic choice of 
law clause would read: Proper La:w: this Agreement shall be 
governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with 
the laws of [England]. 
See A.C. Cates & S. Isern-Feliu. Governing Law Jurisdiction 
Clauses in Euroloan Agreements. (1983) Int'l Fin.L.R. 28. 
For other examples see .R. Brown. Choice of Law Provisions in 
Concession and Related Contracts. (1976) 39 M.L.R. 62S at 
p.627 et seq . 
. J.'E.Jaffey. Limitations on Choice of Law Provisions. A 
10 
In standard form contracts it is quite common to see 
a choice of law clause in the printed text. The printed 
clause usually has an open space where the parties are 
supposed to fill in the name of the state or country whose 
law shall be decisive. Some standard form contracts go 
one step further. For example the Baltic & International 
Maritime Conference (Copenhagen) Barecon Charter Clause 
25 states "This charter shall be governed by the law of the 
country agreed to in Box 33 (if Box 33 is not 
English law applies.)H16 
lied in then 
A choice of law clause can also refer indirectly to 
the governing law by declaring which connecting factor is 
to be relevant. For example the contract may state that a 
charter party is to be subject to the law of the flag 17 . 
As noted above some contracts contain jurisdiction or arbi-
tration clauses only. At different periods of time these 
have been seen as synonymous with a choice of law clause. 18 
The object of a choice of law clause is to state which 
law out of competing laws is to govern the contract. Pot-
entially the parties could choose one of a number of laws. 
Comment. (1977) 40 M.L.R. 440 and R. Brown. Choice of Law 
Provisions - A Rejoinder. (1977) 40 M.L.R. 442. 
16See S. Braekhus. Choice of Law Problems in Inter-
national Shipping (1979) 111 Recueil des Cours 255 at p.264. 
17E . g . Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. 
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] A.C. 572. 
18Discussed infra at p.49 et seq. 
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A party might wish for his own law to apply, alternatively 
he might accept the foreign law or choose a combination of 
both laws to govern the contract. Yet again a state uncon-
nected with~ither party could be chosen. The governing 
law clause could apply to all legal aspects of the trans-
action or alternatively it could govern only certain aspects. 
Options open to the Courts 
Not only do the parties have a choice but the court 
faced with an international contract containing a choice of 
law clause likewise has a number of options open to it. 
The court may give effect to the parties' choice of law 
clause. Here the court is said to recognise party autonomy. 
On the other hand the court could completely ignore the 
parties' wishes; thirdly the court could treat a choice 
of law clause as a relevant but not the most important factor 
in deciding what is the applicable, governing and proper 
law - the lex causae of the contract. In this last situa-
tion a choice of law clause is said to be a 'connecting 
factor I. Thus a choice of English law would help connect 
English law to the contract; other connecting factors 
might be the place where the contact is made (the locus 
contractus) or performed (the locus solutionis.) 
The Problem 
The choice of law dilemma for international contracts 
is concerned with two major problems. The first concerns 
party autonomy. It is generally accepted that the world's 
major legal systems allow for a certain amount of party auto-
nomy. This autonomy principle or rule is not however as 
broad as its name might suggest. One of the enduring 
12 
problems associated with the autonomy theory is the extent 
to which party freedom is restricted. 
The second major problem concerns the difficulties 
for a forum faced with an international contract with ele-
ments in a number of jurisdictions and which contains no 
choice of law clause. How is the Court to decide which 
law is to govern the contract? 
These two matters should be kept distinct. An inter-
national contract with a choice of law clause should be 
viewed as something radically different from an inter-
national contract that contains no such clause. However 
the cases in the jurisdictions considered and the academic 
writers do not always do this. The three rules of the 
Proper Law concept for example are generally discussed to-
gether as are the various governmental interest analysis 
theories in America. 
Ideally the theories and rules canvassed in this thesis 
should be considered twice, first as they relate to choice 
of law clauses and secondly as they pertain to international 
contracts that are silent on choice of law issues. However 
as "one can't have everything",19 instead of dividing this 
thesis into two parts, the first dealing with party autonomy 
and the second with the lack thereof, the traditional approach 
has been adopted whereby the rules or approaches for both 
situations are considered together. The very concepts 
currently used, such as the proper law doctrine require such 
treatment because of the interrelationship of the doctrine's 
19As Morris said when discussing the new arrangement 
of materials in the third edition of his text book 'The 
Conflict of Laws'. See the Preface at p.vii. 
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rules. This is itself a criticism of the doctrine. How-
ever before criticising the law, it is necessary to state 
the present New Zealand position regarding international con-
tracts and the choice of law. New Zealand law follows 
English law in this field. Thus the English Conflicts of 
Law approach is first considered. Before discussing the 
'Proper Law of the Contract', the concept of party autonomy 
in a general historical setting is considered appropriate 
as this sets the stage and assists in the understanding of 
the proper law doctrine itself. 
Chapter I 
Chapter II 
Chapter III 
PART A 
Party Autonomy 
The Proper Law of a Contract 
Criticisms of the Proper Law 
Doctrine 
14 
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Chapter I. 
PARTY AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
The t matter to consider is that of party autonomy. 
The theory defined and its origins traced from civil 
law jurisdiction. 
The development of party autonomy in America is next 
considered again briefly. ) J The English Proper law doctrine 
is then discussed which leads beyond the concept of party 
autonomy, as the Proper law doctrine applies to contracts 
where the parties have not made a choice of law decision. 
In other words the Proper law doctrine determines which law 
will apply in all contractual situations. 
Party Autonomy Defined 
Party autonomy simply means that the parties to a 
transaction are free to choose the law to govern their con-
tract. They have autonomy of will. Complete party auto-
nomy allows the parties to choose any law they like without 
any restrictions whatsoever. As will become apparent 
jurisdictions have generally felt the need to limit party 
autonomy in one way or another. At various points of time 
differing jurisdictions the choice has had to be reason-
able or substantially connected. 1 Some systems of law 
have required that the choice be bona fide and legal. 2 
These limitations are discussed in detail below. Party 
ISee infra at p.220 e~ seq. & p.271 et seq & pp.347-B. 
2See infra at p.35 et seq. & p.342 et seq. 
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autonomy may also be called the Intention Theory.3 In both 
the parties' wishes or intentions are respected and given 
effect to. The Implied Intention Theory differs radically 
as is shown in the following section. In this latter 
situation the court and not the parties decide which law 
is to apply to the transaction in question. Occasionally 
it may be the parties' intention that the court is giving 
effect to; but it may equally be quite the reverse. 
Finally the concept of party autonomy differs from the 
proper law doctrine in so far as the proper law doctrine 
is designed to cover three situations. 
The Proper Law doctrine applies when parties have made 
a choice (party autonomy), have failed to consider the matter 
and the middle position which concerns those situations where 
the parties have not articulated their intentions sufficient-
ly, but have nevertheless made a choice of law decision. 
Finally a note on the theory of party autonomy would 
appear relevant at this point. Yntema4 considered that 
in general three possible meanings have been proposed over 
the years. 
Under the first view the parties to a legal transaction 
have the power, subject to the general public laws, to choose 
the law governing the transaction. Accordingly their in-
tention is controlling as regards the applicable law. In 
this view private consent provides the law of the contract, 
3The parties' intentions and wishes are respected and 
upheld. 
4H. E . Yntema. Autonomy in choice of law. 1 Am J. of 
Compo Law 341 at p.343 et seq. (1952). 
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except as restricted by imperative statutory requirements. 
Pursuant to the second view the sovereign state plays 
a much more dominant role. The parties are free, within 
the limits prescribed by law, to enter into agreements on 
such terms as they may prefer. 
For their convenience, they may adopt the rules of a 
given legal system. But such 'incorporation' of legal 
provisions is not legislation; these provisions are binding 
only because, and to the extent that, the law prescribed by 
the sovereign state having jurisdiction over the contract 
so provides. 
A third view suggests that autonomy denotes not a 
power to stipulate the applicable law as such but the free-
dom of the parties in contracting to localise transactions 
by their voluntary acts. The law of the contract is deter-
mined by its economy, the circumstances that indicate its 
location in space, which may, but usually do not, include 
an express stipulation regarding the applicable law. 
These three views have enjoyed differing support over 
the centuries by both courts and academic writers; much 
depending on the basic theories of conflict law in general 
prevailing at the given time. The only firm conclusion 
that may be stated is, that whatever theory is, or has been 
in vogue, party autonomy has existed for a very long time 
(by Conflict of Laws standards), and in the words of Rabel 5 
5 E. Rabel. The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative 
For a general 
and Yntema 
Study (1958-1964) (2nd edit.) at pp.368-9. 
world-wide survey see Rabel at p.368 et seq 
op.cit. supra n.4 at p.350 et seq. 
"Despite some resistance by writers, there is prac-
tically no doubt that the parties to a contract have 
a right to determine by agreement the law applicable 
to their contractual relationship. Only the limits 
may be controversial." . 
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The Development of Party Autonomy in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
It has been suggested that the doctrine can be traced 
back into Roman times. 6 It may be noted7 that the Roman 
Empire regarded a system of law as the peculiar property of 
the person entitled to and which an individual might claim 
as of right at any time. However one could always decide 
to accept another system of law. In other words whilst 
a Roman citizen anywhere in the world had a right to claim 
the protection of Roman law he could also waive that pro-
tection and abide by the law of the place where he happened 
to be. This liberty of choice has persisted into modern 
times, for !lit a prevailing doctrine on the Continent of 
Europe that in the case of all voluntary obligations, par-
ties, since they have the right to choose whether or not they 
will be bound, have also the right to choose the law under 
which they shall be bound. This doctrine, first clearly 
formulated by Dumoulin,8 is known as the principle of auto-
6See generally O. Lando. 'Contracts' in International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law. (1976). Vol.III at p.5 et seq. 
7J . Beale. What Law Governs the validity of a contract? 
23 Harv. L. R. 1 at p. 7. ( 19 0 9 -191 0) . 
8Charles Dumoulin (1500-66) the father of party auto-
nomy appears to have been the first scholar to have criticised 
the place of contracting rule. For a brief summary of his 
views see O. Lando. The Proper Law of a Contract. (1964) 8 
Scand. Studies Law 107 at p.114 et See also A. Nuss-
baum. Conflict Theories of Contract. Cases versus the Re-
statement. 51 Yale L.J. 893 at p.895 (1942) who considers 
19 
nomy of will.9 
The influence of Dumoulin and such writers as Huber, 
voet,Savigny and Laurant is 11 felt in Civil Law countries 
today.10 Huber11 stated for example that contracts are 
entirely governed as regards form and substance by the lex 
loci contractus 12 and he then in effect retracts his state-
ment by warning the reader that "if the parties in contract-
ing have another place in mind the lex loci contractus should 
not prevail. 1113 
Whilst party autonomy became prevalent in civil law 
jurisdictions its acceptance in common law countries was a 
slower business. Its appearance into American conflict of 
laws is now br fly considered. 
that Molineaus, the sixteenth century French jurist is the 
founding father of the theory of party autonomy. 
9Beale. op.cit. supra n.7 at p.7. 
10M. Wolff. The Choice of Law by the Parties in Inter-
national Contracts, (1937) 49 Juridical Rev. 110. In France 
for example the parties are considered to be free by virtue 
of Article 1134 of the Civil Code. Art.1134.Agreements 
legally made take the place of law for those who make them. 
They may be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes 
which the law authorises. They must be exercised in good 
faith. (The French Civil Code as amended to July 1 1976, J. 
H. Crabb 1977). 
11Huber. De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis 
Imperiis (1689). 
12Ibid . No.5 translated by E.G. Lorenzen. Selected 
Articles on the Conflict of Laws 11974) at p.167. 
13 Ibid . No. 10 translated by Lorenzen ibid at p.174. 
See Morris at p.267, and D.J.Llewelyn Davies. The Influence 
of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private Internation-
a 1 Law. ( 19 37) 37 B. Y . B . 1. L. 49. 
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Development of Party Autonomy in the United States 
In the early years of the nineteenth century the idea 
grew up that a contract could be governed "by the law with 
a view to which it is made. 1114 If the parties entered into 
their contract in a particular state or country it could be 
assumed that they intended that that law should govern their 
transaction. This could be rebutted if they entered a con-
tract in one place and specified performance in another place; 
in this situation it could be inferred that the parties in-
tended the lex loci solutionis15 to govern. In other words 
although in both cases the lex loci contractus or the lex 
loci solutionis was being applied it was not so much the place 
of contracting or performance that counted but the parties' 
intention. 
From the parties' point of view this development had 
the result of allowing them to choose a law to govern their 
contract insofar as they could choose the place of contract-
ing or the place of performance. It was still a long way 
off party autonomy in its fullest sense of allowing the par-
ties to choose any law they liked. 
From the court's point of view this development allow-
ed the judge to presume an intention. If the parties chose 
14wayman v. Southard. 
253 at p.264 (1825). 
10 Wheat 1 at p.48 (U.S.) 6 L.Ed. 
15The lex loci solutionis is the law of the place of 
performance and the lex loci contractus is the law of the 
place of contracting. 
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performance in a given state then it could be held that 
that was the law the parties intended to apply. It was 
a fiction. ,Quite often the parties may not have given 
the choice of law question a thought. However from a 
judge's viewpoint it saved much difficulty in trying to 
find out what the parties had real intended, a problem 
facing judges in contract cases generally. 
The case concerning the birth of the intention theory 
in the United states is generally considered to be the 
1882 case of Pritchard v. Norton16 which involved a con-
tract between a New York resident and a Louisiana resident 
whereby the New York resident was to indemnify the Louisiana 
resident from loss on an appeal bond which the Louisiana 
resident had executed in connection with litigation in a 
Louisiana court. The contract was executed and delivered 
in New York, but was unenforceable there because of lack 
of consideration. This contract was, however, valid when 
tested by provisions of Louisiana law. The lower court 
applied New York law, thereby invalidating the contract. 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, saying: 
"But, in the case of contract, the foreign law may, 
by the act and will of the parties, have become part 
of the agreement; and in enforcing this, the law 
of the forum may find i
r7necessar
y to give effect to 
a foreign law, ...•. " 
16106 u.s. 124 (1882). 
l7Ibid at p.129. 
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Similarly during the same century American writers were 
considering exceptions to a straight out application of 
either the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis,18 
and it has been suggested that the writings ot continental 
scholars such as Huber and Voet influenced judges and aca-
demics on both sides of the Atlantic. 19 
Although early examples may be cited of this presumed 
intention theory20 and whilst examples can be found through-
out its history21 it has been suggested that its widespread 
acceptance never eventuated due to the fact that it was a 
fiction. 22 Secondly the limited acceptance of an intention 
theory can be attributed to the critics of the doctrine. Out-
standing among these was Beale l who as an advocate of the 
territorial vested rights theory was one of the most severe 
and influential critics of the intention rule. Unlike most 
other critics however~Beale had the opportunity to translate 
his objections into action which retarded development of 
uniformity in the concept throughout the United States. 
18Story writing in 1834 suggested that the lex loci sol-
utionis should be applied wherever the parties contracted, ex-
pressly or tacitly for performance in a place that differed 
from the place of contracting. He applied the lex loci 
solutionis on the objective ground that this was the presumed 
intention of the parties. See J. Story. Commentaries on 
the Conflict of Laws (1834) at pp.459-460. 
19 See H.E. Yntema. Contract and Conflict of Laws: 
Autonomy in choice of Law in the United States. 1 N.Y. Law 
Forum 46 at p.49 et seq. (1955). 
20 Eog . Andrews v. Pond 38 (13 Pet) 65 (1839) and for 
other examples see ToW. Pounds.Party Autonomy - Past and 
Present 0 South Texds t. J . '217 footnote 19. (Fall 1982). 
21Ibido 
22 See MoJ. Levin. Party AutonomY,Choice of Law Clauses 
23 
In 1927 The American Law Institute held a conference during 
which Chapter 8 (Contracts) of the proposed Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws was considered for the last time. At this 
conference, Beale, as Reporter for the Restatement, was 
directed to prepare a revision of this chapter on contracts. 
He did so and it was totally devoid of any mention of the 
party intention concept. Similarly, the finished restate-
ment was subsequently published in 1934 with a complete ab-
sence of any mention of party intention. 23 
Development of the theory following the Restatement 
was erratic 24 but remained a viable doctrine rather than 
fulfilling Beale's hopes, and gradually the idea was develop-
ed that rather than impute an intention the actual intention 
of the parties could be applied. 
By 1942 Nussbaum was able to conclude after a detailed 
examination of the cases that 
in Commercial Contracts. 
(1957-58) . 
Georgetown L.J. 260 at p.269 
23 By ignoring this significant portion of conflicts 
law, the Restatement departed from its purpose of consoli-
dating and restating case law, and made what could be con-
sidered as an affirmative pronouncement that party intention 
formed no real part of American case law. That such a 
distortion of the then existing law was intentional was 
indicated by Beale in 1935 when he stated "[i]t is probable 
that before many years have passed the influence of the 
American Law Institute will have led to the abandonment of 
the doctrine of intention of the parties, and to the general 
adoption of the law of the place of contracting." See 
2 Beale. Conflict of Laws (1935) at p.1174. 
24Pounds op. cit. supra n.20 at p.220 et seq. and 
infra at p.217. 
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"the law of the country, with which in the expressed 
or presumed intent of the parties the contract had its 
most important connection, shall govern, taking into 
account the various territorial 'contacts' of the 
contract, such as the place of contracting, place 
of performance, domicil of the parties, situs of the 
res. etc ... 25 
The first major step toward bringing about a general 
acceptance of the concept of party autonomy was the for-
mulation of the 1952 version of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, drafted with the aid and concurrence of the American 
Law Institute. 26 
Also in the 1950's the case of Auten v. Auten27 
did much to promote party autonomy. Both Code and case 
reject the imputing of intentions to parties. In the 
Auten decision Judge Fuld writing for the New York Court 
of Appeals clearly repudiated the imputation of fictional 
intentions to contracting parties and adopted the "centre 
of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" approach in order 
to apply the policy and laws of the jurisdiction "most 
intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular 
litigation",28 and also to give effect to the probable 
25A.Nussbaum. Op.cit. supra n.8 at p.896. 
26Discussed infra at p. 217 
27124 N.E. 2d 99 (1954). 
et seq. 
28 Ibid at p.102, quoting Note, Choice of Law Problems 
in Direct Actions Against Indemnification Insurers. 3 Utah 
L. Rev. 490, at pp.498-9 (1953). 
25 
intention of the parties and consideration to whether one 
rule or the other produces the best practical results."29 
The Uniform Commercial Code of New York permits party 
autonomy subject to certain qualifications which are dis-
cussed below. 3D 
English cases on the other hand developed the concept 
of the "proper law" of a contract. How to find the proper 
law and in particular the degree to which each party should 
be permitted to choose or to be presumed to have chosen 
that law are matters that have exerci English courts and 
scholars to no little degree, and it is this English approach 
that is next considered. 
29 124 N.E. 2d 99 at p.1D2. 
3Dlnfra at p.22D et seq. 
Chapter II 
THE PROPER LAW OF THE CONTRACT 
The Proper Law Defined 
The term"proper law of a contract" means the system 
of law by which the parties intended the contract to be 
governed, or, where their intention is neither expressed 
nor to be inferred from the circumstances, the system of 
law with which the transaction has its closest and most 
real connection. 1 
"'The proper law of the contract' means that law 
which the English .... court is to apply in deter-
mining the obligations under the contract. English 
law in deciding these matters has refused to treat 
as conclusive, rigid or arbitrary criteria ... and 
has treated the matter as depending on the intention 
of the parties. ,,2 
"Parties are entitled to agree what is to be the 
proper law of their contract, and if they do not 
make any such agreement then the law will determine 
what is the proper law. There have been from time 
to time suggestions that parties ought not to be so 
entitled, but in my view there no doubt that they 
are entitled to make such an agreement and I see no 
reason why, subject though it may be to some limi-
tations, they should not be so entitled. But it 
must be a contractual agreement. It need not be 
in express words. Like any other agreement it may 
be inferred by reading the agreement as a whole in 
the light of relevant circumstances known to both 
parties when they made their contract.,,3 
26 
The definition given by Dicey & Morris above includes 
1Dicey & Morris. Rule 145 at p.747. See generally 
Dicey & Morris at p.747 et seq. Morris at p.267 et seq. 
Cheshire & North at p.195 et seq. 
2Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temper-
ance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society [1938] A.C. 
224 at p.240 per Lord Wright. 
3James Miller and Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street 
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 at p.603 per 
Lord Reid. 
27 
the three English rules on choice of law for contracts, 
because it is sufficiently widely drafted to incorporate: 
1. The parties' actual express choice. 
2. The parties' choice which although not express 
can be inferred. 
3. The situation where the parties have not made 
a choice of law decision. Here the court 
applies the law most closely connected to the 
contract to govern. 
Historical Development of the Proper Law Doctrine in 
England 
Robinson v. Bland4 is generally considered to be the first 
major deci.sion on party autonomy in England. 5 It was the 
decision where Lord Mansfield made his famous statement 
that: 
"The law of the place can never be the rule where 
the transaction is entered into with an express view 
of the law of another country, as the rule by which 
it is to be governed."6 
On the facts of the case the two laws, that of France and 
England were identical. However the judges all expressed 
their views on the question of which law would prevail 
41760 1. W.Bl. 234 (1760). 2 Burr. 1077. 
5Although other earlier examples can be cited, see 
for example Foubert v. Turst 1 Eng. Rep. 464 (1703) which 
involved a large settlement containing a clause that it 
should be governed by the customs of Paris. 
The Court held that "all lawful contracts as well as of 
marriage, as well as anything else, ought to be fully 
performed between the parties and their representatives, 
according to the apparent intent of such contracts~' 
Ibid at p.465. 
61760 1 W.Bl. 234 at p.259. 
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if the laws of France and England were different. Denni-
son J. considered that English law would prevail, since 
the plaintiff had chosen England as his forum and must 
therefore be bound by English law. Wilmot J. held that 
a claim contrary to the public policy of the forum could 
not succeed in England. Lord Mansfield said, 
"The general rule established ex comitate et jure 
gentium, is that the place where the contract is 
made, and not where the action is brought, is to be 
considered in expounding and enforcing the contract. 
But this rule admits of an exception when the parties 
at the time of making the contract had a view to a 
different Kingdom. "7 
He went on to give his famous dictum above. 
These three judges may be seen as expressing four 
possible views as to the law which should govern if the 
laws of France and England had been different. 
1. The law of the forum. 
2. The law of the place of performance. 
3. The law intended by the parties. 
4. The law of the place of performance as that 
presumably intended by the parties. 
Lord Mansfield's first reason for preferring the law 
of England, i.e. "that it was the law intended by the 
parties, has never been repudiated by an English court 
and has finally been accepted as the rule by which the 
validity of all contracts is to be decided. IIS 
7Ibid at pp.258-9. 
SJ. Beale. What Law Governs the Validity of a 
Contract? 23 Harv. L.R. 1 at p.6 (1909-1910). 
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During the next century English Judges continued, 
however, to rely on the law of the place of contracting 
more frequently than on any other law. Various writers 9 
have suggested that it was not until 1865 that the law of 
the place of contracting was finally abandoned in favour 
of the proper law and that the case which shows the trans-
ition most clearly is P. & O. Stearn Navigiation Co. v. 
Shand. 10 
The facts of the case were that the plaintiff who had 
been appointed Chief Justice to Mauritius, bought a ticket 
in England for his passage from Southampton to Alexandra 
and from Suez to Mauritius on board the defendant's steam-
ships. An exemption clause excluded the defendant's 
liability for loss of or damage to passenger's luggage. 
The plaintiff's luggage was lost in Egypt. The Supreme 
Court of Mauritius held that the contract was governed by 
French Law which was the law which prevailed in Mauritius 
and by that law the defendants were liable in spite of the 
exemption clause. This decision was reversed by the Privy 
Council. Having laid down the general rule that contracts 
were governed by the lex loci contractus, the Court went on 
to stress the fact that the greater part of the performance 
was to be on board two English ships and that the application 
of English law must have been intended by both parties. 
However, the point was made that the carrier would never 
9Morris at p.267 and Lando. O.Lando. The Proper Law 
of a Contract. (1964) 8 Scand. Studies in Law 107 at p.126. 
10(1865) 3 Moo P.C. (N.S.) 272. 
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have accepted the law of Mauritius and emphasis was put on 
the parties' intention. It was this reasoning that marks 
the case as one of significance. 
said 
Also in the same year Willes J. in Lloyd v. Guibertll 
"In such cases it is necessary to consider by what 
general law parties intended the transaction should 
be governed, or rather by what general law it is 
just to presume that they have submitted themselves 
to in the matter."12 
By these two cases the principle of party autonomy seems to 
have been established in English law. 
Two decades later Bowen L.J. in Jacobs v. Cr~dit 
Lyonnais 13 held that 
"What is to be the law by which the contract or any 
part of it, is to be governed or applied must always 
be a matter of construction of the contract itself 
as read by the light of the subject matter and of 
the surrounding circumstances. 1114 
Party autonomy was supported by the laissez-faire philo-
sophy of the nineteenth century and was in harmony with 
the English substantive law contracts at that period 
which emphasised freedom of contract; thus by the twentieth 
century it had been established that 
lilt is now well settled that by English law the 
proper law of the contract is the law which the 
parties intended to apply. 1115 
11 (1865) L.R. l.Q.B.115. 
12Ibid at pp.120-1. 
13 (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589. 
14Ibid at p.600. 
l5Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[1939] A.C.277 at pp.289-290 per Lord Wright. 
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THE PRESENT ENGLISH LAW: THE PROPER LAW OF A CONTRACT 
Introduction 
English courts apply the proper law of the contract 
when the contract-contains facts o~ contacts with more 
than one jurisdiction. Whilst'1t is now well settled that 
by English law the proper law of the contract is the law 
which the parties intended to apply,16 the difficulty lies 
in ascertaining this party intention. 
Parties to a contract may of course expressly state 
that they wish the law of England, or wherever, to govern 
their contract, and then the court will, subject to certain 
qualifications discussed below17 honour such choice. These 
are the eas cases. with increased sophistication in 
international business matters parties will presumably and 
hopefully employ express cho of law clauses with increas-
ing frequency. Unlike the New York situation there appear 
to be no recent surveys considering the incidence of govern-
ing law clauses in England. 18 There will however always 
be a range of possible situations. Parties will use govern-
ing law clauses, will ignore the matter or they will,be seen 
as taking a middle course whereby they intend a law to 
govern but fail to expressly state which law that 
16vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[1939] A.C. 277 at pp.289-90 per Lord Wright. 
17Infra at p.35 et . & p.342 et seq. 
l8A New York survey is discussed infra at p.310 et seq. 
In England three rules have been developed to assist 
the court in its enquiry. Thus the traditional English 
approach is for the judge to enquire first, whether there 
is an express selection of the proper law by the parties, 
secondly, if not, whether there is an implied selection, 
and thirdly, if not, with which system law did the 
transaction have its closest and most real connection. 
These three stages will be considered in turn. 
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RULE I: Express Choice: Party Autonomy 
Definition 
lilt is the law which the parties intended to apply. 
Their intention will be ascertained by the intention 
expressed in the contract, if any, which will be 
conclusive ... "19 
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Numerous other cases have given a similar definition. 20 
Dicey & Morris state the rule in the following words: 
"When the intention of the parties to a contract, as 
to the law governing the contract, is expressed in 
words, this expressed intention in general determines 
the proper law of the contract."21 
It has been recognised since Robinson v. Bland22 that 
at the time of making the contract the parties may expressly 
select the law by which it is to be governed. 23 All they 
need to do is declare their common intention by a simple 
statement that the contract shall be governed by the law of 
a particular country. For example in an early twentieth 
19R. v. International Trustee for the Protection of 
Bondholders A.kt [1937] A.C. 500 at p.529 per Lord Atkin. 
20 E . g . "Parties are entitled to agree what is to be the 
proper law of their contract ... There have been from time to 
time suggestions that parties ought not to be so entitled but 
in my view there is no doubt that they are entitled to make 
such agreement, and I see no good reason why, subject it may 
be to some limitations, they should not be so entitled." 
James Miller & Partners Limited v. Whitworth street Estates 
Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 at p.603 per Lord Reid. (However this 
statement was obiter because there was no express choice of 
the proper law in that case.) 
See also Du Pont v. Agnew (1987] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 585 at 
p.592. 
21Dicey & Morris, Rule 145 SubRule 1, and see generally 
Dicey & Morris, p.747 et seq., Cheshire & North, p.199 et 
seq., Morris, p.270 et seq. 
221 7 6 0 . 1. W . B. ( 1 760) 2 Burr 1077. 
23 See also Gienar v. Meyer (1796) 2 Hy. BI. 603 and 
the list of cases cited by Cheshire & North at p.199, foot-
note 2. 
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century case it was specified that "the contract evidenced 
by this bill of lading shall be governed by the law of 
England. "24 The case which was a decision of the then 
New Zealand Supreme Court concerned a contract involving 
shipment of goods from England to New Zealand and the court 
held that whilst English law governed the contract as the 
lex loci contractus the matter was completely settled by 
the incorporation of this clause and thus New Zealand legis-
lation did not apply to the contract. 25 
The leading case on express choice is the Privy Council 
decision of vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. 
Ltd. 26 
The facts were that a cargo of herrings was shipped 
from Newfoundland for New York on board a Nova 
Scotian vessel. Owing to negligent navigation the 
ship carne to grief off the coast of Nova Scotia and 
the herrings were damaged. 
The bill of lading stated that the contract was 
governed by English law and exempted the shipowners 
from liability for negligence. A Newfoundland 
Statute provided that every outward bill of lading 
from Newfoundland must contain the Hague Rules; 
because out of date forms were used the bill of 
lading in question did not contain these relevant 
provisions. 
24New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Tyree (1912) 
31 N.Z.L.R. 825. 
25Thus also illustrating the New Zealand development 
away from the mechanical rule of the lex loci contractus. 
26[ 1939] A.C. 277. Although not binding in England 
it is generally stated to be the leading case. 
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The buyers sued the shipowners. Both parties assumed 
that Newfoundland law was the proper law of the con-
tract. 27 
The Privy Council however held that English law was 
the proper law and consequently as the choice of it was 
valid there was no liability by reason of the contract. 
The importance of the decision for the present purposes 
is that is the most authoritative pronouncement on the 
limits of party autonomy. 
Limits on Party Autonomy 
Bona Fide, legal and not contrary to the public policy of 
the Forum 
There are two schools of thought on the question of 
freedom of choice of law, a topic which has received much 
attention over the years.28 One view of the matter is that 
the parties to a contract have complete freedom of choice 
provided that their choice is made in good faith and does 
not involve any inroad on the public policy rules of the lex 
fori. The other view29 is that parties have a choice but 
that they cannot make a system of law with which the contract 
has no connection the proper law of the contract. The 
first of these solutions, i.e. a freedom of choice which is 
27 J . See .H.C. MorrlS & G.C. 
of a Contract. (1940) 56 L.Q.R. 
provides a detailed examination 
a criticism of the case. 
Cheshire. The Proper Law 
320 at p.325. The article 
of the facts together with 
28Gutteridge considered this to be one of the fundamental 
problems of private international law. See H.C.Gutteridge. 
Notes. (1939) L.Q. Rev. 323 at p.324. and see generally P.R.H. 
Webb and D.J.L.Brown. A Casebook on the Conflict of Laws 
(1960) p.332 et seq. (Hereinafter cited as Webb & Brown). 
29see for example M. Wolff. The Choice of Law by the 
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virtually absolute, was adopted by the Privy Council in the 
vita Food case. In the words of Lord wright30 "connection 
with English law is not as a matter of principle essential." 
Lord Wright also dealt with the question of the limits to be 
assigned to the doctrine by the statement that "it is diffi-
cult to see what qualifications are possible, provided the 
intention expressed is bona fide and legal and there is no 
reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of public 
po cy.n31 
This statement is not free from ambiguity as it is 
difficult to know by which law Lord Wright intended the 
legality to be tested. The only safe conclusion would 
appear to be that a choice is not bona fide or legal if it 
can only be explained as having been made to escape some 
otherwise applicable law. 32 Dicey & Morris 33 suggest that 
a foreign law would thus not be applied if it contravened 
the public policy of the forum or the mandatory provisions 
Parties in International Contracts. (1937) 49 Juridical 
Review 110 and G.C.Cheshire. International Contracts. 
Being the fifteenth Lecture on the David Murray Foundation 
in the University of Glasgow delivered on March 4 1948 at 
p.31 et seq. (Hereinafter cited as Cheshire). 
3°[1939] A.C. 277 at p.290. 
31Ibid • 
32This is discussed in greater detail below. See 
infra at p. 342 et seq. 
33Dicey & Morris at p.756. 
of a foreign proper law. A choice of law unconnected 
with the contract could be seen as an evasive attempt 
and therefore not bona fide. 
As the case endorses the subjectivist school of 
thought on party autonomy it has, obviously, attracted 
much criticism by the opposing objectivist adherents 
who quickly pointed out the rather odd results of the 
case. 34 
37 
What is relevant here is the fact that although now 
by conflict of laws standards an old case Vita Foods 
remains the prevailing judicial authority on the limits 
of party autonomy. There are no English or New Zealand 
decisions which have altered Lord Wright's dictum. 
There would appear to be only two Commonwealth 
decisions where the parties' choice was set aside as being 
either unconnected with the realities of the contract or 
an attempt to evade a statute in force in the forum and 
these are both Australian decisions. The first case was 
Golden Acre Ltd. v. Queensland Estates Ltd. 35 
34 See F.A. Mann. The Proper Law of the Contract 
(1950) 3 The Int. L.Q. 60. J.H.C. Morris. The Proper 
Law of the Contract: A Reply .(1950). 3 The Int. L.Q. 
1970. F.A. Mann. The Proper Law of the Contract. A 
Rejoinder (1950) 3 The Int. L.Q. 69. 
35 . [1969] St.R.Qd. 378, afflrmed on other grounds by 
the High Court of Australia (1970) 123 C.L.R. 418, Sub 
nom. Freehold Land Investments Ltd. v. Queensland Estates 
Pty. Ltd. 
38 
Briefly the facts of this case were that a contract was 
made in Queensland between a Queensland undertaking 
and a Hong Kong Company. The latter was doing busi-
ness in Queensland as a real estate agent, and the 
contract involved the sale of some Queensland land to, 
amongst others, persons from Hong Kong. Queensland 
statute law required that real estate agents be licensed 
and provided for maximum rates of commission chargeable 
by real estate agents. The Hong Kong Company had 
charged excessive commission and was unlicensed. It 
was considered that in order to circumvent the Queens-
land law the parties had made Hong Kong law the proper 
law of the contract. Hoare J. held that their choice 
was not bona fide and that the law of Queensland was 
the proper law of the contract. 
"I am satisfied that the attempted selection of this 
(Hong Kong) law was for no other purpose than to avoid 
the operation of the Queensland law. Under all the 
circumstances, I conclude that the purported selection 
of the Hong Kong law was not a bona fide selection." 36 
In the second case 37 Campbell J. said, obiter38 
liThe question is not one of jurisdiction which is not 
raised but what law should be applied. If the parties 
in this clause have indicated an intention that the law 
of Hong Kong to govern the whole of their contractual 
relations they have expressed a choice unconnected with 
the realities of the contract II 
Kelly39 points out that whilst the decision reached in 
Golden Acres was not questionable the method of reaching it 
36[1969] St.R.Qd. 378 at p.385. 
37Queensland Estates Pty. Ltd. v. Collas [1971] St.R.Qd.75. 
38 Ibid at p.80. 
39 D• St.L. Kelly. International Contracts and Party 
Autonomy. (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 701 at p.702 et seq. 
39 
perhaps was. He says that even if Hoare ~ had treated the 
parties' choice as effective the Queensland Act would not 
necessarily have been made inapplicable. The Queensland 
Act was obviously in force in Queensland and could have been 
applied notwithstanding the parties' choice of law. 40 
Choice of a law unconnected with the contract 
Capricious Choices 
Another possible limitation on party autonomy is the 
question of whether the parties may choose a law to govern 
which is unconnected with their contract, in other words may 
the parties make a capricious choice or alternatively if 
not capricious one totally unconnected with the contract? 
The matter .has been controversial. Lord wright41 said 
IIconnection with English law is not, as a matter of principle, 
essential." Morris 42 has suggested that it could be poss-
ible that there could be sound financial or commercial 
reasons for choosing a governing law that appears otherwise 
unrelated to the contract. This is discussed in detail in 
the section on New York law. 43 At this point it may be 
noted that a large number of cases and a volume of academic 
writing may be cited to support the view that subject to the 
40As to the theoretical soundness of this argument see 
Kelly ibid at pp.703-4. See also J.L.R.Davis. A Note. (1970) 
44 A.L.J. 80. 
41vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] 
A.C. 277 at p.290. 
42Morris at p.273. 
43Infra at p.289. 
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'bona fide and legal' requirement the parties may choose 
any law they like. An equal~y large amount of judicial 
and scholastic statements support the view that this is not 
so. 
Some illustrations 
"It is open to the parties to stipulate in express 
terms that the law of a particular country shall 
apply. If they do so, that law is applicable." 44 
"The legal principles which are to guide an English 
Court on the question of the proper law of a contract 
are now well settled. It is the law which the parties 
intended to apply. Their intention will be ascertained 
by the intention expressed in the contract, if any, 
which will be conclusive." 45 
Likewise in British Controlled oil Fields v. Stagg46 and 
Tzortzis v. Monarch Line A/B47 laws were upheld which had 
no connection with the contract. 
Stagg's case involved a Canadian company with a Branch 
office in London and an Ecuadorian citizen engaged in bus 
ness in Ecuador for the sale of mineral rights in Ecuador. 
A clause in the contract read "it is agreed that whilst for 
convenience this agreement was signed by the parties in the 
City of New York, United States of America, it shall be con-
44British South Africa Co v. De Bee~s Consolidated 
Mines Co. Ltd. [1910] 1 Ch.354 at p.381 per Swinfen Eady J. 
45 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of 
Bondholders Aktiengellschaft [1937] AC 500 at p.529 per 
Lord Atkin. 
46 (1921) 127 L.T. 209. 
47[1968] 1 All ER. 949. 
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sidered and held to be one duly made and executed in 
London, England.,,48 The plainti s, the Canadian company, 
invoked the jurisdiction of the English court and it was 
upheld that the clause quoted was an effective choice of 
English law and therefore of English jurisdiction. 
In Tzortzis v. Monarch Line 49 Swedish sellers con-
tracted to sell a Swedish ship to Greek buyers, deliverable 
at a Swedish port with payment to be made in Swedish money. 
The contract was in English and the money of account was 
sterling and a clause provided for arbitration in London. 
Disputes arose under the contract and were submitted for 
arbitration. The Arbitrators first considered the question 
of whether English or Swedish law was the proper law of the 
contract. The Arbitrators Award on this preliminary 
point was stated as a special case for the opinion of the 
Commercial Court and it was held IInot-
withstanding that the procedure may have an exclusively 
Scandinavian flavour, the parties, by inference, have indi-
cated the choice of English (law) as the proper law of the 
contract. 1I50 
Lord Denning5l said an express clause should be "con-
clusive in the absence of some public policy to the contrary." 
However he had said some years earlier "I do not be-
lieve that parties are free to stipulate by what law the 
48(1921) 127 L.T. 209 at p.209. 
49 [1968] 1 All E.R. 949. 
50However see later cases discussed infra at p.50 et seq~ 
51[1968] 1 All E.R. 949 at pp.951-2. 
validity of their contract is to be determined. Their 
intention is only one of the factors to be taken into 
account .,,52 
42 
Likewise in Re Claim by Helbert wagg53 it was stated 
that the court will not necessarily regard the intention 
expressed by the parties "as being the governing considera-
tion where a system of law is chosen which has no real or 
substantial connection with the contract looked upon as a 
whole. 1154 
Academic writers have made similar observations. For 
example, Wolff55 has stated most emphatically that the 
parties may subject their contract to any system of law 
with which it is internally connected. Hereby he says 
they make the selected territory the seat of their contract. 56 
They cannot make a system of law with which the contract 
has no connection the proper law of the contract. If 
they nevertheless do just that, the proper law must be 
ascertained as if no law had been agreed upon and it must 
be further ascertained whether the law selected by the 
parties contravenes any compulsory provisions of the true 
proper law. Only in so far as this is not the case, does 
the law selected by the parties govern the contract. 
52Boissevain v. Weil [1949] 1 K.B. 482 at p.491. 
53 [ 19 5 6 ] Ch . 3 2 3 . 
54 Ibid at p.341 per Upjohn J. 
55Wolff. Op.cit. supra n.29 at p.119. 
56This reasoning is no longer popular. 
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Cheshire took this view and as Mann 57 notes, Cheshire 
emphasises his horror no less than ten times in the course 
of ninety pages at a theory which would allow the parties 
to choose any law in the world, even one with which the 
contract has no factual connection. 
Cheshire & North state "The Courts should, and do, 
have a residual power to strike down, for good reason, 
choice of law clauses totally unconnected with the con-
tract."58 However they do not state their authority nor 
what that residual power is; possibly they are only re-
ferring to Lord Wright's view that the choice must be bona 
fide and legal and not contrary to public policy. 
Of interest here are the views of Gamillscheg59 who 
considers that a contract is a creation of the human mind 
and this creation is not to be bound to any fixed locality. 
If it is an international contract then Gamillscheg con-
tends that the parties should have freedom to choose the law 
they wish. He gives an example of a German and an Argen-
tinian making a corn contract which they make subject to 
English law. They do this not because they consider it to 
be an English transaction but because they want English law 
to govern their transaction. Whilst this is not a capri-
cious choice as the parties consider the English law is 
57F.A.Mann, op. cit. supra n.34 at p.64. 
58Cheshire & North at p.202. 
59Gamillscheg's writings are listed on p.197 of Lando 
who summarises his views in English on p.144 et seq. See 
O. Lando. The Proper Law of a Contract (1964) 8 Scand. 
Studies in Law 107. 
best suited to their agreement it is wholly unrelated to 
Yet would an English court uphold such a the contract. 
choice?60 The answer must be yes. 
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The controversy returns to the basic conflicting views 
of the subjectivists and objectivists; this involves 
"a debate which has provoked a spate of writing in 
volume so considerable and in quality of such 
scholastic finesse as to be almost reminiscent of 61 
a theological disputation among medieval schoolmen." 
Conclusion for this possible limitation 
From a practical point of view it may be noted that 
there are no reported decisions where the parties have made 
a wholly capricious choice as defined by the judge deciding 
the case. Possibly the answer lies in the fact that persons 
involved in international transactions simply do not make 
such choices and thus the problem is of academic making and 
of undeniably academic interest only. 
Alternatively it may be argued that "many matters are 
of world-wide import and 'located' in some particular place, 
such as the insurance and financing of various commercial 
transactions in London. Accordingly, it is not eccentric, 
it is not capricious, if a contract of this nature is sub-
ject to English domestic law even though there is no pal-
pable connection with England. n62 
60Discussed infra at p.45. 
61webb & Brown at p.332. 
62p.R.H.webb. The Conflict of laws and Contract 
(1985) at p.17 (hereinafter cited as Webb). 
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Gutteridge's63 view that it is difficult to conceive of 
any case in which a purely arbitrary choice of law can be 
said to be made in good faith is another possible answer. 
However despite the interest in this area for academic 
conflict of law scholars the fact remains that there are no 
decided cases on this aspect. Thus Lord Wright's views in 
Vita Foods 64 states the present law. connection with Eng-
land is not essential. This is also the law in New Zealand. 
Thus a choice unconnected with the contract is permissible. 
It is argued that this, whilst not only being the law, is 
the better view. If parties are to be allowed autonomy then 
there is no logical reason why this choice should be confined 
or restricted to choices that relate to the contract. 
It is suggested below65 that the only general restric-
tion on party autonomy should be that of public policy. The 
use of the word legal by Lord Wright is ambiguous and a bona 
fide limitation has its difficulties. It may well have 
been a bona fide choice in a case such as Golden Acre Ltd. 
v. Queensland Estates Ltd. 66 If the result of the parties' 
actions is to avoid some consequence that would otherwise 
apply to their detriment it is easy to suggest that their 
actions are not bona fide. If the parties in Golden Acres 
Ltd. had not known of the Queensland legislation ,but had 
chosen the law of Hong Kong nevertheless it would be tempting 
/ 
63Gutteridge Ope cit. supra n.28 at p. 323 et seq. 
64Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] 
A.C. 277. 
65Infra at p.489 et seq. 
66[1969] St.R.Qd. 378 
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to consider their actions as not bona fide. It could be 
possible that genuine actions by parties could be misinter-
preted. If the court considers that the parties' choice 
is not bona fide it may, in a Golden Acres situation, be 
adequately covered by the public policy limitation. 
Summary to Rule I 
The Vita Foods 67 case is the leading decision on ex-
press choice of law clauses. Parties may expressly choose 
a law to govern their contract subject to certain limit-
ations. The choice must be bona fide legal and not con-
trary to the forum's public policy. 
It is regrettable that there has been no "difficult" 
case since 1939 whereby this English rule has had to sur-
vive the "acid test"68 of being used to validate a contract 
void by the law most significantly connected with it. 
Whilst having stated the English law on party autonomy 
by discussing the first rule of the Proper Law doctrine, 
other exceptions to party autonomy do in fact exist, some 
of which are applicable in England. These further limit-
ations are discussed after the New York law has been con-
sidered as they are exceptions which apply on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
67vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
(1939) A.C. 277. 
68J.Prebble. Choice of Law to Determine the Validity 
and Effect of Contracts. A Comparison of English and 
American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws. Vol.58 
Cornell L. Rev. 433, 635 at p.497 (1973) (Hereinafter cited 
as Prebble.) 
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RULE II: Inferred Choice 
Definition 
"The intention .... may be inferred from the terms 
of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. ,,69 
This second rule applies again where the parties have 
actually made a choice. The difference between the first 
and second rule is that in the first situation the parties 
have expressly stipulated a choice of law to govern their 
contract and have inserted such a clause in their written 
agreement. In this second situation the parties while 
having made a choice have failed to articulate it. In 
the words of Dicey & Morris 70 
"When the intention of the parties to a contract 
with regard to the law governing the contract is 
not expressed in words, their intention is to be 
inferred from the terms and the nature of the con-
tract, and from the general circumstances of the 
case, and such inferred intention determines the 
proper law of the contract."71 
At one time it was thought that the problem of in-
ferred choice could be solved by means an implied term 
in the contract. However it has been pointed out72 that 
this creates difficulties and Lord Reid held in James Miller 
69 R. v. International Trustee for the Protection of 
Bondholders Akt [1937] A.C. 500 at p.529 per Lord Atkin. 
70Dicey & Morris at p.761. 
71 Ibid . Rule 145 SubRule 2. 
72James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth street Estates 
(Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 at p.603 per Lord Reid. 
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& Partners v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. 73 
that "the better view is now to apply a more objective test." 
Similarly Lord Wilberforce 74 in the same decision said "In 
my opinion, once it was seen that the parties had made no 
express choice of law, the correct course was to ascertain 
from all relevant contemporary circumstances 75 including, 
but not limited to, what the parties said or did at the 
time, what intention ought to be imputed to them on the 
formation of the contract."76 Thus the rule here is that 
the parties' choice still prevails if it can be discovered. 
The choice may said to be implicit. 77 The difficulty 
is to work out what law the parties had in fact had in 
mind when they entered their contract. As the litigants 
have not articulated their choice the court is in a dif 
cult position. Traditionally a number of presumptions exist-
ed which if applicable to the contract under consideration 
were used to assist the court inferring a choice. How-
ever presumptions in general are today out of favour 78 and 
indeed the development of some of them in recent years, as 
will be shown, has reduced their usefulness in the search 
for the parties' choice. 
73 Ibid . 
74 Ibid at p.614. 
75This test was recently applied in JMJ Contractors v. 
Marples Ridgway (1985) 31 Build. L.R.100 by Davies J. 
76 See also Viscount Dilhorne [1970] A.C. 583 at p.611. 
77webb & Brown at p.343. 
78See infra at p.60. 
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Various matters that have assisted the courts in 
applying this rule may now be stated. 
Aids in Establishing Party Choice 
Arbitration Clauses 
until the end of the nineteen sixties 79 the English 
courts had generally held that if the parties had agreed 
that arbitration should take place in a given country then 
the law of that country was intended to be the proper law 
of the contract. Numerous cases may be cited to illustrate 
this. 80 
For example, in The Suisse Atlantique81 the only 
connection with England was the arbitration clause. The 
ship owners were Swiss, the charter Dutch and the contract 
concerned carriage of coal from the U.S.A. to Belgium, 
Holland and Germany. England appears to have been auto-
matically assumed to have been the proper law of the con-
tract because of the arbitration clause. 
79Until Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Com-
pagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. U971] A.C. 572. 
80E . g . Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A.C. 202, 
Spurrier v. la Cloche [1909] A.C. 466, N.V.Kwik Hoo Tong 
Handel Maats-Chappij v. James Findlay & Co. [1927] A.C. 604. 
81Suisse Atlantique Societ~ d'Armement Maritime S.A. 
v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 A.C. 361. 
However the case may also be explained by the fact that by 
not pleading foreign law parties can always make English 
law applicable to a contract unconnected in any way with 
English law because if foreign law is not pleaded, English 
law is applied. See Morris at p.271. 
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Similarly in Tzortzis v. Monarch Line A/B82 d contract was 
made and to be performed in Sweden for the sale of a ship 
by Swedish sellers to Greek buyers and there was no connec·-
tion whatsoever with English law except that it contained 
a clause providing for arbitration in London. The Court 
of Appeal held that English law was the proper law of the 
contract. 
Salmon J. 83 said that the arbitration clause "raises 
an irresistible inference which overrides all other factors." 
This may be seen as the high water mark for this presumption. 
The 1970's witnessed a marked change in attitude. In 
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne 
de Navigation S.A. 84 a contract was made in France between 
French shipowners and a Tunisian company whereby the former 
agreed to ship oil from one Tunisian port to another. The 
contract was made on an English printed document. French 
law was the law in Tunisia. A clause in the contract pro-
vided for arbitration in London. 
The House of Lords held that French law was the proper 
law and that the arbitration clause was merely one of the 
factors to be taken into account. "It would be highly 
anomolous if our law required the mere fact that arbitration 
is to take place in England to be decisive of the proper 
82 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 406. 
83 Ibid at p.413. 
84 [1971] A.C. 572. 
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law of the contract."8S "An arbitration clause" said 
Lord Wilberforce86 "must be treated as an indication, to 
be considered together with the rest of the contract and 
relevant surrounding facts. Always it will be a strong 
indication ..... But in some cases it must give way 
where other indications are clear." Thus the effect was 
that the arbitrator was bound to apply a different law 
from the law provided in the arbitration clause as the proper 
law. 87 
Subsequent cases such as "The Mariannina" 88 support 
this view. It may be concluded that it is no longer true 
to say that in English law an inclusion of a standard London 
arbitration clause and, or, a submission to arbitration in 
for example London ensures application of English substant-
ive law as the proper law to govern the contract. 
"The Mariannina" illustrates the modern effect of 
arbitration clauses with regard to the second rule of the 
Proper Law doctrine. Lord Justice Ackner held that the 
arbitration clause was an important factor, and cited at 
length, and with approval the decision of Compagnie 
d'Armeme,nt Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne de 
Navigation S.A. 89 All matters must be considered. 
85[1971] A.C. 572 at p.584 per Lord Reid. 
86Ibid at p.600. 
87Clause 13 had specif ally made the governing law the 
law of the flag of the vessel but a number of different 
vessels flying different flags had been used. 
88Astro Venturoso Compania Naviera v. Hellenic Ship-
yards S.A. (liThe Mariannina") (1983) Lloyds Law Rep. 13. 
89[1971] A.C. 572 
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On the facts of the case the fact that the contract stated 
that the Arbitration was to be in London "pursuant to English 
Arbitration Lawll90 was an indication that English law was 
the proper law. These two facts, neither conclusive in 
themselves, together made English law the chosen law. 
Particular language as an aid to inferred choice 
" ...... [W]hen you have two men of business ... with 
a contract made in London, between English brokers 
and an English firm, who are not supposed to know 
German law, but who are supposed to know English 
mercantile law, with a contract made upon an English 
form, and on a printed form in common use; with a 
contract made with nothing but English phrases in it, 
and with a contract made with phrases peculiar to 
English contracts, what inference can be drawn •.... 
All the circumstances together show that the in-
tention was to make an English contract." 91 
It has been suggested92 that the use of terms such 
as IIAct of God ll or IIQueen's Enemies" in a contract may 
suggest that English law was intended to govern. These 
two phrases are for example meaningless in German law. 93 
The use of an English standard form94 is however 
only a factor to be taken account of in assessing the 
9°(1983) L10yds Law Rep. 13 at p.15. 
91 The Industrie [1894] 58 at p.73 per Lord Esher M.R. 
92Dicey & Morris at p.762. 
93 See H.P. de Vries. 
at p.19. 
International Contracts (1961) 
94For cases discussing the form of the documents used 
see Cheshire & North at p.205 footnote 4. 
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proper law. For example in Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpor-
ation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. Bingham J. at first instance 
said: 
liThe use of an English standard form may be a powerful, 
even conclusive, indication that the parties intended 
to contract with reference .to English law .... But 
there is, in my judgment a factor here which cannot 
be ignored in assessing whether, and if so, how strong-
ly, that inference should be drawn. The evidence in 
this case plainly establishes that this form of ruling 
policy, produced and developed on the London Insurance 
market, has achieved world wide currency. Partly 
this is due to the long history, the great experience, 
the professional expertise and the high standing of 
that market, combined with a traditional dominance 
of London as a Commercial centre. Partly it is due 
to the process of imperial fertilization which has 
led to the reproduction of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 in far corners of the globe .... the more inter-
national and generally used the reference (i.e. the 
standard form) is the less specifically English it 
becomes. 1195 
Two other recent cases have made similar observations. 
In one 96 the point was made that the English language was 
the lingua franca of commerce and the language of the United 
States of America and in the second case97 the Court of 
Appeal in England held that the fact that the agreement 
was in English was of little weight as it was the language 
of shipping. The form of the contract did not point to 
English law as it was in world wide use. 
95[1982] 1 W.L.R. 961 at p.968. 
96 In Armar Shipping Co. v. Caisse Algerienne d'Assurance 
et de Reassurance [1981] 1 All E.R. 498. 
97Monterosso Shipping Co. v. International Transport 
Workers Federation [1982] 3 All E.R. 841. 
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Other Matters 
The effect of another English Court of Appeal decision98 
is that the commercial or legal connection between contrac·ts 
may allow the court to say that the parties implicitly sub-
mitted both to the same law. 99 Through United States 
brokers contracts were entered into by a Panamanian ship-
owning company and its sister companies. All the insurance 
polic s contained a "Follow London " clause, lOa although 
they were negotiated in the United States and provided for 
payment of premiums and claims there. Some of the risk 
was placed on the London market (part of it through Lloyds) 
some on the United States market and some in Belgium, Greece 
and Japan. 
It was held that the policies issued by the American 
insurer were governed by English law because the policies 
placed in the English market were governed by English law 
and the inference to be taken from the "Follow London" 
clause was that the United Sates policies would be governed 
by English law as well. 
Dicey & Morris suggest that a contract making reference 
to for example a Scottish Statute, would presumably be taken 
98Armadora Occidental S.A. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co. 
[19781 1 All E.R. 407. 
99 See Webb at p.27. 
lOaThe aim of such a clause ig that negotiations on 
claims should be undertaken as first instance by e.g. Lloyds' 
underwriters or a British insurance company. See Webb at 
p.26. 
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to intend that it be governed by Scottish law even if its 
subject matter was situated in England and the person 
executing it be domiciled there. 1 
Others matters have included the choice by the parties 
of a method of negotiating and financing a loan. 2 The 
fact that a form or wording of a contract has been approved 
or prescribed by the authorities of a given country or by 
the Head Office of a commercial undertaking with branches 
in a number of countries may be a pointer to the proper 
law. 3 The residence of the parties, occasionally the 
nationality of the parties, the nature and location of the 
subject matter of the·contract and the currency of payment 
have likewise been considered. 4 
Finally the parties' choice could be inferred from 
the theory that parties intend their contract to be valid. 
If there are two possible laws to choose from, then if a 
particular choice would render the contract void this 
choice is to be avoided. 5 
ISee Dicey & Morris at p.763 footno~e 96 and cases 
cited e.g. Re Pilkington's will Trusts [1937] Ch. 574 cf 
Lindsay v. ~iller [1949] V.L.R. 13. 
2Re United Railways of Havana etc. Warehouses Ltd. 
[1960] Ch. 52 affirmed subnom Tomkinson v. First Penn-
sylvania Banking & Trust Co. [1961] A.C. 1007. 
3 . 
Anspach & Co. Ltd. v. C.N.R. [1950] 3 D.L.R. 26, and 
other cases cited by Dicey & Morris at p.763 footnote 99. 
4See Cheshire & North at p.205 and footnotes 5-9 and 
p.206 footnotes 1-5 for relevant cases. 
5This rule of validation is discussed below. See 
infra at p.399 et seq. 
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But as with Arbitration clauses all these considerations 
are merely indicators and must be considered in the light 
of all relevant circumstances. At the end of the day the 
assistance offered a judge is of little help. 
liThe only certain guide is to be found in applying 
sound ideas of business, convenience and sense to the 
language of the contract itself, with a view to dis-
covering from it the true intention of the parties. 116 
Summary to Rule II 
The difficulties in establishing the parties' choice 
when they have failed to articulate their wishes are ob-
viously considerable. The lack of presumptions leaves 
the court without any really useful aids. It is argued 
below that this rule should be abolished. If the parties 
may make a choice as to which law will govern their contract 
then so long as a rule exists for coping with situations 
where no choice has in fact been made there is no need for 
Rule II. It simply panders to parties who should have 
articulated their choice clearly in the first place. 7 
However the present English law is that the parties' 
choice will be upheld even though it is not explicitly 
expressed. The court will consider all relevant circum-
stances but will not rely on any predetermined presumptions. 
6Jacobs v. Cr'dit Lyonnais (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589 at p.60l 
per Bowen L.J. 
7See infra at p.127. 
RULE III: Law of Closest Connection 
Definition 
"The English courts will give effect to their choice 
unless it would be contrary to pUblic policy to do 
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so. But it is a liberty to choose - not a compulsion 
and if the parties do not exercise it as respects the 
proper law applicable to their contract the court 
will determine what is the proper law."8 
If the parties have not included a governing law 
clause and if the court is unable to infer a choice then 
the contract is governed by the legal system with which the 
transaction has its closest and most real connection. 
There will always be situations where parties do not 
give choice of law problems a thought. Many international 
contracts are oral; many such contracts are concluded by 
persons unaware of the fact that they are making a legally 
binding agreement. Not all international contracts are 
concluded by sophisticated businessmen or multinational 
corporations. 
In this situation it cannot be said that the parties 
8Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie 
Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. [1971] A.C. 572 at p.603 
per Lord Diplock. See also James Miller & Partners Ltd. 
v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 
583 at p.611 where Viscount Dilhorne quoting Widgery L.J. 
in the Court of Appeal [1969] 1 W.L.R. 377 at p.383 said: 
"Finally, if one ..•. is driven to the conclusion that 
the parties never applied their minds to the question 
at all, then one has to go to the third stage and see 
what is the proper law of the contract by considering 
what system of law is the one with which the trans-
action has its closest and most real. connection." 
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have any common intention about a governing law. At most 
all that can be assumed is that the parties probably in-
tended some binding agreement, but as Dicey & Morris 9 point 
out in this context, if one did in fact ask the parties 
what law was to govern their contract they might quite 
likely have given different answers. 
Traditionally there have been two views on what must 
be done when applying this third rule of the proper law. lO 
On one view 
"The parties may not have thought of the matter at 
all. Then the Court has to impute an intention, or 
to determine for the parties, what is the proper law, 
which, as just and reasonable persons, they ought or 
would have intended if they had thought about the 
questions when they made the contract."ll 
On the other view the court ignores the parties and 
applies the law which is the closest and has the most real 
connection to the contract. This is sometimes referred 
to as the Bonython.test after the case of that name. 12 
IIWhen the intention of the parties to a contract 
with regard to the law governing it is not expressed 
and cannot be ferred by the circumstances, the 
contract is governed by the system of law with which 
the transaction has its closest and most real connec-
tion."13 
9Dicey & Morris at p.769. 
10See P.A.Mann. The Proper Law in the Conflict of 
Laws. ( 1987 ) 36 I. L . L . Q. 437 at pp. 444 - 5 . 
llMount Alber~, Borough Council v. Australasian 
Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance society [1938] 
A.C. 224 at p.240 per Lord Wright. 
l2Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201. 
l3 Rule 145 SubRule 3 Dicey & Morris at p.769. 
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The judge puts himself in the place of the reasonable 
man and determines the proper law for the parties. He 
does not attempt to attain the actual intention of the 
contracting parties because that is non-existent but "how 
a just and reasonable person would have regarded the prob-
lem.,,14 
Cheshire & North15 point out that it is a "complete 
myth" to regard the ultimate decision by the judge as a 
ful lment of the common intention of the parties. The 
judge is asked to decide at a time when both parties are 
at loggerheads as to the choice of law so "how can it be 
said with any approach to truth that the court, whichever 
way it decides the matter, will give effect to what both 
parties would presumably have accepted. 1I16 
The prevailing17 and better view is the latter test: 
liThe proper law of the contract (is) the system of 
law by reference to which the transaction has its 
closest and most real connection." 18 
However there are no reported decisions which have 
turned upon whether the court adopted the presumed intention 
test or the closest connection test. Probably the law with 
the closest and most real connection to the contract is very 
likely to be the law which just and reasonable persons may 
14The Assunzione [1954]P.150at p.176 per Singleton L.J. 
15cheshire & North at p.206 and see especially foot-
note 8 thereto. 
16 Ibid . 
17Lord Diplock recently approved the test in the House 
of Lords in Arnin Rasheed Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 
[1984] A.C. 50 at p.61. See also Du Pont v. Agnew [1987] 
2 Lloyds Law Rep. 585 at p.592. 
18Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201 
at p.219 per Lord Simonds. 
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be presumed to have intended to govern their obligations. 
Application of the Test: 
When applying this third test the judge may consider 
all the relevant circumstances. Morris 19 suggests that the 
principal considerations are the place of contracting, 
place of performance, the places of residences or business 
of the parties respectively and the nature and subject 
matter of the contract. 20 
However it has been suggested that reliance should not 
be placed on presumptions in favour of the lex loci con-
tractus or lex loci solutionis, or indeed on presumptions 
in general. 21 
and 
"To enter upon the search with a presumption is only 
too often to set out upon a false trail."22 
"Presumptions, once fashionable during the earlier 
development of English private international law, 
are now, whether for good or for ill, out of fashion 
and rejected.,,23 
at p.277. 
20See Re united Railways of Havana etc. Warehouses 
Ltd. [ 1 9 6 0 ] Ch . 5 2 at p. 9l. 
21All 3 Judges in the English Court of Appeal in Coast 
Lines Ltd. v. Hudig and Veder Chartering N.V. [1972] 2 Q.B. 
34 atpp.44, 47, 50 disapproved of the use of presumpt~ons. 
22Cheshire & North at p.210. 
23This was said in Coast Lines Ltd. v. Hudig & Veder 
Chartering N.V. [1972J 2 Q.B. 34 at p.47 per Megaw L.J. 
where it was held that the proper law of the charter party 
was English law as the law of the ship's flag. A number 
of other cases exist where the ship's flag, not being a flag 
of convenience, was applied. See for example those cases 
cited by Webb at p.42. 
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Cases to illustrate the application of the third rule 
The court must consider all relevant factors or con-
tacts (to use the American term). As it is impossible to 
list all such connections it is therefore considered appro-
priate to illustrate the third rule of the proper law by 
reference to actual decisions. 
One well known example of the application of this 
Bonython test is Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance 
Co. 24 where the court held that Ontario law applied as the 
proper law to the transaction which involved three endowment 
policies all of which were associated with Ontario. It was 
noted that the defendant company had its head office in 
Ontario, that the form of policy was based on the law of 
Ontario, that despite Rossano, an Egyptian national resident 
in Egypt negotiating the contracts initially in Cairo he 
would never have got the policies if the Ontario head office 
had not approved. Finally the Court considered that gener-
ally a person contracting with a foreign insurance company 
does so because he has faith in it and the system of law 
under which it operates. 
The Assunzione,25 an English Court of Appeal decision, 
also illustrates this third rule. The case is the perfect 
example of a Court adding up all relevant factors to deter-
mine the applicable law. The facts were that a contract was 
24[1963] 2 Q.B. 352. Another example is Offshore 
International S.A. v. Banco Central S.A. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 399. 
25 
[1954] P.150. 
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made for the carriage of wheat from Dunkirk to Venice on 
board an Italian ship. The charterers were an organisation 
of French grain merchants. The wheat was shipped under an 
exchange agreement between the French and Italian Governments 
(but the Italian ship owners did not know this.) The con-
tract was negotiated by correspondence between brokers in 
France and brokers in Italy. It was formally concluded in 
Paris in the English language and on an English standard 
form. Freight and demurrage was payable in Italian currency 
in Italy. The points in favour of applying French law were: 
1. The contract was made in France. 
Paris, 1949. 
It was headed 
2. It was written in English but had a French supplement. 
3. The Bills of Lading were in French Standard form. 
4. The Charterers were a French firm acting for the 
French Government (although the Italians did not 
know this.) 
Matters favouring the application of Italian law -
1. The ship was Italian flying an Italian flag. 
2. Italy was the place of performance where delivery 
was to be made. 
3. The Is of Lading were assigned to Italian Con-
signees. 
4. The freight expenses were payable in Naples in 
Italian currency. 
The English Court of Appeal had to use "a very delicate 
pair of scales"26 order to determine the proper law. It 
was unanimously held that Italian law was the proper law 
26Morris at p.277. 
of the contract. The decisive factor was that both 
parties had to perform in Italy.27 
One of the most frequently cited cases on this third 
rule is the united Railways of Havana Case 28 a House of 
Lords decision. As with the Assunzione contacts could 
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be made with a number of countries including England, Cuba 
and certain American states. The parties had agreed to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the City of 
Havana "for all notifications, summonses and other judicial 
or extrajudicial formalities to which this lease shall give 
rise." 
As webb29 notes this clause concerned only ancillary 
matters and is not to be equated with a choice of law 
dec ion by the parties, and that the "obvious candidate" 
to be the proper law was one of the united states of America 
as only the security was situated in Cuba. 30 
27A triology of employment contracts likewise illus-
trates this test. See Sayers v. International Drilling 
Co. [1971] 3 All E.R. 163i Brodin v. AIR Seljar 1973 
S.L.T. 213 and Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Petroleum Co. 
[1983] 3 All E.R. 226. In the last mentioned case the 
court held that despite the contacts with England the pre-
vailing connection was with Libya, where, in effect, the 
contract was to be performed. 
28 Re United Railways of Havana etc. Warehouse Ltd. 
[1960] Ch. 52 affirmed sub. nom. Tomkinson v. First Penn-
sylvania Banking & Trust Co. [1961] A.C. 1007. 
29webb at p.28 and p.36. 
30Another recent example is XAG and others v. A. Bank 
[19 83 ] 2 All E. R. 4 6 4 . 
Difficulties with the test 
It must be noted that the test can be difficult to 
apply. 
"Sometimes it is said that the test - and it is a 
very useful test - is: what system of law has the 
closest and most real connection with the contract? 
My difficulty is that I can find very little clue 
in the contract as to what the parties intended, and 
very little indication that the contract has a very 
real or close connection with any particular system 
of law." 3l 
In this criticism and in Dicey & Morris 32 the term 
'system of law' is used. 33 In some cases a different 
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phrase had been employed. For example in re united Rail-
ways of Havana etc. Wahrehouses Ltd. 34 Lord Denning had 
said "with what country has the transaction the closest and 
most real connection." However Lord Denning 35 in 
Whitworth Street Estates said that this had been a slip 
on his part; later in the House of Lords Lord Reid suggest-
ed that the two tests must be combined. 36 Morris 37 
concludes that if a choice has to be made then the "system 
of law" is preferable, for as has been noted: 
3lsayers v. International Drilling Co. [1971] All E.R. 
163 at p.168 per Salmon L.J. 
32 Rule 145 SubRule 3 at p.769. 
33For other cases see Cheshire & North at p.208 note 5. 
34[1961J A.C. 1007 at p.1068. 
35Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James 
Miller & Partners Ltd. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 377 at p.381. 
36[1970] A.C. 583 at p.604. 
37Morris at p.270. 
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"To formulate the rule in terms of the closest connec-
tion with a particular country is to invite the unwary 
judge to give unwarranted weight to the locus solu-
tionis, or in appropriate cases, to the locus con-
tractus. 1138 
Generally the country with the closest connection will 
be the same as the system of law with the closest and most 
real connection but cases do exist where the difference 
could be important. One such case James Miller & Part-
ners v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. 39 All 
the legal factors in the case pointed to English law as the 
system of law with the closest connection whilst all the 
other factors pointed to Scotland as the country most closely 
connected. The case involved a Scottish company that had 
contracted to do alterations to an English company's 
premises in Scotland. The contract was standard form 
approved by the Royal Institute of British Architects. 
The case went to the House of Lords which held that 
English law was the proper law of the contract. Whilst 
Lord Hodson 40 considered that variation in language between 
'country' ana 'system of law'as not important he does in 
effect admit the possible importance in the difference by 
noting many Scottish contacts before deciding the contract 
was governed by English law. Emphasis on the 'country' 
rather than the 'system' could have led to Scottish law 
38prebble at p.667. 
39 [1970] A.C. 583. 
40[1970] A.C. 583 at p.600. 
being applied. 
For example Lord Wilberforce 41 considered that per-
formance in Scotland was a "very weighty" fact which in-
fluenced his decision that the law of Scotland was the 
proper law of the contract. 42 
It is suggested that Lord Reid's view43 that both 
tests must be combined must prevail over those of Morris. 
If the country most closely connected to the contract is 
to be ignored and only the system of law considered then 
the complaint made by Salmon L.J. 44 will become more pre-
valent. If the English language is the lingua franca of 
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the commercial world45 and the English Standard Form merely 
a factor to be taken into account46 then it may very well 
be difficult to find any indication that the contract has 
a close connection with any particular system of law. 
41 Ibid at p.615. 
42Another recent example is Amin Rasheed Corporation 
v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50. The House of Lords 
held English law was the system of law with which the con-
tract was most closely connected, and although they did 
not say so it is implicit that Kuwait was the country which 
had the closest connection with the contract. 
43James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street 
Estates Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 at p.604. 
44sayers v. International Drilling Co. [1971] 3 All 
E.R. 163 at p.168. 
45Armar Shipping Co. v. Caisse Algerienne d'Assurance 
et de Reassurance [1981] 1 All E.R. 498. 
46 See supra at p.53. 
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If Morris was correct in thinking that if a choice 
must be made it should be made in favour of "system of 
law" then all the geographic contacts would become irrele-
vant. Thus for example in Whitworth Street Estates 47 so 
many of the contacts considered should not have been men-
tioned at all if the country most closely connected is 
ignored. Lord Reid's views would thus appear to represent 
the present law. 
Summary 
This third rule is used only when the parties have 
failed to make a choice of law decision. The court must 
objectively determine which law is most closely connected 
to the contract. All relevant factors must be considered 
in the light of the particular transaction. Presumptions 
are out of favour and thus the court is left with really no 
guidance. It is the criticisms of the proper law doctrine 
that are next considered. 
J 
47James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street 
Estates [1970] A.C. 583. 
Chapter III 
CRITICISMS OF THE PROPER LAW DOCTRINE 
"I have found no basis either in the cases or else-
where for any theory capable of explaining the 
whole field of the conflict of laws respecting 
contracts. "1 
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In the previous pages the three rules which together 
form the English proper law doctrine have been outlined. 
The law applied to contracts with contacts with more than 
one jurisdiction appears to be relatively easy to state. 
If the parties make an express choice of a governing law 
to determine their agreement then subject to some general 
exceptions the court will honour the parties' choice. 
Even if the parties have not articulated their choice the 
court will still uphold a choice if the judge can elicit 
the parties' intention. If this is impossible then the 
judge will apply that system of law which has the closest 
and most real connection to the contract. 
It would be reasonable at this point to illustrate 
the operation of the proper law doctrine by reference to 
specific contractual issues. Indeed all the major text 
books do this. It would be reasonable to assume that 
this proper law doctrine was to be applied to the particular 
topics that the text books discuss. Some exceptions to 
the proper law doctrine might be considered justifiable 
given that it is always difficult to have a rule to cover 
10 • Lando. The Proper Law of the Contract (1964) 
8 Scand. Studies in Law 107 at p.l10. 
every aspect or eventuality, especially in an area as 
diverse as international contracts. However when one 
attempts to find two or three topics to demonstrate the 
application of the proper law rule in English cases a 
remarkab state of affairs presents itself. In many 
areas there are no relevant English decisions at all .. 
Furthermore in areas where litigation has occurred the 
exceptions and alternatives given to the proper law doc-
trine effectively deprive the doctrine of much of its 
force. These two aspects are now considered in detail. 
Lack of Judicial Decisions indicating lack of usefulness 
of the doctrine 
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The first matter to consider is the dearth of judicial 
decisions in particular areas. If one considers the topics 
of offer, acceptance, consideration, mistake, misrepresent-
ation, duress and undue influence, privity and capacity 
only a handful of reported decisions can be found. 2 
The reasons for the lack of case law in these areas 
must be speculative. Does the proper law doctrine work 
20n offer and acceptance see Albeko . Schumaschinen v. 
Kamborian Shoe Machine Co. Ltd. (1961) III L.J. 519. 
For consideration see Re Bona.cina [1912] 2 Ch. 392. 
For mistake see Mackender v. Feldia [1967] 2 Q.B. 590 and 
The Parouth [1982] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 351. 
For Privity see Scott v. Pilkington (1862) 2 B & B 11. 
It may also be noted, in passing, that these cases are not 
particularly helpful anyway. Much of the discussion on 
the proper law is obiter, and many of the fact situations 
are not good illustrations. For example in Albeko's case, 
ibid, no letter of acceptance was posted, in Mackender v. 
Feldia, ibid, the discussion is obiter. 
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so well that litigants can work out in advance the definite 
result a court would corne to and thus save themselves the 
time and expense of actual litigation? It would seem 
unlikely. 3 All that may be said is that in some very 
important areas of contract law there is a dearth of 
judicial decisions to illustrate the workings of the proper 
law concept in private international law for contracts. 
If the concept was a useful working tool to resolve con-
tractual conflict problems surely it would have been 
utilised more frequently over the years? One would have 
expected an appreciable body of case law to have material-
ised by this time if the proper law doctrine was in fact 
the panacea that the leading English text book writers 
would claim it to be. 
The existence of other conflict of laws concepts to 
resolve contractual issues. 
There appears to be a contradiction in the major 
English text books when particular topics of contract law 
are discussed. On the one hand one finds statements such 
as "the English doctrine of the proper law is one of the 
outstanding contributions made by English lawyers to the 
general science of the conflict of laws,,4 and on the other 
hand the very same writers are unable to apply this proper 
3Begg , in the context of consumer credit transactions 
suggests that cases are not litigated because of the costs 
involved. See S. Begg. Conflicts Problems in Consumer 
Credit Transactions. (1985-86) The Adelaide L.R. 138 at p.139. 
4Morris at p.281. 
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law to actual contractual issues. English academics have 
had to develop concepts besides that of the proper law 
doctrine to resolve choice of law issues. If the proper 
law doctrine was all it was claimed to be these writers 
would be able to apply the proper law to the fact situations 
they have had to create because of the unavailability of 
illustrative case law. 
All the major areas of contract law are briefly can-
vassed in the following pages. Whilst some aspects or 
topics are inherently more interesting than others (Danish 
boat builders and questions of offer and acceptance being 
of particular interest)Sall topics are discussed albeit in 
varying degrees of detail. If only certain topics had 
been chosen this could have given a biased result, indeed 
some topics illustrate more than others that the proper law 
is not omnipotent. By discussing all major areas it can 
be seen that the conclusions to be drawn do apply in all 
areas of contract law. These conclusions are that there 
are really very few cases and that other conflict concepts 
have had to be utilised, especially by academics, to 
resolve .issues. 
Some conflict of laws scholars make much of the 
difference between the creation of a contract and its 
validity. Some writers 6 consider that rule one of the 
SSee Morris at p.283 and Wolff cited by Dicey & 
Morris at p.776. 
6See e. g. Weintraub infra at p. 402. 
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proper law for example can have no part to play in the 
actual creation of a contract and thus limit its operation 
to the validity of the agreement. Other writers do not 
make such distinctions. It is to be argued that this 
latter approach is preferable,7 party autonomy can and 
should prevail when any issue arises. However a dis-
cussion of all major contractual issues shows that whilst 
the proper law is not exclusively dominant in any area it 
is relegated to a very minor position when the creation of 
a contract is considered. 
The first matter considered is thus that of offer and 
acceptance. This is a particularly interesting field for 
conflict of laws scholars as the various solutions to the 
problems of offer and acceptance in an international setting 
highlight. This discussion illustrates the use of other 
concepts besides that of the proper law. The discussion 
on illegality reinforces these conclusions and also demon-
strates that the law can be difficult to apply. 
The same conclusions can be drawn when all the other 
aspects of contract law are considered. Thus the discussion 
on capacity, formal validity, construction and interpre~ 
tation reinforce the previous conclusions. 8 The brief 
discussion on the effects of a contract serve to reiterate 
that which has been stated before. In other words whatever 
7See infra at p.486 et seq. 
8Thus the first five rules on specific topics (Rules 
146-150) of Dicey & Morris have been considered. 
aspect of contract law one chooses it demonstrates a lack 
of omnipotence in the proper law doctrine. 9 
Offer and Acceptance 
There is only one decision directly on offer and 
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acceptance in English conflict of laws which is but briefly 
and obscurely reported and contains an unhelpful fact 
situation. 10 This area of law has however received much 
academic attention and is used here to illustrate the fact 
that the proper law cannot provide an adequate solution to 
questions of offer and acceptance. The writers have had 
to introduce other concepts to resolve issue or have had 
to create others. 
The first concept to consider is that of the Putative 
Proper Law. 
Offer and Acceptance and the Putative Proper Law 11 
The Putative Proper Law defined 
It has been suggested that if the choice of a proper 
law has been expressly made in the contract it can only be 
effective if the contract is valid. A question as to the 
existence of the contract necessarily places in issue also 
the effectiveness of the choice. In deciding whether 
9Morris' discussion of topics is misleading because 
he divorces illegality from essential validity. See Morris 
at p.29l. 
10Albeko Schuhmaschinen v. Kamborian Shoe Machine Co. 
Ltd. (1961) III L.J. 519. 
11See generally Morris at p.282, Cheshire at.p.55 et seq. 
See also H.J.E.Jaffey. Offer and Acceptance and Related 
Questions in the English Conflict of Laws. (1975) 24 I.C.L.Q. 
603 and P.S.C.Lewis. The Formation of a Contract. (1961) 
10 I.C.L.Q. 908 at pp.909-10 and D.F. Libling. Formation of 
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there is a valid contract there is therefore a logical 
absurdity according to some writers in referring to the 
chosen proper law. 12 Thus the concept of the Putative 
Proper Law has been developed. Morris 13 defines this as 
"the law which would have been the proper law of the con-
tract if it had been concluded." 
Dicey & Morris Rule 146 14 states: 
liThe formation of a contract is governed by that law 
which would the proper law of the contract if the 
contract was validly concluded." 
It may also be cal the "potential" proper law. 15 
Cheshire & North state 
liOn principle, it seems clear that the question 
whether agreement has reached should be submitted 
to the putative proper law, i.e. the law that would be 
the proper law in the objective sense assuming that 
the contract had been e ly created." 16 
They continue 
lilt seems only rational that the valid creation of 
a contract, a matter upon which the parties are not 
free to choose the governing law, should be deter- 1 
minable in all its aspects by a single legal system. 7 
Whilst Dicey & Morris do not frame the rule ob-
jectively they do state that "it seems that, determining 
International contracts. (1979) 42 M.L.R. 169, and A. 
Thomson. A Different Approach to Choice of Law Con-
tracts (1980) 43 M.L.R. 650 at p.651 et seq. 
12See Thomson ibid at p.651 especially notes 10 and 11. 
13Morris at p.282. 
14Dicey & Morris at p.775 
15Webb at p~7. 
16Cheshire & North at p.216. 
17Ibid . 
the putative proper law, an express choice of law by the 
parties will be disregarded. 18 
Dicey & Morris cite as their authority for their 
definition Cheshire & North, who in turn state that 
Albeko Schuhmaschinen v. The Kamborian Shoe Machine Co. 
Ltd. 19 "is strong, though only persuasive, authority for 
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this view." They cite the facts and summarise Salmon J. 's 
decision but they do not show why they consider Albek0 
supports application of the putative proper law object-
ively determined. 20 
Finally Morris 21 uses the language of Rule 146 and 
cites as his authority22 Dicey & Morris and Cheshire & 
North above; thus presumably adhering to the objectively 
determined putative proper law. He also cites Wolff 23 
but Wolff does not discuss how to determine the putative 
proper law on the page given24 as the reference by Morris. 
18Dicey & Morris at p.777. 
19(1961) 111 L.J. 519. 
20Cheshire & North at p.213state "that autonomy has 
no place in the choice of a law to govern the creation of 
a contract is generally agreed" and they go on to cite three 
cases, see p.213 footnote 3, which states parties cannot by 
their choice avoid a peremptory rule otherwise applicable; 
however these cases do not say that parties cannot otherwise 
choose a law to govern their transaction. 
21Morris at p.282. 
22 Ibid at footnote 98. 
23 Ibid . 
24 Ibid , Morris cites Wolff at p.439. 
76 
Disadvantages of the Putative Proper Law 
1. Can Produce Injustice 
Having created the 'putative proper law' which appears 
to be merely the third rule of the proper law doctrine the 
same group of writers cannot but fail to note that it is 
far from satisfactory. Wolff25 gives the example of a 
Danish merchant making a written offer to an English mer-
chant with whom he has had previous dealings. In this 
offer is a clause stating that the contract shall be govern-
ed by Danish law. The English party does not answer. 
"Can his silence be interpreted as acceptance because, 
under Danish law, it would be regarded as such, and 
because the letter referred to Danish law? It cannot. 
The silence of a person can be deemed to be an act 
of legal significance only if that is so under the 
law of that person's residence or place of business."26 
25M. Wolff. Private International Law (1950) (2nd Edit.) 
at p.439, cited by Dicey & Morris at p.776 and Morris at 
p.283. The putative proper law is also criticised in this 
context by P.S.C. Lewis op.cit. supra n.ll at pp.909-l0. 
26 Ibid . In the words of Morris at p.283 an enter-
prising Dutch yacht builder writes a letter to a well-
known English yachtsman offering to build a yacht for him 
in Denmark. The Englishman puts the letter in his waste-
paper basket and does not reply to it. By Danish law, 
silence on the part of the offeree amounts to an acceptance 
of the offer. By English law it does not. It would 
surely be wrong, Morris says, to hold the Englishman liable, 
even though Danish law is the putative or proper law. 
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2 . issues 
If one employs Cheshire & North and Morris' definition 
the question of where a contract is made is not resolvable 
by reference to the putative proper law (as defined by 
those wr ) .27 
Let us suppose that A is in Germany and B is in England 
and that A in his offer to appoint B his agent, fixed all 
the important terms of the contract and included a clause 
stating that the proper law be that of New York and that B 
was to act as A's agent in Scotland. In the lost accept-
ance B agrees to all A's terms. A not having had a reply 
from B appoints D as his agent. B brings an action in 
England. The objectively determined putative proper law 
does not help at all in determining whether the agreement 
is complete. Given that the express choice must be ignored, 
as must the second rule concerning inferred choice the 
court would have to use the rule applying the law of 
closest connection. How would a "just and reasonable II 
person determine the question? Presumptions are out of 
favour,28 so the lex loci contractus not to be given 
undue weight nor is the lex loci solutionis, thus the law 
27Cheshire & North at p.216 give the following example. 
itA mails an offer in London to B in Hamburg; B 
mails an acceptance in Hamburg but his acceptance 
is lost. By English law there is a completed 
agreement, by German law there is not." 
They say that the governing law would depend upon whether 
the contract, assuming its existence, would be more closely 
connected with England or Germany. 
28Supra at p.60. 
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o·f scotland must not be over emphasised. It could be 
decided that the laws are equally balanced and a reasonable 
person might conclude that the problem is insoluble by the 
putative proper law. Alternatively one could argue that 
a reasonable businessman would apply the law of New York; 
there appears to be no other sensible alternative. Even 
if one makes A and B English and German without any connec-
tion whatsoever with New York it still seems a reasonable 
solution and as parties do not tend to make capricious 
choices there would probably be a good reason for A suggest-
ing New York as the proper law anyway.29 
Thus the proper law (putative or not) does not solve 
the stion. It is impossible to tell whether the con-
tract (assuming its existence) is more closely connected 
with England or Germany, New York or Scotland. The object-
ively determined putative proper law not assist the 
enquiry in any way whatsoever. 
To conclude it would seem that there is no judicial 
authority for the objectively determine~ putatiV~ proper 
law to apply to questions of offer and acceptance. Second-
ly as a choice of law rule for resolving problems in this 
Id it is not on unhelpful but as the academics who 
29 Such as fact A is a resident of New York, and 
uses a New York law firm. He could reasonably be in 
Germany (or England) on business only. 
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created the concept have pointed out it can produce unsatis-
factory results. 30 
Alternative solutions to the concept of putative proper 
law to determine questions of offer and acceptance 
A number of academic solutions have been suggested in this 
area. 
1. Application of the lex loci contractus as determined 
by the lex fori to establish validity of agreement 
Cheshire considered it "a little artificial" to rely on 
the putative proper law before it is known whether the 
parties have ever reached agreement. Moreover it may be 
difficult to determine what the proper law is until it has 
been settled where the contract was made, "for this place 
constitutes one of the important elements, in fact the most 
important, on which the question turns. u31 
He likewise rejected the lex loci contractus theory. 
Taken literally, he said, this suggestion of course 
absurd. "For if the enquiry is whether any agreement was 
reached, it is begging the question to re 
where it was reached."32 
to the place 
Cheshire 33 concluded that a reasonable solution is to 
30Se~ generally P.S. Winfield. Some Aspects of Offer 
and Acceptance (1939)~.L.Q.R. 499. 
31Cheshire at p.53 et seq. 
32 Ibid . 
33 Ibid . 
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apply the lex loci contractus and to leave it to the lex 
fori to identify the lex locus contractus. 34 English law 
must put its own interpretation on the expression the lex 
locus contractus. In other words it is for English law 
to decide where the last act is upon which the completion of 
agreement depends. "The decision should be reached on the 
basis that it is required for a conflicts of laws case but 
it so happens that the English courts have not developed a 
theory on the matter, especially adapted to international 
contracts. They have been content to adopt the domestic 
test of the place of posting."35 Cheshire considered this 
unfortunate; he notes that the posting rule in English 
law is arbitrary and was not designed for conflict of law 
cases. He concluded in 1948 that English courts will deter-
mine the fact of agreements by the lex loci contractus and 
will establish the locus contractus by applying the relevant 
tests recognised by their domestic laws. This solution, 
however, he said, is not satisfactory, since the decision of 
a disputed question of agreement will vary with the forum 
in which the action is brought. 
34Cheshire suggested this was the English view in 1948. 
Ibid at p.56. 
35This appears from the Privy Council decision of 
Benaim & Co. v. Debono [1924] A.C. 514; where an offer 
to sell anchovies sent by the appellants from Gibralta was 
accepted by a cable handed in by the respondents in Malta. 
The Privy Council held that the contract had been made in 
Malta and in that case the Court was sitting as a Maltese 
Court of Appeal and strictly speaking was laying down a rule 
of Maltese private international law. "Nevertheless there 
is little doubt that had the action for breach of the con-
tract been brought in England, the High Court would have 
taken the same view." Cheshire at p.56. However the 
issue in the case was whether the buyer had the right to 
rescind the contract, not whether the parties had reuched 
agreement. 
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Cheshire thus resolves the problem of where a con-
tract is made by use of the lex fori and the lex loci con-
tractus. 
nored. 36 
The proper law whether or not putative is ig-
Application of the law of a person's residence or place 
of business to determine where a contract is made 
Wolff 37 suggested this possibility in the context of 
his Danish and English merchant example. The relevant 
person is the person who is silent. In other words the 
matter is resolved by reference to the acceptor's place 
of residence or place of business. 
It is suggested that a general rule is needed to 
resolve the choice of law issue, whether it be a matter 
that involves formation or validity. Detailed rules of 
limited applicability tend to make the law difficult to 
find and to apply and for this reason should not be develop-
ed. Cheshire's 1948 ideas suffer from the same disadvan-
tage. 
36It may be noted in passing that since 1948 Cheshire 
would appear to have changed his mind. On p.216 of 
Cheshire & North Cheshire endorses application.ofthe 
putative proper law. This view also appears in the 9th 
edition of cheshire's Private International Law which as 
North pointed out in the Preface (p.v.) still involved 
Cheshire. 
37Wolff p.cit. supra n.2S. 
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Application of forum law to determine where a contract 
is made. 
On the question of where a contract is made, Webb38 
suggests that lithe only satisfactory way out of the dilemma 
is for the forum to decide by its own domestic law." 39 
The problem however remains when the forum has not by 
its domestic law settled the matter in question. 40 
'Offer and Acceptance' decided by reference to the personal 
law of the parties, and to the lex fori. 
Jaffey4l considers that the question of whether the 
parties should be held to have reached agreement is essent-
ially a problem of achieving justice between the parties. 
liThe rules of offer and acceptance of any particular domes-
tic system of contract represents the notions of justice 
worked out by that system. u42 Where the contract is an 
international one, the question is which country's or 
countries' notions of what is just as between the parties 
should be applied. Looked at this way, the law of the 
38Webb at p.5. 
39 Engl ish domestic law has for example decided that 
instantaneous means of communication such as telex results 
in the contract being completed where and when the offeror 
receives the acceptance. 
Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 Q.B. 327 
and Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl [1983] 2 A.C. 34. In 
the latter case a telex was sent from London to Vienna where-
by an English company agreed to buy some steel bars from 
Austrian sellers. The House of Lords held that the con-
tract had been made in Austria this being the place where 
the offeror had received the acceptance. 
40Webb at p.6. 
4l'Jaffey Ope cit. supra n.ll. 
42 Ibid at p.609. 
country to which a party belongs, resides, carries on 
business will become relevant. 43 
Jaffey gives two examples: 
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"1. X contends that Y is bound while Y contends that 
he, Y, is not bound. By the law of X's country, Y 
is not bound, but by the law of Y's country Y is bound. 
Here it suggested that Y should be held bound. He 
has no cause for complaint if the law of his own 
country is applied. It may be that X is not bound by 
the law of his own country but that is hardly to the 
point if X w,ishes to be bound (where in such a case 
one party submits that the other bound he must 
necessarily expect that himself is bound). Where 
one party wishes to be bound and the other is bound 
by the law of his own country, it seems right to hold 
that there is a binding contract. 
"2. X contends that Y is bound but Y contends that 
he is not bound. By the law of X's country Y is 
bound but by the law of Y's country Y is not bound. 
Here there is a conflict which cannot be resolved 
between the notions of the parties' countries as to 
what is just as between them. The solution it is 
suggested, is to apply the lex fori (which of course 
may well be the law of one of the parties) on the 
grounds that where there is no reason to prefer any 
other country's notion of justice in a particular 
case, the Court should apply its own."4~ 
Jaffey next considers Albeko 45 on the assumption that 
a letter of acceptance was posted and assuming that when 
43However it could be argued that to say that the rules 
of offer and acceptance of any particular domestic system 
of contract represents the notions of justice worked out in 
that system is in a sense incorrect. The rule in English 
domestic law that acceptance is complete on posting is 
arbitrary and from the point of view of justice to the 
parties it might just as easily be that acceptance is comp-
plete when received by the offeror. It is however just 
in the sense that it is an established rule by which all 
parties must abide. 
44Jaffey op. cit. supra n.11 at p.610. 
45Albeko Schumaschinen v. The Kamborian Shoe Machine 
Co. (1961) 111 L. J. 519. 
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the la~ of both parties' countries produce the same results 
they should be applied. Otherwise a party who contends 
that he is not bound will be held bound if he is bound 
by his own law, or, if he is not bound by his own law, he 
will nevertheless be held bound if he is bound by the other 
party's law and the lex fori (which may in a given case be 
the other party's law) .1146 
The difficulties of offer and acceptance are resolved 
by Jaf without any reference to the proper law doctrine. 
It is suggested that his conclusions concerning Albeko 47 
are unnecessarily complicated. Assuming again that the 
letter of acceptance was posted the party autonomy .rule can 
apply and no injustice is done. If the choice of law 
clause specified English law as the governing law then the 
Swiss offera~ having accepted the offer is bound by the 
English law. There is nothing unjust about this. The 
English offeree wanted and expected the contract to be 
governed by English law and the Swiss party has accepted 
this. He knows he is being governed by a law which is not 
his own. If he later finds that this results in some 
unexpected legal consequence he has only himself to blame. 
H~ should have considered the content of English law before 
committing himself to the agreement. 
If the English offerOr had specified Swiss law to 
46Jaffey op.cit. supra n.ll at p.6l0. 
47Albeko SchJJrnaschi.nen v. The Kambolian Shoe Machine Co. 
(1961) III L.J. 519. 
govern the contract then there is nothing unjust about a 
court applying Swiss law to govern the situation. Again 
the English offeror must have suggested Swiss law and 
again the Swiss party must have agreed to this choice of 
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law. Neither party can complain if Swiss law is applied, 
it is not unjust, both parties have agreed on a law and 
that law should be upheld. 
Had the parties agreed on the law of a third state 
then so long as the offeree agrees to this cho 
by the offeror the same conclusion results. 
suggested 
Jaffey makes the law too difficult in situations where 
a choice of law clause exists. 
If no choice of law clause is present, then in Jaffey's 
second example above the lex fori should apply but not 
necessarily for the reasons given by Jaffey. If the parties 
have not exercised their right to determine the law to 
govern their contract they cannot complain if the choice is 
made for them. Assuming that there was no governing law 
~~~~'s48 case the lex fori arrives at the same clause in 
results as Jaffey achieves but via a much straighter path. 
If the Swiss offeree contends he not bound he will be 
bound by the English lex fori. This is the result Jaffey 
came to in his final fact situation above. 
48 Ibid . 
Offer and Acceptance decided by reference to both the lex 
fori and the Putative Proper Law 
Libling suggests a solution would be to allow class 
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fication'9 by the lex i and determination of validity by 
thE putative proper law. Libling says it is wrong to ask 
initially whether there is a valid contract according to the 
putative proper law. The preliminary question must be 
asked as to whether the transaction satisfies the English 
forum's requirements for classification as a contract. If 
the answer is yes then the putative proper law is applied to 
determine whether a legally enforceable contract has been 
formed. SO Libling considers that if the problem of classi-
fication is dealt with the "undesirable features of putative 
proper law" are eliminated. The lex fori having classified 
the problem as contractual can then use its conflict of laws 
rule to refer questions of validity to the law of whichever 
49Classification is an internal problem. The lex fori 
must c sify the agreement as contractual before its con-
flict of law rules concerning contracts are applicable. 
Characterisation applies after classification. Having es-
tablished a contract by classification characterisation of 
specific issues takes place. Libling op.cit. supra n.ll at 
p.173 note 21 gives the example of an infant entering into 
an agreement, the matter would be classified as a contract 
and then the question arises as to whether infancy is a 
question of status and thus for the law of his domicile or 
a question of capacity and thus for the proper law. This 
latter problem of characterisation is arguably not an ex-
clusive province of the lex fori according to Libling. 
Libling considers that in order to classify a transaction 
as a contract not every element required of a contract by 
English law need be present. What required is that the 
"essence" of the English concept of contract is present. 
And these, Libling suggests, are intention to create legal 
relations and agreement. 
SOLibling op.cit. supra n.ll at p.173 note 17 defines 
putative proper law as the law by which the parties intended 
their contract to be governed or in the absence of a discern-
able intention the system of law with which the contract has 
its closest and most real connection. 
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is the appropriate legal system. 
One may criticise Libling by suggesting that given 
that the problem has been classified as one relating to 
offer and acceptance then there is no need to refer to a 
putative proper law, however defined. 5l The problem can 
be solved by reference to party autonomy and the lex fori. 
To return to the example of the Dane and the Englishman, 
if the Danish yachtbuilder specified Danish law then an 
English forum could hold that the parties had not agreed 
on a governing law; if the Dane had specified English 
law then the Englishman is protected by English law and 
there is no contract. If no choice of law clause existed, 
the Englishman is still protected because the lex fori would 
hold that no contract existed. 
The conclusion is that nothing is gained by intro-
ducing difficult tests into the choice of law area. Nor 
is the "confusing"52 putative proper law doctrine a useful 
concept. However, to return to the main consideration. 
Concepts besides that of the proper law are used by courts 
and academics and this, together with the number of ex-
ceptions that have arisen to the proper law doctrine, 
undermine its omnipotence and severely limit its useful-
ness. This must be further considered. 
5lIndeed his definition of the putative proper law 
is really only that of the proper law doctrine with Rules 
1 and 2 amalgamated. 
52Mackender v. Feldia [1967] 2 Q.B. 590 at p.603 per 
Diplock L.J. 
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Morris 53 has said that "[iJn matters of essential 
validity the proper law is omnipotent ll • The following 
discussion suggests that the doctrine is so hedged in with 
exceptions and other concepts that this statement is not 
maintainable. Illegal contracts may be used to demonstrate 
this contention. 
Use of Other Concepts Besides that of the Proper Law 
illustrated by Reference to Illegality 
The topics of offer and acceptance illustrated the 
putative proper law concept and the need felt by academic 
writers to introduce other concepts to resolve issues. 
When illegality is considered one finds a number of 
reported decisions but again considering the ever increasing 
likelihood of entering an illegal contract the case law is 
scant. With the advent of increased legislation it is 
becoming correspondingly increasingly easy to break some 
regulation as the number of reported domestic decisions 
on illegal contract demonstrates. There has not been a 
corresponding increase in international illegal contracts -
again suggestive that the proper law doctrine is not a 
useful tool. 
Dicey & Morris' rule 14954 although couched in terms 
53Morris at p.291. 
54"The material or essential validity of a contract is 
(subject to the Exceptions hereinafter mentioned) governed 
by the proper law of the contract. 
Exception 1. 'A contract (whether lawful by its proper law 
or not) is, in general, invalid so far as the performance of 
it is unlawful by the law of the country where the contract 
is to be performed (lex loci solutionis).' 
Exception 2. 'The validity or invalidity of a contract 
must be determined in accordance with English law, independ-
ently of the law of any country whatever, in so far as the 
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of the proper law doctrine is, on examining the exceptions 
and case law, consumed by these two exceptions. Cheshire 
& North55 give five propositions to illustrate the law here 
and these likewise are hedged with exceptions to the proper 
law doctrine. 
The first rule states that "contracts that are illegal 
by their proper law cannot be enforced in England. "56 
Dicey & Morris 57 point out in this context that the rule 
which allows legality to be determined by the proper law 
appears to lead to the "startling and quite intolerable" 
result that parties can by their choice give validity to 
an agreement which could otherwise be void, and so could 
lead to law evasion and frustrate attempts to unify sub-
stantive commercial law; they argue that in fact this is 
not so. They consider that a "bold"58 application of 
Lord wright's59 statement that the choice must be bona fide 
and the limitations imposed by the other Rules on illegality 
application of foreign law would be opposed to the public 
policy of English law.' 
Dicey & Morris at p.789 et seq. 
55Cheshire & North at p.224 et seq. 
56For an example see Zivnostenska Banka v. Frankman 
[1950] A.C. 57 and Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1950] A.C. 
24. 
57Dicey & Morris at p.792. 
58 Ibid . 
59Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[1939] A.C. 277 at p.290. 
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put the above criticisms in their proper context. They 
also note that "there does not appear to be any case in 
which a contract, illegal in its entirety according to the 
law most closely connected with it has upheld by 
reason of the parties' choice as the proper law of a gal 
system by which it was valid. ,,60 
Rule (ii) "Secondly no action 1 s England upon a 
contract that infringes the distinc public policy of 
English law, as lex fori.,,6l Here the contract may be 
either valid or invalid by the proper law of the contract. 62 
It should be noted that this situation produces an unenforce-
able contract. 63 
Cheshire & North64 v. Weil 65 to 
illustrate the interrelationship of these two rules. The 
facts of the case were that an English lady resident in 
Monaco in 1944 borrowed money to save her Jewish son from 
the Gestapo. She borrowed French francs from a Dutch sub-
ject who was likewise resident in Monaco. She agreed to 
repay the loan in London at a set rate as soon as possible 
after the war. She" so gave the Dutch lender cheques worth 
six thousand pounds, drawn on a London bank asking the 
manager to honour cheques as soon as legally possible. 
60Dicey & Morris at p.792. 
6lCheshire & North at p.224. Morris. Proposition (2). 
Dicey & Morris Exception 2 to Rule 149. 
62Cheshire & North at p.224. 
63Mackender v. A.G. [1967] 2 Q.B. 590 at p.60l 
per Lord Diplock. 
64 Ches & North at p.224. 
65[1950] A.C. 327. 
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(She did not in fact have an account at the bank). The 
loan contravened wartime legislation making it an offence 
to buy or borrow sell or lend any foreign currency. 
The Court of Appea1 66 and House of Lords 67 agreed 
for fferent reasons that the loan was irrecoverable. In 
the Court of Appeal Tucker L.J. 68 held that the legislation 
had extra-territorial effect and that she carne within 
ambit. . 69 Dennlng L.0. held that English law was the proper 
law and that illegality by the proper law meant the borrower 
could not recover. Lord Radcliffe 70 emphasised the im-
perative nature of the regulation and stated that these 
matters could not hinge on what law was the proper law. 
The lex fori at least equal if not paramount when 
these two rules are considered. Rule 1 can be seen not 
in terms of omnipotence for the proper law but rather as a 
matter for determination by the English forum. It is the 
English forum applying English law which determines whether 
or not to uphold the particular contract rather than it being 
a subservient position vi~ a vis the proper law. 
Again with the second 
policy which is dominant. 
66[1949] 1 K.B. 482 
67 [1950] A.C. 327 
it is the forum and its 
68[1949] 1 K.B. 482 at p.488 
69[1949] 1 K.B. 482 at p.491. 
70[1950] A.C. 327 at p.344. The other Law Lords 
agreed. 
92 
These two rules require that the proper law be as-
certained. This is by no means an easy task as Boissevain 
v. We 171 lustrates. The proper law could easily have 
been that of Monaco or England. 72 This criticism of the 
proper law doctrine is taken up below. 
If the first two rules are difficult to apply and are 
dominated by the lex fori the third rule should hardly need 
stating if the proper law dominated. 73 
Morris has stated that 
"It is generally inadvisable, in modern conditions of 
commerce, rigidly to apply the lex loci contractus 
to any problem affecting the existence, validity or 
interpretation of a contract.,,74 
and Dicey & Morris 75 note that a contract void by its proper 
law will be regarded as void by an English court although 
valid by the lex loci contractus. 
These type of statements are not in keeping with the 
idea that the proper law governs. One wonders why Morris 
saw fit to even mention the matter. 76 
71 [1950] A.C. 327. 
72See F.A. Mann. The Proper Law of the Contract. A 
Rejoinder. (1950) 2 The Int. L.Q. 597 at p.602. 
73 Rule 3 states: "A contract that is valid by its 
proper law does not become unenforceable .in England merely 
because it is illegal according to the lex loci contractus. 
74Morris at. p.289. 
75Dicey & Morris at p.790. 
76Ru1e 3 is illustrated by Re Missouri Steamship Co. 
(1889) 42 Ch.D. 321. English law was the proper law, 
illegality by the lex loci contractus was irrelevant. 
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Rule four, considered IIdoubtful 1l77 ignores the proper 
law. The question here is whether the contract is invalid 
in so far as performance of it is unlawful by the law of 
the country where it is to be performed (irrespective of 
the proper law, by which the contract mayor may not be 
valid. ) 
It must be noted at the outset that there are no 
cases where illegality exists by the lex loci solutionis, 
and where the forum is England and the proper law .. is that 
of a third country. In all the English and New Zealand 
decisions either the proper law was English law and there-
fore the court may be seen as applying domestic law and not 
private international law as such or the lex loci solutionis 
is also the forum or the contract is illegal by the proper 
law anyway. 
dicta. 78 
Thus there is no decisive authority, only 
Cheshire & North79 give the example 80 of two Germans 
77Cheshire & North at p.227. 
78 See Morris at p.289 and R. v. International Trustee 
for the Protection of Bondholders Akt [1937] A.C. 500 at 
p.519 and Kahler v Midland Bank Ltd. [1950] A.C. 24 at p.41. 
and ziVDostenska Banka v. Frankman [1950] A.C. 57 at p.58. 
Two New Zealand decisions are Steinman v. De Courte (1899) 
17 N.Z.L.R. 805 and Klatzer v. Caselberg & Co. (1909) 28 
N.Z.L.R. 994. In the former it was not apparent what the 
proper law was and in the latter illegality resulting from 
New Zealand legislation rendered the contract unenforceable. 
See also F.A. Mann. Nazi Spoilation in Czechoslovakia (1950) 
13 M.L.R. 206. 
79Cheshire & North at p.228. 
80These are the facts of Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera 
Sota of Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 differing in the important ~ 
respect that English not German law was the proper law. This 
case is often cited as authority for this proposition but 
loses force obviously by the fact that the proper law was 
English, making the case explicable on other grounds. 
94 
making a contract in Germany to carry jute on a German 
ship from Calcutta to Barcelona at a freight fixed in marks 
and payable in Barcelona. When payment falls due Spanish 
regulations are passed holding that freight on jute shall 
not exceed a sum which is a lot lower than the contract 
rate. German law is the proper law if the action is 
brought in England. Mann 81 notes German law would prob-
ably hold that in view of the supervening Spanish legis-
lation the place of payment would no longer be Barcelona. 
Cheshire & North make the point that if a court 
decided to hold that illegality by the lex loci solutionis 
resulted in the contract not being enforced then this 
could result in an unjustifiable disregard of the proper 
law if the contract is governed by a foreign legal system 
(and is not the lex loci solutionis). They therefore 
conclude that the proper law should govern. Again if 
the proper law was omnipotent and a panacea for all choice 
of law difficulties they would be able to cite that the 
proper law did determine the matter. It would have been 
settled by case law. 
Finally rule 5 states that 
81F . A. Mann. Proper Law and Illegality in private 
International Law (1931) 18 B.Y.B.I.L. 97 at p.111. 
"A contract is not unenforceable in England merely 
because performance is illegal by the law of the 
country in which a contractual debt is situated or 
in which the promisor carries on his business, or 
to which he belongs by nationality or domicile, 
provided that the contract is not subject in other 
respects to the law of that country." 
Thus, in Rossano's82 case it will be recalled the 
proper law was held to be the law of Ontario. By the 
time the three endowment policies had matured Egyptian 
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legislation had intervened making payment to Rossano with-
out the consent of the Egyptian Exchange control authorities 
illegal. The court held that as Ontario law governed the 
discharge of the contracts and contained no provision stop-
ping payment to Rossano, the company could not insist on 
paying him in Egypt. Thus Egyptian law did not have any 
application. 
From these five rules it may be concluded that 
1) The proper law is not omnipotent in the field of 
illegality. 
2) lack of decided cases suggests that the proper law 
is not a useful concept. 
3) The law on illegality is too difficult. Not only 
does the judge have to ascertain the proper law 
initially, a by no means easy task, he has also 
to consider these various rules. 
82Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance Co. [1963) 
2 Q.B. 352 discussed supra at p.6l. 
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A further criticism in this area is that the law as 
stated by the text books is simply too difficult. A 
judge not only has to work his way through the third rule 
of the proper law (if no choice of law has been made by 
the parties) pe also has to establish if the facts are 
illegal according to the loci contractus or consider 
distinctive public policy depending on the applicable rule. 
A more simple and direct arrangement and one lead-
ing to certainty in commercial transactions would be to 
have one rule to cover all contract situations. Special 
rules are not necessary for the subject of illegality. 
Party autonomy should prevail subject to some overriding 
public policy exception, and if the parties have not made 
an express choice of law provision in their contract then 
the lex fori should determine the issue. 
solution should be adopted. 
This simple 
The cases and rules discussed above can all be 
adequately resolved by applying the chosen law if there 
is one. Depending on the facts the illegality wherever 
it occurs can be upheld or not pursuant to forum public 
policy. If no choice of law clause exists then the forum 
with its laws and public policy can produce the same 
results as are at present achieved but by a simple route. 
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Capacity83 
Even Cheshire & North admit that the question what law 
governs the capacity of parties to a contract is 'a matter 
of ation' .84 Dicey & Morris Rule 147 85 states 
that 
"An individual's capacity to enter into a contract is 
governed by the system of law with which the contract 
is most closely connected or by the law of his domicile 
and residence. 
(1) If he has capacity to contract by the system of 
law with which the contract most closely 
connected, the contract will (semble) be valid 
so far as capacity is concerned. 
(2) If he has capacity to contract by the law of his 
domicile and residence the contract will (semble)_ 
be valid so far as capacity is concerned. 
A person's capacity to contract can be looked at as an 
emanation of his status and is therefore governed by the 
law of the domicile or it can be considered as a factor 
determining the validity of a contract and is therefore 
governed by proper law. 86 Morris 87 says that there is 
general agreement amongst writers that in this context the 
proper law must objectively ascertained as any other view 
would lead to the unacceptable result that a minor could 
83 See Che & North at p.221 et seq., Morris at p.285 
et seq., Dicey & Morris at p.778 et seq., and see Dicey & 
Morris at pp.550-1 capacity with regards foreign immov-
ables e.g. to enter a contract to sell or mortgage them. 
H. Fischer. The Law Governing Capacity with Regard to 
Bills of Exchange. (1951) 14 M.L.R. 114. 
84Cheshire & North at p.221. 
85Dicey & Morris at p.778. 
corporations (see Rule 139) and 
note 83 at p.lS7. 
Rule 147 does not apply to 
Fischer op. cit. supra 
8oMorris at p.285. Dicey & Morris at p.778. 
87Morris, ibid. 
98 
confer capacity on himself by agreeing that some more favour-
able system than the objectively ascertained proper law 
should govern the contract. 88 
In the past capacity was formulated in terms of the lex 
loci contractus and the law of the domicile. 89 Early on 
two distinct schools could be distinguished, a leading pro-
ponent of the latter view being Savigny whilst story con-
sidered that "every person contracting in a country is 
understood to submit himself to the law of the place and 
silently to assent to its action upon his contract.,,90 
Also 
The lex loci contractus is frequently fortuitous and 
"It can hardly be argued that if a person buys goods 
in England under an English contract, French law 
should determine his capacity merely on the ground 
that he happens to be on holiday in France when he 
posts the letter of acceptance. ,,91 
"In times of easy and rapid transport and great 
mobility of persons would often lead to incon-
88 See the New Zealand examples and conclusion given 
by Webb at pp.12-13. 
89 See Dicey & Morris at p.779 and cases cited in foot-
note 98. J.A. Clarence Smith. Capacity in the Conflict 
of Laws: A Comparative Study. (1952) 1 I.C.L.Q. 446 at 
p.452 makes the point that in all the early cases it was not 
necessary to make a decision between the two. He argues 
that the law of the domicile was preferable to the lex loci 
contractus as "any place (of contracting) must be casual 
unless it is the actor's hornell, although for mercantile in-
capacity rather than personal incapacity he suggests that 
the lex loci contractus may be relevant as it is the place 
of business. 
90J.story. Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. (1883) 
(8th edit.) at p.348. Cases exist supporting both views. 
See e.g. Webb footnotes 4 and 5 at pp.10-11. 
91An example given by Dicey & Morris at p.779. 
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venience and to injustice if the validity of an 
ordinary contract made one country was lowed 
to depend on the law of the foreign domicile of one 
party with which the other party could not be expected 
to be familiar."92 
"Thus it would be 'incompatible with justice and with 
the trust that lies at the basis of mercantile dealings, 
for instance, that a person over eighteen years of age 
should be ab to escape from liability for the price 
of goods sold and delivered to him in a London shop on 
the ground that he is still a minor by his lex domici-
1 "'1193 11. 
Thus all leading texts all support application of the 
putative law objectively determined. By refusing to permit 
the parties' choice to govern issues of capacity, English 
law avoids the need to consider this issue in terms of public 
policy. If questions of capacity are regulated by the 
legal system most closely related to the contract, it would 
be unreasonable for English ideas on capacity to override 
the rules of that system merely because England is the 
forum. 94 
Bodley Head, Ltd. v. Flegon95 provides an illustration 
and support for the use of the putative proper law. The 
facts of the case were that Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the 
Russian author, had granted a power of attorney to a Swiss 
lawyer to deal with his literary works outside Russia. This 
power stated that Swiss law was applicable in any disputes 
92 Ibid at p.780. Morris at p.286-7 gives four hypo-
thetical examples which illustrate the difficulty of deciding 
between the law of domicile and the proper law of the con-
tract. 
93Morris' first example in the words of Cheshire & North 
at p.221. 
94 This may be compared to the Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws. 1971. See infra at p.203 et seq. 
95 \ [1972] 1 W.L.R. 680. 
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between them. The Swiss lawyer assigned certain publi-
cation rights to a German publishing house who, in turn, 
authorised the plaintiffs to publish Solzhenitsyn's works 
in the united Kingdom. The defendant disputed the plain-
tiff's rights and argued that the agreement between Solzhen-
itsyn and the Swiss attorney was invalid as the former had 
no capacity under Russian law (which was both the lex 
domicilii and the lex loci contractus) to enter a contract 
to appoint an agent to contract abroad on his behalf. 
Brightman J. whilst doubting the correctness of the 
allegation that Solzhenitsyn had no capacity under Russian 
law held that the question of capacity was to be decided 
by the proper law of the contract which was the law of 
Switzerland. 
Other cases cited by the textbooks concern marriage 
cases and obviously cases involving a party's capacity 
to contract a marriage cannot be likened to ordinary com-
mercial or mercantile dealings. 96 Thus Morris' final para-
graph would seem to be a suitable summary of the present 
law. He said 
" . . .. the law which an English Cour.t would apply to 
the question is obviously anyone's guess. The best 
solution, it is suggested, is to say that if a person 
has capacity either by the proper law of the contract 
or by the law of his domicile and residence, then the 
contract is valid, so far a~ capacity is concerned.,,97 
96 See Dicey & Morris at p.739 for Capacity of Corpora-
tions. Rule 139 does not utilise the proper law concept. 
97Morris at p.288. 
101 
Conclusion 
The role played by the proper law concept in the area 
of capacity is not omnipotent. Dicey & Morris rule 147 98 
does not even use the term "proper law". Domicile and 
residence can determine capacity and although reference is 
made to the system of law with which the contract is most 
closely connected, (a proper law Rule 3 situation) it is 
only afforded equal dominance with the concepts of domicile 
and residence. 
As. with illegality there are few cases, (indeed hardly 
any commercial contract cases are reported) thus the tend-
ency by text book writers is towards considering what should 
be the law rather than stating what the law is. All the 
leading text books consider it an area of speculation. 
Once again if the proper law was an important useful concept 
surely there would be no need to resort to other legal 
devices such as domicile and residence to resolve questions 
of capacity. 
The first rule of the proper law allowed for party 
autonomy subject to Lord Wright's qualifications that the 
choice be bona fide and legal and not contrary to public 
policy.99 The law relating to capacity appears to be 
far removed from this basic rule. If the proper law 
doctrine is the great achievement of English conflict laws 
it would be used in the areas discussed so far rather than 
98Dicey & Morris Rule 147 at p.778. 
99Vita Foods Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[1939) A.C. 277 at p.290. 
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enjoying a status often not even equal to that of other 
conflict of laws concepts. 
Again no special rules are needed for the issue of 
Capacity. Party autonomy should prevail subject to the 
application of 'overriding' statutes in in the 
forum. 100 In New Zealand party autonomy should prevail 
subject to the judge deciding that as a matter of policy 
the Minors Contract Act 1969 is an overriding statute 
of the New Zealand forum. 
If no governing law clause is present then the lex 
fori should apply rather than any putative proper law or 
other legal concept. 
Morris 1 gives four fact situations involving capacity 
and resolves the first by applying the putative proper law. 
He has to resort to the reintroduction of renvoi 2 to solve 
another situation and employs interest analysis to decide 
the other two examples by analysing the facts into a false 
conflict situation. In the first three situations the lex 
fori 3 achieves the results that Morris considers appropriate 
avoids the difficulties of the putative proper law and 
renvoi. 
The fourth situation is the most interesting and 
because the lex i produces a result different from 
100An 'overriding' statute is one which applies no 
matter what law the parties choose. Discussed in detail 
infra at p. 311 et seq. 
IMorris at pp.286-7. 
2It is generally stated that renvoi has no place in 
the law of contract. Morris at p.270 and see infra at p. 
358. 3 
It is assumed that in all examples the forum is Eng-
land. Morris implies this. 
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that of Morris it may be considered in detail. 
A 17 year old Arcadian at school in England enters 
into a contract in England with an English bank to obtain 
an overdraft. By A:rcadian law the contract valid; 
by English law it would be void. 4 Morris argues that there 
is no real problem. The Arcadian is not entitled to the 
protection of Arcadian law, because by that law he is of 
full age, nor of English law, because he is not English. 
Morris then attempts to justify the non application of the 
English protective legislation to the Arcadian. S "The 
desirable result" therefore Morris concludes is that the 
contract should be valid. 
If the lex fori applies the contract is void obviously. 
The Arcadian schoolboy is protected by the law of the 
country in which he is staying and in which he acted. The 
bank lS subJect to its own law, there is nothing unfair 
about this; (indeed Morris ' result produces a windfall 
for the bank in so far as the customer was Arcadian and not 
English) . 
The lex fori should therefore have been applied. One 
is tempted to conclude that ~orris' argument supports the 
4Morris at p.287. 
S"When Parliament reduced the age of majority from 21 
to 18 in order to implement the recommendations of the Latey 
Committee, it did so with English people and no others in 
mind; for all the evidence and statistics assembled by 
the Latey Committee were English evidence and English stat-
istics." Morris, ibid. Footnotes omitted. 
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view that the Arcadian schoolboy is an unworthy foreigner 
who is not to be afforded the advantages of British justice! 
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Formal Validity of a Contract 
Formal validity is another area that may be cited to 
illustrate the use of other concepts besides that of the 
proper law. The formal validity of a contract concerns 
such matters as whether it must be in writing, under seal, 
signed under certain conditions and so on. 
Webb6 gives three reasons for requiring the adoption 
of some particular form. 
"The first is that there shall be evidence that the 
transaction was concluded. The second is the laudable 
aim of ensuring that the parties to a contract enter 
into it after due consideration and with full know-
ledge. The third is that the public interest is 
served in prompting confidence in validly concluded 
transactions and providing a simple and external test 
of enforceability." 
Dicey & Morris 7 state 
If Rule 148 - the formal validity of a contract is 
governed by the law of the country where the contract 
is made (lex loci contractus) or by the proper law of 
the contract. 
(1) Any contract is formally valid which is made in 
accordance with any form recognised by the law of the 
country where the contract is made (which form is 
called the local form), whether or not it is made in 
accordance with the form prescribed by the proper law 
of the contract. 
(2) Any contract is formally valid which is made in 
accordance with any form required, or allowed, by the 
proper law of the contract, even though not made in 
accordance with the local form." 
6Webb at p.47. 
7Dicey & Morris at p.784 and see Cheshire & North 
at pp.219-21i ~orris at pp.284-S. 
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Dicey & Morris also discuss the historical reasons support-
ing the maxim locus regit actum. They point out that 
since the middle ages it had been clearly recognised that 
it was enough to comply with the formalities required by the 
lex loci contractus. This principle generally referred 
to as the rule locus regit actum could thus be justified 
on the grounds of tradition and authority, justice and con-
venience. However the lex loci contractus could be for-
tuitous and whilst dicta in cases between 1797 and 1850 
suggested that "a contract must be available by the law of 
the place where it was entered into or it is void all the 
world over" none of these cases involved mercantile con-
tracts. 8 
Morris 9 states that there is little modern authority 
on which law governs the formal validity of a contract. 
This is probably because most formal requirements in most 
legal systems are now at a minimum, and secondly because 
those which do exist are generally regarded by English 
courts as procedural. 
Morris and Cheshire & North10 like Dicey & Morris say 
that it is sufficient to comply with the loci contractus, 
the justification being that parties must be able to rely 
8Dicey & Morris at p.786, especially footnote 41. 
9Morris at p.284. 
10Cheshire & North at p.220. 
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on local legal advice when entering into their contracts. 11 
Morris suggests that it is also sufficient to comply with 
the formalities prescribed by the proper law. This is 
"in accordance with reason tl12 for why, he says, should 
two Englishmen be compelled to resort to the Swiss Notarial 
form if they happen to be temporarily in Switzerland when 
contracting for the sale of land situated in England. 
Prebble13 makes the point that if parties have gone to 
the trouble to adopt a choice of law clause they will prob-
ably ensure that the contract complies with the formalities 
of that chosen law. Webb14 considers two "sensible 
decisions" to illustrate the law here. In the first case15 
a contract formally valid by the lex loci contractus (Eng-
lish law) was not by the proper law (French law) as in-
sufficient copies have been made. It was held that the con-
tract was valid because English law had been complied with. 
In the case of Van Grutten v. Digby16 (which Cheshire 
& North17 cite as supporting the view that the proper law 
is an alternative to the lex loci contractus) the facts 
concerned a marriage settlement. The contract was govern-
edby English law and the formalities were satisfied by 
110ne may argue that this is equally so in other cases 
as well. 
12M . orrlS at p.285. 
13prebble at p.680. 
14Webb at p.45. 
15 Guepratte v. Young (1851) 4 De G. & Sm 217. 
16(1862) 31 Beav. 56l. 
17Cheshire & North at p.220. 
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English but not French lawj the court held that since the 
contract complied with English legal formalities, it was 
formally valid. 
Some formal requirements are characterised as procedural 
and are thus governed by the lex fori. Formal requirements 
have been revived in modern legislation which protect the 
weaker party to a contract - legislation on consumer credit 
being an obvious example. 18 If such legislation forms part 
of the lex fori, it is likely to be applied irrespective of 
the proper law of the contract if the act for which formali-
ties are required was done within the jurisdiction of the 
court. The English courts have a tendency to characterise 
as matters of procedure many issues which the Continent 
characterises as matters of form. 
The Statute of Frauds is a notable example of a 
statute characterising various matters as procedural. In 
Leroux v. Brown19 for example the then Statute of Frauds 
held that any contract not to be performed for one year had 
to be in writing if it was to be enforceable in court. 
French law, which was the proper law had no such requirement. 
Leroux sued Brown in England for breach of their contract 
for supply of ~ggs and poultry by Leroux in Calais to Brown 
in England and failed as the procedural rule prevented en-
18nicey & Morris at pp.786-7 also point out for example 
that formal validity is important when considering certain 
types of contracts such as contracts involving the transfer of 
property. 
19(1852) 12 C.B. 801. 
20 forcement in England. 
Conclusion 
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Formal validity is not decided by exclusive reference 
to the proper law doctrine. At best it has been on an 
equal footing with the lex loci contractus as a tool for 
determining the formal validity of a contract. As with 
the other topics so far discussed there appears to be a 
dearth of modern case law pertinent to this area of law. 
If a conflict exists whereby the contract is formally 
valid by the lex loci contractus and not by the proper law 
the cases21 show that the latter doctrine does not always 
prevail. 
The role of the proper law is further whittled away 
by the practice of characterising certain matters as pro-
cedural as noted above. If a matter is procedural it is a 
matter for the lex fori and not a question to be determined 
by any other law. 22 Characterising a matter as procedural 
rather than sUbstantive is an example of an "escape device, ,~23 
20Dicey & Morris at p.788 also note the problem 6f 
stamp laws here. If a foreign stamp law makes an unstamped 
documenti"admissible as evidence in a foreign court it can 
nevertheless be used in an English court. See Bristow v. 
Sequeville (1850) 5 Exch. 275; but if the foreign law makes 
the document null and void for want of the stamp the reverse 
applies. See Alvez v. Hodgson (1797) 7 T.R. 241. 
21Supra at pa107. 
22Morris at p.483. 
23 See J.R. Lowe. Choice of Law Clauses in Internation-
al Contracts: A Practical Approach. 12 Harv. Int'l Law J. 
1 at p.19 et seq. (1971). 
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whereby the court 'escapes' for doing something it would 
otherwise have had to do. These escape devices provide 
a limitation on the effect of the proper law doctrine. 
There are a variety of ways to escape having to apply 
choice of law clauses, characterisation being merely one 
example. One can for example interpret a choice of law 
clause, especially an unclear choice, in such a way as to 
avoid its application. In one case it was held that the 
word. "covered II by German law did not mean that the case 
was "governed" by German law and therefore the New York 
forum applied New York law. 24 Probably the most common 
escape device is to hold that while the foreign law is to 
govern, it has not been adequately proved, so that the pre-
sumption is that the foreign law is the same as the forum's 
law and hence the forum's law is applied. 25 Public policy 
may also be evoked as an escape device to avoid the appli-
cation of otherwise applicable law. 26 All these devices 
limit and undermine the effect of party autonomy on both 
sides of the Atlantic. However to return to the subject 
of formal validity, the conclusion must again be that the 
proper law is limited by other concepts and moreover the 
escape device of characterisation further reduces its im-
portance and use. 
24Goodman v. Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen Gesell-
schaft 2 N.Y.S. 2d 80 (S. Ct. Kings Co. 1938). 
25 Lowe op. cit. supra n.23 at p.19 cites Gaines 
v. Jacobsen 124 N.E. 2d. 290 (1954). Morris at p.41 
suggests it is preferable to abandon the terminology of 
presumptions and to simply say that where foreign law is 
not proved, the courts apply English law. See Lloyd v. 
Guibert (1865) L.R. 1.Q.B. 115 at p.129 for English author-
ity. 
26 See generally Morris at p.42 et seq. and supra at 
p. 327 et seq. 
Construction and Interpretation 
liThe task of construing the contract as a whole 
against the commercial background was not made 
easy by the combination of a mediaeval English 
form with a translation from modern Swedish." 27 
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The construction and interpretation of a contract is 
obviously a matter of considerable importance and potential 
difficulty.28 This is the only area of law considered 
under the formation or creation of the obligation which 
has not as yet been discussed. 
Once again the major text book writers tend to 
attribute an importance to the proper law doctrine which 
is unfounded. In Rule 150 29 Dicey & Morris hold that 
the proper law determines these issues. This may be 
illustrated by reference to the Bonython decision men-
tioned above when the third rule of the proper law was 
discussed. 
Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia30 was a decision 
of the Privy council. The court was concerned with the 
meaning of the word 'pound'. In the last decade of the 
27Schiffshypothekenbank zu Luebeck A.G. v. Compton 
(The Alexion Hope) . The Times 3 January 1988 per Lloyd 
L.J. 
28Dicey & Morris give the example of the words "to 
ship" which to English and New Zealand courts means "to 
place on board" whilst in America it often means lito load 
on a train." See Dicey & Morris at pp.294-5. 
29Dicey & Morris at p.808 and see Cheshire & North at 
p.239 et seq. and Morris at pp.294-5. 
30[1951] A.C. 201 and see F.A. Mann. On the Meaning 
of the 'Pound' in Contracts. (1952). 68 L.Q.R. 195. 
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last century, the Queensland Government issued certain 
debentures to secure a loan of two million pounds; the 
money was raised in England and Australia. Debenture hold-
ers were entitled to repayment in 1945 in Sterling in 
either London, Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane, at their 
option. At the beginning of 1930 Australia devalued her 
pound to the English pound whereby one Australian 
pound equalled sixteen English shillings and correspondingly 
one Engl pound equalled twenty-five Australian shillings. 
One debenture holder chose to be paid in London and claimed 
to be paid value of his stock in English pounds. It 
was held that the substance of obligation must be deter-
mined by the proper law and Queensland law was the system 
of law with which this contract had its closest and most 
real connection. The debentures had been issued under a 
Queensland statute and was secured on Queensland public 
revenues. Whilst part of the loan had been raised in 
England it had been presumed that the Queensland Government 
was referring to the terms of its own monetary system as 
the money of account throughout and not to that of England. 
pc~~As ~ 
Thus a holder of a thousand/stock desiring payment in London 
would receive 1000 Australian pounds (or if he wanted English 
money, 800 English pounds.) In other words as Queensland 
law was the proper law that law interpreted the word 'pound'. 
The principle that a contract must be construed in 
accordance with its proper law is however subject to an impor-
tant exception in the case of foreign money obligations. 31 
31Dicey & Morris at p.810. 
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"As soon as a contract refers to a currency other than 
that of the proper law, it is for the lex monetae and 
not for the proper law to define what are and what are 
not units of that currency."32 
Thus in Bonython ' s 33 case had the contract referred to 
pounds sterling English law would have determined how 
many Australian pounds would make an English pound. 34 
Thus again the proper law concept is limited by ex-
ceptions. 
Remaining Topics 
Four contractual topics considered by the textbooks 
remain; there are Privity, Performance, Remedies and 
Discharge. 
Privity was briefly considered in the pages that 
emphasised the lack of judicial decisionsjthus three areas 
remain. Again rather than state the law in detail35 it 
is the exceptions to the proper law of doctrine that are 
the present concern. 
Whilst the proper law is applied to the rights and ob-
ligations of the parties36 the "method and manner" of per-
formance is regulated by the law of the place in which 
32 Ibid at p.81l. 
determine the effects 
Morris atp.811. 
However it is for the proper law to 
of revaluations etc. See Dicey & 
33[ 1951] A.C. 201. 
34 For other currency cases, especially those 
New Zealand see B.D. Inglis. Conflict of Laws. 
at p.425 et seq. 
involving 
(1959) 
35See generally for the law here Dicey & Morris at 
p.8l2 et seq. Morris at p.291 et seq. 
36E • g . see Rule 151. Dicey & Morris at p.812. 
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it occurs rather than the proper law. This can be seen as 
the only practical possibility when one considers the 
examples Dicey & Morris cite after this proposition. 
Thus in Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian 
etc. Assurance Society Ltd. 37 a New Zealand local authority 
borrowed money from a Victorian insurance company pursuant 
to a contract governed by the law of New Zealand. Rates 
of interest, a matter pertaining to the substance of the 
obligation would be determined by the proper law, i.e. New 
zealand. However, a question such as whether such payments 
could be made by cheque or must be made by cash is a matter 
for Victorian law, being a question concerning the mode of 
payment. 38 
Dicey & Morris suggest that it is possible to explain 
the application of the lex loci solutionis to the mode of 
performance on the grounds that the parties must be deemed 
to have intended to incorporate into their contract those 
parts of that law which refer to the manner in which the 
contractual obligations are to be discharged. From a 
practical point of view any other alternative would not make 
for good international relations. As an exception to 
party autonomy it of limited significance. It can be 
likened to the rule that procedure is always a matter for 
the lex fori. This exception does not detract from party 
autonomy in any way. 
37[1938] A.C. 224. 
38 s . . 814 ee D~cey & Morr~s at p. . 
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The above discussion would suggest that whenever the 
law of the place of performance and the proper law of the 
contract do not coincide a problem of classification could 
present itself. Either the issue must be seen as affecting 
the obligation itself and thus determined by the proper law 
or it could be classified as a matter of detail concerning 
the mode, place and time of performance and thus determined 
by the lex loci solutionis. 39 Again the proper law is not 
completely omnipotent. 
Discharge 40 of a contract is "normally"4l determined by 
the proper law doctrine. Remedies 42 likewise are governed 
by the proper law with certain areas, once again, being 
determined by another law. For example quantification or 
the measure of damages is a matter for the lex fori while 
questions of remoteness are determined by the proper law. 
39The difficulty in this distinction may be illustrated 
by reference to gold clauses and the determination of the 
currency in which a monetary obligation is expressed or to 
be discharged. Dicey & Morris at pp.8l4-5 give an example: 
"If X borrows $1,000 from A under a contract governed by 
the law of New York, and the contract provides for repay-
ment in London, English law will decide whether X must or 
may pay the debt in dollar bills or pound notes (money 
of payment) but the law of New York will determine 
whether "dollars" means United states or e.g. Canadian 
dollars (money of account)." 
Thus in Bonython's case it was for the proper law namely 
Queensland law to determine the substance of the obligation; 
although England was a possible place of performance it could 
not define the term 'pound'. 
40See generally on the law here, Dicey & Morris at p.8l8 
et seq. Cheshire", North at p.24l et seq., Morris at p.295 
et seq. 
41Dicey & Morris Rule 152 at p.8l8. 
42See generally Dicey & Morris at p.1177, Morris at 
p.295 et seq. Cheshire & North at p.240 et seq. 
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Conclusion 
The inescapable conclusion, having considered the 
various topics of contract law, is that the proper law 
doctrine does not enjoy paramount control as the textbooks 
would indicated in their respective chapters on the proper 
law doctrine. There are very few areas where the concept 
is thought to apply without reference to other conflict of 
laws concepts such as domicile, or other theories such as 
the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis. 
The absence of a coherent or comprehensive body of case 
law in these areas suggests that defects exist in the proper 
law doctrine which make it difficult to apply. 
The rules of the proper law were developed as flexible 
and reasonable rules to resolve the choice of law issue. 
However they have not worked in practice I they have not been 
used exclusively to determine contractual issues which would 
have been the case had the rules provided a workable solu-
tion. The reasons why the rules (especially rules two and 
three) are not satisfactory are next discussed. Rule 
three is criticised first followed by criticisms of rule 
two. A discussion of the criticisms that have been level-
led at party autonomy concludes this chapter. 
RULE 3 CRITICISED 
"At one time I thought that the factors pointing in 
each direction were very evenly balanced. So much 
so that I wondered whether it was permissible in 
affairs of this kind to declare a dead heat. 1143 
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It is considered that the present Rule 3 of the Proper 
Law is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: 
The Rule is too difficult to apply in actual cases 
It is suggested that this is the result of the follow-
ing matters: 
i) Lack of Guidelines 
No guides are provided by Rule 3 for the judge to 
decide which law is most closely connected with the contract. 
Until recently the court made use of certain presump-
tions in order to establish the proper law of a given con-
tract. Arbitration clauses are the obvious example. 44 If 
the parties chose to arbitrate in England then it was 
presumed that English law applied. This made for ease of 
application and certainty. It saved the courts time, and 
the litigants money. Today however an arbitration clause 
is merely a pointer to be considered with all other contacts. 
Rule 3 gives no guides as to what contacts are important 
in the setting of the particular contract. 
It will be recalled that the aim is to find the system 
43Atlantic Underwriting Agencies Ltd & David Gule 
(Underwriting) Ltd. v. Compagnia Di Assicurazione Di Milano 
S.P.A. [1979} 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 240 -at p.245 per Lloyd J. 
44supra at p.49. 
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of law45 most closely connected .to the contract. Judges 
left without any guides may be forgiven for over-
emphasising the geographical contracts. Assuming that the 
'country' and 'system of law' most closely connected must 
both be considered together there is not even any indication 
whether geographic contacts are to be afforded the same 
weight as legal contacts. 
ii) Multiplicity of Potential Contacts 
The lack of guidelines for the judge becomes more acute 
when the number of potential contacts are considered. Even 
the judge limits his choice of contacts to the actual con-
tractual situation itself the multitude of potential con-
tacts is staggering. 
iii) Weight to be afforded to contacts difficult to 
establish 
The weight to be afforded to each contact also pro-
vides problems. The cases which are discussed below illus-
trate the fact that contacts are not just to be lumped to-
gether but evaluated according to the importance they have 
on the particular fact situation under consideration. This 
is a very difficult task for the judge. 
iv) Lack of stated reasons for choice 
The judge is not required to state why any given contact 
or contacts should appeal to him as more weighty than any 
other contact. Each case must start anew, and if the con-
tacts are equally balanced the onerous task of making a 
45As suggested by Lord Reid in James Miller & Partner~ 
Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester)Ltd. [1970J A.C. 
583 at p.604. See supra at p.66. 
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decision is in each case time consuming and consequently 
expensive. 
If each case must be decided anew no useful body of 
precedent will emerge as a result of Rule 3. 46 No two 
contracts can ever be identical if one takes all the potential 
contacts into account. Even in simple contracts the 
nationality of the parties, place of contacting, place of 
performance, format, language, etcetera can lead to innumer-
able permutations making each case useless as a precedent. 
Illustrations of Difficulties 
These four points may be illustrated by a trilogy of 
English decisions. 
First, The Assunzione 47 illustrates the problems in-
herent in applying Rule 3. It will be recalled that the 
contract was for the carriage of wheat from Dunkirk to 
Venice on an Italian ship. The French buyers wanted the 
law of France to apply and the Italian sellers wanted 
Italian law to govern the contract. 
Singleton L.J. listed a number of Italian contacts 
and stated that some of these contacts were important. 
No reasons are given as to why he should have felt this. 
The form and place of payment seemed to be particularly 
46 0n the relationships between precedent and choice 
of law generally see E.M. Maltz. The Concept of Precedent 
in Choice of Law Theory. 51 Missouri L.R. 191 (Winter 
1986). 
4-1, [1954] P. 150 . See also J. A. Clarence Smith. The 
Assunzione Revisited. (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q. 449. 
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important and this probably helped the judge in concluding 
that "the scale comes down in favour of the application of 
Italian law". However the facts can be seen as nicely 
balanced between France and Italy. It would not have been 
unreasonable to find a dead heat except of course that 
that would defeat the very object of the exercise. Why 
the place and manner of payment should be the decisive 
factor coupled with the fact that the ship was Italian and 
the destination was an Italian port is not stated. It 
must be considered arbitrary to take one circumstance and 
elevate its importance without giving one's reasons. 
James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth street Estates 48 
also illustrates the difficulty in applying the third rule 
of the proper law. Lord Guest49 considered that there were 
strong factors either way and 'on balance' decided not to 
differ from the majority. By the time Whitworth Street 
Estates reached the House of Lords presumptions were out of 
favour. Hence the court had really very little to assist 
it in determining the proper law. One could argue that 
their lordships have to resort to a somewhat mechanical 
counting of contacts to find the system of law to govern the 
contract. Lord Wilberforce who perhaps more than any of 
the other judges endeavours to evaluate his contacts does 
so in what may be considered t with respect t a somewhat 
arbitrary manner. He notes that the contract was in English 
48[1970] A.C. 583 
49 Ibid at p.607. 
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form and that the architect was London based "but goes on 
If 
to say that one must not put too much weight on this fact." 
Pointers the other way were, Lord Wilberforce said, two 
in number. First he saw it as significant that no express 
choice of law clause had been inserted but "more important" 
was the "very weighty fact" that the place of performance 
was Scotland. He does not say why but rather emphasises 
his view by repetition " .... a Scottish site, under Scot-
tish regulations, and probably by Scottish workmen". The 
whole exercise seems somewhat hit and miss. Why not em-
phasise the English form and the English respondents with 
a London-based English architect. Negotiations took place 
in London, and the locus contractus was probably London. 
This case also provides an illustration of geographic 
contacts pointing in one direction and legal contacts in 
another. As it is "law not geography u50 that regulates 
the rights of parties, the close cunnection must be with 
the system of law. An inexperienced judge could easily 
over-emphasise the geographical contacts. 
In Amin Rasheed51 Lord Wilberforce engaged in the "clas-
sic process"52 of weighing the factors to determine the 
governing law, and acknowledged the difficulties inherent 
in the process. As a recent House of Lords decision Lord 
50prebb1e at p.667. 
51Amin Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] 
A.C. 50. 
52Ibid at p.71. 
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Wilberforce's judgment deserves detailed attention. His 
initial statement is that the ingredients said to connect 
the policy with English law are irrelevant or lacking in 
weight. These "include" payment of premiums and the use 
of London brokers. He then lists the remaining significant 
factors: 
1. The form of policy expressed in the English 
language and requiring interpretation according 
to English rules of practice. 
2. The nationality of the parties; 
English. 
neither were 
3. The use of English sterling as the money of 
account. 
4. The issue of the policy in Kuwait. 
5. Provision In claims to be paid in Kuwait. 
To this point the only evaluation given by Lord Wilberforce 
is that he places little weight on points 4. and 5. above; 
but he does not say why he feels that these contacts deserve 
little weight. 
6. Lack of choice of law clause. This Lord Wilber-
force considered a "pointer" towards English law. 
7. Two other clauses were considered. The London 
street or Royal Exchange or London clause was 
held to be insignificant, whilst the Institute 
clause with express reference to English law 
provisions was seen as important. 
With "no great confidence" Lord Wilberforce concluded 
English law was the proper law of the contract. 
The cases illustrate that the third rule does not work 
in a satisfactory way to solve choice of law problems in 
situations where the parties have failed to decide the 
matter themselves. An alternative rule is therefore re-
quired. It is argued that the only possible solution is to 
resort to the lex fori. 
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Rule 3 open to a number of further criticisms 
going beyond the problem of difficulty of application. 
Possibility of Abuse 
This rule in the hands of inexperienced judges could 
result in lip service being given to the proper law doctrine. 
By not giving one's reasons for assessing contacts as 
weighty or unimportant it would be possible, and indeed 
tempting, to choose contacts that advance a predetermined 
choice. 
It must be very difficult in cases where the facts or 
contacts are nicely balanced not to make an arbitrary 
decision by picking a contact at random to emphasise. 
After I the judge is obliged to come to a choice himself, 
he cannot very well declare a dead heat. 
Results can be arbitrary 
Rule 3 provides arbitrary results. The object of 
Rule 3 was to provide a solution to the choice of law 
dilemma when the parties had failed for one reason or 
another to nominate a law to govern their transaction. 
Whether the test is framed in terms of what reasonable 
businessmen would do or in terms of the closest connection 
the application of the test as illustrated by the cases 
results in arbitrary decisions. French law could just 
as easily have been chosen in The Assunzione. 53 
53[1954] p.150. 
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When one has followed the progress through the various 
courts to the House of Lords in the decisions discussed abov~4 
one is left with the feeling at the end of the day that the 
actual law chosen could just as easily have been rejected 
in favour of the rival law or laws. This brings the 
argument back to the former conclusion that the rule is 
difficult to apply, and if the result is in fact going to 
be arbitrary then it seems a waste of everybody's time and 
effort to employ a rule that is supposed to produce the 
opposite result. 
No Logical Basis for the rule 
~It seems to be accepted as an axiom that the law to 
which the case has its closest connection is the law 
best suited to govern it. In my opinion this is far 
from self-evident."55 
There is no legal or logical necessity for having a 
rule which hopes to find the law most closely connected 
to the contract. The law most closely connected to a 
contract is not inherently better able to decide the rights 
and liabilities of the parties. Take two African farmers 
in the middle of Afr entering a contract for the sa 
delivery of some purely African commodity. The law most 
closely connected would be of the relevant African state 
but that does not mean that that law necessarily the 
most satisfactory law to settle the dispute. 
54 E . g . James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth Street 
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. 1970 A.C. 583 and Arnin Rasheed 
Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance [1984] A.C. 50. 
and 
55 S . Braekhus. Choice of Law Problems in International 
Shipping. (1979) 111 Recueil des Cours 255 at pp.274-5. 
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Alternatively it may be argued that in purely commer-
cial contracts disputes are often rather prosaic, one 
brand of legal regulation of a case may be just as good 
as another and so long as one has a clear choice of law 
rule parties will accept the results as just. Thus there 
is little need to use the expensive and time consuming 
methods which weigh contacts and evaluate them. If 
contacts are nicely balanced means that the alternative 
solutions from a practical point of view are equivalent, and 
that the choice between them should be made on the basis 
of far simpler and clearer criteria. Indeed the fact that 
England has so often been chosen as the forum in arbitration 
clauses (with or without an accompanying choice of law 
clause) indicates that although the contact might be 
geographically most closely connected to another country 
the parties considered English law best suited to govern 
their particular contract. 
If there no logical necessity for the rule the 
question becomes why have it? Obviously it was considered 
to be a rule that would produce the best result in the 
circumstances. Arbitrary rules are frequently criticised 
and Rule 3 was supposed, one presumes, to be a flexible 
tool. However it is difficult to apply and for this 
.reason does it in result in arbitrary decisions being 
reached. It seems unfortunate to have a rule that is in 
practice difficult to apply and therefore time consuming 
for the judge and consequently costly in terms of time 
and expense if at the end of the day the result reached is 
going to be arbitrary anyway. 
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Conclusion (Rule 3) 
It would of course be possible to alter Rule 3 to 
avoid some of its present disadvantages. Judges could be 
required to state why any given factor is weighty, legis-
lation could be passed setting out important contacts and 
so on. However the rule is inherently defective in so 
as it must always,by its very nature,be too difficult to 
apply. Change is needed. 
Three points may be made at this stage. 
First there must be a rule to cover situations where the 
parties have failed to exercise the choice. Ideally 
every international contract would contain a clear choice 
of law clause. This must be the goal. Parties should 
be made aware of the fact that a choice of law clause can 
save litigation if a dispute ses. Choice of law clauses 
should become the norm, one could even foresee a time where 
it would be considered careless, perhaps even negligent for 
a sol itor not to have advised his client on the necessity 
for such a. course of action. However there are oral con-
tracts which do not lend themselves so readily to choice of 
law consideration and there will always be parties who do 
not seek legal advice. People will always exist who sign 
contracts without reading them; contracts will contain 
meaningless choice of law clauses and there will inevitably 
be a group of litigants who through stupidity, negligence 
or intention find that someone else will have to make a 
choice of law decision for them. 
So there is a need for a rule to cover situations 
where the parties have not made a choice. 
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Secondly it may be argued that given that the parties 
may choose a governing law clause~not to do so is to risk 
being viewed unsympathetically. Whatever law a court 
decides to apply in this situation should not be a cause 
of complaint by the litigants. They could have exercised 
their choice had they so desired. Thus for the parties 
to argue that an unexpected or arbitrary choice has been 
made by the court should be an argument doomed to failure. 
To argue this means however that party autonomy must not 
be hedged in with a multitude of exceptions; the parties 
must be able to exercise genuine free choice. 
If parties have the opportunity to choose a governing 
law and then fail to exercise this option there is no 
reason why a court cannot choose a law it likes to deter-
mine the issue. To consider the parties' wishes at this 
stage merely pampers them and could tend to discourage the 
use of choice of law clauses. 
Thirdly the rule chosen should be reasonably easy to 
apply. This will assist judges, decrease court costs, and 
make for certainty and predictability. It will become 
apparent after considering existing and proposed alter-
natives in other parts of the globe that the only possible 
law to apply is the lex fori. All that needs to be noted 
at this stage is that in the two House of Lords decisions 
discussed above Eng~ish law was held to be the proper law 
and in The'Assunzione the litigants finally chose English 
law anyway.56 The lex fori has produced the same results. 
via an easier, more logical road. 
56James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth Street Estates 
(Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583; Amin Rasheed Corp v. 
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To Summarise 
1. A rule is needed to cover situations whereby the parties 
have failed to choose a law to govern their contract. 
2. Because the parties have failed to exercise their op-
tion to make a choice of law decision their wishes 
on the matter are no longer relevant. 
3. The aim must be towards encouraging the use of choice 
of law clauses. The rule adopted must foster not 
discou.rage party autonomy. 
4. The present Rule 3 is unsatisfactory. It is difficult 
to apply; the judge has no guides, the contacts in-
volv~d are potentially too numerous, the weight to be 
afforded each contact difficult to establish. The 
present rule means each case must be considered anew, 
and the lack of a requirement specifying the reasons 
for emphasising different factors could lead to abuse. 
5. There is no logical or legal necessity to frame the 
rule in its present terms. 
6. The conclusion is that Rule 3 should be abolished and 
an alternative rule sUbstituted. Rule 3 produces 
arbitrary results after much time and effort for all 
concerned. The new rule should avoid these defects. 
The lex fori should be applied to determine inter-
national contracts that do not contain a choice of 
law clause. 
Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50. 
[1954] P.150. 
The Assunzione, 
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RULE 2 CRITICISED 
Rule is difficult to apply 
As there are few words "less precise or more ambiguous 
than intention,,57 the major difficulty with Rule 2 is that 
it asks the judge to embark upon an enqmry that can again 
be simply too difficult. 
The problems inherent in establishing party intention 
are obviously not unique to con ict of law situations. It 
has long been a problem in domestic contract law. The 
position for judges faced with an international contract 
has become increasingly difficult since the decline in use 
of presumptions. Today all factors are merely indicators 
to be considered in the light of all relevant circumstances. 
The judge is asked to consider the parties' intention 
at a time when a dispute has already arisen. Obviously 
the stage has been reached where there is a conflict between 
the parties as to which law is to govern otherwise the 
issue would n9t usually have arisen. 
By the time the matter is before the judge each side 
will have decided which law they would have liked to govern 
their contract using hindsight, and as Singleton L.J. pointed 
out in The Assunzione58 it is little use in saying that 
neither party would ever have agreed to the other's choice 
57Cheshire & North at p.197. 
58[1954] P.150. 
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had they considered the matter because that would have 
resulted in no contract existing whereas one clearly did. 59 
The need for a Rule 2 questioned 
Sure it is not reasonable to ask a court to ascertain 
the parties' intentions if they had had the opportunity to 
make an express choice of law provision in their contract 
and had failed to do so. 
If the parties do not expressly choose a law to govern 
their contract they can hardly complain if a choice is made 
for them (.:cr..d Rule 3 is employed.) The court objectively 
determines the matter. It sees what a reasonable business-
man would consider objectively to be the law with the 
closest connection. The parties are not thereby prejudiced. 
In commercial matters parties should be aware of choice of law 
clauses. If they act without legal advice then they should 
not be able to complain if they do not avail themselves of 
a legal advantage, namely a choice of law clause. Alter-
natively if parties seek legal advice when entering their 
contracts then if they are not advised to make an express 
choice the legal advisor may be said to be failing in his 
duty. In this event the parties will only make the mistake 
once of not providing for a governing law and as stated 
above the law will still assist the litigants to the extent 
590ne wonders why Singleton L.J. mentioned the parties 
at all in this context. He was after all considering a 
Rule 3 situation, which is not a situation where the parties 
are consulted or considered. 
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that the judge applying the third rule will determine a 
governing law reasonable in the circumstances. 
Conclusion 
It has been suggested that logically, if an intention 
is discoverable, its treatment should not depend on whether 
or not it is explicit. 60 However American courts and 
theorists no longer search for the parties' intention as to 
choice of law unless it is explicit. This was not always 
the case as last century decisions illustrated6l however the 
American Restatement {Second)62 suggests that where the choice 
is not explicit very little weight should be given to it. 
It may be suggested that if there is no express choice 
then it is logical for the courts to look for an implied 
choice and that if they cannot find one the judge can fall 
back on the third rule. However there is nothing illogical 
for a judge to go straight from rule one to rule three. 
Furthermore rule two, by its very existence, pampers the 
parties who should have made a choice for themselves ex-
plicitlYi it can thus be seen as discouraging the use of 
choice of law clauses. Furthermore it is not necessary. 
It should be abandoned. 
Only rules one and three are necessary if the proper 
60 R. J . Bauerfeld. Effectiveness of Choice of Law 
Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or 
Objective Determination. 82 Colum. L.Rev. 1659 at p.1661 
(1982) . 
6l E . g . Pritchard v. Norton 106 U.S. 124, at pp.136-7 
(1882), Wayman v. Southard 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I, at p.48 
(1825) . 
62Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. 
comment (a) at p.561. 
Section 187 
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law is to be maintained. If a choice is made rule one 
governs and rule 3 covers I contracts where the parties 
failed to exercise their option of including a choice of 
law clause. 
Subsequent Conduct: A Note 
If Rule two did not exist the problem 0 f subsequent con-
duct would not arise. The present English position is 
that subsequent conduct may not be considered when ascertain-
ing the law to apply to an international contract. 63 
The main reason for not allowing subsequent conduct to 
be considered is that such a rule makes for certainty64 
"otherwise one might have the result that a contract meant 
one thing the day it was signed, but by reason of subsequent 
events meant something different a month or a year later".65 
Another possible reason for not allowing subsequent 
conduct to be considered is the possibility that a party 
could be tempted to act in a certain way in the hope such 
conduct would be considered in preference to previous conduct 
63Amin Rasheed Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] 
A.C. 50 at p.69. This does not apply if the parties have 
var their contract, entered into a collateral contract 
or if questions of estoppel arise. Cheshire & North at 
p.210. 
64 see F.A. Mann (Note). (1973) 89 L.Q.R. 464. 
65James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth street Estate 
(Manchester) Ltd. v~A.C. 583 at p.603 per Lord Reid. 
(lo,lB 
133 
which for some reason the party would preferred to have 
overridden by the subsequent conduct. 
The advantage of allowing subsequent conduct is obvious. 
The judge needs all the help he can get and what parties 
subsequently say and do could be very relevant. 66 The cases 
do not make it clear if subsequent conduct applies to Rule2 
as well as Rule 3 situations. It should in any event not 
be relevant for Rule 3 situations as what the parties may 
or may not have done is irrelevant once it has been estab-
lished that they have not made a choice of law decision. 
If Rule 2 was abolished then there would be no need to con-
sider subsequent conduct at all for these rules. 
The remaining matters to consider are perhaps not 
strictly criticisms of Rules 2 and 3 themselves as such but 
rather criticisms of the way in which they have been con-
fused by judges and academics alike. One may however 
contend that this would not have occurred had the Rules 
themselves been less difficult to apply in the first in-
stance. 
The first matter concerns the lack of clarity over 
which rule is in fact being applied. 
66The present New Zealand Court of Appeal attitude to 
subsequent conduct in wholly domestic contracts may be seen 
in James Wallace Pty Ltd. v. William Cable Ltd. [1980] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 187. and International Ore & Fertiliser Corporation 
v. East Coast Fertiliser Co. Ltd. [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 9 at 
p.18. 
A Further Problem: Lack of Clarity over which rule is 
being applied in the actual case at bar 
Whilst the fact situations of some cases 67 make it 
difficult to place the parties' actions into one of the 
three rules above there is nevertheless a tendency for 
judges to arrive at conclusions without specifying which 
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Rule they consider applicable. Lord Hodson's judgment in 
Whitworth street Estates 68 illustrates this point. His 
Lordship specifically states that the proper law is that 
. 
with which the transaction has its closest and most real 
connection 69 and cites Bonython v. Commonwealth of Austra-
lia. 70 He then in the following paragraph said liThe 
parties not having expressly chosen the proper law or stated 
their intention the court must act on the evidence before it 
and fix the presumed intentions of the parties as best it 
.. 71 
can. 
67 For example in Dimskal Shipping Co. S.A. v. The 
International Transport Workers Federation (The 'Evia Luck') 
[1986] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 165 a number of closely connected 
agreements were entered into but only one specified a govern-
ing law. Hirst J. at p.173 pointed out that he considered 
it difficult to think that the parties intended different 
proper laws to apply but if the third test was used English 
law would still apply as the most closely connected. 
68James Miller & Partners v. Whitworth street Estates 
(Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583. 
69 Ibid at p.605. 
70 [1951] A.C. 201 
71[1970] A.C. 583 at p.606 emphasis added. 
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With respect to Lord Hodson he did not have to do this 
at all. If he thought it a Rule 3 situation he could ob-
jectively determine the law with the closest connection to 
the contract. This assumes of course that the correct 
approach for the third rule is objective as discussed above. 72 
Lord Hodson was not alone in this view. Lord Wilberforce 
also questioned "what intention ought to be imputed to the 
parties ,,73 yet he appeared to be applying the third rule. 
By not explicitly stating which rule one is considering) 
could be argued that confusions can arise. It seems very 
unlikely from the tenor of their Lordships' judgments that 
they were intending to alter the Bonython74 test, indeed 
they cite it with approval, yet references to party intent 
if one is applying the Rule 3 Bonython test are misplaced. 
By the time Rule 3 is approached the court has given up the 
quest for the parties' intent and is applying an objective 
test. 
The two rules are quite separate and distinct. It is 
therefore utterly confusing to state as Morris does that 
"there is inevitably some overlap between the second stage 
and the third. ,,75 If the Bonython76 test is the correct 
test for Rule 3, and Morris and the cases would indicate it 
72See supra at p.58. 
73[1970] A.C. 583 at p.614. 
74Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201. 
75Morris at p.270. 
76Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201. -
was, then there can be no overlap. Even if Morris was 
considering the wide range of possibilities within Rule 2 
one is still within Rule 2 and is endeavouring to elicit 
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the parties' intention. It is only when the parties have 
not made a choice that the objective third test is applied. 
This lure to articulate which rule is being applied 
becomes of greater significance when the consequence of 
the choice between the two rules is considered. 
If one employs Rule 2 a different law may be 
applied by the court than if the court decides it is a Rule 3 
situation. 
this point. 
Again Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. 77 illustrates 
Lord Reid78 considered that the contract used was in 
English form. What reason, he asked, could there be for 
adopting the English form other than an intention that the 
law of England should be the proper law of the contract? 
It would seem that thus far Lord Reid is suggesting that it 
is a Rule 2 situation and that he will be able to infer a 
choice of law. However he continues by saying that there 
could be a very good reason why an English architect should 
choose an English Royal Institute of British Architects 
(R.I.B.A.) form. The architect may well prefer that a 
contract should be in a form with which he is familiar 
because any form of building contract is exceedingly com-
77 [ 1971] A.C. 583. 
78 Ibid at p.602 et seq. 
plicated, and he continues by suggesting that all the 
parties may accede to this wish without giving a thought 
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to the question of proper law. "Indeed, this is what seems 
to have happened in the present case". Lord Reid does 
however apply Rule 3 and comes to the conclusion that the 
law of Scotland is the proper law. 
This may be contrasted to the judgment of Viscount 
Dilhorne. 
Viscount Dilhorne clearly stated that if the case had 
reached the third rule or stage then "I would hold without 
hesitation that the Scottish system of law was the one ... " 79 
but he went on to say, "I do not, however, think that in 
this case one gets to that stage, for .... both parties 
intended that the contract should be governed by the law of 
England." He considered that the conduct of the parties 
at the time the contract was entered into showed that des-
pite the fact that the work was to be done in Scotland meant 
that both parties intended English law to apply. He had 
earlier on in his judgment80 noted that it could be expected 
that a contract to be carried out in Scotland by a Scottish 
company with Scottish labour would be governed by Scottish 
law. 
In order to arrive at the conclusion he did, Viscount 
79 Ibid at p.609. 
80 Ibid at p.6l1. 
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Dilhorne first quoted the evidence of the builder's chief 
surveyor who had said that he had met the architect in 
London and expected "some sort of agreement", probably 
a R.I.B.A. contract. Viscount Dilhorne's second point 
accords with Lord Reid's view that the English architect 
would naturally choose a form of contract with which he was 
familiar, but adds "and one governed by English law." 
(There was no evidence of this.) 
The Chief Surveyor agreed to the R.I.B.A. form and 
so, "in the circumstances of this case must be taken to 
have agreed that the contract in English form and with its 
language based on English law should be governed by the law 
of England." 
Two completely different views which produce the 
important practical consequence that different laws are 
obtained depending on the Rule used. 
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A Practical Consequence of the English Rule 
The Proper Law doctrine must be seen in its English 
conflict of laws setting. Cheshire & North81 have pointed 
out that the function of private international law is com-
plete when the appropriate system of law is chosen and that 
its rules do not furnish a direct solution of the dispute. 
"It has been said by a French writer that this depart-
ment of law resembles the enquiry office of a railway 
station where a passenger may learn the platform at 
which his train starts."82 
The proper law locates the jurisdiction, this is its 
only object, it does not actually consider the final 
practical result. It is sometimes called a jurisdiction 
selection approach in contrast to the American result -
orientation approach. 83 In England the actual content of 
the law is not considered when establishing the proper law. 84 
This can produce some rather strange practical results. 
The Assunzione 85 illustrates this point. Had the 
actual effect of applying Italian or French law been con-
sidered initially much time and effort and expense could 
have been saved. The parties clearly could not have con-
sidered the effect of either of the two laws, and the judge 
was not required to. Two court cases resulted and finally 
the judge applied the third rule and decided Italian law 
81Cheshire & North at p.8. 
82 Ibid . 
83 The content of the relevant laws is considered in 
America. See infra at p.161. 
84prebble at p.720 et seq. 
85 [1954] P.150. 
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governed the contract. The amazing fact is that when the 
parties' case finally came to trial on the merits they had 
agreed that the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 
should apply! 
Prebble 86 considers that the parties and their legal 
advisors must have been somewhat "hazy" about the effects 
of the relevant laws. 
Since however the English approach does not provide a 
rule of decision, (but only identifies the country that is 
to provide it) the proper law doctrine tends to be negative 
in regard to criteria such as justice and fairness between 
the parties. 
In selecting the proper law English courts do not com-
pare the content of the relevant laws and apply the law 
which appears the most suitable in the circumstances. It 
has been suggested87 that the reason for this is that to ask 
judges to compare the lex fori with other laws is an "in-
vitation to parochialism." A strict neutrality is to be 
preserved between the possible applicable laws; by not 
considering their content this is said to result. It is 
also argued that courts would not manage the task of examin-
ing the end solutions of different systems of law and then 
choosing the one that seems to best meet the forum's 
86prebble at p.452. 
87L . F . K. Baxter. International Business and Choice 
of Law. (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 92 at p.107. 
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criteria of fairness between the parties, one of whom at 
least will be a foreigner. 
laws are examined. 88 
In America the uontent of the 
Whilst in theory it would appear an excellent plan to 
consider the content of each jurisdiction's law, the 
practical possibilities of actually doing so must be con-
sidered. Who is to find out the content of the various 
laws, who is to advise the judge, is the judge to decide 
which law is 'best' in the circumstances? Would certainty 
and predictability be sacrificed by such an approach? If 
the approach was used in Rule 3 situations why not in Rule 
1 situations also. Party autonomy might have to be sacri-
cede 
tages. 
The various disadvantages must outweigh the advan-
However by abandoning the proper law and adopting 
party autonomy and the lex fori the practical consequences 
discussed above should, to a certain degree, be mitigated. 
If parties are encouraged to make choice of law decisions, 
in other words if party autonomy to prevail, then the 
parties will consider the effects of their choice. Most 
reasonable parties are going to ask what effect the law 
to be chosen will have on their contract and thus cases such 
as The Assunzione 89 will be rare. They will be rare because 
choice of law clauses will be the norm. Party autonomy 
assumes in general that most parties will consider the 
effect of their choice. 
88 See infra at p.161 et seq. 
89[1954] P.150. 
CRITICISM OF THE PARTY AUTONOMY OR RULE 1 OF THE 
PROPER LAW DOCTRINE 
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By way of completeness the criticisms of party autonomy 
may be considered at this point. There are eight in number. 
1. Party Autonomy becomes a legislative act. 
., Party Autonomy cuts across other theories. .t:... 
3. Party Autonomy may not effect party intention. 
4. Party Autonomy is difficult to apply. 
5. Party autonomy could lead to absurdity. 
6. Party Autonomy is illogical. 
7. Party Autonomy evades the application of the applicable 
law. 
8. Party Autonomy is not required. 
A Note on the Advantages of the Party autonomy concludes 
this heading. 
1. Party Autonomy Becomes a legislative Act. 
The primary theoretical objection to the autonomy rule 
in the 1930's was that it allowed the parties to a contract 
to do a legislative act. "So extraordinary a power in the 
hands of any two individuals is absolutely anomolous."90 
People cannot by agreement sUbstitute the law of 
another place. An agreement is not a contract, except as 
the law says it shall be, and to try and make it one is 
to pull on one's bootstraps. IISome law must impose the 
90 2 Beale. Conflict of Laws. (1935) at p.261. 
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obligation and the parties have nothing whatever to do with 
that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or 
crimes. 1191 
The answer quite simply is that the parties are not 
legislators; the forum choice of law rule allows the parties 
to choose a law to govern their contract. 92 
As Mann 93 points out, IINo act of the parties can have 
any legal effect except as a result of the sanction given 
to it by a legal system." He notes that "this elementary 
and obvious fact is frequently overlooked." 94 
There is nothing to prevent the forum from adopting a 
cho~ce of law rule that holds that the governing law shall 
be that chosen by the parties. "When the forum adopts 
such a rule, the law chosen is applied not because the 
parties are legislators but simply because this is the 
result required by the choice of law rule of the forum." 95 
91 E . Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co. 48 F.2d 115 at 
p.117 (2d Cir. 1931) per Hand J. 
92 W.L.M. Reese. Contracts and the Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, Second, (1960) 9 I.C.L.Q. 531 at p.534. 
Restatement (Second) Section 187 (2) comment (e) . 
M. Rheinstein Book Review, 15 U.Chi.L.Rev. 478 at p.486 
(1948) . 
93 F . A. Mann. Lex Facit Arbitrum in International 
Arbitration. Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) at p.161. 
94 Ibid . Note 25 at p.179. Mann makes these obser-
vations in the context of arbitration but they have general 
applicability. 
95W.L.M. Reese. Power of the Parties to Choose Law 
Governing their Contract. 54 Proceedings - Am. Soc. of 
Int'l Law. 49 at p.51 (1960). 
The party autonomy rule makes for certainty,96 predict-
ability and spares the court the "painn97 of deciding 
which law is to govern. 
2. Party Autonomy cuts across other theories 
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Another argument is that the autonomy rule fails be-
cause it cuts across all of the other theories, carving out 
a spec 1 group of cases - "those in which the parties' in-
tention concerning which law to apply is explicit - and 
decides them without reference to the general theories ... "98 
Bauerfeld lists the general theor s as government 
interest analysis, grouping of contacts, Weintraub's Pre-
sumption of Validity99 and Ehrenzweig's Rule of Valida-
tion100 none of which give complete control to choice of 
law clauses. 
Against this one may argue that choice of law clauses 
must and will become the norm. Elsewhere Bauerfeld1 argues 
that choice of law clauses do not provide the parties with 
96 See infra at p.472 et seq. 
97Reese op. cit. supra n.95 at p.51. 
98Bauerfeld op. cit. supra n.60 on p.131 at p.1664 
et seq. 
99 See infra at p.402. 
lOOSee infra at p.403. 
IBauerfeld op. cit. supra n.60 on p.131 at p.1668 
et seq. 
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any degree of certainty because the courts ao not always 
uphold such clauses. This is not the fault of the principle; 
if the court upheld such clauses more and more persons would 
use such clauses. 
In answer to Bauerfeld's argument one may say that the 
autonomy rule is and should be paramount, contracts con-
taining governing law clauses are not a special group, rather 
they represent, or will come to represent, the majority of 
contract cases. The 'general theories"could only possibly 
apply to the lesser group of contracts that do not contain 
a choice of law provision. 
3. Party Autonomy may not effect party intention 
Another criticism of party autonomy runs along the 
lines that party autonomy does not give effect to party 
intention because the parties could choose a law which 
resulted in their contract being invalid or because the 
court chose not to uphold it for whatever reason. wein-
traub2 argues that the 'true' intent of parties is not so 
much that a particular law govern but that the contract 
is binding. Except when parties err they will choose a 
validating law and thus the autonomy theory is really only 
a rule of validation, a choice of law clause only expresses 
the obvious - the parties wish their contract to be binding. 
2 R • Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contract. 54 Iowa 
L. Rev. 399 (1968). 
They would wish this whether or not a choice of law clause 
is included. 
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It is possible to see the ultimate intention of each 
party as a matter of furthering self interest. Each party 
is entering into a bargain; each side endeavours to secure 
the most advantageous results possible. As both parties 
wish the best possible result for him or itself and each 
realise the other is wanting the same some compromise is 
therefore inevitable. Whilst it might be possible to argue 
that in many wholly domestic contracts parties could be 
entering contracts without being aware of the fact they are 
doing so and can therefore be seen as being unaware of the 
legal significance of their acts, this is less likely to be 
the case in a more sophisticated business setting involving 
more than one jurisdiction. In general the parties must 
be aware at this level that contracts are legally binding 
and each party agrees to be bound so long as it is to his 
advantage. If both parties always intend that the contract 
binds them and is to be fully effective then there would 
never be any court actions. The very fact of litigation 
means that one party does not want to be bound by the agree-
ment he in fact made. He might think that it is legally 
effective but he can hardly be said to wish something to be 
effective which he is now trying to avoid. What each 
party really would like at heart is to secure the best 
bargain for himself and bend the other side to this bargain. 
If later it appears that it would be more advantageous not 
to continue with the arrangement then ideally he would like 
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not to be bound, but until such a situation comes into 
existence he compromises and becomes bound himself because 
that is the only way that he can bind the other party, (and 
obviously he will want to bind the other party until such 
time as it is advantageous to him to not be bound) . 
Whilst this would appear to be stating the obvious, 
it does illustrate the fact that party intention is not 
static, the parties' intention can change depending on 
non legal circumstances. Party autonomy does give effect 
to the parties' intention at some point in time. When the 
parties agree on the choice of law to govern their contract 
it may be said that that is the law which they intend to 
govern if a dispute arises. By the time the parties are 
in court, arguing over some matter whether it be the choice 
of law clause itself or some other issue their wishes and 
intentions differ. It the court upholds the governing law 
clause it is not only giving effect to what bcth parties 
originally intended but the court is also giving effect to 
the present intention of one of the parties. It is giving 
effect to the choice made by the party who has not changed 
his mind. It would seem that it is preferable for a court 
to uphold this party's choice; the court is giving effect 
to the original agreement. Unless some fundamental public 
policy consideration is pertinent or the consent was not 
genuine for some reason, it is surely preferable to have 
a rule which upholds the original agreement. To help 
parties who have changed their minds and who now do not 
want the governing law to apply encourage others to change 
their minds tooi and if parties are not to be kept to 
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their agreements then the whole idea of having enforceable 
bargains, that one can rely on, is undermined. 
Thus in answer to the criticism that party autonomy 
may not effect party intention it may be said that if 
courts always respected party autonomy the will of the 
parties would prevail at one stage, and the choice of one 
of them (the litigant seeking to rely on the choice of law 
clause) will continue to be upheld. Again the criticism 
relates more to the way the party autonomy rule is applied 
by the courts than to its inherent characteristics. 
4. Party Autonomy is Difficult to Apply 
Some writers 3 see the autonomy rule as easy to state 
but difficult to apply in an actual decision because states 
or jurisdictions which adhere to the rule always include 
some fundamental policy exception to override an express 
choice in certain situations. 
This however is not so much a criticism of the limits 
thereto. Obviously party autonomy should not be hedged 
in with a mUltiplicity of exceptions. 4 It should be the 
basic rule, governing law clauses should only be defeated 
in rare cases. 
3E . g . Bauerfeld op. cit. supra n.60 at p.178. 
4The limits on party autonomy are discussed infra 
at p.310 et seq. 
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5. Party Autonomy could lead to absurdity 
MorrisS states that the disadvantages of allowing 
the parties express selection of the proper law is that if 
iously exercised, it may subject the parties to a 
law which is unrealistic to the point of absurdity. This 
argument, which appeals to all object sts, can be equally 
reversed, the argument being that given one's choice is 
bona fide and legal and not contrary to public policy then 
why not let Gamillscheg's German and Argentinian choose 
English law?6 
This argument is of academic interest only as parties 
do not choose capriciously, "Situations of this sort do not 
arise in practice. "7 
6. Party Autonomy is illogical 
Another cr cism8 of the doctrine arose towards the 
end of the nineteenth century when jurists in France, Ger-
many, Holland and Switzerland branded the judic decisions 
as illogical; before it is possible to say, they reasoned, 
that an agreement between the parties determines the law 
governing the contract, it must first be ascertained what 
law is to be ied to determining the validity of the 
agreement itself. 
5Morris at p.281 et seq. 
6Gamillscheg's views are discussed supra at p.43. 
7Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. (1971) Section 
187 Comment (f) at p.567. 
8See M. Wolff. Choice of Law for the Parties in Inter-
national Contracts. (1937) 49 Juridical Review 110 and see 
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Again the arguments of Mann 9 counter this criticism. 
It is the forum's law which allows the party's choice to 
apply. 
7. Party Autonomy evades the application of the 
Applicable law 
A further criticism of party autonomy is that it 
allows the parties to evade the applicable law by adopt-
ing any law they so wish. 
Cheshire lO took this view. He gave an example of 
two Englishmen making a written contract in London by 
which A agreed to pay B five hundred pounds a year to B 
for five years. By English law this agreement is void 
for want of consideration. If it were a Scottish con-
tract it would be valid. 
Cheshire said it would be "puerile"ll to suggest that 
the parties could make the contract valid by stating that 
consideration was not essential and to insert a Scottish 
choice of law clause cannot be a more effective means of 
conferring validity upon the English contract. liThe 
parties have attempted indirectly instead of directly, to 
avoid the compulsory rule." Even if the contract is made 
in Edinburgh, thus giving it a faintly Scottish connection, 
this cannot alter its essentially English character. 
A. Thomson Ope cit. supra at n.ll on p.74 at p.650. 
9supra at p.143. 
10C~eshire at p.20. 
11Ibid. 
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Cheshire concludes that a contract, so far as its valid 
creation is concerned, must in the nature of things be 
subject to the law of the country with which it has the 
most real connection. 12 Mann13 suggests that Cheshire's 
observations lose their force when it is realised that he 
(Cheshire) "is inevitably driven to the very conclusion 
which he condemns and in fact allows and must allow, the 
parties to do by a little more indirect route what, accord-
ing to him they cannot do directly; he allows the parties 
to determine the localising elements on the basis of which 
the judge is supposed to ascertain the contract's centre 
of gravity." Mann goes on to say that in Cheshire's 
example above had the parties made S~otland the place most 
substantially connected with the contract {e.g. by using 
agents to conclude the contract in Scotland, by making 
provision for payment in Scotland, etc.} then the law of 
scotland would apply. Such reasoning, says Mann14 
"rewards the artful and penalises the innocent." Mann's 
reasoning destroys Cheshire's argument and disposes of 
this criticism of party autonomy. 
Two further points may be made. First, the argument 
requires the existence of an applicable law in the first 
12 Ibid at p.2l. 
13F . A. Mann. The Proper Law of the Contract. (1950) 
3 I.C.L.Q. 60 at p.63. 
14Ibid . 
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instance. 
The notion that a contract is governed by an a priori 
applicable law and that party autonomy, by allowing a 
different law to be chosen is an exception to this, is 
now out of favour. 15 Rather it is argued that an inter-
national contract generally has a real connection with more 
than one jurisdiction and so there is no one applicable 
law anyway. 
Secondly, it was held in Golden Acre Ltd. v. Queens-
land Estates Ltd. 16 that the choice of Hong Kong law was 
not to be upheld because it evaded Queensland statute law. 
As Kelly17 noted the choice of law clause could have been 
upheld and the Queensland legislation still have applied. 
This is the better view, party autonomy prevails subject 
to the Queensland statute applying in a Queensland forum. 18 
8. Party Autonomy is not reguired 
Finally and at a more general level Niboyet19 has 
15 J . M .. Levln. 
Clauses in Commercial 
p.271 (1957). 
Party Autonomy. Choice of Law 
Contracts. 46 Geo. L.J. 260 at 
16[1969] st. R. Qd. 378, aff'd on other grounds by 
the High Court of Australia (1970) 123 C.L.R. 418, Sub nom 
Freehold Land Investments Ltd. v. Queensland Estate pty 
Ltd. 
17Supra at p.38. 
18Discussed in detail below. See infra at p. 311 et 
seq. 
19J . p • Niboyet. La Th~orie de l'Autonomie de la 
Volonte. (1927) 16 Recueil des Cours 5. 
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argued that as autonomy does not exist in dome law, 
should have no place in the private international law 
of contracts. prebble 20 submits that dif considera-
tions relating to contracts with multi state contacts not 
only justify but demand a treatment at variance with that 
accorded to purely domestic agreements. This view would 
seem preferable to that of Niboyet. 
Having noted the criticisms that have been suggested 
from time to time about party autonomy this may be the 
appropriate place to briefly state the advantages of the 
doctrine. 21 
The great advantage of allowing party autonomy is that 
it achieves certainty. If the s know that their 
choice of governing law is going to be applied they know 
in advance exactly where they stand. As Lando points out 
"The choice-of-law clause should be respected in principle. 
This uniformity ensures that such a party reference will 
relieve the parties of the 
governing their contract."22 
20prebble at p.493. 
uncertainty as to the law 
21See generally o. Lando. Contracts. (1976) 
Chapter 24 Vol.3 Internat. Encyclopaedia of Compo Law. 
at p.33. 
22 Ibid . 
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In the absence of such a clause the law of the contract 
will often be unknown by the parties until after a court has 
considered the matter. In a later chapter23 the goals of 
conflicts of laws are canvassed. At this point it need 
only be stated that certainty in commercial transactions is 
of paramount importance. Again a later chapter24 the 
American case law is reviewed and the'ticket cases' provide 
a c example of the need for certainty. For example 
in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star 25 Judge Harlan in the 
United States Court of Appeals pointed out that the major 
purpose of including a choice of law clause in the case was 
that Cunard White Star Ltd. would want a uniform result no 
matter where the ticket was issued or where litigation 
arose. Uniformity and certainty were seen as valuable 
goa1s. 26 
The goal of certainty cannot be over emphasised, and 
unless party autonomy is recognised this goal is jeopard-
ised. 
A second consideration in favour of party autonomy 
concerns expedience. Allowing parties to make an express 
23Infra Chapter I at p. 461 et seq. 
24Infra Chapter IV at p. 270 .et seq. 
25 221 F. 2d. 189 (2d Cir .. 1955). 
26The action was brought by Mr. Siegelman against 
Cunard for injuries to his wife sustained whilst a 
passenger on Cunard White Star. The governing law claUse 
specifying English law was applied. 
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choice of law in their contract relieves the court from the 
difficult task of ascertaining which law to apply to the 
contract especially when facts are nicely balanced between 
various jurisdictions. This saves pressure on busy judges 
and courts and avoids litigation and the attendant time 
and cost to the parties. 
On this point Judge Harlan stated in the above decision 
"We see no harm in letting the parties' intention 
control Instead of viewing the parties as usurping 
the legislative function, it seems more realistic to 
regard them as relieving the courts of the problem of 
resolving a question of conflict of laws. Their 
course might be expected to reduce litigation, and 
is to be commended as much as good draftsmanship which 
relieves courts of problems of resolving ambiguities. ,,27 
Another reason for allowing party autonomy which is 
often cited28 is that party autonomy also satisfies the need 
for freedom. In many international commercial contracts 
the parties have creditable motives for their choice. They 
may want to use a certain formula that is internationally 
knownj they may want to submit their contract to the 
country that dominates the marketj they may want to select 
a "neutral" law or a law that is very developed in commercial 
law. These reasons may justify a choice of law clause and 
should be respected and upheld in international contracts. 
The advantages of party autonomy are summarised by the 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 1971: 29 
27~221 F. 2d. 189 at p.195. (2d. Cir. 1955) 
28 See Lando op. cit. supra n.21 on p.153 at p.33. 
29Comment on Sec. 187(2). Comment (e) at p.565. 
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"Prime object s contract law are to protect the 
justified expectations of the parties and to make it 
possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will 
be their rights and liabilities under the contract. 
These objectives may be best attained multistate 
transactions by letting the parties choose the law to 
govern the validity of the contact and the rights 
created thereby. In this way certainty and pre-
dictability of results are most likely to be secured." 
Having stated the advantages and disadvantages of party 
autonomy it is apparent that the advantages far outweigh 
any of the so led criticisms of the concept. Each of 
the eight cr cisms canvassed above can be counteracted by 
a cogent argument. If party autonomy is not to prevail 
then uncertainty and unpredictability are introduced into 
an area of the law which needs clear and precise rules. 
In so far as the proper law doctrine upholds party autonomy 
it is to be praised, however the doctrine is wider than 
party autonomy and viewed overall must be criticised. 
The concluding note on the proper law doctrine is a criticism 
of the concept in so far as the second and third rules are 
concerned and in so far as unsettled limits exist concerning 
the t rule. It is not a criticism of party autonomy 
which seen as the only possible answer for international 
contracts. 
Concluding Note on the Proper Law Doctrine 
It has been said that the proper law doctrine is "an 
academic theory posing as a rule of law which is in fact 
non- stent and would be unnecessary if it existed. 1130 
30J . G. Foster. 
of Conflict of Laws. 
Some Defects in the English Rules 
(1935). B.Y.B.LL. 84 at p.93. 
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Whilst Foster's views are as extreme as Morris' in 
praise of the proper law doctrine it does seem that the 
concept is infinitely eas to state than to apply. There 
would be no reason for abandoning the doctrine if the only 
criticism concerned difficulty of application. However it 
is only a fiction that the abstract legal concept of a 
" contract"has a natural seat, or belongs to, or is proper 
to a particular legal system. Today many contracts may 
be seen as truly international. In recent years new types 
of contracts have appeared with respect to which the proper 
law doctrine is ill suited to supply an answer. Such is 
the case of both Euroloans, which by definition are "deloc-
al ed ll operations 31 and complex multi party or interrelated 
arrangements for carrying out large industrial, mining or 
other international projects. These contracts cannot be 
said to have a "proper law". Thus the very name given to 
the present system is inappropriate besides the many problems 
inherent in the doctrine as discussed above. 
As America in general and New York in particular are 
very busy commercial parts of the world perhaps the laws 
applicable to international contracts on the other side of 
the Atlantic may have rules which New Zealand could adopt. 
It is the 'American solution' that is now discussed. 
31 G. R. Delaume. The European Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations. Why a Convention? 
22 No.1 Virgo J. of Int'l L. 105 at p.121, Footnote 71 
(1981) defines 11 delocalized operations" as those intended 
to reach a transnational community, as opposed to operations 
taking place within national markets. 
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New York Common Law Relating to 
Interstate and International Contracts 
PART B. 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST ANALYSIS 
"Everyone now making a speech or writing an article 
on contracts in the conflict of laws begins by 
saying that this is 'the most confused subject in 
the conflicts of laws' .,,1 , 
"It is common for American Conflicts scholars to 
refer to contracts as the most complex and confused 
area of choice-of-Iaw problems .... In large part, 
however, the scholars' signs of despair stem from 
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the confusing diversity of choice-of-law rules which 
have been applied by United States courts in resolving 
contracts-conflicts problems. 1I2 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern conflicts of laws in both England and America 
finds its roots in the eighteenth century common law3 and 
traditionally the law in this field has been regarded as 
lL. Nurick. Choice-of-Law Clauses and International 
Contracts. 54 Proceedings. Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law 56 (1960). 
Although a quarter century old this would still seem to be 
applicable. For example in this decade it has been said 
II Con icts law as a whole is marked by ambiguity, but con-
flicts doctrine pertaining to the validity of contracts has 
been singularly characterised by confusion. II F.J. Nicholson! 
Conflict of Laws. Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law. 255 
at pp. 269-70 (1982). For a different view see F.K. Juenger. 
The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Application to Contractual 
Obligations: An American Assessment in Contract Conflicts. 
In the E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. A Comparative Study. (Ed. P.M. North) (1980) 
at p.295 who considers the most confused subject is tort 
choice of law ~f the ,'dearth' of contract decisions in com-
parison to the 'glut' of torts cases is any indication. How-
ever he does go on to note that the livery complexity of the 
subject may be responsible for the rather meagre crop of 
Judicial opinionll which rather goes against his argument. 
See however his footnote 2 at p.308. 
2R. J . weintraub. Choice of Law in Contract. 54 
Iowa L.R. 399 (l968). 
3See generally Prebble at p.436 et seq. R.H.Graveson. 
Comparative Evolution of the principles of Conflict of Laws 
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livery s 1ar".4 
Justice story's Commentaries 5 which was the rst 
general treatise on the subject treated English and American 
law the same. Likewise Beale ' s 6 treatise of 1935 was 
"devoted to a careful study of the positive common law of 
England and America", and Reese,7 the Reporter of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws has pointed out that in 
preparing the drafts for the Restatement (Second) nearly 
as much consideration was given to English as to American 
cases and that lithe drafts should, in general, be consistent 
with English law, since it is believed that there are few 
bas differences between the choice of law rules prevailing 
in England and in the United States. 118 Likewise English 
writers have also pointed out, sometimes impliedly that the 
laws of England and America are similar. Dicey's rst 
edition of Conflict of Laws, the leading English textbook 
attempted to cover the laws of both countries. 9 
in England and the U.S.A. (1960) 99 Recueil des Cours 21. 
4prebble at p.436, as opposed to Commonwealth Conflict 
of law which has been regarded as identical to English Con-
flict of law. See Prebble at p.436 footnote 6. 
5J . Story. Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. 
(1854) (1st edit.) 
6See J. Beale. A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 
Vol.1 (1935) at p.12. 
7 W.L.M. Reese. 
Conflict of Laws. 
531 at p.541. 
8Ibid . 
Contracts and the Restatement of 
Second. (1960) 9 Int'1 & Compo L.Q. 
9See A.V. Dicey. A Digest of the Law of England with 
Reference to the Conflict of Laws. (1896) . Prebble notes 
that this was not attempted in subsequent editions which fact 
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Prebble lO points out that "the casual observer" would 
consider this an odd state of affairs considering most 
American cases are interstate and subject to the United 
States constitution whilst English choice of laws for 
contracts are international and part of the common law. 
However the most important difference is that modern choice 
of law rules are built upon entirely different theoretical 
bases in America and England. Briefly English courts 
follow a classification and jurisdiction selecting method 
when faced with a choice of law problem, whereas the major-
ity of American courts adopt what is known as the principles 
of interest analysis. Under the latter approach, a choice 
of law is made after an evaluation of the specific con-
flicting rules (not the conflicting jurisdictions) and of 
the relative interests of the different legal systems that 
have some connection with the case at bar. "Nevertheless, 
ironically, in view of the immense amount of theorising 
that takes place on the western side of the Atlantic the 
results reached by English and American courts in the field 
of contracts will usually be found to be the same." l2 Not-
withstanding this comment it should be noted that this 
basic difference does affect many aspects of the subject, 
one example being the effects of events occurring after the 
he (Prebble) attributes to the general lack of interest by 
English lawyers in what was happening on the other side of 
the Atlantic. See Prebble at p.437 footnote 10. 
lOprebble at p.437 et seq. 
11 Ibid at pp.437-8. 
l2Ibid at p.438. 
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making of the contract. It will be recalled13 that in 
England it not legitimate to use as an aid anything 
the part s did or said after the contract was made. 
"Otherwise one might have the results that a contract meant 
one thing the day it was signed but by reason of subsequent 
events something different a month or year later." 14 
In America however subsequent events are considered by 
the courts in so far as these subsequent events affect the 
state or states concerned. 15 Thus whilst the origins of 
the subject may have been similar, at later stages16 
ferences were apparent and the object of considering 
the American approach in this decade is to see if the 
"American Revolution" has anything to offer New Zealand. 
Because of the enormous number of contract cases with 
connections with more than one state and due to the volume 
of academic writing by American conflicts scholars on this 
subject it has been thought appropriate to limit the dis-
cussion on the American approach in some way. Consequently 
wherever possible New York decisions are used to illustrate 
rules or approaches or academic suggestions. The New York 
l3 see supra at p.60. 
l4James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street 
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 at p.603 per Lord 
Reid. 
l5See Prebble at p.479 et seq. who points out that it 
is in American insurance litigation that post transaction 
events may most likely affect the choice of law. He gives 
examples on pp.479-80. 
l6 E . g . 1920-l950's. See Prebble at p.440, footnote 29. 
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jurisdiction was chosen because of New York City's role as 
a leading international and financial centre. 17 It may 
be likened to London in so far as courts in both juris-
dictions are frequently faced with contract cases which 
have no obvious connection with New York or London. 18 
These jurisdictions are chosen because of a widespread 
be f that they have a well developed commercial law and 
that New York and English judges are competent, unprejudiced 
and experts in this of law. New York courts are 
also faced with a higher percentage of international con-
tracts rather than interstate contracts which are prevalent 
in ss developed states of America. This fact also makes 
consideration of the New York jurisdiction more pertinent 
17Technically the courts of resort have the power 
to disagree with each other and develop discordant notions of 
cho of law. W1ilst variations and differences in emphasis 
exist within America New York represents the basic approach. 
See R.B. Schlesinger: Book Review 16 Am. J. Compo L. 608 
at p.614 (1968). 
18See M. Gruson. Governing Law Clauses in Commercial 
Agreements - New York's Approach 18 Columbia J of Trans-
national Law 323 at p.325 (1979). (Hereinafter cited as 
Gruson governing law clauses) . A recent statement by the 
New York Court of Appeals on New York's interest in fostering 
s role as a ading commerc centre is Erhlich-Bober & Co. 
v. University of Houston 427 N.Y.S. 2d. 604; (1980) where 
the court said: 
"Arrayed against (the policy of Texas law) is New York's 
recognised st in maintaining and fostering its undis-
puted status as the pre-eminent commercial and financial 
nerve centre of the nation and the world .... access to a 
convenient forum which dispassionately administers a known, 
stable and commercially sophisticated body of law may be con-
sidered as much an attraction to conducting business in New 
York as its unique financial and communications resources." 
Ibid atpp.608-9. 
164 
New Zealand. Finally two related introductory matters 
require noting before considering the American idea of 
interest analysis. The first is that complete isolation 
of individual approaches is not possible. For example, 
later academic writings build on earl views and as 
Morris and North note "in a similar situation where the law 
is in a state of fluid development, in over 50 different 
jurisdictions, it is not surprising to find reliance in any 
one case on several, not wholly mutually consistent theor s 
for the basis of the decision. 19 
Reese 20 has pointed out that the complexity of choice 
of law for contracts in America can be attributed in part 
to the fact that judges although they might have said they 
were applying a given rule interpret that rule to obtain a 
desired result. He cites the New York courts' former 
approach which re ed on a number of theories and used 
whichever rule was felt best suited the case being litigated. 
"This practice, however, was not frankly recognized in the 
opinions; each customarily mentioned but a single rule 
and simply ignored what the courts had s 
sions.,,21 
on other occa-
The second related matter to note is that a certain 
confusion exists in the terminology used. Governmental 
19Morris & North. 
national Law (1984) at 
& North). 
20 W.L.M. Reese. 
erning The Contract. 
Law 49 (1960). 
Cases & Materials on Private Inter-
pp.697-8.{Hereinafter cited as Morris 
Power of Parties to Choose Law Gov-
54 Proceedings. Am Soc'y of Int'l 
2lIbidat p.50 et seq. 
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interest analysis or just interest analysis is used by 
some writers to refer to a number of theories which because 
of their general charucteristics may be considered as part 
of interest analysis, whilst on the other hand it may be 
used more specifically to refer only to Currie's theory.22 
Reppy23 defines eclecticism as an approach involving use 
by the court of two or more distinct choice of law methods 
or parts of those methods, in deciding a single choice of 
law issue, whilst he defines "method" as a theory for 
reaching a choice of law result. Thus for example the lex 
loci contractus and 'centre of gravity' theory may both be 
seen as a method, whilst interest analysis "describes 
perhaps a dozen different methods," or theories. 24 
INTEREST ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
"The term 'interest analysis' has come to include 
a wide variety of scholarly and judicial opinion 
concerning the proper functioning of the choice of 
law process."25 
Generally speaking it may be said that interest analysis 
involves the court in making an assessment of the conflict-
ing rules involved in the dispute rather than directing 
the court to apply fixed rules to a give case. An enormous 
amount has been written on interest analysis, both in praise 
22It is used in 
23 W.A. Reppy. 
method or Mishmash? 
24 Ibid at p.647. 
25 See Prebble at 
criticism. See H.H. 
of Law in the Courts. 
its wider sense in the following pages. 
Eclecticism in Choice of Law; Hybrid 
34 Mercer L.R. 645 at p.645 (1982-1983). 
p.447 for a general introduction and 
Kay. Theory into Practice: Choice 
34 Mercer L.R. 521 (1982-1983). 
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and condemnation of it generally and of the many speci 
varie s of it in particular. The lowing discussion 
emphasises the more important theor s from a contracts 
point of view. 26 
The word 'interest' comes from the theory that in every 
conflicts case each state that is connected with a trans-
action may in some way be interested the result. This 
interest is apparent and manifests itself in the various 
policies of the state or states concerned, and the polic s 
may be ascertained from the local laws of the relevant juris-
dictions. Having established the various interests involved 
in the case the court's duty is to apply the law of the 
state or country which is seen to be most concerned with the 
determination of the particular issue in the case. It is in 
the way to achieve this that American scholars differ in 
their views, which considering the enormity of the task in-
valved is not surprising. It may be argued that interest 
analysis is more appropriate to "solving" tortious problems 
than interstate and international contracts as it is diffi-
cult to conceive of policies or interests (except in very 
general terms) which affect contracts. 27 However it has 
been and is used in the United States and so the following 
specific theories are discussed in the following order: 
26Although some articles referred to relate to torts they 
are noted because they are considered equally pertinent in 
the given context to contract law. 
27Discussed infra at p.198. 
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1. Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis. 
2. Cavers' Principles of Preference. 
3. The Rheinstein Method. 
4. The Comparative Impairment Approach. 
5. The Functional Approach. 
6. The Forum Centred or True Rules Approach. 
7. Leflar's 'Better Law' Approach. 
8. The 'Contract' (or 'Centre of Gravity' or Grouping 
of Contacts Approach, or Significant Contacts Approach.) 
Having considered these specific theories of interest 
analysis the concept of party autonomy is discussed in the 
New York setting. This involves a consideration of both 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Adopted by the 
illnerican Law Institute in 1969 and the Uniform Commercial 
Code with special reference to the latest New York Uniform 
Commercial Code. The New York Common Law concludes Part B. 
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Governmental Interest Analysis 
"The very considerations which judges most rarely 
mention, and always with an apology, are the secret 
root from which the law draws all the juices of life. 
I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient 
for the community concerned.,,28 
Although Currie was not the first scholar to suggest 
that decisionmakers should consider government "interests" 
when resolving a choice-of-law controversy, he was the first 
to incorporate the idea into a speci theory. 29 Writing 
in 1963 he said: 
111. When a Court is asked to apply the Law of a 
foreign state different from the law of the forum, it 
should inquire into the policies expressed in the res-
pective laws, and into the circumstances in which it 
is reasonable for the respective states to assert an 
interest in the application of those policies. In 
making these determinations the Court should employ the 
ordinary processes of construction and interpretation. 
2. If the Court finds that one state has an interest 
in the application of its policy in the circumstances 
of the case and the other state has none, it should 
apply the law of the only interested state. 
3. If the Court finds an apparent conflict between 
the interests of the two states it should reconsider. 
A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the 
policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid 
conflicts. 
4. If, upon reconsideration, the Court finds that a 
conflict between the legitimate interests of two states 
is unavoidable. it should apply the law of the forum. 30 
28 0 . Holmes. The Common Law. (1881) at p.35. 
29 See L.L. McDougal. Choice of Law: Prologue to a 
Viable Interest-Analysis Theory. 51(2) Tulane L. Rev. 207 
at p.237 (1977). 
30 See also Enrenzweig's view at pp.183-4 discus below 
at p. Although the reference to the 1963 article refers to 
Babcock v. Jackson 12 N.Y. 2d. 473 (1973) a torts case, the 
six points above are equally applicable to c~ntr~cts.. See for 
example B. Currie. Notes on Methods and Ob]ectlves In the 
Conflict of Laws. Duke L.J. 171 at p.178 (1950). 
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5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable 
conflict exists between the laws of the two other 
states, it should apply the law of the forum - until 
someone comes along with a better idea. 
6. The conflict of interest between states will 
result in different dispositions of the same problem,. 
depending on where the action brought. If with 
respect to a particular problem this appears seriously 
to infringe a strong national interest in uniformity 
of decision, the Court should not attempt to improvise 
a solution sacrificing the legitimate interests of its 
own state but should leave to Congress, exercising its 
powers under the full faith and credit clause, the 
determination of which interest shall be required to 
yield.,,31 
Currie in developing his Governmental Interest Analys 
distinguished between three types of conflicts; a true 
conflict exists where two jurisdictions have identifiable 
policies that would be furthered by the application of the 
respective laws. In a se conflict32 one state has no 
claim (or a spurious claim) for the application of its law 
and the other state has a legitimate claim whilst the third 
situation i~ the "unprovided for" case where "neither state 
cares what happens u33 or a disinterested forum is unable to 
choose between competing policies in which it has no stake. 34 
Currie insisted that the forum should not resolve true con-
flicts because balancing the relative importance of competing 
31B. Currl'e. C ~ B b k J k A ornnlCD ,_8 Oil a coc v. nc con. 
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws. 63 Columbia L.R. 
1212 at pp.1242-3 (1963) and see B. Currie. Selected Essays 
on the Conflict of Laws. (1963) . 
32See generallly P.K. Weston. 'False Conflicts' 55 
Calif. L.R. 74 (1967). 
33Currie op. cit. supra at n.31 at p.152. 
34 Ibid . See Ch. 3 generally. See also B. Currie. 
The Disinterested Third state. (1963). 28 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 754. 
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state interests is not a judicial function, it " .... is a 
political function of a very high order. This is a function 
that should not be committed to Courts in a democracy. It 
is a function that the Courts cannot perform effectively for 
they lack the necessary resources. 1135 MCDouga136 suggests 
Currie's approach "is still less than fully helpful" and 
has 'parochial' characteristics - presumably a reference to 
the lex fori applying in a true conflict situation. Sedler 37 
has " re formulated ll Currie's approach/ first Sedler suggests 
that if the forum has a 'real interest' it applies forum law 
assuming this will not be fundamentally unfair to the other 
party. Secondly if the other state and not the forum has 
a real interest that law is applied again assuming no funda-
mental unfairness. Thirdly lI when neither state has a real 
interest in applying its law on the point in issue/ the 
choice of law decision should be made with reference to the 
cornmon policies reflected in the laws of the involved 
states. n38 
Kramer39 suggests that in order to determine whether 
it is a true or false conflict situation regard must be had 
35Currie op. cit. supra n.3l at p.182. 
36 0p • cit. supra n.29 at p.242. 
37 R . A. Sedler. Choice of Law in Michigan: A time to 
go Modern. 24 No.3 Wayne L.R. 829 at p.835 (1978). 
38 Ibid at pp.835-6. 
39 R . Kramer. Interest & Policy Clashes in Conflicts 
of Laws. Vol. XIII Rutgers L.R. 523 (1959). 
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to three types of interests; these are 'public at large', 
individual and group interests respectively. Ratner40 on 
the other hand suggests three policy values to be taken 
into consideration in the conflict cases, namely the avoid-
ance of internal policy stultification, "home protection" 
and "ful lment of expectations. "41 
Westbrook 42 considers that viewed as a whole Professor 
Currie's approach is "basically a philosophy of surrender" 
which does not provide a complete answer to the choice of 
law problem. However, it does achieve greater certainty 
by referring the court back to the forum than other approach-
es which require the court to choose between conflicting 
state interests. As noted above much of the writing on 
governmental interest analysis has been in the context of 
torts and obviously many of the considerations are more 
applicab in that context. Ratner's "home protection,,43 
is one such example; however this does not mean that 
Currie's approach has not been used in contract situations. 44 
Before turning to Cavers' views it may be noted that 
analysing a case to see if it presents a true or false con-
40L . G. Ratner. Choice of Law, Interstate Analysis 
and Cost Contribution. No.3. 47 So. Calif. L.R. 817 
at p.824 (1973-1974). 
41 Ibid at pp.826-7. 
42J.E.Westbrook. A Survey and Evaluation of Competing 
Choice of Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism. 
40 Missouri L.R. 407 at p.419 (Summer 1975). 
43 0p . cit. supra n. 40. 
44An example is given infra at p.196 See also Chapter 
4 at p.270 on the New York common law. 
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flict is a hallmark of the interest analysis approach. 45 
The term 'false' has been used in at least six different 
ways46 but the two major views of what constitutes a false 
conflict may be summarised as follows. In the first 
situation the court discovers that the domestic law of both 
or all interested jurisdictions is identical and thus the 
conflict may be said to be truly false. Whilst all writers 
would agree this is a false conflict situation~ many other 
American scholars consider that it is also a false conflict 
if on enquiry it is established that one state has a con-
siderable interest in having its domestic law applied whilst 
the other state or states has proportionately less interest 
in applying its law to the contract. Others would see 
this as an "easy" true conflicts case. 47 
45prebble at p.466. 
46Comment. False Conflicts 50 Calif. L. Rev 74 (1963). 
47Weston op. cit. supra n.32. 
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Principles of Preference Approach 
Cavers 48 advocates an approach which in many ways is 
similar to that of Currie. In Cavers' view the difficulty 
of interest analysis is not in ascertaining the purpose 
behind laws but rather the difficulty resulting from the 
fact that often laws have multiple purposes which may point 
in opposite directions. 49 Cavers and Currie differ IDOst 
sharply when interest analysis does not reveal a false or 
readily avoidable conflict. Curr at this point asserted 
that an interested forum should apply its own law. Cavers, 
however, believes that it is the responsbility of the court: 
" .•. to seek a rule for choice of law or a principle 
of preference which would either reflect relevant 
multistate policies or provide a basis for a reasonable 
accommodation of the laws' conflicting purposes. A 
principle of preference would be applicable to all 
cases having the same general pattern of law and fact 
and would identify a preferred result on choice-of-
law grounds. If the case could not thus be general-
ised, the court should state the reasons leading it 
to prefer one result to the other on choice-of-law 
grounds. In either case it should apply the law 
leading to the preferred result. 1150 
Cavers has suggested in his book various principles 
of preference for certain areas of conflict of laws. 
cerning contracts he said that where'protective' legis-
lation exists it should be evoked against a party where 
48 See D.F. Cavers. The Choice of Law Process. 
Especially Ch. vii (1965). 
49 Ibid at p.108. 
SOIbid at p.64. 
Con-
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a person has a home in the state (if the law's purpose 
was to protect that person) and the transaction was 
"centred" there or if it were not, this was due to facts 
that were fortuitous or had been manipulated to evade the 
protective law. 
If the parties made an express (or reasonably prefer-
able) choice of law decision that was reasonably related 
to the contract then a court should uphold such a choice. 
However Cavers considered that this too should be subject 
to the principle that protective legislation should prevail 
despite a choice of law clause. 51 
A decade later Cavers 52 wrote 
"The modern state surrounds the individual with a pro-
tective screen of restrictions on the conduct of his 
fellows .... This protective screen extends also to 
the exercise of contractual powers ... and its safe-
guards may be reinforced either by the remedy of 
damages or simply by denying the state's aid in the 
enforcement of offending agreements ... Modern con-
flicts arise because . ... transactions involve two 
or more states that offer different degrees of pro-
tection . 
..... The resolution of conflicts ... could •.. be 
greatly simplified if the courts and legislators would 
expressly address the following questions: in choos-
ing between two laws, under what circumstances should 
we prefer the more protective law?,,53 
Cavers' principles have been considered in Europe. For 
example the drafters of the Swiss code considered at length 
51Ibid at p.181. 
52D. F . Cavers. A Critique of the Choice-of-Law 
Process: Addendum 1972. 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 651 (1976). 
53 Ibid at pp. 655-6. 
175 
whether to use Cavers' principles,54 and many of his 
colleagues in the United States have hailed his principles 
as a significant contribution to the American Revolution 
of Conflicts law. 55 Cavers may be seen as espousing an 
approach half way between those advocating the ad hoc 
approach of interest analysis and those advocating narrow 
rules. 56 Although the principles of preference are rather 
general, they are rules blending domiciliary and territorial 
factors and forge a link between geography and teleology.57 
Taking a middle way he is criticised by those on either 
side. 58 Reese has suggested that the prinipcles of 
54 See F. Vischer. Drafting National Legislation on 
Conflict of Laws: The Swiss Experience. (Spring 1977) 
41 No.2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 131 at p.143. It was decid-
ed to take a IImore neutral approach ... the draft, in the 
chapter on contracts, adheres to the principle that those 
contracts where one party normally has a special need for 
protection are subject to the law of the State at that 
party's habitual residence; in labour contracts, to the 
law of the State of the normal place of employment. A 
party should not be deprived of the protection given by the 
law on which he normally relies and which is the law of his 
'home' state. This principle is also a limit on party 
autonomy. II Ibid at p.143. 
The Swiss Code influenced the E.E.C. Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980). 
55E . g . H.H. Horowitz. The Law of Choice of Law in 
California. A. Restatement. 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 719 
at p.780 (1974) believes that the principles of preference: 
"will surely be the form which the choice of law rules of 
the future will take." 
56E . g . Currie as opposed to Reese and Rosenberg. See 
infra at n.59 p.176. 
57 R. L . Felix. The Choice of Law Process at a Cross-
road. 9 Duquesne L. Rev. 413 at p.4l4 (1971). 
58compare for example the views of H.W. Baade. Counter-
Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflection on Read-
ing Cavers, the Choice of Law Process. 46 Tex. L. Rev. 
14 (1967) with M. Rosenberg. Symposium on the Value of 
Principled Preferences. 49 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1971). 
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preference will not be useful until precise rules are for-
mulatedj59 however Cavers 60 believes that general prin-
ciples of preference will be of more use in the long term 
because they will have broader applicability than narrow 
rules. 61 
westbrook62 suggests that the "greatest strength" of 
the Cavers approach lies in the fact that he seeks to 
further the purposes and policies underlying state law 
without exposing lawyers and litigants to the expense and 
uncertainty which accompany a case by case analysis of 
governmental interests. 
It is suggested that in so far as Cavers allows party 
autonomy his theory is commendable. However if no choice 
has been made it is very difficult to apply a law leading 
to "the preferred result." Whilst much legislation may be 
seen as protective, many rules for contract law are arbitrary 
in the sense that the rule provides a way of resolving an 
impasse irrespective of anything else. Take for example 
the rule in England that acceptance of an offer is complete 
on posting. In Germany the acceptance must be received. If 
59 . W.L.M. Reese. Cholce of Law. Rules of Approaches. 
57 Cornell L. Rev. 315 at p.324 (1972). 
60Cavers op. cit. supra n.48 at p.133. 
61 He suggested (ibid) that long intervals are likely 
to elapse before reported decisions involving narrowly 
defined conflicts rules emerge. 
62 . Westbrook op. Clt. supra n.42 at p.460. 
an international contract concerned this point Cavers' 
principles of preference do not assist. 
The English and German rules are not concerned with 
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protection or moral consideration. Both are neutral, both 
are satisfactory rules in so far as they solve an issue 
of contract law. As long as everyone knows the rule and 
the rule is upheld by the court the question of communi-
cation of acceptance is covered. 
lack ease of application. 
Cavers' principles 
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The Rheinstein Method 63 
Rheinstein's view is that much of the difficulty in 
choice of law arises because "writers came to regard it as 
the task conflicts law to demarcate from each other the 
spheres of proper exercise of the power of sovereign states 
to regulate human activities .,,64 He suggests that the true 
task of conflict law is to mitigate the hardships for in-
dividuals which result from differences in the rules of 
decision by which the conduct of private individuals is 
measured. 65 His thesis is that the main purpose of choice 
of law rules - indeed the very raison d'etre - is to protect 
the justified expectations of private individuals. 66 
Rheinstein considers that the ideal situation would be one 
whereby each individual could know in advance by what state's 
law his conduct will be measured. 
h · . 1 . k Eh . 67. h h k R elnsteln, 1 e renzwelg, vlews t e approac ta en 
by the governmental interest unalysis school as mistaken in 
its belief that the purpose of conflicts law is to decide 
which of competing government interests shall prevail. 68 
63Summarised by Cavers op. cit. supra n.48 at pp. 63, 
67-9. 
64M. Rheinstein. Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict 
of Laws. 18 Okla. L. Rev. 238 at p.240 (1965). 
65 Ibid at p.241. 
66M. Rheinstein. 
Method of Case Law. 
The place of Wrong: A Study in the 
19 Tul. L. Rev. 4, at pp.17-31 (1944). 
67 See lnfra at p.185. 
68M. Rheinstein. 
369 at p.375 (1965). 
Book Review. 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
179 
Whilst law can be seen as a body of s and regulations 
which are enforced by the state it is easy to view rules 
of law as rules of conduct addres by the sovereign to 
individuals which in turn make it natural to view conflicts 
law as providing guidance as to which sovereign's command 
shall prevail. 69 Rheinstein points out that it is possible 
to view law differently - instead of being directed beyond 
the parties concerned, rules of law may be seen as addressed 
to individuals as rules conduct. 70 It has been noted71 
that this "makes a difference in conflicts thinking because 
the emphasis shifts from accommodating the conflicting 
demands of sovereigns to a more important consideration -
the parties' expectations." 
The protection justified expectations can best be 
accomplished, according to Rheinsten, by relying on narrow 
jurisdiction selecting choice of law rules developed to 
deal with specific problems. He would develop rules 
through a functional approach by analysing the problems 
raised concrete situations. Rheinstein believes that 
there is a widespread misconception in the United States 
concerning the way to classify matters; he considers that 
what should be classified is the problem itself rather than 
the statute or rule of law involved, and then once having 
classified the fact situation a rule should be there to 
69 r bid at p.373. 
70 Ibid . 
71Westbrook op. cit. supra n.42 at p.4l9. 
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apply to it. 72 In so far as Rheinstein advocates rules 
rather than approaches his views are similar to those of 
Reese. 73 Both criticise the first Restatement's attempt 
to provide a few all-embracing rules rather than provide 
detailed specific ones and both emphasise the importance of 
party expectation. However Westbrook's74 conclusion that 
Rheinstein places far greater emphasis on this than Reese 
would seem correct. 
Rheinstein was considering choice of law generally, 
however his thesis would appear particularly relevant to 
contract cases. Whilst some would argue that the state 
has an apparently increasing interest in protecting certain 
persons in transactions they choose to enter, the state's 
interest is nevertheless considerably less significant 
than in, say, tortious situations where protection of one's 
own citizens is of greater concern to the state and where 
party expectations play a far lesser role than they do in 
contract law. 
72Rheinstein considers that this is what is done in 
European jurisdictions especially Germany. See M. Rhein-
stein. How to Review a Festschrift. 11 Am J. Compo L. 
632 at p.660 (1962). 
73 See infra at p.466 et seq. 
74westbrook op. cit. supra n.42 at p.421. 
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The Comparative Impairment Approach 75 
Here, the court is asked to measure the comparative 
impairment of the policies of the two states it the law of 
the other state was applied. Baxter, an exponent of this 
view, suggests that when a court determines which state's 
internal objectives will be least impaired it is doing 
something II •••• very different in kind from the weighing 
process often referred to by similar rubrics, but the two 
are often confused .... ,,76 He suggests that the fact that 
"super value judgments are separable from the comparative im-
pairment principle is one of the cornerstones ... " 77 of 
the approach. 
75 See generally L. Kanowitz. Comparative Impairment 
and Better Law; Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws. 
30 Hastings L. Rev. 255 (1978) and H.H. Kay. The Use of 
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evalua-
tion of the California Experience. 68 Calif. L. Rev. 577 
(1980) . 
76W. F . Baxter. Choice of Law & The Federal System. 
16 Stanford L.R. 1 at p.18 (1963). 
77 Ibid . 
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The Functional Approach 
Here the court firstly ascertains which jurisdictions 
are concerned and then constructs a rule for each relevant 
jurisdiction. If these rules conflict then the next step 
is to determine whether or not one jurisdiction is pre-
nominantly concerned. A jurisdiction predominantly 
concerned if analysis reveals that even though the domestic 
policies of the concerned jurisdictions are of relative 
equal weight, that of one jurisdiction in light of its 
relation to a multistate transaction far outweighs that of 
the other jurisdictions, or that one jurisdiction has a 
greater "aggregation of concerns"78 than do the other 
jurisdictions. Should there be no predominantly concerned 
jurisdiction then analysis may reveal that "the claims of 
one jurisdiction are so clearly superior" that it should 
be recognised. 79 In this situation the lex fori is applied 
if the forum is concerned and if the forum is neutral it 
applies the concerned jurisdiction whose law !lmost closely 
approximates" the law the forum. 80 
This approach was developed by Von Mehren and Trautman; 
the former so considered the possibility of developing 
special substantive rules for multistate problems. These 
rules are not necessarily to be chosen from amongst the 
provisions of the conflicting domestic jurisdictions con-
78 A.T. Von Mehren & D.T. Trautman. The Law of the 
Multistate Problem. (1965) at pp.341-2. 
79 Ibid at p.77. 
80 Ibid at pp.407-8. 
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cerned. Von Mehren8l discusses three types of situations 
where such rules could be advantageously applied. For 
the st situation he envisages a fact situation where 
two legal orders are both sufficiently concerned so that 
both rules should be given effect to but the two laws do 
no lend themselves to cumulative application. Secondly 
are those situations which because of their multistate 
characteristics involve considerations which do not have 
particular significance in comparable domestic settings,82 
and thirdly come the true conflict situations. 83 
Von Mehren admits that the legislature is not likely 
to be active in developing these rules and so their for-
mulation would be left to the judiciary and here he notes 
the "traditional hesitancy" to accord law making functions 
to the courts and lithe general reluctance of all contemporary 
societies to assign additional tasks of great complexity and 
difficulty to already over burdened courts. 84 Cavers 85 
recognised lithe logical alternative that a rule derived from 
none of the domestic laws in question should be fashioned 
for the case" but rejected the approach on the grounds that 
8lA. T . Von Mehren. Special Substantive Rules for 
Multistate Problems: Their Role & Significance in Con-
temporary Choice of Law Methodology. 88 Harv. L.R. 347 
(1974) . 
82 Ibid at p.358. 
83 Ibid at p.367. 
84 Ibid at p.357. 
85 D.F. Cavers. A Critique of the Choice of Law Prob-
lem. 47 Harv. L.R. 173 at p.193 (1933). 
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the judge would lack guidance and that further multiplication 
of the rules of substantive law undesirable. 
The difficulties attached to the functional approach 
are obvious and numerous - what criteria should be used to 
determine a predominantly concerned jurisdiction; when is 
a claim superior; to name but two obvious difficulties. 
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The Forum Centred or True Rules Approach 
Ehrenzweig, champion of the lex fori looks at past de-
cisions to see the "real ll or IItrue reasons II for the appli-
cation of a particular legal system. If no true rule was 
apparent then Ehrenzweig suggested that the lex fori govern 
unless on the policy grounds of the forum it should be dis-
placed. 86 Ehrenzweig contended that American Conflict Law 
had developed true rules of choice in most of those situa-
tions in which parties can claim to have taken into account 
a specific law. 
"What is thus left for the residuary lex fori ... are 
essentially such liabilities as those for ...... breach 
of contract ... as to which application of forum law 
cannot be said to defeat a party's justified expec-
tations ..... 1187 
Ehrenzweig's views at similar in their conclusion to 
those of Currie discussed above. 88 He did however arrive 
at his result by a different path. 89 First he considered 
that reference to choice of law rules and foreign law was 
essentially abnormal but that there were in certain areas 
well established rules where the court did apply foreign 
law. Where a case 11 to be decided where there was no 
86A. A. Ehrenzweig. The Lex Fori: Basic Rule in 
the Conflict of Laws. 58 Mich. L.R. 637 (1960) also 
A.A. Ehrenzweig. A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. (1962). 
Ch. 4 especially at pp.352-3. 
87A. A. Ehrenzweig. 
A "Restatement" of the Lex 
340 at p. 352. (1965). 
A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: 
Fori Approach. 18 Okla. L.R. 
88 See supra at p. 168 et seq. 
89 See R.B. Schlesinger. Book Review, 16 Am. J. Compo 
L. 608 at pp.610-2 (1968). 
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established rule then Ehrenzweig considered there must be 
reference to public policy and this could only be the 
forum's public policy, reference to which would usually 
result in the court applying forum law. (He admitted that 
some super law which all states were bound to obey could 
provide the necessary guidelines but that no such law 
existed. ) Ehrenzweig realised that application of his 
theory could result in forum shopping but felt that this 
could be overcome by tightening the rules relating to juris-
diction. 
Whilst Currie and Ehrenzweig have support for their 
forum favouring ideas 90 it has been suggested91 that the 
courts are unlikely to adopt such an approach as it would 
require wholesale legislative revision of American rules 
o£ jurisdiction. 
Finally Ehrenzweig's92 views on the desirability of 
90Cheatham, Reese, Rheinstein and Shapira all advocate 
a preference for application of the lex fori. See E. Cheat-
ham & W.L.M. Reese. Choice of the Applicable Law. 52 
Columbo L. Rev. 959 at p.965 (1952). Rheinstein op. cit. 
supra n.64 at pp.239-40 and A. Shapira. The Interest 
Approach to Choice of Law. (1970) (Shapira's book is however 
written with reference to tort cases but his theory can be 
applied to contract cases) . 
91prebble at p.473. 
92See A.A. 
Conflicts Law: 
717 (1957). 
Ehrenzweig. Interstate and International 
A Plea for Segregation. 41 Minn. L. Rev. 
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separating interstate from international contracts is of 
interest. He advocates separate treatment for the two 
types of contracts and has gone so far as to write text 
books on each. 93 His view here contradicts the Restate-
ment (Second) of Con ict of Laws 94 which suggests there 
should be no difference between interstate and internation-
al contracts. 
93 A. A. Ehrenzweig. Private International Law. (1967) 
and A.A. Ehrenzweig. Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 
(1962) . Some American articles deal only with inter-
national contracts, see also R. Johnston. Party Autonomy 
in Contracts Specifying Foreign Law. 7 Williams & Mary 
L.R. 37 (1966). 
94Section 10. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. 
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The "Better Law" Approach 
In 1952 Cheatham and Reese identified nine factors 
relevant in determining which law should apply.95 Reese 
subsequently added a tenth96 whilst Yntema 97 went on to 
list no ss than seventeen considerations reducible to 
two primary groupings, namely security and comparative 
justice. However, it is Leflar's98 'choice-influencing 
considerations' which seem to have achieved the most popu-
larity in the United states. The five considerations are: 
(a) the predictability of results. 
(b) the maintenance of interstate and international order. 
(c) simplification of the judicial task. 
(d) advancement of the forum's governmental interests. 
(e) application of better law. 
95Cheatham and .Reese op. cit. supra n.90. 
In order of importance they are (i) the needs of the inter-
state and international system; (ii) application of local 
law unless there good reason not doing so; (iii) the 
effectuation of the purpose of the relevant local rule in 
determining a question of choice of law; (iv) certainty, 
predictability, uniformity of results; (v) protection of 
justified expectations; (vi) application of the law of the 
state of dominant interest; (vii) ease in determination of 
applicable law, convenience of the court; (viii) the funda-
mental policy underlying the broad local law field involved; 
and (ix) justice in the individual case. 
96 The court must follow the dictates of its own legis-
lature, provided these dictates are constitutional. W.L.M. 
Reese. Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Second). (1963) 
28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 679 at p.682. 
97 H. E. Yntema. The Objectives of Private International 
Law. 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721 at pp.734-5 (1957). 
98 R• A. Leflar. American Conflicts Law. (1977) (3rd 
edit) at p.195 (hereinafter referred to as Leflar). See also 
R.A. Le ar. Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts 
Law. 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267 (1966). R.A. Leflar. Conflicts 
Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations. 54 Cal. 
L . Re v. 15 8 3 ( 1 9 6 6) . 
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These considerations are not listed in order of im-
portance and Leflar specifically limited the number of con-
siderations to a manageable number which could be used as 
a practical basis for making decisions. He said "no 
priority among the considerations is intended from the 
order of listing. Their relative importance varies in 
accordance to the area of law involved. Some will be more 
important in one area of law, others in another. 
should be considered regardless of the area.,,99 
But all 
Leflar points out that most choice of law cases require 
a deliberate choice between the opposing rules of two states. 
At one time, he suggests, judges would have self-consciously 
denied that they gave any weight to the quality of the rules 
of law between which choice was made. "A vested rights 
approach called for a choice between states not between 
laws, and there was thought to be some of the unethical 
in the conduct of a judge who unlike blind justice admitted-
ly opened his eyes to see the consequences of his choice."lOO 
What actually happens, accord to Leflar l is that the 
lawyer starts by characterising his problem so that he knows 
what area of law is involved, he then looks up the laws of 
the connected states to see which would best suit his client. 
Then he looks at the conflicts rules which choose a state 
rather than a law and selects a characterisation or a 
conflicts theory that will under the rules lead him to the 
99Le at p.198. One wonders why there he saw 
to alter the list around. In the second edition (1968) 
consideration of the better law is listed first whilst it 
appears last in the 1977 ion. 
lOOIbid at p.200. 
lIbid at p.198 et seq. 
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previously chosen law with its desired results. When the 
lawyer appears in court he reverses his reasoning process 
and argues firstly his conflicts theory which leads to the 
conclusion he desired and which he started with. Leflar 
suggests that the court real that this is in fact what 
lawyers do, and that they, the judges, also look at the 
content of laws in order to achieve justice. 
Reppy2 likewise suggests that the judge decides the 
result he wants and then applies methods that achieve s, 
also the judge may well decide which is the better law but 
being "too embarrassed" to openly state this applies a com-
bination of methods which arrives as the same end result. 
Leflar has been much criticised for his theory. For 
example McDougal 3 notes that Leflar's factors are "at a 
high level of abstraction" which means courts will have to 
use an "inordinate amount of discretion" and this could lead 
to unpredictabllity. In a 'true conflict' the court pre-
sumably has still to determine which is the better law and 
this requires the making of value judgments and this can 
lead to a "mindless homeward trend" and should not be en-
couraged.( "The court is assuming powers which should be 
left to its state's legislature if it applies another state's 
law because of a belief that it is superior to a forum 
statute ..... "5 
2Reppy Ope cit. supra n.23 at p.650 et seq. 
3McDougal Ope cit. supra n.29 at p.249. 
4 D.F. Cavers. In Symposium on the Value of Principled 
Preferences. 49 Texas L.R. 221 at p.221 (1971). 
5Westbrook Ope cit. supra n.42 at p.461. 
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Jaffey6 has recently stated that "if it is proper for 
a court to select the rule of one country rather than 
another on the ground that it is better, why stop short 
of inventing ad hoc a rule which seems to the court even 
better than any existing one." Whilst Morris & North7 
have said 
"Many commentators frown on the application of the 
better rule of law, and with good reason. It is not 
the function of the courts to reform the law of other 
countries (still less of their own country) by giving 
it the narrowest possible scope or refusing to apply 
it in a conflict of laws case. That is a task better 
left to legislatures or law reform bodies. As Cavers 8 
says, to ask the judge simply to express a preference 
between two rules of law on the grounds of justice and 
conven~ence 'is to abolish our centuries-old subject' .,,9 
If unacceptable to European writers Leflar does have 
support within the United States. Juenger,10 Reppy,11 
6A• J . E . Jaffey. The Foundations of Rules for the 
Choice of Law. 2 Oxford J. of Legal Studs. 368 (1982). 
7Morris & North at p.741. 
8 Cavers op. cit. supra n.48 at p.86. 
9This note by Morris & North comes at the very end (p. 
741) of Chapter 30 entitled IIArnerican Methods for Choice of 
Law". The authors outline and illustrate by cases true and 
false conflicts, Governmental Interest Analysis, Comparative 
Impairment, Principles of Preference, The Most Significant 
Relationship test, the Restatement (Second) as well as Lef-
lar's Choice Influencing Considerations. Such would appear 
to be the anathema for Leflar's "Better Law" that the authors 
are unable to refrain from a criticism of it. It is to be 
noted that they do not criticise or evaluate the other 
approaches discussed. 
10Juengerop_ cit. supra n.1 on p.1S9 at p.302 and F.K. 
Juenger. Choice of Law in Interstate Torts. 118 U.Pa. 
L. Rev. 202 at p.233 et seq. (1969). 
11Reppy Ope cit. supra n.23 at p.6S0 et seq. 
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Weintraub 12 and Westbrook13 all to a greater or lesser 
degree praise aspects of his theory, but even here criticism 
of the better rule of law criterion occurs. Westbrook14 
quotes Cavers as taking the correct view namely that although 
Leflar is right in saying that judges do consider which is 
the better law it is only a tendency which should be rocog-
nised .... not encouraged. 
However at the end of the day Leflar's considerations 
may be seen as having been adopted by the important section 
6 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.15 
l2 R. J . Weintraub. A Method for Solving Conflict 
Problems - Torts. 48 Cornell L.Q. 215 at p.249 (1963). 
l3Westbrook Ope cit. supra n.42 at p.460 et seq. 
14Citing Cavers Ope cit. supra n.48 at p.215. 
l5Discussed infra at p.203 et seq. 
193 
The 'contacts or 'Centre-of-Gravity' or Grouping of 
Contacts or Significant Contact Approach 
Here the law of the jurisdiction with the most 'con-
tacts' with the contract prevails. There appears to be 
some confusion over terminology here. Nicholson16 for 
example says (whilst discussing the retreat from the vested 
rights theory) 
"The contacts methodology brings a more functional and 
less mechanic analysis to the cases. The following 
theories have been the most influential in promoting 
the contacts approach: (1) the late Professor 
Brainerd Currie's 'governmental interest' analysis; 
(2) the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 'most 
significant relationship' rulei (3) Professor Robert 
Leflar's ~ive 'choice-influencing considerations' 
analys Although there are differences of emphasis 
among these three formulations, they agree in stressing 
the importance of evaluating all the substantial con-
tacts of the conflicts situation. They reject the 
exclusive, one-dimensional lex loci rule. 1I17 
Whilst a little later he seems to view the approach as 
something more specific by saying: 
and 
"One new approach to the validity of contract problem, 
which is receiving increasing approbation by courts 
and publicists, is the 'center of gravity' or 'grouping 
of contacts' theory. A lucid exposition of the theory 
can be found in the New York Court of Appeals decision 
in Auten v. Auten. 1I 
"The Restatement (Second) or Conflict of Laws has 
aligned itself with the 'contacts' standard enuncia-
ted in the Auten case. In rejecting the dogma of lex 
loci contractus, states that the validity of a con-
tract is governed by the law of the state with which 
the transaction has 'its most significant relationshi~.1118 
16see generally F.J. Nicholson. 29 Annual Survey of 
Massachusetts Law 255 (1982). 
l7 Ibid at pp.255-6. 
18 Ibid . 
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Weintraub19 likewise equates 'centre of gravity' with 
Section 188 Restatement (Second). H"e says 
"In the absence of a choice-of-Iaw clause in the con-
tract in issue, the emerging consensus of united States 
courts appear to be that questions of validity should be 
controlled by the 'centre of gravity' of the transaction, 
this being the state having the most significant relation-
ship with the parties and with the transaction." 
It will be shown below20 that the New York approach to 
choice of law for contracts has adopted this approach in pre-
ference to all the previous approaches. Interest analysis, 
as a specific approach is occasionally used21 but the over-
whelming choice has been the 'centre of gravity' approach 
coupled with party autonomy. As these two approaches domin-
ate in New York an illustration of their application in actual 
cases seems appropriate by way of introduction to a more de-
tailed review of New York law which is undertaken below. 
Perhaps the best known example of the 'centre of gravity' 
approach is Haag v.Barnes 22 which involved an Illinois resi-
dent who had promised to pay $275 per month to a New York 
resident who was the mother of an ex nuptial child. The 
agreement stated that "it shall in all respects be inter-
preted, construed and governed by the laws of the State 
of Illinois. II The plaintiff had become pregnant in 
New York but at the defendant's wish had had the baby 
19Weintraub op. cit. supra n.2 on p.159 at p.412. 
20Infra at p.270 et seq. 
21Infra at p.301. 
22 216 N.Y.S. 2d. 65 (1961). Although not a commercial 
contract it is cited because it has been applied by New York 
courts in commercial situations. See infra at p.301 et seq. 
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in Chicago. Following the birth the mother lived for two 
years in California before returning to New York. The 
defendant supported the mother and child in compliance 
with the agreement and made large additional payments. 
The mother commenced proceedings in New York contrary to 
the agreement which had provided that return for support-
ing the child until 16 years of age the mother would re-
linquish claim against the defendant. Under Illinois 
law the support agreement was binding whilst pursuant to 
New York law it was subject to judicial review for fairness. 
The New York Court of Appeals held that Illinois law govern-
ed because, in light of the large number of contacts with 
Illinois! Illinois was "the 'centre of gravity' of this 
agreement. ,,23 
A more recent example is Keystone Leasing Corp. v. 
Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co. 24 which was an action to 
enforce an alleged guarantee agreement. The guarantee 
provided that New York law governed 1 disputes between 
the parties. The defendant contended that Tennessee law 
applied to the agreement and that the guarantee was unen-
forceable under Tennessee insurance and corporation law. 
Applying New York Conflict of Laws rules the court found 
that the law of Tennessee governed the question of the 
23 Ibid at p.69. 
24 514F . Supp. 841 (1981). 
enforceability of the guarantee . "The more modern view 
... holds that while the parties' choice of law is to be 
given considerable weight, the law of the jurisdiction 
with the 'most significant contacts' is to be applied.,,25 
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One well known New York case which applied interest 
analysis is Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Daystrom Inc. 26 
where the plaintiff sued for a finder's fee on the theory 
that the parties' written contract had been orally modi-
fied. The contract did not state a governing law. The 
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York Statute of 
Frauds, which prevented recovery of a finder's fee without 
a written agreement, rather than a New Jersey statute which 
would permit recovery, applied to the contract. The 
court applied interest analysis and stated that 
"the interest analysis approach "gives to the place 
'having the most interest in the problem ,I paramount 
control over the legal issues arising out of a par-
ticular factual context ... '[T]he rule which has 
evolved clearly in our most recent decisions is that 
the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest 
interest in the litigation will be applied and that 
the facts or contacts which obtain significance in 
defining State interests are those which relate to 
the purpose of the particular law in conflict. 11127 
25 S14F . Supp. 841 at pp.847-8 (1981) 
26 ) 300 N.Y.S. 2d 817 (1969 . 
27 Ibid at pp.825-6. 
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Criticism of Interest Analysis 28 
Ehrenzweig has suggested that interest analysis has 
been rejected by many American states 29 and "almost entire-
ly ignored" in both foreign codifications and international 
conventions.30 31 
Interest analysis and in particular the centre of 
gravity approach is used, together with party autonomy in 
New York. Detailed criticisms of New York law follow the 
discussion of that state's law; at this point some general 
criticisms only are appropriate. 
28 See generally D. Trautman. Some Notes on the Theory 
of Choice of Law Clauses. 35 Mercer L.R. 535 (1983-4). 
L. Brilmayer. Methods & Objectives in the Conflict of 
Laws. A Challenge. Ibid at p.555. C.D. Allo. Methods 
& Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Response. Ibid 
at p.565. J.A. Martin. An Approach for the Choice of Law 
problem. Ibid at p.583. L. Weinberg. 'On Departing from 
Forum Law'. Ibid at p.595. R.J. Weintraub. 'Interest 
Analysis in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of 
Sound Legal Reasoning. Ibid at p.629. R.A. Sedler. 
Interest Analysis & Forum Preference in the Conflict of 
Laws. A Response to the 'New Critics'. 34 Mercer L.R. 
593 (1982-1983). F.K. Juenger. Conflict of Laws: A 
Critique of Interest Analysis. 32 Am. J. of Compo Law. 
1 (Winter 1984). 
29A. A. Erhenzweig. Choice of Law in California -
A "Prestatement". 21 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 781 at p.782 (1974). 
See also H. Goodrich. Handbook on the Conflict of Laws 
(1964) (4th edit.) 
30He cites G. Kegal. The Crisis of Conflict of Laws 
(1964) 112 Recueil des Cours 93; and The Hague Convention 
Private International Law, eleventh session, Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents - 16 Am. J. Compo 
L. 580, 589 (1968), and the twelfth session, Convention on 
the Lavl Applicable to Products Liability. 21 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 136 at p.150 (1973). 
31See however the E.E.C. Convention on the La~ Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (1980) and its reference to 
interest analysis. See infra at p.410 et seq. 
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Relevance of Policy Considerations to Contract Law 32 
A general crit ism of interest analysis is that policy 
considerations are in general somewhat less relevant in 
contractual situations. In torts, for example, a state 
has a considerable interest in the welfare of accident 
victims; the result of a tortious act can have a far 
greater effect on a state's resources that any contractual 
dispute. Contracts, to state the obvious, generally affect 
the parties to it whilst other areas of the law involve 
society and its resources. Admittedly there is a world 
wide trend towards protective legislation which could involve 
policy considerations but even here it is possible that at 
an international level such legislature is less likely to be 
relevant than at a domestic level. 32 Large companies who 
regularly enter into international co~tracts are more likely 
to be in equal bargaining positions. 33 
Thus the policy considerations that fect contract 
situations are therefore likely to be at a very general level. 
One could cite for example the desire for impartiality 
especially towards out of state litigants as a factor in 
promoting New York as a commercial centre. However such 
a general policy consideration cannot be of great relevance 
if the dispute is, for example, concerned with the communi-
cation of acceptance of offers or the interpretation of 
320ne would imagine that most protective legislation 
regulated such matters as Hire Purchase, Door to Door Sales, 
and Consumer Protection legislation generally. Large inter-
national contracts do not usually involve such matters. 
33At the interstate level individual consumers are more 
likely to be involved and thus perhaps for America and other 
state systems interest analysis may be advantageous. In 
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words in a contract. 
Difficulties in Applying Interest Analysis 
It is suggested that even if one allows that policy 
may playa part in contract law it is a very difficult task 
to establish " shifting sands of policy" in any given 
case. One doubts if a court would really find assistance 
from Yntema's seventeen considerations,34 and to resort to 
"the ordinary process of construction and interpretation u35 
is surely of little help to a court faced with an inter-
national contract. To determine the policy behind d purely 
domestic law is a difficult task and at an international 
level almost impossible. Statutes generally tend to ignore 
problems ra by foreign elements and this is applicable 
on both s s of the Atlantic. 36 
Policy and the reason or reasons behind any given law 
reflect the country's or state's norms and values. Even 
if these policies can be found it must be extremely difficult 
for a court in a truly international contract to make an 
evaluation. It is also hard to see how Federal courts 
can develop any criter for choosing rationally between 
New Zealand litigation involves intern~tional not inter-
state contracts. 
34Supra at p.188. 
35 Curr ie supra n.31 on p.169 at p.1242. 
36Kramer op. cit. supra n.39 on p.170 at p.537. 
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clashing legitimate state policies, the conflict situa-
ations. 
Interest analysis properly applied must involve con-
siderable time and expe~se to administer. The ordinary 
adversary system cannot fully and adequately inform the 
court of the scope and extent o~ the issues involved and 
as one commentator37 has noted a court has no duty to apply 
interest analysis until a party requests it to do so, and 
even if a court undertakes a party-initiated interest 
analysis it apparently has no duty to consider the interest 
of states whose laws are not advanced by the litigation. 
Reese 38 suggests that approaches generally have the 
defects of uncertainty, unpredictability and are time con-
surning to apply; they prove an "onerous~difficult and 
frustrating task" for the judiciary and that "when the 
policy underlying a statute or decisional rule is otherwise 
ascertainable, it wiLL often be difficult to refine the 
policy to the point of being able to determine whether it 
would or would not be furthered by the rule's application 
in a case involving foreign facts. u40 
37 J . F . Bradley. After Hurtado & Bernard; Interest 
Analysis and the Search for Consistent Theory for Conflict 
of Laws Cases. 29 Stan. L.R. 127 at p.141 (1976). 
38Reese op. cit. supra n.S9 on p.176. 
39 Ibid at p.317. 
40 Ibid . 
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A further difficulty iil applying interest is is 
the problem of classification. A given situation may 
be a "false" "true" "no interest" or "disinterested forum" 
case. If it is inappropriate to cons state or nation-
al policy in private disputes between two parties then 
arguably the bulk of cases will fall within the last 
mentioned category. 
Interest Analysis may ignore Party Autonomy 
An examination of the governmental interests reflected 
in the relevant domestic laws conc reveals nothing to 
suggest an interest in the s' intentions about the 
law to govern. These interests are simply outside the 
focus of the enqUlry. 
"Interest analysis .... necessarily creates con-
fusion and uncertainty in one of the few areas of 
choice of law in which was thought that some 
degree of certainty existed."41 
Thus in Haag v. ~B~a~~~s42, cited above, to ignore the 
choice of law clauses could to uncertainty.43 This 
is probably the most criticism of interest analysis 
as it applies to contract cases. 
41Trautrnan op. cit. supra n.25 p. 197 at pp.537-8. 
42 216 N.Y.S. ~d. 65 (1961). 
if interes't 
See however 
Brumfield 
however Illinois law applied no matter 
of law clause were applied. 
Sales Co. v. Potter & ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y.) 
See 
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As New York has apflied governmental interest analysis 
and the grouping of contacts approach to choice of law 
problems 44 it is these two methods in particular that need 
to be critically evaluated. However it appears preferable 
to consider the New York case law before undertaking a 
detailed criticism of these two methods. 
New York cases often cite the Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws 1971 45 and the New York Uniform Commercial 
Code in their decisions. It is the former document that 
is next considered. 
44See infra at p.270 et seq. 
45section 6 discussed infra at p.203 
suggested by the writers considered above, 
clusion of such writers in this chapter. 
applies criteria 
hence the in-
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Chapter II 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS 
ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE IN 1971 1 
The general choice of law provision is Section 6 which 
provides a court will follow its own state's statutes 
and that failing any such directive the relevant factors 
for the choice of law include: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states 
and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of jus fied expectations. 
(e) 
( f) 
(g) 
the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law, 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of results, and 
ease in the determination and application of the law to 
be applied. 2 
These considerations may be seen as a modified version 
of the list of policies set out in the 1952 article by 
Cheatham and Reese 3 and they are similar to and are designed 
to serve the same purposes as Leflar's4 choice influencing 
considerations. The major differences are firstly the 
greater number of factors listed in Section 6 and secondly 
the omission of Leflar's better rule of law consideration. 
If emphasis is placed on section 6 (2) (b) and Section 
6 (2) (c) the Restatement (Second) may be seen as supporting 
1Hereinafter cited as the Restatement (Second) 
Sections 186-188 are set out in Appendix B infra at p.561 
et se2f. 
Section 6 (2). 
3 See supra at p. 188. 
4I - . " blU. 
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Currie ' s 5 view and that of other exponents of interest 
analysis. Reese 6 suggests however that whllst section 
6(2)(d) the "bas "policy consideration it would be 
wrong to ignore any of the matters listed in section 6(2). 
"To reiterate, a number of different values underlie 
choice of law. To ignore anyone of them is to 
ignore what the courts have actually done in the past. 
To be sure, these values will vary somewhat in impor-
tance from area to area, and frequently they will 
point in opposite directions in a single case.,,7 
It has been suggested8 that Section 6 is merely a 
"rather loose guide". It has also been termed 
"a shopping list of desiderata, all of which are 
very plausible, except that they conflict with 
one another. fl9 
Juenger lO points out that Section 6(2) (b) and Section 
6(2) (f) conflict and that Section 188 also lists numerous 
contracts to be considered. 11 He concludes that " ... even 
a juggler, not to mention a trial judge, can only cope with 
a finite number of balls in the air.,,12 
5Discussed supra at p.168 et seq. 
6W. L . M• Reese. The Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws Revisited. 34 Mercer L.R. 501 at p.508. (1982-1983). 
7Ibid . 
BG. L • Milhollin. 
District of Columbia. 
(1975) . 
The New Law of Choice of Law in the 
24 Catholic Univ. L.R. 448 at p.479 
9F • K. Juenger. The E.E.C. Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations: An American Assess-
ment in Contract Conflicts. In Contract Conflicts 
The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations - a Comparative Study. Ed. P.M. North. at p.300. 
10 Ibid . 
11Discussed infra at p. 211. 
12Juenger op. cit. supra n.9 at p.300. 
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It would appear to be a valid criticism of Section 6 
and Section 188 that too much is asked of the judge. The 
contacts listed in section 188 13 have to be evaluated in 
the light of their relative importance to the particular 
issue presented. liThe permutations of any number of issues, 
six choices of law factors and five contacts, combined with 
the need to evaluate the contacts in the light of each par-
ticular issue, would stymie a computer. 1I14 
Before considering Section 186 it may be noted that 
the original Restatement of 1934 with its emphasis on vested 
rights and territorial jurisdiction stated that the lex loci 
contractus determined the validity of international con-
tracts and the lex loci solutionis the performance of such 
contracts. 1S The original Restatement did not acknowledge 
any power by the parties to choose the applicable law; the 
Restatement (Second) does. 
Section 186 states that lIissues in contract are deter-
mined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with 
the rule of Section 187 and otherwise by the law selected 
in accordance with the rule of Section 188. 1116 
Apart from these sections17 the remaining pertinent 
13 See infra at p.211. 
14Juenger op. cit. supra n.9 at p.300. 
15See the Introductory Note to Chapter 8 at p.557 of 
the Restatement (Second) for a brief summary of the 1934 
Restatements Contract provisions. 
16For the differences between the two Restatements see 
J.F. Westbrook. A Survey and Evaluation of Competing 
Choice of Law Methodologies. A Case for Eclecticism. 40 
Missouri L.R. 407 (Summer 1975). 
17Section 6, Section 186, Section 187, and Section 188. 
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sections emphasise territory.18 
Party Autonomy 
Section 187 is the American equivalent of the English 
law on express choice19 as the section holds that party 
autonomy prevails in America and that the parties' choice 
of law will be applied if the particular issue is one which 
the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in 
their agreement and even if it is one that could not the 
choice is still applied unless there is no substantial 
relationship between the chosen state and the parties or 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the 
parties' choice. Alternatively the chosen law will not 
be applied if 
18For example the validity and effect of specified 
contracts are said to be governed by the law of the state 
where a particular contract is located. See Sections 
189-197. Usually contracts concerning the transfer of 
interests in land will be governed by the law of the situs, 
(Section 189) and insurance contracts will be governed 
by the law of the statewhere the insured was domiciled at 
the time the policy was applied for. 
Section 192. See also Section 302 for contracts involving 
corporations. 
19 
Discussed supra at p.33 et seq. 
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"application of the law of the chosen state would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has 
a materially greater interest than the chosen state in 
the determination of the particular issue and which, 
under the rule of Section 188 would be the state of 
the applicable law in the absence of an effective 
choice of law by the parties.,,20 
It is clear from the Comment21 on the scope of Section 
187 that this section includes the situation where the 
parties have not expressly stated a choice of law clause 
but where it may be concluded that the parties did wish to 
have the law of a particular state applied. In other 
words Section 187 is concerned with both express and in-
ferred choice of law situations. Thus as long as it can 
be established that the parties have chosen the state of the 
applicable law the case will be treated as if the parties 
had actually made an express choice. But in America at 
least, "[i]t does not suffice to demonstrate that the par-
ties, if they had thought about the matter, would have 
wished to have the law of a particular state applied.,,22 
WeightWatchers of Quebec Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inter-
national, Inc. 23 illustrates Section 187 in the setting of 
New York. The case involved alleged breach of franchise 
20Restatement (Second) Section 187(1) (b). 
21Restatement (Second) Section 187 Comment (a) at 
pp.561-2. 
22 Ibid at p.562. 
23 398 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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agreements which were stated express to be governed by 
New York law. The Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York gave effect to this choice of law 
clause saying 
"The court will honour a choice-of-la\\T rule consented 
to by the parties where there is a reasonable basis 
for the choice or the chosen state has some relation 
to the agreement.,,24 
Section 187 is then cited. 
There are however other limits on party autonomy. 
For example Comment (b)25 is concerned with the effect of 
impropriety or mistake on the choice of law and states that 
whether consent to a choice of law clause is the result of 
such impropriety or mistake is a matter for the forum to 
decide in accordance with its own legal principles. Ad-
hesion contracts 26 in particular will be scrutinized and 
the court is to refuse to apply any choice of law provision 
they may contain if to do so would result in "substantial 
injustice to the adherent."27 
Secondly, unless the contract has significant contacts 
with two or more states it will be treated as a domestic 
contract. 28 
24 Ibid at p.1051 n.17 per Judge Neaher. 
25Restatement (Second) Comment (b) at p.562. 
26Discussed infra at 368. 
27Restatement (Second) Section 187 Comment (b) at 
p.562. 
28 W.L.M. Reese. 
Conflict of Laws. 
Contracts and the Restatement of 
Second. (1960) 50 at p.52. 
Thirdly and more importantly a choice of law pro-
vision will be denied effect if there was no reasonable 
basis for the parties' choice. 29 
"The forum will not, for example, apply a foreign 
law which has been chosen by the parties in the 
spirit of adventure or to provide mental exercise 
for the judge. 1130 
The Restatement (Second) suggests however that the 
parties may choose a law that has no connection with 
their contract so long as such a choice reasonable. 31 
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Thus for example "parties to a contract for the transport-
at ion of goods by sea between two countries with relatively 
under-developed legal systems should be permitted to submit 
their contract to some we known and highly elaborated 
commerciallaw.,,32 
Whilst this would appear reasonable it has been 
criticised by such eminent writers as Weintraub who con-
tends that this ability to choose an unrelated law should 
only be allowed when matters concerning construction are 
involved and not if validity is in issue. 33 
29Restatement (Second) Section 187 (2) (a) and Comment 
(f) at pp.566-7. 
30 Ibid at p.567. 
31 Ibid . 
32 Ibid . 
33R. Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contract. 
L.R. 399 at p.412 (1968). 
54 Iowa 
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Two further limitations on party autonomy remain. The 
parties' choice will be limited to the internal or domestic 
law of their choice. 34 Thus renvoi is not applicable. 35 
Finally the chosen law will be disregarded if it con-
flicts with the fundamental policy of the state which would, 
except for the parties' choice, be the applicable law. 36 
Ree 7 considers this to be the most important exception 
to party autonomy. 
The difficulty to define what is a IIfundamental 
policy", the Restatement (Second) points out that it must 
"in any event be a sUbstantial one.,,38 
be "important".39 
Reese says it must 
Section 187(1) will cover most situations as few cases 
will fall within Section 187(2) because few cases concern 
issues "which the parties could not have resolved by an 
explicit provision in their agreement, but as Prebble notes 
these are the "hard cases".40 
34Restatement (Second) S.187(3) Comment (h) at p.569. 
35Renvoi is discussed infra at p.358 et seq. 
36Restatement (Second) S.187 (2) (b). Comment (g) at 
p.567. 
37Reese Ope cit. supra n.28 at p.54. 
38 Restatement (Second) section 187 (2) Comment (g) 
at p.568. 
39Reese Ope cit. supra n. 28 at p. 54. 
40 E . g . questions relating to capacity, formalities. 
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Section 188: Cases where the parties have not made a 
Choice of Law Decision 
The final section requiring discussion is Section 188 
of the Restatement (Second) which is concerned with the 
situation where the parties cannot be said to have made a 
choice of law decision as regards their contract. Whilst 
the English and New Zealand courts apply the law which has 
the closest connection in America the judge applies the law 
which has the most "significant relationship" to the con-
tract. 41 Section 188 states that the contacts to be taken 
into account in applying the principles of Section 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
( a) the place of contracting 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
the place of negotiation of the contract. 
the place of performance. 
the location of the subject matter of the con-
tract and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the 
parties. 42 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their 
relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 
Finally "if the place of negotiating the contract and 
the place of performance are in the same state, the local 
law of this state will usually be applied.,,43 
41Restatement(Second) Section 188 (1). 
to be no jUdicial discussion on either side 
on the difference between the two phrases. 
reasonable to consider that the terms would 
results. 
42Restatement (Second) Section 188 (2). 
There appears 
of the Atlantic 
It would seem 
produce the same 
43Restatement (Second) Section 188 (3). The section 
continues by stating that this applies unless otherwise pro-
vided in Sections 189-199 and 203. 
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iticism of Sections 187 and 188 
Both Sections 187 and 188 have received academic 
crit ism. Szold 1 s 44 writing at the time of the sixth 
draft of the Restatement (Second) could not see how Section 
187 could work in practice and a more recent writer45 has 
agreed that the task imposed on the jUdiciary by Section 188 
is " formidable" 46 and that despite the "appealing ring n47 
of words "the most significant relationship" the concept 
is complex when related to Section 6. In particular he 
criticises the use of the word "usually" in Section 188 by 
pointing out that could mean virtually anything. 48 
The criticisms levelled at the Restatement (Second) 
generally~may validly be applied to Sections 187 and 188. 
Ehrenzweig49 suggests the Restatement is too "vague" and 
Cavers50 criticises the Restatement (Second) as ing un-
certain. In particular he considers that it is unfortunate 
that no criteria are given for assessing the relative impor-
tance of the choice of law principles in any given case. 
44 R. Szold. Comment on Tentative Dra No. 6 of The 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.Contracts. 76 Harv. 
L.R. 1524 (1963). 
45Juenger op. cit. supra n.9 at p.299. 
46 Ibid . 
47 Ibid . 
48 Ibid at p.300. 
49A. A. Ehrenzweig. The Second Conflicts Restatement. 
A Last Appeal for its withdrawal. 113 Univ. of Pen. L.R. 
1230 at p.1232 (1965). 
50D. F • Cavers. 
et seq. 
The Choice of Law Process (1965) at p.207 
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Reese 51 , the official Reporter, contends that it is 
impossible to achieve certainty and predictability where 
there is a contract with contacts equally divided among 
two or more states. He sees a virtue in the rule which 
"does not pretend to give certainty and predictability in 
situations where in the nature of things these values cannot 
be had.,,52 "The only way of enabling parties to a multi-
state contract to know in advance what the rights and 
liabilities will be is to empower them to choose the state 
whose law is to govern the contract. 1153 
weintraub54 does not consider Reese's argument here to 
be a valid one. Commercial convenience is obtained by 
validating contacts, he says, whenever it is reasonable 
to do so. He considers Section 187 a partial rule of 
validation55 only and as such is subject to his criticism. 
The commentators who have praised the Restatement 
(Second) are generally those who prefer flexibility to 
hard and fast rules. 
51 W.L.M .. Reese. 
of Laws Revisited. 34 
(1982-1983) . 
52 Ibid at p.515. 
53 Ibid . 
Thus Leflar,56 for example suggests 
The Second Restatement of Conflict 
Mercer L.R. 501 at p.515 et seq. 
54Weintraub op. cit. supra n.33 at p.408 et seq. 
55Discussed infra at p.399 et seq. 
56Leflar made this comment while criticising the torts 
provisions of the Restatement (Second). See R.A. Leflar. 
The Torts Provisions of the Restatement (Second) 72 Colum. 
L. Rev. 267 at p.274 (1972). 
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that on the whole it is a successful attempt to reconcile 
the various new approaches to choice of law. 
westbrook57 sees the overriding characteris of the 
Restatement (Second) as eclectic, and considers this most 
appropriate a field in which contradictions and change 
are inherent. 
II Every thing considered [it] is the most workable 
and useful single tool which is currently available 
to the bench and the bar. It is comprehensive, 
flexible and eclectic. 1158 
What remains uncertain is the extent to which the 
Restatement (Second) has actually influenced the courts 
in their dec ions and in the way that they have approached 
conflict of laws problems. There is no way of telling 
whether the courts have customarily looked to the Restatement 
(Second) as a guide in reaching their decisions or whether 
instead the Restatement (Second) is cited in situations 
which happen to support a result which the court had already 
decided to reach on some independent basis. 
"In the United States it is more an act of faith than 
a deduction of legal reasoning that leads one to assert 
that Section 187 (2) of the Restatement (Second) em-
bodies the American rule, or even the majority rule 
among American jurisdictions. ,,59 
5 Westbrook op. cit. supra n.16 at p.437. 
K.H. Nadelmann. Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in 
American Conflicts Law (1963) 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 860 
at pp.861-2. 
58Westbrook op. cit. supra n.16 at p.462. 
59prebble at p.497. 
Be that as it may courts do refer to the Restatement 
(Second) .60 
The Restatement (Second) may be seen as representing 
an intermediate position in conflict of laws. At one 
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extreme stands the "objectivis.t approach" which would give 
only limited weight to governing law clauses and emphasises 
the legislative policies of the competing jurisdictions. 61 
On this approach one looks at the "most substantial con-
tacts" with the agreement if there is no choice of law 
clause, and if there is such a clause, then it is only one 
factor to take into account in determining which juris-
diction bears the most substantial contacts. 
At the other extreme is the autonomist position which 
maintains that parties' choice of law clauses should be 
honoured and upheld. This it is argued gives effect 
to the parties' intent. 62 The autonomists minimise the im-
portance of legislative policies in contractual disputes 
and reject the need for a relationship between the contract 
and the chosen jurisdiction. The Restatement (Second) in 
Sections 187 and 188 tries to achieve a compromise between 
the two extremes. Party autonomy is recognised but the 
Restatement also recognises the legislative policies of 
60 E . g . Scientific Holdings Co. v. Plessey Inc. 510 
F. 2d 15 at p.22 (2dCir. 1974), Business Incentives Co. 
v. Sony Corp. 397 F. Supp. 63 at p.67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
See infra at p.274 et seq. 
6lHaag v. Barnes 216 N.Y.S. 2d 65 (1961) discussed 
supra at p. 301 et seq. 
62Discussed infra atpp.472-3 and see Title 14 New York 
General Obligations Law Section 5-1401 discussed infra at 
p. 257 et seq. 
competing jurisdictions. Under this half way approach a 
court will apply the law of the jurisdiction bearing the 
'most substantial contacts' to the agreement absent a 
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choice of law clause. When the parties have in fact exer-
cised their right to choose a governing law clause a court 
is to honour the stipulation unless no reasonable relation-
ship exists between the contract and the chosen state or no 
other 'reasonable basis' exists for the stipulation. Public 
policy also has a part to play and a court will not enforce 
a law which has the effect of violating some strong public 
policy of another interested jurisdiction. 
In so far as the Restatement seeks to achieve a balance 
between two extremes it may be criticised as not going far 
enough in anyone direction. Autonomists would question 
the reasonable relationship requirement on the one hand and 
the objectivists would disagree on the emphasis placed on 
party autonomy. Perhaps a neutral observer would consider 
its greatest virtue lies in the fact that it does try to 
bring a little closer together two schools of thought on 
choice of law. 
The next matter to consider is the New York Uniform 
Commercial Code and its commitment to party autonomy. 
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Chapter III 
THE NEW YORK UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 81-105 1 
The Uniform Commercial Cod~ probably the most im-
portant single piece of legislation in the united states, 
and in so far as contract law is concerned it undoubtedly 
is of enormous significance. It was adopted in New York 
in 1962. 
The idea of promoting uniform legislation throughout 
America goes back to the 1890's when the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was established for 
this purposei however it was not until 1952 that the 
official Edition of the uniform Commercial Code with Ex-
planatory Comments was published. William Schnader was 
the first to propose the idea of a Uniform Commercial Code 
in 1940 which was at that time considered to be a somewhat 
novel idea. Henson3 attributes the impetus towards one 
lSection 1-105 is set out in Appendix C infra at 
pp.563-4. 
2See generally W. Schnader. A Short History of the 
Preparation and Enactment of the uniform Commercial Code. 
22 U Miami L. Rev. 1 (1967) and W.D. Malcolm. The uniform 
Commercial Code in the United States, (1967) 12 Int'l & 
Compo L.Q. 226. J.F. Burton. The uniform Commercial 
Code & Confl of ,Laws. 9 Am. J. of Compo L. 458 (1960). 
3R. D. Henson. Secured Transactions Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code at p.3 et seq. (1979). For an criti-
cism see J.B. Smith. Conflicts & Chaos or Contract & Uni-
formity. The Uniform Commercial Code. 2 Univ. of Kansas 
L. Rev. 11 (1953). Similarly J.F. Beggan & A.A. Kaelin. 
Notes. Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial Paper Trans-
actions Between Code & Non-Code States: The Problem of 
Applicable Law. 34 Notre Dame Lawyer 215 at p.223 (1959). 
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all encompassing Code to a proposal in 1938 by the Merchant 
Association of New York City for a federal sales act to 
govern interstate sales. 
~ There has been a series of official texts~ since 1952, 
probably the most important being those of 1962 and 1972. 
Whilst the Code has been adopted in all states of America 
it must be noted that the Code has rarely been enacted in 
complete accord with any official text. 5 The present dis-
cussion is limited to a .consideration of the New York Uni-
form Commercial Code and only Section 1-105 is considered. 
This is the important conflict of laws section in the Code. 
It is the general and basic section applicable to all 
commercial contracts, It applies to the validity of con-
tracts 6 and whilst other sections in the code provide 
alternative rules for specific situations it is Section 
1-105(1) that is the basic section. 
4The term "official text" refers to a text approved 
by the sponsoring organisations and published with their 
authority. See D.F. Adams. The 1972 Official Text of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Analysis of Conflict Prob-
lems. 45 Miss.L.J. 281 note 2 (1974). 
5In 1961 a Permanent Editorial Board was established, 
the primary function of which was to maintain uniformity 
in the Code. In Report No. 3 the Board noted the "dis-
tressing situation" wherebl 337 non uniform amendments 
had been made to Article 9. A review committee was 
appointed and their report ultimated in the 1972 official 
text. Louisiana was the last state to adopt the major 
provisions of the Code. 
6R• Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contracts. 54 Iowa 
L.R. 399 at p.407 (1961). 
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The New York Uniform Commercial Code contains s 
sections specifically designed to solve the choice of law 
problems for commercial contracts or transactions. The 
basic section is found in Section 1 which establishes 
three rules. 
One rule covers five factual situations and fou~d 
in Section 1-105 (2). The law of a particular juris-
diction is to be applied by all states to transactions con-
trolled by Code provisions dealing with rights of creditors 
against goods sold,7 bank deposits and collections,8 bulk 
transfers 9 investment securities10 and secured transactions. 11 
In general these are situations in which a third party is 
likely to become involved and in which a of situs law 
can reasonably be selected as the controlling law. 12 
The second allows for party autonomy subject to 
certain limitations, whilst the final concerns trans-
actions where no governing law has chosen. In this 
situation the Code of the forum state is applied to trans-
actions bearing an appropriate relationship to the forum 
state. 
7Section 2-402. 
8section 4-102. 
9section 6-102. 
10section 8-106. 
11Sections 9-102 and 9-103. 
12see generally Adams on. c . supra n.4. 
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It is the latter two rules which have caused difficulty 
in their construction and application. 
PARTY AUTONOMY 
The Uniform Commercial Code of New York13 allows for 
party autonomy in commercial contracts but it is not an 
unfettered choice that the parties are given. section 
1-105 of the Code applies and despite its apparent sim-
plicity contains a number of possible limitations on the 
parties' ability to choose a law to govern their contract. 
Limitations on Party Autonomy 
Reasonable Relationship Required 
The first limitation is that there must be a reasonable 
relationship hetween the transaction and the chosen law. 
This proviso is found in the first sentence of section 
1-105(1) which states that "except as provided hereafter 
in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable 
relation to this state and also to another state or nation 
the parties may agree that the law either of this state or 
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and 
duties. II 
In general the test is "similar"14 to that laid down 
13 In this chapter hereinafter referred to as the Code. 
14 U. C . C. Official Comment 1. See Appendix C p. 563. 
in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 1S where it 
was said that the parties must "act in good faith" and 
that the form of the transaction must not disguise its 
"real character".16 The object was to stop parties 
entering Lnto a contract which had no normal relation 
to the transaction. 17 
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1S In Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 274 U.S. 
403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927) the plaintiff, 
a Pennsylvania Corporation having its place of business 
in Philadelphia, had entered into a loan agreement with 
a borrower conducting its business in New York. The 
transaction would have been void as usurious under New 
York law but was valid under Pennsylvania law. The 
contract did not contain a choice of law clause but the 
agreement whilst probably entered into in New York pro-
vided for repayment in Pennsylvania. The court held 
that Pennsylvania law applied under the rule which permits 
the parties to a contract made in one place and performed 
in another to contract for the interest rate of either 
place, whichever is higher. 
16 Ibid . 
17 Ibid at p.408. 
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Normal Relationship 
The idea that the relationship must be normal has 
considered by a number of writers. Thus Nordstrom 
and Ramerman18 conclude for example that unless the trans-
action has a 'normal' connection with the governing law 
c it should not be upheld. Gruson19 interprets 
o to mean that if the contacts with a jurisdiction 
do not occur in the normal course of the transaction but 
were contrived simply to validate the parties' choice of 
law then the relation will be held to be unreasonable. This 
introduces the Sl motives and this Gruson argues 
creates prob The very object of governing law clauses 
is to exclude all laws but the one chosen. Contacts with 
a Jurisdiction can easi be manufactured, and parties 
could be seen as choosing events to occur in a given loca-
tion in order to val the choice of law clause. He 
asks whether the the parties destroys the reason-
ableness of the re between the transaction and 
the chosen state, even though absent such motive one would 
conclude that the relation is reasonably related because 
substantial. 
18 R.J. Nordstrom & D.B. Ramerman. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code & The Choice of Law. 3 U.C.C. L.J. 230 at 
p.235 (1971). 
19Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.344 et seq. 
20seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 274 U.S. 403 
47 S. Ct. 626, (1927). 
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One may argue that it is difficult to determine exactly 
when a transaction has a normal relation to a jurisdiction. 
Would, for example, a valid business reason for the occur-
rence of certain acts in a jurisdiction constitute a normal 
relationship? Gruson gives the example of a Californian 
and German Corporation entering into a contract in New York 
to be performed outside New York. If the place of con-
tracting is fortuitous and simply chosen because of their 
be that New York lawyers are the most competent to 
handle complex transactions then is this normal? Gruson 
considers the answer to be debatable given that the result-
ing choice is made because of the parties' opinions rather 
than resting on any given facts. 
It would seem that to substitute 'normal' for 'reason-
able' is not particularly helpful. 2l Whilst the place of 
contracting or the place of performance is reasonable there 
appears to be less certainty as to whether the domicile of 
the parties, the place shipment, the principal place of 
business of either party or the situs of the goods would be 
reasonable. To ask if such matters are normal does not 
appear to assist the resolution of the problem. 
Furthermore Seeman's22 case may be considered an old 
case decided at a period when mechanical choice of law rules 
21 T. G. Ryan. 
Under the Uniform 
at p.226 (1979). 
22 
Reasonable Relation & Party Autonomy 
Commercial Code. 63 Marquette L.R. 212 
274 U.S. 403 (1927). 
applied and secondly the Official Comment23 does only say 
the test is similar to rather than identical with that of 
Seeman. 24 
Type of contracts necessary to establish a reasonable 
relationship 
Non Geographic Contacts 
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The Official Comment 25 states that ordinarily the law 
chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a signi cant 
enough portion of the making or performance of the contract 
is to occur or occurs. This is no more helpful than the 
reference to the Seeman decision. 26 It may be taken to 
mean that the contacts necessary to establish a reasonable 
ationship must have some geographic basis but if the 
parties are limited by their choice of governing law to the 
law of the place of making or performance then Section 1-105 
would merely represent a revival of Chancellor Kent's 
teaching which gave the parties a choice between the law 
of the place of making and the place of performance. How-
ever the comment does start with the word "ordinarily" 
which suggests that the relation could be reasonable because 
of criteria that lacked a geographic basis. The problem 
is that no guides are given as to when the general rule is 
not to apply. In the example given by Gruson above of a 
Californian and German Corporation making a contract in New 
Yo::-k to be performed elsewhere it would seem possible for 
23 See Appe~dix C pp.563-4. 
24274 u.S. 403 (1927). 
25 U.C.C. Of cial comment 1. 
26Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 274 u.S. 403 
(1927) . 
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German law to be applied although it was neither the 
of making the contract nor the location of its performance. 
It would be a situation that fell outside the ordinary. In 
one decision27 the choice was considered reasonable because 
one of the parties routinely entered into a large number of 
substantially identical agreements with customers in various 
states. It had an interest having those agreements 
governed by the same law. The only geographic contact 
between the law chosen and the contract was that the head 
of of one of the parties was situated in the chosen 
state. 
Whilst it would be impossible to detail a of the 
factors which, every case, will constitute a "reason-
able relationship" the above sentence in the Official 
Conunent merely seems to substitute IIsignificant" for 
"reasonable". Nordstrom & Ramerman28 argue that what is 
meant is that the entire conunercial transaction is to be 
divided into its principal components and that only a 
portion of either of these components must be significant. 
They reach this conclusion by emphasising the word "portion". 
Even if the contact is insignificant when the whole trans-
action is considered nevertheless measured against the 
contract's components it could be sufficient under Section 
1-105 to justify choosing the law of that state. 
27Triangle Underwriters Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 
457 F. Supp. 765 (1978). 
28Nordstrorn & Rarnerrnan Ope cit. supra n.18 at p.234. 
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The final sentence in the Official Comment29 states 
that an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take 
effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties 
as to matters governed by their agreement, even though the 
transaction has no significant contact with the jurisdiction 
chosen. Ryan30 suggests that this passage simply means 
that "an analysis founded on geographic contacts alone is 
incomplete, and the failure to locate a geographic contact 
does not automatically invalidate the parties' choice." 
Pounds 31 contends that the sentence appears to do away 
with the reasonable relation requirement and should therefore 
be evoked sparingly. He suggests that is .re1evant when 
the contract bears a reasonable relation to the forum but 
not to the jurisdiction chosen by the governing law. 
Geographic Contacts 
The Official Comment32 specifically refers to the place 
29 U. C. C. Official Comment 1. See Appendix C p.563. 
30Ryan op. cit. supra n.21 at p.227. 
31T . W. Pounds. Party Autonomy - Past and Present. 
12 S. Texas L.J. 214 at p.227 (1970). 
32Uniform Commercial Code. Official Comment 1. See 
Appendix C p.56]. 
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of performance 33 as a relevant geographic contact. 
In the 1950's when the goal was to apply the Uniform 
Commercial Code wherever possib Judge Goodrich considered 
that any contact that triggered application of the Code 
would also confer upon the parties' choice the requisite 
reasonable relationship.34 Thus the making, offering or 
acceptance of the contract would suffice and as noted above 
the Official Code Comment would validate the parties' choice 
if a "significant enough portion of the making" of the con-
tract occurs within the chosen jurisdiction. 
33 It has been suggested that the strength the place 
of performance contact could prove an obstacle to the vali-
dation of the parties' choice in certain circumstances. In 
I.S. Joseph Company Inc. v. To1.ific Aris &Fils388 N.Y.S. 
2d. 1 (1976) a New York court considered the validity of a 
contractual provision which provided that disputes under an 
agreement would be arbitrated in New York - under its laws. 
The appellant suggested that the laws Louisiana should 
govern the matter as that was the state where performance 
was to take place. The court treated the argument serious-
ly. The contention was finally rejected because the court 
concluded that the issue concerned that portion of the con-
tract calling for arbitration (rather than the portion 
calling for performance) . As arbitration related to the 
law of remedies and as lithe law that governs remedies is 
the law of the forum" New York law applied. The court 
went on to hold that the parties' choice of law would be 
upheld pursuant to Section 1-105(1). The court may have 
gone to such lengths to uphold the choice of New York law 
precisely because of the strength of the place of perform-
ance contacts with the case. It is clear that the court 
was concerned with the lack of New York contacts and in a 
rather conclusory way stated that "at least as to the pro-
vision for arbitration, the transaction bears a reasonable 
relation to New York." Ibid at p.3 .. 
34H. Goodrich. Conflict Niceties & Commercial 
Necessities. Wisc L.R. 199 at p.207 (1952). 
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When one turns to other possible contacts that could 
constitute a reasonable relationship between the governing 
law clause and the jurisdiction the cases and commentators 
are less conclusive. The tendency is however to consider 
geographic contacts. 35 
Nordstrom & Ramerman 36 contend that if the choice of 
law clause has no reasonable relationship to the forum the 
clause should be upheld despite the code being "inartfully" 
drafted. They reason that the forum will have no interest 
in the outcome of the dispute, and that if there is no 
reasonable relationship between the choice of law clause 
and the forum then the forum is only providing the venue 
for the action. It should therefore endeavour to fulfil 
the policy of the Code which is to uphold party autonomy. 
Application of the Reasonable Relationship 
A trilogy of cases may be cited to illustrate the New 
York courts' attitude towards the reasonable relationship 
requirement. 37 
35 Ryan for example in this context discusses the situs 
of the property or goods, the principal place of business, 
the place of incorporation and the place from or through 
which goods are shipped as contacts. Ryan Ope cit. supra 
n.21 at p.232 et seq. 
36Nordstrom & Ramerman Ope cit. supra n.18 at p.234. 
37Associated Metals & Mineral Corp. v. Sharon Steel. 
590 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and L. Orlik Ltd. v. Helme 
Products Inc. 427 F. Supp. 771 (D.C.N.Y. 1977) have been 
chosen because they feature in the Notes of Decisions in the 
Update to the Uniform Commercial Code from the McKinney 
Supplement. The third case, Fleischmmann Distilling Corp. 
v. Distillers Co. Ltd. 395 F. Suppl. 221 (D.C.N.Y. 1975) 
is included because it is discussed in Orlik's case, supra 
and has been much quoted. 
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Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd. 38 
involved contracts for the distribution of whisky. The 
court held that 
liThe canon in new York which controls the disposition 
of this issue ... is that the intent of the parties 
shall govern as to the choice of law regarding their 
contract, provided that intent can be discovered and 
that the state chosen bears a reasonable relationship 
to the agreement. "39 
After citing judicial authority for this the court 
refers to both the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
Section 187 (2) 1971 and the Uniform Commercial Code Section 
1-105 (1). Carter J. 40 continued by noting that the agree-
ments expressly provided that they were to be governed by 
the law of England and then applied the reasonable relation 
test. What appears to be significant is the way in which 
he applies the requirement. He said the test was met and 
he found this to be so by adding up the contacts with 
England. The contracts were executed in the United King-
dom, the defendants were incorporated there and performance 
and payment and title to the goods passed in the United 
Kingdom. 
This approach of finding the contacts and listing them 
leads to the conclusion that it is to a party's advantage 
to gather together as many geographic contacts as possible. 
38 395 F. Supp. 221 (D.C.N.Y. 1975). 
39 Ibid at p.229. 
40 Ibid . 
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No attempt is made to evaluate the contacts. 
In L. Orlik Ltd. v. Helme Products Inc. 41 the choice 
of law clause also stipulated English law to govern the 
sale of briar pipes. The court found a reasonable re-
lationship between the transaction and England by simply 
stating two geographical contacts. 42 The whole choice of 
law issue was dispatched very briefly. This case is a 
typical example of the application of the reasonable 
relationship test and illustrates the fact that the courts' 
approach is robust. If a choice of law clause exists then 
not a lot of time and energy is put into considering the 
reasonableness or otherwise of the choice. 
The third case in this trilogy is Associated Metals & 
Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Stee143 and is cited here because 
again it is typical of the courts' approach in New York. 
As noted above is also cited in the notes of Decisions 
which makes it a decision of greater significance. The 
United States District Court first stated the facts of the 
case which were undisputed. The litigation involved two 
contracts for the purchase and sale of steel slabs. Both 
orders contained a choice of law provision stating that 
they were to be governed by the law of Pennsylvania, and 
both indicated that the steel slabs were to be delivered 
F.O.B. in Pennsylvania. The material was to be used by 
Sharon at its Pennsylvania premises. All the steel was 
41427 F. Supp. 771 (D.C.N.Y. 1977). 
420ne party was English and the pipes were sold to 
the other party (American) in England. 
43 590 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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delivered and , however Sharon was late in some 
payments although the total purchase price was eventually 
paid. Association Metals & Minerals Corporation had ac-
quired the steel from NOrway and brought the action seeking 
damages in the form of interest on Sharon's late payments. 
The contracts contained no provision for interest on late 
payment but provided payment to be made within 15 days of 
delivery. 
Having stated these the court proceeded to 
discuss the choice of law issue in a manner typical of so 
many decisions. Erie Rai Co. v. Tompkins 44 ----------~------- is 
cited as authority for the that state law governs the 
substantive aspects of actions in diversity in the Federal 
Gourts and Klaxon Co. 45 is c as authority for the pro-
position that in order to which state's law is 
to be applied the federal court must look to the choice of 
law rule of the forum state. Thus arrives at 
the conclusion that the court must fore look to the 
choice of law rules of the State of New York to determine 
the governing law of this action. 
Next comes a much stated sentence namely, IINew York 
courts will honor a choice of law provision in a sales 
contract as long as the transaction bears a 'reasonable 
relationship' to the state whose law is chosen." 46 
U.S. 
44304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
46 
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 313 
1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941). 
590 F. S u pp . 18 at p. 20 (S . D. N. Y. 1983). 
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The Code 47 and Fleischmann48 are cited before the 
reasonable relation test is considered. All the court says 
is liThe purchase orders indicate that the steel slabs were 
to be delivered F.O.B. in Pennsylvania. It is also undis-
puted that the material was to be used by Sharon at its 
Farrell, Pennsylvania facility. The court concludes that 
the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to Penn-
sylvania. Hence it is to Pennsylvania law that the court 
must turn in considering the instant motions. 1149 
A straightforward and common fact situation is followed by 
what might be cons red as an arbitrary application of a 
reasonable relation test. The court gives no reasons why 
delivery and the fact that the steel to be used in Penn-
sylvania should be sufficient to satisfy the test. It is 
not clear in the judgment where the contracts were made and 
no reference is made to the fact that the plainti is a 
New York corporation. Two geographic contacts are deemed 
sufficient to establish the reasonable relationship. 
The similarity with Orlik50 is apparent. The only 
discussion of the reasonable relationship in that case was 
contained in one sentence. Given the existence of a 
choice of law clause specifying English law as the applic-
able law the matter was settled; lithe question since the 
defendants' purchase in England of the plaintiff's br 
47 D.C.C. Sl-105 (1). 
48Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Di llers Co. Ltd. 
395 F. Supp. 221 at p.229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
49 590 F. Supp. 18 at p.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
500rlik Ltd. v. Helme Products Ltd. 427 F. Supp. 771 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
pipes provides a reasonable relation between this trans-
action and England, thus validating the clause under New 
York law. n51 
The conclusion is that the tendency is to choose 
geographic contacts and obviously the place of making the 
contract and the place of performance are important con-
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tacts. There is a trend to find the reasonable relation-
ship test satisfied and the cases do not indicate that the 
court considers the weight of the contacts. This is des-
pite references to the Restatement which requires evalua-
tion of the closer contacts. 52 
A Reasonable Relationship to the Forum 
On a literal reading of the section the transaction 
in question must bear a reasonable relation to both the 
forum and another state or nation. Thus New York courts 
should be obliged to establish a reasonable relationship 
with New York as well as with another jurisdiction. The 
cases illustrate that this is not in fact done. The 
courts imply a relationship with the forum and find the 
requirement satisfied rather than find the section in-
applicable. 
51 Ibid at p.774. Numerous other examples could be 
given. In Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp. 
339 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) for example a list of 
geographic contacts is given, no reasons are stated why 
other geographic contacts are ignored. 
52see supra at p.203 et seq. 
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Sharon's case53 illustrates this point-. The only 
contact with New York was the fact that the plaintiff was 
a New York corporation. 54 Instead of citing the whole 
of the first sentence of Section 1-105 the New York District 
Court said "New York courts will honour a choice of law pro-
vision in a sales contract as long as the transaction bears 
a 'reasonable relationship I to the state whose law is 
chosen.1f 55 No mention is made of the contacts with New 
York; it is assumed or implied in the judgment that New 
York and the transaction were reasonably related. By 
only stating half of the test the court naturally only 
went on to apply that half of the test. 
This case is typical of other cases;56 given the 
existence of a choice of law clause the court dQe~ not 
expend time and energy finding a reasonable relationship 
between the choice and New York. 
This would appear to be an eminently sensible attitude 
to adopt given the existence of a choice of law clause. 
53Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon 590 
F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
54 It is not clear that the steel slabs ever saw New 
York; they appear to have gone directly from Norway to 
Pennsylvania. 
55 Ibid at p.20. 
56Another example in County Asphalt Inc. v. Lewis 
Welding & Engineering Corp. 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) where Ohio law was applied and the relationship with 
New York assumed. 
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A Partial Relationship 
One problem in section 1-105 (1) lS whether a reasonable 
relation to a chosen state could exist as to only some 
aspect of a transaction, and if so whether the choice of 
law clause would be valid for this aspect only. 
Adams 57 and Henson58 have suggested that this is so, 
however Gruson59 and Goodrich60 disagree. Goodrich con-
siders that it is the purpose of Section 1-105 to apply 
the stipulated law to the whole of a transaction, even if 
only one aspect of the transaction needs the reasonable 
relation requirement. Gruson points out that the language 
in Section 1-105 would suggest that Goodrich's views are 
correct. He notes that the word 'the' is used before the 
word 'transaction' in both the section and in the Official 
Comment 1. 
Adams 61 considers it quite possible that a stipulation 
of the parties that the law of a particular state is to 
govern their contract would be given effect only in part, 
because the forum court concludes that there is a reasonable 
relation to the chosen state as to some aspects of the 
transaction but not to others. 
57Adams Ope cit. supra n.4 at p.317. 
58Henson Ope cit. supra n.3 at p.209. 
59Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.350. 
60 d' h . Goo rlC Ope Clt. supra n.34 at pp.201-2. 
61Adams Ope cit. supra n.4 at p.317. 
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Henson62 takes a similar view and cites Associated 
Discount Corp. v. Cary63 in this context. The case in-
volved a sailor who in the course of his peripatetic life 
had his car repossessed. When not at sea he seemed to be 
constantly moving from place to place and thus the case 
involved a number of states. There was no express choice 
of law clause but the court applied Section 1-105(2) and 
Section 9-103. The latter section deals with multiple 
state transactions and provides that when property already 
subject to a security interest, as the sailor's car was, 
is brought into a state the validity of that interest is 
determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the security 
interest attaches. Thus a rule applies to one aspect of 
the contract and presumably the parties in Cary could have 
chosen a law to govern some other aspect of their contract 
and thus Henson's argument applies. 64 
Note on Number of States Involved 
One interpretation not considered by courts or com-
mentators is that, again on a literal reading of the first 
62Henson op. cit. supra n.3 at p.319~ 
63 262 N.Y.S. 2d. 646 (N.Y.Civ. ct. 1965). 
64cary 's case is also another example of the forum 
assuming a reasonable relation to it by the contract. 
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sentence of Section 1-105(1) it does not apply to trans-
actions having contacts with three or more states. Strictly 
rpreted there must be a reasonable relationship to the 
forum and another state or nation. However given the 
policy of the Code it is unlikely that a court would take 
this restrictive interpretation of the section. Thus the 
Code will apply if there is a reasonable relationship with 
three or more jurisdictions. 
Conclusion to the Reasonable Relationship Requirement 
1. The Courts' Attitude: The aim of the Code is to 
create certainty65 in the Id of commercial law. Unless 
the courts tend to find a reasonable relationship estab-
Ii shed in the vast majority of cases then the parties are 
going to be left in a state of uncertainty with regard to 
the effectiveness of their cho of law clause. It is 
suggested that the New York court's attitude in tending to 
assume a reasonable relationship encourages party autonomy 
and the use of governing law clauses and thus avoids un-
certainty which the Code was designed to eliminate. The 
courts practical and robust approach may therefore be 
praised. 
2. Difficulties in applying the test: However the test 
can be difficult to apply. There are no clear guides 
laid down as to what constitutes a reasonable relationship. 
The temptation is to place the emphas on geographical 
65See Section 1-102(2) of the Code; read as a whole 
certainty may be said to be a goal. See generally 
J.M. Finnerty. The Uniform Commercial Code. 29 Albany 
L. Rev. 1 (1965). 
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contacts. Ryan takes this view. He considers that the 
preoccupation with geography is neither mandated by the 
~ode nor called for under conflict of laws principles, and 
that an lIexclusively geographic analysis of the 'reasonable 
relation' criteria im?roperly restricts party autonomy 
under section 1-105. II 
Ryan suggests that what the courts have done is to 
search for geographic contacts and then the characteristic 
response is to lump them together before ranking them in 
an order. It is clear in Ryan's view that the greater 
number of contacts the parties can amass the more assured 
they will be that their choice will be upheld, (subject to 
the principle of good faith bargaining.)66 His views would 
seem to be correct. 
3. Difficulty in predicting results: The lack of guid-
ance as to the choice of contacts and the weight to be 
afforded to each contact necessary to establish the reason-
able relation test, together with the court's tendency to 
consider the cases on an ad hoc basis means that each case 
is of little use as a precedent for future cases. However 
by taking the attitude they do, the judges of New York do 
foster party autonomy which must always be the first goal 
to consider. 
Perhaps the problems posed by Section 1-105(1) could 
be said to be few from a practical point of view, otherwise 
a greater body of case law would have emerged by now. If 
66 Ryan Ope cit. supra n.21. 
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one takes this view then possibly Denonn is correct. He 
states in the Practice Commentary prefacing the Official 
Comments that what is a reasonable relation "should not 
be too difficult to determine from the facts. It should 
not be an adventitious relationship but one that bears upon 
the facts involved in the transaction itself." 
Turning from the reasonable relationship requirement 
the next matter to consider is the necessity for "agreement". 
The Necessity for Agreement 
The second major limitation on party autonomy in the 
uniform Commercial Code is also found in Section 1-105(1). 
The Code states that the parties may agree as to the law 
which will govern their rights and duties. 'Agree' is 
not defined but 'agreement' is, and obviously the two words 
must be interpreted similarly. lAgreement 1 is defined as 
"the bargain of the parties in fact". 
It is the duty of the court to determine whether or 
not the parties have agreed. One code section which can 
be used here is Section 1-103 which states that 
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 
this Act, the principles of law and equity, including 
the law merchant and the law relative to capacity 
to contract, principle and agent, estoppel, fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy or other validating or invalidating cause shall 
supplement its provisions." 
Similarly for sales transactions Section 2-302 re-
lating to unconscionability can also be used to test the 
enforceability of a choice of law clause. This section 
gives the court the power to refuse to enforce any clause 
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found to be unconscionable. Such a finding could apply 
where there was no true agreement by the parties or perhaps 
where the law chosen had no normal connection with the 
transaction. 
In Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter67 the court held uncon-
scionable a clause by which the parties agreed to submit to 
the jurisdiction of a New York court. Paragon Homes, a 
Maine corporation, had contracted with the defendants who 
lived in Massachusetts to carry out improvements to their 
house in that city. The court considered that the object 
of specifying a New York court was to harrass and embarrass 
the defendants who were not in an equal bargaining position. 
Whilst no choice of law clause involved the case does 
illustrate the court's attitude towards unconscionability. 
Nordstrom & Ramerman 68 argue that 'agree' could mean 
more than the usual express choice of law clause; they 
suggest that 'agree' can be given an expanded meaning to 
include agreement by implication. They point out that 
agreement is defined to include the bargain of the parties 
as found in the language "or by implication from other 
circumstances",69 and they suggest that if all the contacts 
of a transaction are with one jurisdiction and if the 
ties are or should have been famil with that law then by 
implication the parties agree on that law as the applicable 
law. These two writers suggest that this wider inter-
67 288 N.Y.S. 2d. 817 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
68Nordstrom & Ramerman op. cit. supra n.18 at p.239. 
69Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-201(3). 
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pretation of the word 'agree' is not inconsistent with 
the language or policy of the Code and is supported by case 
1aw. 70 
If one takes the view that businessmen do not choose 
laws that "are strange to them71 then this requirement that 
the part s must 'agree' is probably the greatest limitation 
on party autonomy in the Code. Although it argued in 
this thesis that party autonomy should be as red as 
possible some limitation is obviously necessary. 
There must always be.a general escape device to enable 
the judge to strike down a choice of law clause that has 
been included in a contract as a result of unequal bar-
gaining power, duress or overreaching. To use the term 
'agree' would appear. to be a sound general term to employ 
in this situation. 72 
Another limitation on party autonomy in the Uniform 
Commercial Code is that in general no third party should 
be bound by a choice of law clause. Most third parties 
will fit into one of the exceptions listed in Section 
1-105(2) although these sections may not be exhaustive. 
Section 2-402 contains another exception. Situs law is 
to be used to determine the rights of creditors of a seller 
70Nordstrom & Ramerman op. cit. supra n.18 at 
p.239 footnote 29. 
71 and thus risk having their choice attacked as not 
reasonably related. 
72 The exceptions to party autonomy are discussed 
at p.310 et seq. 
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who has retained possession of sold goods. This limitation 
may be seen as a result of the wording of Section 1-105(1) 
itself as the section does read "The parties" may agree as 
to the system of law to govern "their" rights and duties. 73 
Meaning of "Transaction" 
Another problem concerns the meaning of the word 
'transaction' . It could apply to every step taken by 
either party in the course of the performance of the con-
tract 74 or it could have the same meaning as the term 
\contract .' Thirdly it has been suggested by Rheinstein 75 
that the word 'transaction' may have a broader meaning in 
so far as it could refer to the total chain of business 
activities of which a particular contract is a part. 
If the first interpretation above is correct then the 
question becomes does the Uniform Commercial Code apply 
only to the transaction in question or to the contractual 
relation as a whole? In the former case different aspects 
of the same contractual relation may have to be judged by 
different laws which may conflict with each other; in 
the latter case it could be that the Code would be applied 
73 In Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort pitt 
Packaging Int'l Ltd. 339 Pa. 643 at p.647 for example 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that a clause 
providing that New York law was to govern bound the parties 
but did not affect the rights of the parties' creditors. 
"Otherwise it would be possible for two parties to render 
nugatory as to third parties an Act of Assembly passed for 
the benefit of such third parties." 
74 M. Rheinstein. Conflict of Laws in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. (Winter 1951) 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
114 at p.127. 
75 1 ., . d DJ. • 
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to a contractual relation which may have only slight con-
tact with the forum. 
If 'transaction' has the third meaning given above 
then Rheinstein 76 considers a "particularly undesirable" 
result could eventuate as "it might make the application 
of the lex to a contract for sale dependent upon 
factors which may be totally unrelated to that particular 
contract. ,,77 
It is suggested that the courts would take a practical 
view here as has been done with the reasonable relationship 
requirement. There is no reason why the word 'transaction' 
should not be synonymous with the word 'contract'. The 
Code's aim is to simplify the law concerning contracts. 
Ease of application must have been seen as desirable; to 
give strained meanings to the word 'transaction' does not 
help matters. No cases appear to have considered the 
meaning' of the word I transaction' which suggests that the 
difficu s here are more academic than real. 
A Note on Public Policy 
One limitation which courts should not put on choice 
of law clauses is that the public policies of the forum 
are not to be overriden by the application of foreign law. 
All commentators78 put this interpretation on the Code, 
76 Ibid . 
77 Ibid . 
78Nordstrom & Ramerman op. c . supra n.18 at at 
p.24l. Prebble at p.534 and see infra at p.333. 
generally stating that as the Code is so widely accepted 
within the united States and as it deals with commercial 
matters it is not likely that variations will reflect some 
fundamental policy or "some deep-rooted tradition of the 
common weal. n79 
Thus the cases do not consider public policy and a 
choice of law valid by Section 1-105(1) is in effect 
unreviewab on public policy grounds. 80 
Conclusion: Party Autonomy and the Code 
Party autonomy dominates in the New York Uniform 
Commerc Code. The courts' attitude to the reasonab 
relationship requirement keeps the exception in proportion. 
Other matters discussed above, such as the meaning of the 
word 'transaction' are probably of academic interest only, 
for otherwise the matter would have been litigated from 
time to time during the last twenty-five years. 
As the rule is the result of legislation it is 
to Lawyers are not required to hunt through a mass 
79Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 224 N.Y. 99 atp.1l1 (1918-). 
80 In Ne::1erlandse, etc. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp. 466 
F. Supp. 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) the court made the statement 
that "It is an established principle of New York law that 
the parties to a contract may consent, in the of a 
strong countervailing public policy, to the law to be applied 
with respect to the contract." U.C.C. S.1-105 (McKinney). 
However public policy was not an issue in the case and the 
court went on to apply the Uniform Commercial Code to the 
breach of contract. 
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of case law to the party autonomy rule as is the case 
in other jurisdictions. 
New York would appear to have adopted the most 
sensible and practical solution to the choice of law 
issue for contracts with contacts in more than one j s-
diction. New Zealand should likewise adopt such an 
approach. 
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NO EXPRESS CHOICE 
The Appropriate Relationship Test 
The next matter that requires discussion is the appl 
cation of Section 1-105 to those cases where the parties 
have failed to stipulate a law to govern their transaction. 
If the parties have not made an express choice then pursuant 
to the second sentence of Section 1-105(1) the Uniform 
Commercial Code of the forum applies to the transaction if 
it bears an "appropriate relationshipllto the forum State, 
and that in the present context is New York. 8l . 
The Official Comment 282 makes the point that the mere 
fact that the action is brought in a state does not make 
it appropriate to apply the sUbstantive law of that state. 
An example is given of what would not be appropriate. If 
the lavl of the place of contracting and the law of the 
place of contemplated performance are the same and are 
contrary to the law under the Code then would not be 
appropriate to apply the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Official Comment 3 leaves the question of approp-
riate relationship to judicial decisions and states that 
in deciding that question the court is not strictly bound 
by precedents established in other contexts. 
On a teral interpretation the statement that the 
Code "applies to transactions bearing an appropriate re-
81 For a history of the Appropriate Relationship Test 
see R.J. Nordstrom & D.B. Ramerman. The Uniform Commercial 
Code & the Choice of Law. 4 Duke L. Rev. 623 at p.635 et 
seq. (1969). 
82See Appendix C. pp.563-4. 
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lation to this state" means that the lex fori is going to 
be applied irrespective of the number and strength of con-
tacts with other states so long as an appropriate relation 
exists with the forum. 
It has been pointed out83 that what amounts to 
'appropriate' can change with time. A relation which was 
appropriate when the problem was whether to apply a newly 
drafted comprehensive Code or the law of a non Code state 
does not neces ly continue to be appropriate when all 
states involved have the same basic legislation. 
The Of ial comment84 gives cases where a relation 
to the enacting state is not appropriate to include, for 
example, those cases where the parties have clearly con-
tracted on the basis of some other law, as where the law 
of the place of contracting and the law of the place of 
contemplated performance are the same and are contrary to 
the law under the Code. 
Two cases may serve as illustrations of the test. 
Application of the Appropriate Relationship Test 
Windsor Industries, Inc. v. Eaca Intern. Ltd. 85 pro-
vides a c example of the application of the appropriate 
relation requirement. There was no choice of law clause. 
The plaintiff, a New York Corporation brought an action 
\ 
against two corporations which were organised under the 
83Nordstrom & Ramerman op. cit. supra n.81 at p.641. 
84 See Appendix C pp.16 and 17. 
85 548 F. SUppa (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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laws of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong for alleged breach 
of warranties by the defendants in their sale of electronic 
television games to Windsor. 
The plaintiff relied on section 1-105(1) and argued 
that New York law should govern since delivery was made in 
New York and it was understood that the games were to be 
resold and distributed through the plaintiff's facilities 
in that state. The court found however that the "facts of 
the transactions" did not support the application of New 
York law. NExt follows a list of contacts which the 
court presumably considered pertinent. First negotiations 
for the transactions occurred Hong Kong, second the 
plaintiff's orders for the games were accepted there, thirdly 
the games were delivered to the plaintiff's agents in Hong 
Kong and were accepted there after inspection and shipped 
F.O.B. Hong Kong aboard carriers he designated, and finally 
payment was made to the seller by means of irrevocable 
letters of credit established in Hong Kong. 
No attempt is made to evaluate these different con-
tacts nor is stated why they should have been chosen 
in preference to other possible contacts such as the plain-
tiff's place of incorporation and business. The court 
having listed the geographically orientated contacts simply 
concluded that the appropriate law was that of Hong Kong. 
In Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank 86 Dr. Hughes stopped a 
cheque which had been given by his wife to a real estate 
86 484 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (City Ct. 1985). 
249 
agent for a month's rent for accommodation in Florida. 
The doctor gave the wrong cheque number but otherwise 
fied the cheque he wanted stopped. The bank subsequently 
paid out the full amount. 
The court noted the contacts with New York - Dr. and 
Mrs. Hughes were New York residents, the bank owned and 
operated a branch bank in the jurisdiction and the banking 
contract between the parties was made in that state. Fin-
ally the debtor-creditor relationship it created was to be 
performed in Roches New York. 
New York law governed and section 1-105(1) and Auten 
v. Auten are cited as authority, and the court went on to 
hold the bank liable, much to Mrs. Hughes' re f. 
The Problem of Determining When the Appropriate 
Relationship test Applies 
Gruson87 suggests that the New York lex also 
applies if the part s have chosen a jurisdiction other 
than the forum which does not bear a reasonable relation 
to the transaction. 
Adams 88 takes a similar view. Henson 89 however 
does not consider that section 1-105(1) governs the case 
where parties choose the law of a state to govern whose 
relation to the transaction is not reasonable. 
The Code says "Failing such agreement this Act applies 
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this 
state". 
87Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.350. 
88Adams op. cit. supra n.4 at p.285. 
89Henson op.cit. supra n.3 at pp.209-10. 
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One could both interpretations. If the sen-
tence means "If the first part of Section 1-105(1) cannot 
be satisfied for whatever reason then the appropriate 
relationship appl s" one would favour Gruson's and Adams' 
view. Alternatively if the words mean exactly what they 
say and no more, i.e. that the relationship applies if 
there has been no , then the other limitations, 
including the reasoning relationship, still apply. 
Whilst on the one hand it could be said Gruson and 
Adams are reading more into the section than is there the 
object of the Code was to make for uniformity. It was 
intended to apply to as many contracts as possib This 
aim is furthered by applying Gruson's and Adams' 
pretation. 
The matter does not appear to have been jUdicially 
considered. From a practical point of view either inter-
pretation results in the ultimate application of the 
fori. Pursuant to Gruson and Adams views New York law 
will apply so long as there is an appropriate relation 
to New York; it does not matter if the transaction fails 
on the reasonable relationship requirement in the first 
half of Section 1-105(1). If Henson correct then 
having led on the reasonable relationship test the last 
sentence of Section 1-105(1) is inapplicable therefore 
New York as the forum must fall back on its common law 
conflict of laws provisions. The actual result applying 
either the Code or this common law is however likely to 
be the same. 90 
Finally in this context one may consider what the 
cases have actually done. On the one hand it has been 
suggested that this matter has not been judicially con-
sidered; on the other hand the cases can be interpreted 
as supporting either view. 
In one case91 it was found that New York had no 
reasonable relationship to the transaction. 92 
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90 See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Lawss.187. The 
New York Annotations suggest that the Official Comment 3 
means that the Code adopts the significant contacts test, 
which is the New York common law position anyway. 
In Martin v. Julius Dierck Eguipment Co. 384 N.Y.S. 2d 
479 (1976), Titone J. in the Appeliate Division of the 
Supreme Court said it was court's opinion that the 
framers of the Uniform Commercial Code II were not of a mind 
to follow blindly the traditional conflict of laws theory 
with respect to contracts and the related laws of warranty, 
to wit, that the place of making or performing the contract 
is controlling as to the governing law." Ibid at p.483. 
The court conside that the language of Section 1-105 show-
ed this and that the Official Comment thereto was indicative 
of legislative approval of the IImost significant relation-
ship" test of the Restatement (Second). The court accord-
ingly applied the 'grouping of contacts or centre of gravity' 
doctrine to the facts. 
91Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills Inc. 442 
F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
92 The governing law clause specified a choice of New 
York law. All the "truly significant" contacts were held 
to be with North Carolina. Prebble at p.533 considers 
that a IIbizarre" situation could arise here. He says that 
if forum law was chosen and failed on the reasonable relation 
test then the Code would still apply if the transaction bore 
an appropriate relation to the forum. H.e therefore con-
siders it "conceivable" that a court might strike down an 
express choice of forum law as not being reasonably related 
to the contract, but nevertheless apply that same law as 
"appropriately" related. However he concludes that "appro-
priate" and "reasonable" in this context would have the same 
meaning. 
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The court applied Auten v. Auten93 (the significant 
contacts test) without referring to the second sentence of 
section 1-105(1), This is explicable on two grounds. 
First of all it may be argued that the judge was 
applying the appropriate relation test but had failed to 
articulate his reasoning process. On this view the 
appropriate relationship test is the significant contacts 
test of Auten. 94 The judge may be seen as jumping ahead 
in applying the test before explaining how he arrived at 
this test. 
Alternatively it may be seen as a situation where the 
Code does not apply, The reasonable relationship re-
quirement is not satisfied and it is not a situation falling 
within the second sentence because there has been no II 1-
ing such agreement ll , The parties had chosen New York law 
to apply. Therefore once the first part of section 1-105 (1) 
is found to be inapplicable the court goes straight to its 
common law conflict of laws provisions. 
The Duplan decision95 does not help Gruson and Adams 
because the second sentence of Section 1-105(1) arguably 
not being applied. Henson's view can be seen as correct 
if one argues that the court has gone straight to the 
common law from the first sentence of Section 1-105(1). 
93 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
94As suggested by the U.C.C. Official Comment 3 and 
as interpreted by the New York Annotations. 
95Duplan Corp. v. W.E. Davis Hosiery Mills Inc. 442 
F. Suppl. 86 (S. D. N. Y. 1977). 
However it can be argued that the court arrived at the 
significant contacts test via the appropriate relation 
test. 
The matter of whose view is correct remains to be 
solved by judicial decision. The only fact in favour 
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of arguing that the courts do reach the significant con-
tacts test via the appropriate relationship test is that 
cases exist which fall squarely within the second sentence.' 
of Section 1-105(1) which have not mentioned the appropriate 
relationship requirement at all. For example in Bache Co. 
v. International Controls corp.96 there was no governing 
law clause. Having noted this fact the court said "there-
fore one must look to the 'centre of gravity' of the 'group-
ing of contacts theory' of conflict of laws."97 Auten 98 
is cited99 and the contacts with New York stated. No 
mention is made of the appropriate relation test. Here 
the court is faced with a situation on all fours with the 
second sentence of Section 1-105(1) and yet it is not men-
tioned. This suggests that the court is applying the test 
but not articulating its reasoning process. 
As the matter has not arisen to date it could be argued 
that the whole problem is o~ academic making. In Bache 
96 339 F. Supp. 341 (1972). 
97 Ibid at p.347. 
98Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d .. 99 (1954). 
99 339 F. Supp. 3 41 at p. 348 (1972). 
254 
for example the court did not mention the reasonable 
relationship requirement presumably because was no 
governing law clause anyway. 
Conclusion 
If the first sentence of Section 1-105(1) is not ap-
plied for any reason then the court is likely to apply the 
significant contacts test. From a practical point of view 
whether the court reaches its decision via the appropriate 
relationship test or by simply applying common law is 
probably immaterial. From a technical point of view it 
is suggested that the two sentences are not related in 
any way. Either there is a choice of law clause in which 
case the reasonable requirement qualification applies, or 
if there is no choice of law clause then one starts afresh 
by considering the second sentence Section 1-105(1). 
Conclusions to Section 1-105(1) 
The Uniform Commercial Code is probably the most im-
portant piece of business legislation ever prepared in the 
United States. 100 Because is designed to have 
force of law and control the major part of interstate mer-
cantile and financing transactions it is more important 
than the American Restatement (Second) which is a non-
100 Some American writers would say the world. See 
F.K. Beutel. The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a 
Problem in Codification. (Winter 1951) 16 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 141. 
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official statement of what the law is thought to be. The 
Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in all states and 
the resulting uniformity should avoid a great many of the 
choice of law problems which confronted pre-Code lawyers 
and judges. Regrettably however the widespread acceptance 
of the Code has not completely eliminated the need for 
choice of law rules in commercial transactions. This is 
because the Code has not been adopted outside the United 
States and within America most states have altered various 
sections to reflect some local policy. Moreover courts 
have and no doubt will continue to interpret the same Code 
sections differently.1 
The conclusion is that even though commercial trans-
actions are regulated in the United States, international 
contracts and even transactions between Code states will 
continue to generate choice of law problems. 
The Code has its critics. These critics tend to 
focus on the disadvantages generally of forum-oriented 
rules. "Blanket insistence on application of the law of 
the American forum is likely to impress our foreign trading 
partners as unwarranted parochialism" is a typical criti-
cism. 2 
However as a clear pronouncement in favour of party 
autonomy the Section must be considered of great value. 
The weakness of Section 1-105(1) lies in the vague 
IFor example see Nordstrom & Ramerman op. cit supra 
n.S1 at p.624 footnote 2. 
~Weintraub op. cit. supra n.6 at p.41S. He 
was considering the appropriate relationship test. 
test given for establishing the applicable law absent a 
choice of law clause. A test which is easier to apply 
and which would introduce certainty into the area is 
required. 
This would seem a reasonable conclusion given the 
object of the Code and its intention to simplify inter-
state commercial contracts. 
A further conclusion is that by ultimately applying 
the significant contacts test the uniform Commercial Code 
and New York common law will apply the same test for both 
commercial and non commercial contracts. 
seen as advantageous. 
This must be 
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SECTION 5-1401 OF THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW3 
Defined 
This section which became effective in New York on 
19 July 1984 provides as follows: 
"Choice of law. 1. The parties to any contract, 
agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, 
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in consideration of, or relating to any obligation 
arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate 
not less than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, 
including a transaction otherwise covered by subsection 
one of section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code, may 
agree that the law of this state shall govern their 
rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not 
such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a reason-
able relationship to this state. This section shall 
not apply to any contract, agreement or undertaking 
(a) for labour or personal service, (b) relating to 
any transaction for personal, family or household 
services, or (c) to the extent provided to the contrary 
in subsection two of section 1-105 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed to limit or deny the enforcement of any 
provision respecting choice of law in any other 
contract, agreement or undertaking. H4 
In 1983 the Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law 
of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York had 
made a Proposal for Mandatory Enforcement of Governing-Law 
Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial Agree-
ments. 5 
The Proposal was intended to apply to large commercial 
transactions where New York had been chosen because of its 
leading role as an international commercial centre. The 
Proposal resulted in Section 5-1401# 
3This section is sometimes referred to as Title 14. 
4New York General Obligations Law S.5-1401 (1984 N.Y. 
Laws Ch. 421) (McKinney 1986 Supp.) 
5See The Record of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York. Vol. 38 No. 6 537 (1983). 
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Section 5-1401 is a clear legislative attempt to 
support and uphold party autonomy. The Committee had 
suggested a minimum monetary requirement of one hundred 
thousand dollars which would result in only really large 
non consumer transactions being involved. Furthermore 
these requirements would reduce the likelihood that any par-
tyhadagreed to a governing law clause through fraud, mis-
take, overreaching or unequal bargaining power. The 
Committee 6 also noted that parties to a sizeable commercial 
transaction will probably have been represented by counsel 
during the negotiation process. These factors, it was 
suggested, guaranteed as far as possible, that the parties 
had carefully considered the consequences of their choice 
of New York law. It so ensures that the public policy 
concern to protect personal family, agricultural or con-
sumer transactions would not be impaired when liberalizing 
the law applied to larger commercial transactions. 7 
Paragraph 2 of Section 5-1401 expressly states that 
a choice of law clause in contracts not covered by the 
statute are not deemed to be ineffective. Such choice of 
law clauses will be determined by New York conflict of 
laws principles and, where applicable, Section 1-105 of the 
6Ibid at p.543. 
7G. A• Penn & T.W~ashel. Choice of Law Clauses in 
Commercial Agreements Under New York and English Law. 
(1985) J. Bus. Law 501. 
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Uniform Commercial Code. 
A number of matters resulting from Section 5-1401 
need to be noted. 
1. The Monetary Limitation 
First the monetary limitation adopted was significant-
ly higher than the recommended figure, and whilst expressed 
in terms of United States dollars the New York courts will 
apply the equivalent in foreign currency in determining 
this threshold requirement. 8 To choose a monetary limit 
may be said to involve an arbitrary cut off point which 
would have been better avoided. In times of rapid in-
flation it will be necessary, presumably, to continually 
alter this figure to ensure that only really large contracts 
are covered. Alternatively, of course, if the figure is 
left at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars Section 
5-1401 will apply to an increasing number of cases as the 
value of money decreases. 
It is difficult to see why the need was felt for a 
monetary limit at all given that the parties are going 
to be in equal bargaining positions. The contracts 
that are excluded by Section 5-1401(1) (a), (b) and (c) 
include those contracts where the parties are in unequal 
bargaining positions. Penn & Cashel9 suggest that a 
threshold of size indicates the contract is important and 
8This is clear from the legislative history of Section 
5-1401. See McKenney's Session Laws of New York 1984 
Vol2 at p.3288. 
9penn & Cashel op. cit. supra n.7 at p.501. 
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that legal advice has been obtained, thus by implication 
the parties realise the significance of their choice of 
law clause. If parties are in equal bargaining positions 
and if they chose New York law to govern then they should 
be bound with their choice even though New York has no 
relationship to the contract other than the choice of law 
clause. The monetary hurdle required by the section may 
be seen as indicative of the section's general character 
which is cautious and limited. 
2. D~pecagel0 is allowed 
/ 
The second matter to note is that contractual depecage 
is expressly recognised by Title 14. 
3. Scope of Section 
Thirdly the scope of the section is a little unclear. 
Obviously only commercial contracts are contemplated but 
there will inevitably be borderline cases arising which 
could exhibit characteristics belonging to both commercial 
ventures and to types of contracts enumerated in Section 
5-1401. The statute is remedial and therefore should 
be interpreted liberally but it is easy to see difficulties 
arising. 
It has been suggested11 that although the words used 
are "the parties to any contract" the legislature intended 
10This simply means that parties may subject part of 
their contract to one law and another part to another law. 
The matter is discussed below. See infra at p.379-80. 
11 S.M. Cone. A Note. III Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 38 
(Sept. 1984). 
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that wherever litigants were properly before a New York 
court, whether by virtue of the new Act or otherwise, the 
court should view the Act as embodying a mandatory enforce-
ment rule of general application which would cover both the 
parties to the contract and any third party for whose bene-
fit the contract was entered into. New York's liberal 
third party beneficiary doctrine is cited in support of 
this contention. 
4. The effective date 
Fourthly the section came into effect on July 19, 1984. 
This means that the provisions of the statute apply to 
contracts entered into after that date and also to contracts 
entered into on or before the effective date in connection 
with any action or proceeding commenced on or after the 
effective date of July 19 1984. 12 
5. Jurisdiction - A Note 
Finally as a related matter is the question of juris-
diction. The Committee13 in 1983 were aware of the fact 
that English law was frequently preferred to New York law 
for international transactions because English law is not 
said to require a relationship between the transaction and 
England, and English courts do not dismiss on the basis of 
forum non conveniens if the parties to the litigation are 
foreigners. 14 Hence.the.need existed to make New York equally 
12 Penn & Cashel op. cit. supra n.7 at p.502. 
l3Record of the Association of the Bar of the city of 
New York op. cit. supra n.5 at p.544. 
l4 Ibid . 
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attractive to international parties. Con~equently the 
legislation has three basic principles. First is the 
principle of party autonomy, secondly where parties agree 
on the application of New York law the courts should have 
jurisdiction to hear the case and the third princip is 
that the defence of forum non conveniens should not be 
invoked by a party to such a contract who has agreed in 
contract to New York law and has agreed to submit to 
New York jurisdiction. 
Title 14 Section 5-1402 is the jurisdiction section 
accompanying Section 5-1401. If parties to a contract of 
at t one million United States dollars stipulate New 
York law under Section 5-1401 they may also avail themselves 
of New York courts under Section 5-1402. Section 5-1402 
allows the parties to contracts stipulating New York law 
pursuant to Section 5-1401 to consent to New York in person-
am jurisdiction. When the parties consent to jurisdiction, 
the statute prohibits New York courts from dismissing 
case on the grounds of inconvenient forum. 15 16 
6. The Effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of the United States Constitution 
Finally a question has been raised as to the extent 
to which the full faith and credit clause of the United 
l5N. y • Civ. Prac. R. 327(b) (McKinney SUppa 1984-85) 
Rule 327(b) was enacted as part of Assembly Bill 7307-A. 
1984 N.Y. Law Ch. 421. Rule 327(b) provides that the courts 
shall not stay or dismiss an action on the grounds of in-
convenient forum when Section 5-1401 and Section 5-1402 apply. 
16Section 5-1402 also removes prior restrictions on the 
rights of foreign corporations and banks to sue in New York 
if Section 5-1401 and 5-1402 apply. 
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States Constitution 17 may affect the operation of the 
New York statute. The full faith and credit clause oper-
ates in the federal system to provide for recognition in 
one state of the public acts and judgments of another 
sister state. The question is whether Section 5-140 
can constitutionally be applied in a case where a New York 
forum is required by the section to apply New York law 
absent a reasonable relationship with New York and where 
a fundamental policy of another interested state is involved. 
As has been pointed out18 the problem does not arise 
in international contracts as the clause does not operate 
outside the United States federal system. Where the 
contract is interstate future cases will have to determine 
whether New York has a sufficient state interest by virtue 
of its status as a pre-eminent financial centre, as the 
place of the chosen law and forum, and in promoting certain-
ty in commercial contracts under New York law to outweigh 
the governmental interest of another sister state. 
It has been suggested that an exception should be 
added to 5-1401 to read "Nothing in this section or in 
Section 5-1402 shall be construed to permit contracting 
parties to stipulate New York law to circumvent the public 
policies of other interested states."19 
17 U. S • Const. Art. IV Section 1. 
18penn & Cashel op. cit. supra n.7 at p.503. 
19B. W. Rashkover. Title 14, New York Choice of Law 
Rule for Contractual Disputes: Avoiding the Unreasonable 
Results. 71 Cornell L.R. 227 at p.247 (1985). 
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One writer 20 takes the view that as Section 5-1401 
explicitly directs the court to apply New York law even if 
there is strong public policy of another interested juris-
diction, the full faith and credit clause is definitely 
violated. The statutory language and legislative intent 
of Title 14 ifically direct the courts to enforce 
governing law clauses in all cases covered by the statute. 
If this proviso were to be adopted then its author con-
siders Title 14 would still forward the important conflict 
of law value of party autonomy , and will also forward 
another important conflict of law value which is recognition 
of significant legislative pol 
state jurisdictions. The full 
would not be overridden. 
Criticisms of Section 5-1401 
s of interested other 
ith and credit clause 
Some criticisms of Section 5-1401 have already been 
canvassed. The suitability of a monetary requirement 21 
the scope of the section,22 and its effect on the Full 
Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution23 
have already been cons 
Three further criticisms may be noted. 
20 Ibid . 
21Supra at pp.295-6. 
22Supra at pp.262 
23supra at pp.262-3. 
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1. The object of Section 5-1401 might not be achieved 
It was intended that Section 5-1401 would promote New 
York's role as a leading commercial centre. It has been 
argued24 that this object might not be achieved. Rashkover 
argues that this section does nothing to actually encourage 
commerce in New York state. Contracts for the production 
of goods or for the construction of facilities generate 
employment at the site of production and the positive 
economic effect of such employment benefits that state's 
economy. New York's s ta·ture as a commercial centre will 
not be fostered by Title 14 because parties may "bestow 
the significant fruit" 25 of their activity in other states 
while reaping the benefits of New York's well developed 
commercial law. Under the reasonable relationship test 
the parties had an incentive to maintain some actual contact 
with New York; now they need only include a governing law 
clause in their contract. 
2. Certainty may not result 
Rashkover 26 also suggests that Title 14 does not achieve 
certainty. Whilst a New York choice of law clause will 
provide certainty in New York there is nothing to stop 
other party from bringing an action in another state. 
Other states do not have a Title 14 but apply the reasonable 
24Rashkover Ope cit. supra n.19 at p.241 et seq. 
25 Ibid . 
26 Ibid . 
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relationship test or interest analysis. A non New York 
forum will not uphold the choice of New York law on either 
of these approaches if there is no connection with New York. 
So part s can never be sure that their clause will be 
effective. 
3. Impact of Section 5-1401 Limited 
Thirdly it may be suggested that the Section will have 
little impact in New York because it will apply to very few 
cases. A number of cases will have been discussed 
in the New York context. 27 Had the Code come into effect 
the day Auten28 was decided only two of the cases discussed 
in the text would have met the requirements needed to bring 
Section 5-1401 into operation. The first decision is 
Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. 29 and even 
here it is not altogether clear from the judgment that the 
monetary requirement is met. No figures are given although 
there is a statement to the effect that "loans amounting to 
a quarter million dollars might be sought ll • 30 Assuming 
the monetary requirement is met then the case is on all 
four squares with Section 5-1401. It will be recalled 
that the New York governing law clause was not upheld. How-
ever the judge noted that the result would be the same 
27 I . e . the D.C.C. cases supra at p.217 et seq. and the 
New York common law cases infra at p.270 et seq. 
28Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1954). Auten is 
the earliest decision considered in this part of the thesis. 
29 514 F. Supp. 841. 
30 Ibid at p.845. 
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whether Tennessee law or New York applied. Keystone 
would be unsuccessfu1 31 whether party autonomy, the 
significant contacts test or Section 5-1401 applied. 
The new section has no impact on the decision. 
Bank ItecN.V. v. J. Henry Schroeder Bank & Trust32 
a case yet to be discussed satisfied the requirements 
of Section 5-1401. Six million dollars was involved 
and there was a New York governing law clause. Again 
the section has no impact on the decision, New York law 
was uphelQ anyway. 
It seems,therefore~that Section 5-1401 is perhaps 
too cautious and limited, and that it should have been 
framed in terms that would have meant that it applied to 
a greater number of decisions. 
Conclusions 
Despite these disadvantages the removal of the 
reasonable relation test can only be seen as advantageous. 33 
However the New York legal system is faced with a dilemma. 
On the one hand is the desire to promote New York's role 
as an international commercial centre and on the other is 
the fear that if no restriction is placed upon party auto-
nomy then the New York State and Federal courts will become 
completely inundated with minor disputes. In New York 
31Keystone's conduct was such that no law would be 
likely to allow Keystone to profit from its actions. 
32 612 F. Supp. 134 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). 
33Discussed in detail below. See infra at p.289 et seq. 
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the courts are already overloaded,34 and the ever increasing 
number of cases suggests that in New York some limitation is 
necessary. Whether a monetary limitation is the answer 
is,however,debatable. 
Overall however Section 5-1401 with its clear pro-
nouncement in favour of party autonomy must be seen as a 
tool to promote certainty within the law in New York. 
The object of passing this legislation was to ensure 
the effectiveness of choice of law clause in large com-
mercial transactions. 35 Section 5-1401 should ensure 
that this is achieved. 
The monetary limitation, or any limi"tation that 
endeavoured to limit the use of the courts' time is not 
an argument that is applicable to New Zealand. Geograph-
ica1ly isolated and not a world-centre any legislation 
that adopted party autonomy in New Zealand would not 
result in an overwhelming mass of cases coming before our 
courts. 
34 See generally R.A. Posner. The Federal Courts. 
Crisis and Reform. (1985) 
35The Record of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York op. cit. supra n.5 at p.538. 

Chapter IV 
THE NEW YORK COMMON LAW RELATING TO 
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
Introduction 
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The discussion on governmental interest analysis and 
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws serve as a 
general introduction to New York Law. 
The New York Uniform Commercial Code will apply to 
many interstate and international contracts. However when 
the Code is not relevant and when Section 5-1401 does not 
apply, New York common law will prevail. It is this body 
of law which is next considered. The case law in this 
area is diverse, however a review of the decisions suggests 
a number of propositions: The first consideration is that 
party autonomy prevails in New York. 
1. Party Autonomy supported by Case Law 
Since the 1950's it is possible to cite numerous cases 
in support of party autonomy in New York. 1 A recent 
illustration is found in Bank Itec N.V. v. J. Henry Schroeder 
Bank & Trust2 a decision of the United States District 
Court. 
1E • g . Siegelman v. Cunard White Star 221 F. 2d. 189 
(2d. Cir. 1955), Reger v National Association of Bedding 
Manufacturers Group Insurance Trust Fund 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 
97 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1975), Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Enco Associates Inc. 401 N.Y.S. 2d.767, and see the 
cases ci teo. by Gruson. M. Gruson. Governing Law Clauses 
in International Loan Agreements - New York Approach. Univ. 
of Illinois L.R. 207 at p.211 et seq. (Winter 1982) (here-
inafter referred to as Gruson New York Approach) . 
2 612 F. Supp. 134 (S. D . N . Y. 1985). 
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Goettel J. held that not only does the Restatement 
and the substantial weight of case law support party auto-
nomy but "fundamental policies underlying contract law also 
counsel its adoption."3 The protection of justified ex-
pectations is seen as the prime objective of contract law. 
The court considered that this was best attained in multi 
state transactions by letting the parties choose the law to 
govern the validity of the contract and the rights created 
thereby. In this way certainty and predictability of 
results would be most likely to be secured. Finally the 
judge noted that giving the parties power to nominate the 
governing law is also consistent with the fact that, in 
contrast to other areas of law, persons are free within 
broad limits to determine the nature of their contractual 
obligations. 4 
The cases whi.ch support party autonomy also suggest 
that a reasonable relationship requirement is necessary.S 
Since 1964 the New York Uniform Commercial Code Section 
1-105(1) has required for commercial contracts a reasonable 
relation requirement6 to be placed on party autonomy. How-
ever cases exist which suggest that this was required in 
3Ibid at p.141. 
4The case arose out of a complicated multi-party trans-
action involving a Dutch bank, a New York bank and a Florida 
insurance company. The governing law clause stated New 
York law was to govern the agreement in question. The 
choice of law clause was upheld. 
5Gruson. New York Approach at p.211 et seq. cites the 
cases. 
6Supra at p. 228 et seq. 
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New York prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. For example in S.A. Rampell Inc. v. Hyster 7 the New 
York Court of Appeals upheld a choice of law clause "since 
the parties intended to be applicable and it [the agree-
ment] had a reasonable relation to ,,8 
2. Non Exclusive Use of Party Autonomy in New York 
A number of decisions exist which suggest that party 
autonomy not omnipotent in New York. For example in 
Haag v. Barnes 9 Fuld J. said10 
"The traditional view was that the law governing a 
contract is to be determined by intention of the 
parties .... the more modern view is that 'the courts 
instead of treating as conclusive the parties' inten-
tion or the place of making or performance,' lay em-
phasis rather upon the law of the place 'which has 
the most significant contacts with the matter in 
dispute. 11111 
This case is important as it was a decision of the New York 
Court of Appeals and it was the first case to hold that the 
significant contacts test could be applied where a choice 
of law clause had been made. 12 
7165 N.Y.S. 2d. 475 (1957). 
8Ibid at p.486. 
9175 N.E. 2d 441. 
10 Ibid at p.443. 
11Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954) and one other 
case, Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. 305 N.Y. 288 (1935) are 
cited as authority. 
12 In Auten v. Auten 724 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954) there was 
no governing clause. 
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This approach was followed in La Beach v. Beatrice 
Foods 13 , a decision of the United States Southern District 
Court. The case involved what may be considered to be a 
truly international contract with 'contacts' in America, 
Europe and Africa. 
Werker J. held that following Haag v. Barne although 
the parties' choice of law clause is to be given 'consider-
able weight' the law with the most significant contacts is 
to be applied. The law applied was Illinois law as that 
state had the most significant contacts. 
Similarly in Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Protective 
fe Ins.14 the United States Court for the Eastern District 
of New York refused to give effect to a choice of law 
clause specifying that New York was to govern the contract. 
Costantino J. stated that 
liThe more modern view, however, holds that while the 
parties' choice of law is to be given considerable 
weight, the law of the jurisdiction with the 'most 
significant contacts' is to be applied. "15 
Without giving reasons the court decided that the 
most significant contacts were with Tennessee and that 
fundamental policies of that state as reflected in its 
insurance and corporation Taws were involved, and that 
the applicable Tennessee statutes did not violate the 
public policy of New York. 16 The case provides a clear 
13 461 F. Supp. 152 (1978). 
14 514 F. Supp. 841 (1981). 
15Ibid at p.847. 
16The issue in the case relevant to choice of law 
concerned the enforceability of a guarantee which had 
specified that New York law was to govern any dispute. 
example of a court preferring "the most significant con-
tacts ll test to that of party autonomy.17 
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Similarly in Southern Internation Sales Co. v. Potter 
& Brumfield Division of A.M.F. Inc. 18 the United States 
Court for the Southern District of New York refused to uphold 
a choice of law clause specifying Indianan law to govern. 
The Court relied on the public policy exception in Section 
187 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws and inter-
est analysis to reach its conclusion. The Court noted 
that its decision did not fulfil the parties I expectations 
but concluded that state interests and state regulations 
overruled the parties I choice. ~he applicable law, absent 
the choice of law clause would have been the law of Puerto 
Rico,also th~ application of Indianan law would frustrate 
the fundamental policy expressed in the Puerto Rican Dealers' 
Contracts Act. 
The Court thus made a clear decision to ignore the 
parties I choice in favour of another law. 
In 1975 the United States District Court formulated 
the New York approach somewhat differently. Party autonomy 
would be. upheld provided there were sufficient contacts 
and the application of that state1s law would not be con-
trary to any fundamental policy of a state which had a 
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue at bar, and which 
17However in this case the court thought it unlikely 
that the actual result would have differed under Tennessee 
or New York law. See p.847 of the Judgment. 
18 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N. Y. 1976). 
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would be the state of the applicable law the absence 
of an effective choice of law by the parties. This test 
was stated in Business Incentives Co. Inc. v. Sony Corp. 
of America. 19 Only the Restatement (Second) section 187 
1S cited in support of this alleged test. No other cases 
are discussed on this issue. The test was applied and the 
New York governing law clause was not upheld. The con-
tacts were found to be predominantly with New Jersey and 
so that law would apply absent the choice of law clause. 
New Jersey was also seen as having a strong public policy 
in protecting the weaker party in a contract. 
Academic Views 
It may be argued that party autonomy exists in New 
York, is limited by a reasonabkrelationship requirement, 
or other requirements,20 or alternatively that the sig-
nificant contacts test applies. Cases illustrate 1 
these findings. Since the 1950's academic writers have 
held equally diverse views. Levin21 and Batiffo122 
writing in the 1950's cons that governing law 
68 (1975) 19 397 F. Supp. 
20See Business 
397 F. Supp. 
Incentives Co. Inc. v. Sony Corp. of 
68 (1975). 
21 M. J . Levin. Party Autonomy. Choice of Law Clauses 
Commercial Contracts. 46 Geo. L.J. 260 at p.261 (1957-
1958) . 
22 H. Batiffol. Public Policy and the Autonomy of the 
Parties. Interrelations Between Imperative slation and 
the Doctrine of Party Autonomy. In Lectures on the Con-
flict of Laws and In·ternational Contracts. ··U. Mich. 
Law School Summer Inst. on Int'l & Compo Law (edit. 1951) 
at p.68 
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clauses were not decisive in themselves. Batiffo123 
considered an express choice of law clause as an 'indication' 
only of the law to be applied. 
In the next decade it was Graveson's24 opinion that 
1i's25 case was preferable to Siege1man's.26 
Sch1iesser27 in the mid sixties said there was "growing 
oppositionll to party autonomy. Johnston28 agreed and 
Lef1ar29 in the second volume of his Treatise noted that 
whilst governing law clauses will be helpful they might not 
be respected. Lowe 30 was to make the same point in the 
next decade. 
Recently at least one commentator has stated that 
"New York does .not follow the autonomy ru1e.,,31 
23 Ib l.'d t 78 a p. . 
24 R.H. Graveson. Comparative Evolution of the 
Principles of Conflict of Laws in England and the U.S.A. 
(1960) 9 Recuei1 des Cours 21 at p.98. 
25Ger1i & Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co. 48F. 2d. 115 
(2 d. Cir. Ger 1i I. S case had he 1d that II some 1avl 
must impose the obligation, the parties have nothing 
whatever to do with thatj no more than whether their 
acts are torts or crimes. II 48F. 2d. 115 at p.117 (2d. 
Cir. 1931). 
26siege1man v. Cunard White Star Ltd. 221 F.2d. 189 
(2d. Cir. 1955). 
27 p . C• O. Sch1iesser. International Sales Agreements. 
10 Prac. Law 45 at p.49 (Jan. 1964). 
28 R. Johnston. Party Autonomy in Contracts Specifying 
Foreign Law. 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 37 at p.160 (1966). 
29 R•A• Lef1ar. American Conflicts Law (1968) 
( 2nd. .) at p. 366 . 
30J . R. Lowe. Choice of Law Clauses in International 
Contracts. A Practical Approach. 12 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 
at p.32 (1971). 
31 R.J. Bauerfe1d. Effectiveness of Choice of Law 
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other writers take an opposite view. 32 One recent 
commentator33 for example emphasises the existence of party 
autonomy in New York and Gruson 34 in the last decade con-
siders party autonomy is part of New York law. 
Summary 
The most unbiassed conclusion to draw is that party 
autonomy prevails in New York subject to a requirement that 
the choice of law be reasonably related to the contract. 
This is the basic common law rule which applies to inter-
state and international contracts in the absence of specific 
legislative provisions. 
New YOrk Cases which Involve No Choice of Law Clauses 
It seems clear that since the 1950's New York courts 
have consistently applied the significant contacts test to 
determine choice of law issues where the parties have failed 
to make an express choice themselves. 
Auten v. Auten35 was the first case to apply the sig-
nificant contacts test. It has been so frequently followed 
that it may be considered a landmark decision. Fuld J. 
clauses in Contract Conflict of Law. Party Autonomy or 
Objective Determination. 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1659 at 
p.1669 (1982). 
32 G. A. Penn. Choice of Law Clauses in Commercial 
Agreements under New York and English Law. (1985). J. Bus. 
Law 250. Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.329 et seq. 
T. Brown. Notes. Choice of law Stipulations by Litigants. 
43 Washington & Lee L.R. 141 at p.141 (Winter 1986). 
33penn ibid. 
34Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.329 et. seq. 
35 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
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states the traditional rule, namely that the lex loci con-
tractus and the lex loci solutionis were means of solving 
choice of law problems and notes that "many cases appear to 
treat these rules as conclusive. Others consider control-
ling the intention of the parties and treat the general 
rules merely as presumptions or guideposts, to be considered 
along with all other circumstances. u36 He then notes that 
courts have also applied the 'centre of gravity' or the 
'grouping of contacts' theory. The New York Court of 
Appeals went on to apply this test to the facts and found 
that all the contacts of the case were with England. English 
law was thus applied. 
The next decade saw Auten being applied by the New York 
courts in a number of decisions. For example in Oakley v. 
National Western Life Insurance Co. 37 the court stated the 
Auten rule and considered "clear u38 that New York courts 
would apply the law of the state which has the most signifi-
cant contacts with the matter in dispute. 39 
Motley J. then admits however that "it is less clear 
how this is done."40 He cites the Restatement (Second) 
and states that "the rights and duties of the parties with 
respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local 
36 Ibid at p.10l. 
37 294 F. S u pp . 504 (S . D . N . Y. 1968). 
38 Ibid at p.506. 
39 Ibid . 
40 Ibid . 
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law of the state which as to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." 
"New York courts have delineated the methodology to be 
employed in this procedure. . .. isolate the 
issue, next ... identify the policies embraced in the 
laws in conflict, and finally ... determine the con-
tacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain 
which has a superior connection with the occurrence 
and thus would have a su~erior interest in having its 
policy or law applied. 114 
Motley J. continues by saying that appears that in New 
York the most significant contacts to evaluated are the 
relative interests of the states involved. 42 Four signi 
cant contracts are listed. 43 The fact that New York had 
an interest in protecting its citizens who pay premiums 
or from New York coupled with the fact that New York's 
interest fringed on no interests of Missouri meant that 
New York was to apply. 
Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom44 which was 
cited to illustrate interest analysis in Chapter 1 of this 
part of thesis 45 also states that Auten46 is the rule 
41 Ibid at p.50l. 
42 Ibid . 
43 (1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
( 4 ) 
Both plaintiff and decedent were, at the times 
relevant to this action, New York domiciliaries. 
Decedent paid premiums on this policy and did 
so by mailing them from New York to Missouri. 
The policy was issued in Missouri. 
The policy was issued by a Missouri Corporation 
to its parent, a Delaware Corporation doing 
business in Missouri. 
44300 N. Y.S. 2d. 817 (1969). 
45supra at p. 196. 
46Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d. 99 at p.102 (1954). 
Quoted by Jason J. N.Y.S. 2d. 817 at p.825. (1969). 
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in New York. Jason J. noted that the traditional view 
had been rejected by the New York Court of Appeals, and 
a direct quote from Auten v. Auten is given with approval. 
The approach adopted 
"gives to the place 'having the most interest in 
the problem paramount control over the particular 
factual context, thus allowing the forum to apply 
the policy of the jurisdiction' most intimately 
concerned with the outcome ... " 
Having directly quoted Fuld J. in Auten Jason J. continued 
by stating 
liThe rule which has evolved clearly in our most recent 
decisions is that the law of the jurisdiction having 
the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied 
and that the facts or contacts which obtain signifi-
cance in defining state interests are those which 
relate to the purpose of the particular law in con-
flict." 47 
The Court held that the New York Statute of Frauds 
applied, this legislation prevented recovery of a finder's 
without a written agreement. The Court considered that 
New York had an interest in protecting foreign principals 
doing business in New York. The plainti ,a New York 
broker, could thus not recover his fee. 48 If the law 
of New Jersey had been applied the legitimate interests 
of New York would have been defeated without any corres-
ponding legitimate interests of another state being 
furthered. 
47 Ibid . 
48The other party was a New Jersey company. In New 
Jersey the New York broker could have recovered his fee. 
This decision has been applied in a number of other 
decisions. 49 It can be taken as authority 
analysis or the centre of gravity theory.50 
New York Cornmon Law and the New York Uniform 
Commercial Code Section 1-105(1). A Note 
interest 
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The New York common law obviously applies to all non-
commercial contracts. 
If the contract is of a commercial nature then the 
Code may apply. However it must be remembered that Section 
1-105(1) is not always applicable. It is not "a 
which allows parties to choose the 'law' to apply 
to their 'transaction' whether or not such transaction is 
covered by the Uniform Commercial Code." 51 It will only 
apply in the situations posed by Section 1-105(1) itself. 
Thus if the parties have not made a choice of law decision 
49pallavicini v. International Telephone & Telegraph 
Corp 341 N.Y.S. 2d. 281 (1973). 
J. Zeevi & Sons Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd. 371 
N.Y.S. 2d. 8.92 (1975). 
Index Fund Inc .. v. Insurance Co. of North America 580 F. 2d. 
1158 (1978). 
See also: Joy v. Heidrick & Struggles Inc. 403 N.Y.S. 2d. 
613 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) and 
Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 643 F.2d 98 (2d. Cir. 
1981) for examples of interest analysis. 
50 Cf . Southern Intern. Sales v. Potter & Brumfield Div. 
410 Supp. 1339 at p.1342 (1976) where the court said 
"whether one appl s the 'most significant relation' test 
expressed in Section 188 and in Auten v. Auten or the more 
recent government st analys s 0 International plan-
v. Daystrom Inc . ... " thus suggesting the two 
s are quite distinct. It is argued that this is 
not so. Daystrom was applying Auten. 
51Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.343. 
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and if the transaction does not bear an appropriate relation 
to New York then the New York common law will apply. The 
connection between the Code and common law is closer when 
one takes into account the fact that it is the common law 
which is partially involved in establishing the 'appropriate' 
relationship requirement. 52 The matter is left to judicial 
decisions thus common law decisions are used to interpret 
the phrase. 
At the end of the day the ultimate outcome in a par-
ticular case is likely to be the same whether the Code or 
common law applies. If a choice of law clause exists then 
the choice must be reasonably related both for the Code and 
for the common law. If no choice of law clause exists 
then the Code applies if the transaction is appropriately 
related. The cases 53 list contacts or in other words 
apply the significant contacts test to determine this matter. 
Thus the significant contacts test is in effect applied to 
cases coming within the Code and cases being decided 
pursuant to the common law. 
New York Common Law and the Restatement (Second) 
Conflict of Laws: A Note. 
Assuming that New York common law allows for party autonomy 
so long as a reasonable relationship exists between the law 
chosen and the contract and that failing express choice the 
significant contacts test applies then it may be stated that 
52See supra at p.246 et seq. 
53 See e.g. Windsor Industries Inc. v. Eaca Intern. Ltd. 
548 F. Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and Hughes v. Marine Midland 
Bank N.A. 484 N.Y.S. 2d. 1000 (City Ct. 1985) both discussed 
in the context of the Uniform Commercial Code supra at p.247 et 
seq. 
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the Restatement does basically state New York law. 54 
Some minor differences may be noted. Section 187 
(2) (a) introduces the term "substantial relationship", 
for example, but party autonomy is the rule with the 
significant contacts test applying in the absence of choice. 
The Restatement (Second) is cited with approval in many New 
York decisions. 55 
New York law and English law. A Note 
It has been suggested56 that the real difference be-
tween America and England on their choice of law rule is, at 
the end of the day, a matter of evidence. In America one 
must show that the chosen law is substantially (or in the 
case of New York reasonably) connected with contract. 
This is usually self evident but in a difficult case the 
party relying on the clause must prove a sUbstantial or 
reasonable relationship. In England the inference is in 
the opposite direction. Where the chosen law does not have 
any particular connection with contract the burden will 
be on the person attacking the choice to show that it was 
legally objectionable. Prebble cites Mount Albert Borough 
Council v. Australian Temperance & General Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd 57 and in re Helbert Wagg_ 
54For a more detailed discussion see Gruson Governing 
law clauses at p.340. 
55 See for example the cases c 
especially in footnote 49. 
56prebble at p.507. 
by Gruson ibid 
57[1938] A.C. 224 at p.240. It was said that "if the 
parties have in terms in their agreement expressed what law 
they intended to govern ... prima fac their intention will 
be effectuated by the court." 
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58 
& Co. Ltd to "Support his aY-,9ument. 
Prebble's contention is that England and America have 
basically similar rules and that the results in the cases 
tend to be the same in both America and England. Assuming 
his argument is correct it is still possible to maintain 
that there is a world of difference between finding con-
tacts with the chosen law and finding reasons to invalidate 
its application. As the cases, on both side of the Atlan-
tic show, it is fairly easy to produce contacts and allege 
a significant or substantial connection. It would be 
considerably more onerous to show that a choice of law 
clause was legally objectionable given that connection 
between the chosen law and the contract is not essential. 
Some Conclusions 
As New York is a busy commercial centre with both 
state and federal courts working at a maximum 59 the number 
of decisions reported on choice of law issues is obviously 
considerable. One may find judgments and academic writers 
to support many different contentions. Indeed many commen-. 
tators appear to start with a preconceived idea and consider 
the cases accordingly.60 
58[1956] 1 Ch. 323 at p.341. The court held that the 
parties' choice was "prima facie evidence of the proper law." 
59 See generally R.A. Posner. The Federal Courts. 
Crisis & Reform. (1985) . 
60Johnston op. cit. supra n.28 for example at p.52 con-
siders that Siegelman v. Cunard White Star 221 F. 2d. 189 
illustrates the "general malaise" towards party autonomy! 
Penn in a bid to emphasise party autonomy suggests at p.251 
that the significant contacts approach "has not been applied 
in a commercial case where an express choice has been made." 
Penn is writing in 1985 some seven years after La Beach v. 
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In an attempt to be impartial it could be said that 
the case law in New York would appear to establish the 
following: 
1. Party autonomy exists in New York subject to a 
reasonable relationship requirement. The common 
law and the Uniform Commercial Code are in accord. 
2. Haag v. Barnes 6l applied the significant contacts 
test despite the presence of a governing law clause. 
Although not a commercial contract the decision was 
subsequently applied in two decisions of the United 
states District Court 62 which were commercial cases 
and which contained an express choice of law clause. 
However a recent decision63 has stated that this is 
not the basic approach in New York, and that case law 
supports party autonomy.64 Whilst the New York court 
of Appeals has not again considered the matter it is 
unlikely that would today apply the significant 
contacts test when a choice of law clause 
Beatrice Foods 461 F. SUPR 
Keystone Leasing v. Peoples 
Supp. 841 (1981). See G.A. 
Commercial Agreements under 
J. Bus. Law 250. 
152 (1978) and 4 years after 
Protective Life Ins. 514 F. 
Penn. Choice of Law Clauses in 
New York and English law. (1985) 
61 175 N.E. 2d. 441 (1961). 
v. Beatrice Foods Co. 461 F. Supp. 152 (1978) 
was a s of the Southern District New York United 
States District Court whilst Keystone Leasing v. Peoples 
Protective fe Ins. 514 F. Supp. 841 (1981) was a decision 
o 
63 Bank 
612 F. Supp. 
is a decision of 
N.V. v. J. Henry Schroeder Bank & Trust 
.C.N.Y. 1985). It may be noted that this 
the same court which decided La Beach v. 
461 F. Supp. 152 (1978). 
64 Ibid at p.140. 
This is especially so when one recalls the fact that 
Haag v. Barne 65 was decided some four years before 
the introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code into 
New York. 66 
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It is suggested that the cases cited in the footnote 
below67 are exceptional. The risk remains however 
that interest analysis or the significant contacts 
test could be employed to upset a choice of law clause. 
3. If no express choice of law clause exists then the 
significant contacts test is applied. This test has 
been given many names, it is the Auten68 principle 
after the case of that name, it has also been called 
the contacts test approach or theory and the centre 
of gravity tes~approach or theory. Given that it 
may be described as a type of government interest 
analysis it may be said that New York has adopted 
interest analysis into its law. 
65 175 N~E. 2d. 441 (1961). 
66 It may be noted that in Haag v. Barnes ibid and 
La Beach v. Beatrice 461 F. Supp. 152 (1978) the end result 
was that Illinois law applied. Thus the partjes·expect-
ations were not thwarted. In Keystone Leasing v. Peoples 
Protective L~fe Ins. 514 F. Supp. 841 (1981) the court noted 
that whilst it "finds that the application of Tennessee law 
is appropriate, it is unlikely that the result would have 
differed under New York law." Ibid at p.847. However in 
Southern International Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield 
Division of A.M.F. Inc. 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
the parties· expectations here are openly thwarted. See 
also Business Incentives Co. Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America 
397 F. Supp. 68 (1975) and criticisms of the case infra 
at p. 296 footnote 87 and pp.298-9. 
67 Ibid . 
68Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
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4. The 'reasonable relation' requirement and the signifi-
cant contracts theory may very well produce identical 
results in any given case. If a choice is reasonably 
related it is likely to have significant contacts 
between it and the transaction and vice versa. It has 
been suggested69 that the reasonable relationship re-
quirement presents a "lower hurdle"70 than the signifi-
cant contacts test. 71 
Perhaps reference is being made to the fact that judges 
do not seem to have made too much of the reasonable 
relationship requirement in the cases on the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 72 However there appear to be no 
New York decisions that have upheld a choice of law 
clause and found it reasonably related (on the ground 
that New York is a leading commercial centre) where 
all the contacts pointed to a different law. However 
the main point to be made is that whether or not the 
'reasonable relation' requirement or the 'significant 
contacts test' produces the same results there is a 
basic distinction between the two concepts. The group-
69G. A. Penn & T.W. Cashel. Choice of Law clauses 
under English and New York law (1986) I & II. J. Bus. Law 
333 and 497. 
70 Ibid at p.500. 
71No reasons are given by Penn & Cashel. However one 
could assume that they had in mind the situation where the 
parties choose New York because of its commercial status. 
Here the relationship could be reasonable despite the lack 
of any significant contacts with New York. It is the 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws Sec. 187 Comment (f) 
at p.566 situation. However there appear to be no recent 
New York decisions where this argument has applied where 
a choice of law clause existed. Gruson, Governing Law 
Clauses and Gruson, New York Approach in this context cites 
cases that did not contain a governing law clause. See 
especially Gruson, New York Approach at p.208, note 6. 
72See supra at p. 237. 
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ing of signi cant contacts would seem to be a method-
ology to find the proper law where none has been 
chosen by the parties. The jurisdiction with the 
most significant contacts would then be the juris-
diction whose law would apply. A reasonable relation-
ship requirement is a qualification to the application 
of a law which has been chosen by the parties. 
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CRITICISMS OF THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
Four specific criticisms of the reasonable relationship 
requirement are now considered followed by two general 
criticisms of the New York Approach. Three cases are 
then discussed by way of conclusion to the New York law. 
Criticisms of the Reasonable Relationship Requirement 
1. Neutral Stand Argument 
One favourite argument against a reasonable re ion-
ship requirement is the so called "neutral stand" approach. 
Adherents of this view maintain that merchants may reason-
ably choose a law lacking a reasonable relationship for the 
very purpose of ining a neutral stand. 73 
However from a New York point view it is arguable 
that if the parties choose New York law because New York is 
a leading commercial centre then not only will the court 
find the reasonable relationship sfied74 but it is 
73 See for example Deutsche Schachtbau-Und Tiefbohr-
gesellschaft m.b.h. v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co .. & 
Shell International Petrolum Co. Ltd. [1987] Vol. 2 Lloyds 
Law Reports 246 at p.250, and A.A. Ehrenzweig. Choice of 
Law in California. A "Prestatement". 21 U.C.L.A. Law 
Rev. 781 at p.791 (1974). 
74 J . zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) 371 N.Y.S. 
2d. 892 (1975) and Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v. Daystrom 
300 N.Y.S. 2d. 817. Although not cases containing a choice 
of law clause these two decisions indicate that aNew York 
court would take this approach. 
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applying the neutral stand argument anyway. 
2. The Reasonable Relation Test Confuses the true issue 
It has been argued that the reasonable relationship 
requirement makes for legal acrobatics. This argument 
suggests that party autonomy is the norm and that really 
all the courts are concerned with is that parties do not 
attempt to circumnavigate the public policy of the forum. 
What is important is the good faith of the part s in their 
choice of law clause and to incorporate a reasonable re-
lation test merely serves to confuse the issue. 75 
One writer 76 has suggested that the object of contract 
law is to do justice between the parties. From the parties' 
point of view justice is represented by their own respective 
laws. The court's idea of justice is represented by the 
lex fori. The reasonab relationship test and the factors 
used to determine the existence of such a relationship such 
as place of performance, place of contracting etcetera shed 
no light at all on which country's rules are appropriate 
from the point of view of justice to the parties. 
3. No Theoretical Basis for the Requirement 
If is accepted that parties may choose a law to 
govern ir contract then it is impossible to justify the 
reasonable relationship requirement on any theoretical 
75 T.G. Ryan. 
Under the Uniform 
(1979) . 
Reasonable 
Commercial Code. 
ion & Party Autonomy 
63 Marquette L.R. 212 
76 A.J.E. Jaffey. 
Choice of Law. (1982) 
at p.374. 
The Foundations of Rules for the 
2 Oxford J. of Legal studs. 368 
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ground. Numerous writers have made this point. 77 
The reasonable relationship requirement may be seen 
as a remnant from the past. The old idea had been that 
some a priori law applied to a contract. Allowing 
the parties to choose a law for themselves resulted in 
the otherwise applicable law being evaded. Allowing 
party autonomy was an exception which had to be kept 
within certain limits. Thus the exception of allowing 
party autonomy was qualified by the requirement that there 
must be a reasonable relationship between the contract and 
the chosen law. 78 
Today the exception of party autonomy has become the 
rule but the qualification remains. It has become the 
rule for the cases covered by the Uniform Commercial Code 
and New York case law would suggest that the New York 
common law has retained the reasonable relationship re-
quirement where parties have incorporated an express choice 
of law provision into their transaction. 
77 E . G. M.V. Levin. Party Autonomy. Choice of Law 
Clauses in Commercial Contracts 46 Geo. L.J. 260 at p.263 
(1957) . A.A. Ehrenzweig. Contracts in the Conflict of 
Laws (Part 1'). 59 Colum. L. Rev. 973 at p.990 (1959). 
W.L.M. Reese. Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing 
their Contracts. 54 Proc. Am. Soc. of Int'l L. 49 (1960). 
D.J. Tuchler. Boundaries to Party Autonomy in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. A Radical View. 11 St. Louis U.L.J. 180 
(1967). Prebble at p.503. Ryan op. cit. supra n.75 at 
p.237. Gruson. Governing Law Clauses. 351. 
78The requirement of a reasonable relationship was 
first introduced into New York by the federal decision of 
Hal Roach Studios Inc. v. Film Classics Inc. 156 F. 2d. 
596 (2d. Cir. 1946). Chase J. held that the court could 
see no reason why the parties' choice should not control 
apart from policy considerations of the forum "so long as 
there is that sufficient relationship to make it reasonable 
that the law chosen should apply". Ibid at p.598. 
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4. Difficulties in the Application of the test 
It was suggested in the context of the Uniform Commercial 
Code that the reasonable relationship test was difficult to 
apply in practice as the Code did not give guides as to what 
should amount to a reasonable relationship in any given 
situation. 79 
The same difficulty applies when courts are faced with 
a contract containing a governing law clause that is to be 
decided by New York common law. Whilst the recent New 
York State legislation has abolished the requirement for 
certain substantial contracts 80 it continues to exist for 
many other transactions. However as with the Uniform Com-
mercial Code judges in New York have tended to find the 
reasonable relationship test satisfied. In the cases con-
sidered on party autonomy for New York cornmon law there is 
no discussion by the courts of the reasonable relationship 
test. It merely stated. 81 There appear to have been 
no difficult cases where New York law has been chosen but 
where all the contacts necessary to establish a reasonable 
relationship point overwhelmingly elsewhere. New York 
judges would probably take the view that even in this 
situation the choice would be reasonable for 
79 See supra at p.220 et 
80 See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law S.5-1401(1) (1984 N.Y. Laws 
Ch. 421) (McKinney 1986 Supp.) Discussed supra at p.275 et seq. 
81Reger v. Nat. Assn. of Bedding Mafrs. Etc. 372 N.U.S. 
2d. 97 at p.114 and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates 
401 N.Y.S. 2d. 767. Tl971)}. 
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!lone cannot help but remark that to a judge of the 
forum the selection by the parties of the law of the 
forum as the proper law must always appear eminently 
reasonable. ,,82 
Secondly the New York judge would cons reason-
able to choose New York law because of New York's role as 
an important commercial centre. 
However this does not alter the fact that the test is 
potentially difficult to apply. 
Conclusion: Reasonable Relationship Test and Common Law 
Whilst the reasonable re ship requirement still 
exists in New York for cases being decided pursuant to 
cornmon law the effect of the test is becoming limited. 
This is due to three reasons: 
1. The courts tend to a reasonable relationship 
established without embarking on elaborate analysis 
of the requirement. It is a requirement that could 
be said to be tagged on to the choice of law discussion 
and to which lip only is paid. 
2. The growing tendencies in cases is to state that New 
York is a leading commercial centre and to uphold 
New York choice of law clauses as furthering New York's 
international position. Such a choice is seen as 
reasonable. If this trend continues then the day will 
shortly where a choice of New York law will 
automatically be considered reasonable and the require-
ment will 1 into disuse. 
82 p . E . Nygh. Conflict of Laws in Australia (1984) 
(4th edit.) at p. 226. 
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3. The recent legislation with its monetary requirement 
will apply to more and more cases as the value of 
money decrease$. It may be seen as legislative 
disapproval of the reasonable relationship require-
ment. 
It seems difficult to find a rational basis for 
arguing that the parties' choice must be reasonably related 
to the contract. Whilst it could be seen as reasonaLle to 
suggest there should be some connection with the chosen 
law this argument disintegrates when one considers the 
fact that if two laws are closely connected with the con-
tract the parties are free to choose one of the two laws 
even if the one chosen has less interest in the transaction. 
So if the law with the closest connection may be excluded 
by party determination, as is the law in New York and 
England seems difficult to argue that there must be a 
connection between the chosen law and the contract as 
required in New York. Merely to ensure a connection 
would not seem to have value in its own right. 
In this respect Lord Wright's dictum83 that connection 
with the chosen law is not essential seems more rational. 
83Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] 
A.C. 277 at p.290. 
Criticism of Decisions Which Limit or Override 
Par ty---.S ho ice 
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If parties may not rely on their choice of law clauses 
uncertainty prevails. 84 If any form of interest analysis 
is used when a choice of law clause is present in a con~ 
tract the result is to downgrade the clause to a mere con-
tact to be considered with all other contacts. In such a 
situation the parties' expectations are not met and this 
results in uncertainty, and increases the possibility of 
litigation, two very undesirable consequences. 
In La Beach v. Beatrice Foods 85 it would have been 
infinitely preferable to have upheld the choice of law 
clause and applied Illinois law rather than arrive at 
exactly the same result by embarking on the difficult task 
of interest analysis. The courts' reasoning is unconvincing" 
as it emphasises the Illinois contacts to reach its con-
clusion to such an extent that the Nigerian contacts are 
greatly underestimated. Poor Mr. Amachree, one of the 
defendants who was Nigerian, is completely overlooked in 
the process of collecting Illinois contacts. Delaware, 
New York, London and Geneva contacts are likewise ignored. 
Why not uphold the parties' choice in Keystone Leasing~6 
The contract was commercial; the parties businessmen. 
They had made a choice of law decision and surely this 
84Business Incentives Co. Ltd. v. Sony Corp. of America 
397 F. Sup& 63 (1975), La Beach v. Beatrice Foods Co. 461 
F. Supp. 152 (1978) and Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Pro-
tective Life Ins. 514 F. Supp. 841 (1981). 
85 461 F. Supp. 152 (1978). 
86Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. 514 
F. Supp. 841 (1981). 
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should have been upheld to the complaint under New 
York law rather than dismissing it pursuant to Tennessee 
law. Given that the are not going to be allowed 
to profit from their unacceptable course of conduct it is 
preferable to dismiss action pursuant to their choice 
of law rather than the law of Tennessee. 87 
In Southern International Sales Co. v. Potter & Brum-
field Divisions of A.M.F. Inc. 88 it was not neces 
the forum to cons the public policy of a state which 
was neither the forum nor the state of the parties' choice. 
One party was a manufacturer of electrical products and the 
other a corporation. They had made a contract a term of 
which was that a particular law should govern. There is 
no suggestion the decision that the parties were not in 
equal bargaining position. Applying the Puerto Rican 
legislation results in a windfall for the Puerto Rican 
corporation. The Indiana manufacturer might never have 
consented to the application of the PUerto Rican law. He 
is disadvantaged by the court's failure to uphold the choice 
of law c e. 89 
By ignoring party autonomy not only are the parties' 
expectations ignored (as was admitted by the judge) 90 but 
87Similarly in Business Incentives Co. Inc. w Sony Corp. 
crArnerica 397 F. Supp. 63 (1975) it would have been prefer-
upheld the New York choice of law clause. The 
New Jersey contacts may be seen to be overemphasised and the 
public policy contention fallacious. This latter point is 
discussed in the context of the next criticism below. See 
infra at pp.298-9. 
88 410 F. SUpp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
89 The court even admitted that the choice of Indiana 
law was reasonably related to the contract. Ibid at p.1341. 
90Ibid at p.1343. 
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other uncertainties What conclusjon for example 
would the court have come to had the distributor not 
been Puerto Rican but a corporation in a nearby state 
such as Florida or even Indiana? In such a situation 
the court might or might not upset the choice of law 
clause. 
The only way to fil the goals of certainty, 
predictability, party expectation and make the law 
easy to apply is to uphold party autonomy . Cases such 
as this lead to unpredictable results. 
Insufficient Consideration Given to Practical Consequences 
of Decisions 
If the actual result in any given case is going to 
be identical whichever law is chosen it seems a complete 
waste of time and effort to devote a huge amount of dis-
cussion to the choice of law issue. Rather the court 
should uphold the party cho pursuant to party autonomy 
if such a choice has been made. (Alternatively, if the 
court applied the lex fori in the absence of choice the 
result would be the same absent a large amount of ef 
in applying interest analysis). If the actual consequences 
of the rules are the same it seems unnecessary to do more. 
Yet despite the fact that pursuant to interest analysis 
the court does look at the content of rules the cases 91 
91 E . g . Haag v. Barnes 175 N.E. 2d 441, (1961) i 
Reger v. National Assn. of Bedding Manufacturers Group 
Insurance Trust Fund 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 97 (1975); Triange 
Underwriters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc. 457 F. Supp. 765 (1978); 
Keystone Leasing v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. 514 
F. Supp. 841. (1981). 
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illustrate that much time and effort is wasted here. The 
process becomes a 'legal exercise. ,92 
In Reger's93 case for example six pages of discussion 
on the choice of law issue are reported. The Auten94 
principle is considered, the Uniform Commercial Code and 
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws discussed. Public 
policy is reviewed in the context of choice of law and 
renvoi with all its attendant problems canvassed. Finally 
the court holds that Illinois law governs and notes that 
the end result would have been identical under Yew York 
law anyway. 
A closely connected criticism, and therefore consid-
ered at this point, is that New York courts do not always 
consider the implications of their decision and thus curious 
results can obtain. 
In Business Incentives Co. Inc. v. Sony Corp. of 
America 95 it will be recalled96 that the New York choice 
of law clause was not upheld partly because New Jersey had 
a strong public policy in protecting the weaker party. 
However when the court applied the law of New Jersey the 
weaker party was not in fact protected. Why not uphold 
92Levey v. Saphier 370 N.Y.S. 2d. 808 at p.813 (1975) 
per Harnett J. The case is an example of party autonomy 
being upheld. The court "concludes that New York law applies. 
This is likely a legal exercise however, since the parties 
seem correctly in agreement that New York and Delaware law 
are similar for application to the issues here." Ibid. 
93Reger v. National Association of Bedding Manufacturers 
Group Insurance Trust Fund 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 98 (1975). 
94Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
95 397 F. Supp. 63 (1975). 
96Supra at p. 286, and p.296 footnote 87. 
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party autonomy in this situation? It fulfils the parties' 
expectations and makes for certainty.97 Given that the 
plaintiff fails, would not the family behind Business 
Incentives Inc. prefer to il pursuant to their choice 
of law clause rather than fail and not have their choice 
of law clause upheld? Party autonomy should have pre-
vailed. 
Finally it must be noted 'that it is not an argument 
of this thesis that the content of the possible laws 98 
should be considered by the court. At an international 
level this would be too difficult and time consuming99 and 
unnecessary anyway. The parties' choice should be upheld 
without the consequences considered or the lex fori applied 
absent such choice. 100 
97Whatever New York law held it would not thwart New 
Jersey public policy on the facts of the case. If New 
York law would uphold the contract then the plaintiff 
fails. In this situation New York law comes to the same 
result as New Jersey law and therefore it cannot be said 
to hinder the latter's public policy. If New York law 
in fact protected the weaker party (here the New Jersey 
plaintiff) then it may be seen as ~ostering New Jersey law 
by protecting the economically weaker New Jersey plaintiff. 
98 The parties should consider the matter obviously or 
results like The Assunzione (1954) P. 150 6btains. See 
supra at p.139-40. 
99 The content of a law within a state system is ob-
viously intinitely easier to establish than at international 
level where differences language and legal concepts make 
for difficulties. 
100Discussed supra at p. 139. 
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Illustrations of the Difficulties Involved with 
---Interest Analysis 
Earlier in the thesis the third rule of the Proper law 
doctrine was criticised. It was held that the test was 
difficult to apply because of lack of guidelines provided 
for the judge, because of the mUltiplicity of potential 
contacts and the problems associated with weighing such 
contac'"C.s. The lack of stated reasons for the judge's 
choice, the possibility of abuse of the test and the fact 
that the end results could be seen as arbitrary all equal-
ly apply to interest analysis. 
Three cases were given to illustrate these difficulties 
in the English settingi therefore seems appropriate to 
consider three New York decisions to highlight these prob-
lems in New York. This trilogy of cases also illustrates 
the fact that New York judges are arguably in a more in-
vidious position that their English counterparts as they 
have the added burden of considering policy considerations. 
One matter that must be noted is that the term 'con-
tact(s) appruach,test or method' is identical to the sig-
nificant contacts approach,test or method. The centre of 
gravity is likewise identical. The judge must choose con-
tacts that further state policies; it is a form of inter-
est analysis. In the New York context Auten v. Autenl 
may be seen as applying interest analysis and the "Auten 
130 8 N. Y. 155, 12 4 N. E • 2 d • 9 9 ( 195 4) . 
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approach" has become synonymous with the terms used above. 
However in the cases the judges not only use all the above 
terms they also use the words interest analysis or govern-
mental interest analys Some cases are decided by 
reference to I interest analysis ',2 whilst others3 inter-
mingle terms such as the 'Auten approach' and 'significant 
contacts test' within the same paragraph. Finally some 
decisions refer only to-the 'Auten principle' or 'centre 
gravity' etcetera approach. 4 
From a theoretical point of view not too much should 
be made of this. The test is to apply the law of the 
state that has the greatest interest in having law or 
policy applied. This state will usually be the one which 
has the most significant contacts with the transactions. 
The object is to locate the contacts that will further the 
policy which has already been elucidated. 
In Haag v. Barnes 5 the contacts chosen by Fuld J. 
are not evaluated but merely listed. No reasons are given 
2Krauss v. Manhatten Life Ins. Co. 643 F. Supp. F. 2d. 
98 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
3International Planning v. Daystrom 300 N.Y.S. 2d. 
817, (1969) and Index Fund Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North 
America 380 F. 2d. 1158 (1978). 
4Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank 484 N.Y.S. 2d. 1000 
(City Ct. 1985) cites only Auten and the Uniform Co~nercial 
Code. See also American Homes Assurance Co. v. Employers 
Mutual of Wausau 434 N.Y.S. 2d. 7 (1980). See also 
Southern Intern. Sales v. Potter & Brumfield Div. 410 
F. Supp. 1339 (1976). 
5175 N.E. 2d. 441 (1961). 
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why some contacts are included and others excluded. It 
would be very easy to emphasise the New yrork contacts. 6 
It would be equally easy to emphasise the Illinois connec-
tions. The case has been cited as "one of the most drama-
tic examples" of piling up contacts 'V'lith an eye to possib 
litigation and it is suggested that to allow the lawyer-
manufactured contacts, including particularly the choice of 
law clause tu control "is to exalt a rigid formalism above 
New York's interest in the welfare of the child and mother. ,,7 
However Norman Barnes had ·to live somewhere and given 
that he had always lived in Illinois it is quite reasonable 
that he should engage an Illinois lawyer. Thus one could 
go on arguing. Contacts exist with both jurisdictions. 
One may criticise the case for its lack of emphasis on 
policYi the contacts should have been evaluated in accord-
ance with whatever policy matters Fuld J. found to exist. 8 
6For example one might contend that Dorothy Haag, the 
complainant, had spent fifteen years in New York. She had 
worked there as a law secretary, met the defendant in New 
York and subsequently conceived her child in that state. 
Shortly after the agreement was signed she took her 
daughter back to New York and had resided there ever after-
wards. New York could thus be seen as the home of mother 
and child. Her confinement in Chicago may be viewed as 
not a matter of choice but a last ditch stand to retain 
the defendant's attention, and in t evidence was given 
that Miss Haag went to Chicago because she feared that the 
defendant was losing interest in her. Even the attorney 
that she employed whilst in Chicago had links with New York 
in so far as he had been recommended by a friend in New York. 
7R. Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contracts. 54 Iowa 
L.R. 399 at p.417 (1968). 
8His treatment of the contacts in Auten v. Auten 
124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954) may be compared with his approach 
in Haag v. Barnes. 
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The views of Leflar can be seen as relevant here. 
Leflar, it will be recalled,9 held that judges and lawyers 
looked at the result they desired and worked backwards as 
it were by arguing some theory that would produce the 
desired result. In v. Barnes10 the defendant had 
amply provided for the New York plaintiff. 11 If Miss 
Haag had been a destitute solo mother the court might well 
have emphasised New York contacts in order to have her 
agreement reviewed. Given that she was receiving adequate 
sums of money there was no reason why Illinois law should 
not apply. 
The conclusion is that interest analysis, centre of 
gravity test (or whatever name one chooses to scribe the 
approach in New York) is too difficult to apply. It is 
not enough to instruct judges to choose contacts that 
will further state policies. Because it is impossible 
to provide guides that are not too general~and consequently 
vagueJthe court must consider each case anew. Thus no 
helpful body of case law is established. If interest 
analysis does not work in a satisfactory manner in practice 
it should not be employed in New Zealand. 
9Supra at p.188 et seq. 
10 175 N.E. 2d. 441 (1961). 
11Between 1956 and 1961 almost double the legal 
amount payable had been advanced by Barnes to Haag by 
way of maintenance. 
Pallavicini v. International Telephone and Telegraph 
corporation12 illustrates the difficulties of applying 
interest analysis. Again there is an over-emphasis on 
geographic contacts. The case also highlights other 
difficulties in this area. 
Madame Pallavicini, described as a resident of Rome 
and Liechtenstein (although perhaps better considered as 
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an international "jet set!! person) allegedly entered a con-
tract with Sheraton International (presumably an inter-
national corporation.) Negotiations took place with the 
Corporation's Chairman, one Mr. Boonisar. 13 The alleged 
contract was concluded in an aeroplane somewhere between 
California and New York. 
The contract involved the sale of a hotel in Mexico 
which was owned by a Mexican Corporation, but was run by 
Antenor Patino, a native of Bolivia but also a resident of 
France and Portugal. Madame Pallavicini subsequently 
wished to enforce her oral contract. However the court 
held that the New York Statute of Frauds applied and Madame 
Pallavicini failed. 
The approach taken by the majority in the decision is 
typical of the New York approach. Only geographic contacts 
are considered before the court holds that these contacts 
give New York a substantial interest in applying its law 
12 341 N.Y.S. 2d. 281 (1973). 
13Madame Pallavicini had 
in Beverly Hills California. 
flight from California to New 
subsequently stayed two weeks 
see her fiancEC 
met Mr. Boonisar at a party 
They were both on the same 
York. Madame Pallavicini 
in New York ostensibly to 
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"in view of the policy underlying the applicable provision 
of .... [the] Statute of Frauds to protect principals in 
business transactions from unfounded claims and thereby 
encourage use of New York as a national and international 
business center.,,14 The court also noted that the object 
of the Statute of Frauds is to protect defendants from 
alleged informal promises. 
The geographic contacts are listed but not evaluated. 
Of the ten possible jurisdictions15 only half could serious-
ly be considered as in any way significant. 16 Of these 
five jurisdictions the place of contracting cannot be 
determined and must be considered fortuitous. Other than 
the fact that perhaps Madame Pallavicini met the defendant 
in California that state is irrelevant as is the place of 
incorporation of Sheraton International. New York may 
also be seen as fortuitous; the plaintiff only stayed two 
weeks and had been going there on a matter unrelated to 
the contract. Mexico could be seen as the strongest con-
tact, alternatively it might be irrelevant that the hotel 
is situated in that State. 17 
l4 Ibid at p.283. 
l5 Rome , Liechtenstein, Mexico, Bolivia, France, 
Portugal, New York, California, State Y (being the state 
over which the litigants were flying at the time a contract 
was concluded) and State Z (being the place of incorpora-
tion of Sheraton International). 
l6 No one could contend that Rome, Liechtenstein, 
Bolivia, France or Portugal were in any way significantly 
involved. 
l7If for example the hotel was an international hotel 
identical to those found the world over. (Alternatively 
it might have had a definite Bolivian, French or Portuguese 
atmosphere given its manager.) 
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It is possible to argue that the contract contains 
no centre of gravity. However the court relied on a number 
of telephone calls and from letters sent from New York to 
give New York a significant interest in the matter. Thus 
as the dissenting judge18 pointed out the majority here 
applies New York law solely on the basis of several tele-
phone calls made by the plaintiff from New York during a 
fortuitous and brief sojourn there. He concluded that 
New York therefore lacked the requisite significant re-
lationship.19 
The court placed too much emphasis on the contacts 
themselves and did not give enough emphasis to the evalua-
tion of the contracts in the context of the policies in-
volved. The telephone calls and letters are unrelated 
to the policy of fostering New York's international develop-
ment. 
The reason why the New York court applied New York 
law was because it was the forum. As the forum it wanted 
its law to govern, and its Statute of Frauds to apply. 
Under present New York law the forum could only achieve 
this result by applying some form of interest analysis, 
thus contacts with New York had to be found. Given that 
the court could not really find any weight for these 
contacts the matter of evaluation is glossed over and 
forum law is applied. 
18See 341 N.Y.S. 2d. 281 at p.284 ~er Nurez J. 
19 Ibid• 
307 
Once the argument is allowed that New York is a 
financial capital of the world "serving as an international 
clearing house and market place for a plethora of 
national transactions" 20 which is a policy matter 
wishes to foster, then only lip ser.vice is being paid to 
interest analysis. Given this situation then, if New 
York is the forum, it will always want its law to apply. 
Interest analysis has given way to the lex Given 
that it is always preferable for a court to state openly 
the reasons for its decisions rather than rely on fictions 
or tortuous reasoning, it would be better if the lex fori 
was openly applied. There is nothing unreasonable in a 
court applying its law to a contract if the parties had 
not made a choice of law decision. Madame Pallavicini 
was doomed to fai1 21 on any approach. 
In J. Zeevi & Sons v. 2 the 
New York Court of Appeals argued that as a financial 
capital New York had the greatest interest in having its 
laws apply. The Court stated that the parties by 
listing United States dol as the form of payment im-
pliedly accept and trust New York law and policies. Thus 
New York law was applied to a letter of credit which 
was unenforceable in Uganda where it had been made, due 
to subsequent government action by President Amin. 
v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) 371 N.Y.S. 
5) • 
;lAlso abject of her visit to New York to see her 
fiance "unfortunately, went amiss". 341 N.Y.S. 2d. 281 
at p.283 (1973). 
22 371 N.Y.S. 2d. 892 (1975). 
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The court said 
"In order to maintain its pre-eminent financial 
position, it is important that the justified expec-
tations of the parties to the contract be protected 
.... Since New York has the greatest interest and is 
most intimately concerned with the outcome of this 
litigation, laws should be accorded paramount 
control over legal issues presented.,,23 
This looks like interest analysis or the significant 
contacts test but again it may be argued that it is really 
the lex fori which is being applied in the disguise of 
interest analysis. Given the fact that the parties have 
not made a choice of law decision why not employ the lex 
openly? 
Conclusion 
"Too often the field of Conflicts appears to be a 
mental game with infinite complications, destitute 
of clarity and simplicity and without any certain 
rules.,,24 
The conclusion 1S quite simple. Interest analysis 
is too difficult to apply in practice. It should be 
abandon, ed in favour of the lex fori approach in cases 
where no choice of law clause exists. 
In other cases party autonomy should prevail, there 
would be no reason to limit this freedom of choice by a 
reasonable relationship requirement. New York might 
consider it needs such a limitation because litigation 
in New York state must be in some way controlled. 25 This 
23 Ibid at p.899. 
24 J . p . Niboyet. Territoriality & universal Recognition 
of Rules of Conflict of Laws. 68 Harv. L.R. 382 at p.386 
(1952) . 
25 See generally Posner Ope cit. supra n.59 and J. Lie-
berman. The Litigious Society. (1981) at pp.3-6. 
does not apply in New Zealand which is a geographically 
isolated small commercial centre by world terms. 
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PART C 
LIMITATIONS ON PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
ENGLAND AND NEW YORK 
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In Part C the following limitations on party autonomy 
are considered: 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7 . 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Party Autonomy Limited by overriding statutes. 
The Limitation of Public Policy. 
The English limits on party autonomy. 
The Reasonable Relationship Limitation. 
The contract must be connected with two or more 
jurisdictions. 
Third Parties not Affected. 
Constitutional Limits on Party Autonomy. 
Meaningless Choice of Law clauses will be dis-
regarded or altered. 
Limitations on Cho of Jurisdiction. 
Party Autonomy limited to the sUbstantive law 
of the Chosen Jurisdiction. No Renvoi. 
Choice of Law limi to certain issues. 
Parties may not choose a law to govern procedure. 
The parties must both agree on the Choice of 
Law clause. (The Problem of Adhesion Contracts 
and Party Autonomy) . 
Limitations of Party Autonomy relating to time 
of choice and number of possible choices. 
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1. Party Autonomy Limited by Overriding statutes. 
To the extent that a statute will override an express 
choice of law clause it may be said that statutes provide 
a limitation on party autonomy.l 
According to standard conflict of laws doctrine a 
statute does not normally apply to a contract unless it 
forms part of the proper law or unless (being a statute 
in force in the forum) it is procedural. Overriding 
statutes are those which must be applied regardless of 
the normal rules of conflict of laws because the statute 
says so, or is interpreted to intend such a result. 2 
Thus for example in Boissevain v. Wei1 3 the House of 
Lords held that section 3(1) of the Emera~~cv Powers 
(DelE::!lce) _Act 1939(U.K.) was an overriding provision that 
applied regardless of the proper law of the contract. 4 
Statutes which put into effect international con-
ventions and which pertain to international transport5 
ISee generally A. Nussbaum. Principles of Private 
International Law. (1943) at p.69 et seq. 
Dicey & Morris at p.14 et seq. 
Morris & North at p.676 et seq. 
J.H.C. Morris. The Choice of Law in Statutes (1946) 62 
L.Q.R. 107. 
K. Lipstein. Inherent Limitations in Statutes in the 
Con ict of Laws. (1977) 26 I.C.L.Q. 884. 
F.A. Mann. Uniform Statutes in English Law. (1985) 99 
L.Q.R. 376. 
W.L.M .. Reese. 
Compo Law. 375 
Statutes in Choice of Law. 35 Am J. of 
(1987) . 
2Dicey & Morris at p.19. 
3[1950] A.C. 327. Discussed above in the context 
of illegality. See supra at p.90. 
4see discussion by Dicey & Morris at p.20. 
5E • g . Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.) and 
the Carriage of Goods by Air Act 1961 (U.K.) 
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provide examples of overriding statutes. 6 For example 
in The Hollandia7 the House of Lords held that an English 
Act which put into effect an International Convention8 
applied to a contract which contained an expre~s choice 
of Dutch law to govern the contract. 
A large machine had been shipped from Scotland to the 
Dutch West Indies aboard a Dutch vessel. Dutch law applied 
the Hague Rules and limited the carrier's liability to 
approximately two hundred and fifty pounds. Under the 
amended Hague/Visby Rules scheduled to the United Kingdom 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 the limit of liability 
was about eleven thousand pounds. The English Act applied. 
Lord Denning9 inthe Court of Appeal had explained why this 
was so. 
" there is a higher public policy to be considered-
and that is the public policy which demands that in 
international trade all goods carried by sea should be 
subject to uniform rules governing the rights and lia-
bilities and the limitation of liability of the parties. 
They should not vary according to the particular 
country or place in which the dispute is tried out. 
So many persons are concerned down the chain - buyers 
and sellers, bankers and insurers, indorsees and 
consignees - that each should know what the rules are 
without having to go by the small print in any par-
ticular Bill of Lading." 
6 See M.S.W. Hoyle. Private International Law. Cases 
and Materials. (1982) qt p.226. Dicey & Morris at p.22 
et seq. Morris & North at p.682 et seq. 
See also J.H.C. Morris. The Scope of the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act 1971 (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 59 and F.A.Mann. Statutes 
& The Conflict of Laws. (1972-1973) 46 B.Y.B.I.L. 117. 
7 [1983] A.C. 565. 
8The Hague/Visby Rules were made part of English law 
by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (U.K.) 
9[1982] 1 All E.R. 1076 at p.1080. 
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In other words the principle of international co-
ordination and unification of maritime law take precedence 
over the particular individual contract and its choice of 
law clause. Or as Morris put it -
"the truth is, surely, that when an international 
convention ..•. is given force of law in the United 
Kingdom, its provisions apply to all disputes within 
its scope regardless of the proper law of the con-
tract." lO 
This is potentially a very important limitation on 
the concept of party autonomy. 
Three situations can be considered in the context. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A Statute11 in force in the forum could override 
an express choice of law clause. The Hollandia12 
illustrates this situation. 
A statute in force in the loci solutionis could 
override an express choice of law clause. This 
situation was discussed in the context of 
illegality above. l3 
A statute in force in the jurisdiction which 
would be that of the proper law (absent an express 
choice of law clause specifying another juris-
diction) could override an express choice of law 
clause. . 
10Morris Ope cit. supra n.6 at p.66. 
l1Whi1st legislative laws are referred to here the 
same applies to common law rules. A common law rule could 
equally override a choice of law clause. The discussion 
includes both types of law but is considered in terms of 
legislative laws as it is most likely that it will be a 
legislative rule that upsets a choice of law decision. 
12 [1983] A.C. 565. 
l3 See supra at p.92. 
Forum Statutes 
Justification for forum statutes overriding Choice of 
Law Clauses. 
A number of justifications have been advanced for 
overriding an express choice of law clause. 
1. First, it is argued that public policy requires 
uniformity in the law. Thus a statute which puts 
into effect an international convention should be 
given preference to the parties' choice. 14 
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2. Secondly as Lord Denning pointed out in The Hollandia15 
it is much eas for everyone involved in the trans-
action to know in advance what law will govern rather 
than have to elicit the parties' choice by reading 
the contract. 
3. Thirdly, the judge may decide that the forum's legis-
lation is designed to protect the weaker party and 
he therefore applies the forum law rather than the 
choice of law clause to protect the weaker party in 
the contract. 
Arguments against Applying Forum Rules or Laws 
1. It is difficult to see why uniform statutes16 in 
general should be made a matter of public policy.17 
law. 
14see Morris Ope cit. supra n.6. 
15[1983] A.C. 565. See supra at p.312. 
16 I . e . statutes designed to create uniformity in the 
17 In The Hollandia (1983] A.C. 565 it was not ly 
a matter of public policy whether the shipowner should be 
liable for each kilo of gross weight rather than for each 
package or unit lost or damaged. See Mann Ope cit. supra 
n.1 at p.399. 
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As Mann18 has noted "it cannot be a matter of public 
policy in the eyes of anyone who remembers how inade-
quate, illusory and elusive unification is in the real 
world. In other words unification is an abstract 
ideal. In the concrete case what is, or purports to 
be done in its name may 0 
ification of diversity." 
contribute to intens-
Uniformity of rules is 
frequently illusory 
impossible and "to continue the 
ss by harmonising con-
of laws may make confusion worse confounded. "19 
The advantage of party autonomy is that it achieves 
certainty. By aiming at uniformity of laws and 
sacrificing party autonomy nothing is achieved. 
As Mann20 asks: 
"Does it really make sense that, when an English court 
is concerned with a transport by road from Stockholm 
to Rome, it should apply the convention scheduled to 
the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 as interpreted 
in England, although the contract between the parties 
is governed by Swedish law which has attributed to the 
provision in issue a definite meaning? It is diffi-
cult to believe that there exists any English public 
policy requiring so singularly unattractive a result. II 
2. There is no reason why a judge should apply his own 
country's protective legislation to a contract the 
proper law of which is not that of forum. This 
is so no matter whether one or both parties are from 
the forum state. 21 The parties have agreed on a law 
and only that law should be upheld. Indeed as 
18Ibid • 
19Ibid . 
20 . F.A. Mann. The Proper Law ~n Conflict of Laws. 
(1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 437 at p.446. 
21Both parties could be New Zealanders but the subject 
matter and other factors could be connected with say Japan, 
thus making the contract international. 
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Vischer 22 notes "modern slation may even have a 
tendency of being overprotective, not treating as 
adults even those persons who can look out for them-
selves and defend their positions." 
One may also argue, that in the case where the liti-
gants are foreign it is not appropriate to apply 
laws that were passed with the forum's citizens in 
mind. 23 
Alternatively it may be argued that no matter how 
general in application the law was intended to be 
in its protective scope there is no reason in logic 
or justice why parties should be to avoid their 
bargain (including the effects of the choice of law 
clause) because of some forum law. If parties have 
genuinely agreed on a choice of law clause, convenience 
and certainty require it be upheld. 
3. In answer to Lord Denning's views concerning the 
persons down the line, if his argument was taken 
seriously it would make a complete mockery of party 
autonomy. It is the parties' contract and the 
parties are the persons who must receive first cons 
ation. They have organised the affairs on the 
premise that a certain law will apply; surely that 
consideration is of greater importance than any 
possible inconvenience to strangers to the contract 
who will be required to read the contract. 
22 T• Vischer. Drafting National Legislation on Con-
flict of Laws: The Swiss Experience. (Spr. 1977) 41 No. 2 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 131 at p.143. 
23 See supra at p.103 where Morris did not see why 
English legislation should apply to a A~~~ schoolboy. 
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Statutes in force in the loci solutionis 
These statutes have been taken into account by courts 
as was discussed in the context of i1legality.24 The 
public policy of the forum requires that foreign statutes 
should in certain circumstances be considered. It is 
suggested below25 that public policy is rarely evoked by 
English courts and the only decisions reported in this area 
concern contracts the proper law of which was England. 
One may say that if the circumstances are sufficiently 
grave and serious to warrant the concept of public policy 
being evoked then in these rare situations party autonomy 
must bow to public policy. The real problem lies with 
the third situation. 
Statutes of a Third Jurisdiction 
The European Economic Convention on the law applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (1980) suggests that in certain 
circumstances the II mandatory rules ll of a state which is 
neither the state of the proper law nor the lex fori be 
taken into account. 26 Again the justification is that 
public policy requires such an approach. 
Mandatory rules are compulsory rules or IIjus cogens".27 
24See supra at p.92 et seq. 
25Infra at p.333 et seq. 
26 See infra at p.434 et seq. 
27See M. Wolff. The Choice of Law by the parties in 
International Contracts (1937) 49 JUY'idJco,.L Review. At p.110 
et seq. 
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The essence of such rules is that they are compulsory and 
not optional but obligatory. They are the opposite of 
optional (jus dispositivum) rules. Public policy rules 
for example are considered compulsory rules but many com-
pulsory are not matters of public policy. 
It is argued below28 that these mandatory rules of a 
third state should not overr an express cho of law 
clause. A number of reasons may be cited for this con-
clusion. 
1. The problem of determining what amounts to a forum 
mandatory rule is difficult for the judge. The 
difficulties in establishing what amounts to a foreign 
mandatory rule are even more pronounced. New Zealand 
courts do not have the machinery for eliciting such 
rules. 
2. Justice does not require that parties who have made 
a cho of law decision, and regulated their a s 
accordingly, should be subject to laws which are 
neither of the lex fori nor the proper or 
applicab law. There is no reason why parties 
should be hounded by some rule that by their very 
choice of law clause they have evaded. 
If the s have agreed, and there must be that 
true agreement, then the cho of law clause must 
prevail. The forum is only the venue for the 
parties who have made their decision. This is in 
line with domestic contract law in New Zealand, which 
allows parties a wide degree of cretion in choos 
the terms of their contract and a considerable 
28Infra at p.441et seq. 
latitude in contracting out of otherwise applicable 
conditions. 
3. In so far as application of a mandatory rule of a 
third jurisdiction would override a choice of law 
clause it must be considered unsatisfactory because 
it introduces uncertainty into an area otherwise 
certain. 
The Problem 
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It is suggested that mandatory rules of a third juris-
diction29 be ignored and that judges should not be tempted 
to apply protective legislation of the forum to litigants 
of an international contract. 
However there remain mandatory rules of the lex fori 
that are not protective. Here the word 'mandatory' bears 
the same meaning as above; it is a rule that is obligatory. 
Should a New Zealand judge be asked to ignore compulsory 
rules of the forum when deciding an international dispute? 
At one end of the scale the problem is easily solved. If 
the contract offends public policy then the judge will 
subject the choice made by the parties to the public policy. 
Here the mandatory rule is seen as sufficiently important 
to warrant application of the concept of public policy. 
At the other end of the spectrum a judge is not likely to 
consider some petty minor regulation applicable in the 
forum. However there is a large grey area where mandatory 
29 The English have opted not to consider such rules. 
See the European Economic Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations. (1980) discussed infra at p.410 
et seq. 
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rules could apply. In Golden Acres Ltd. v. Queensland 
Estates pty. Ltd. 30 it will be recalled that a licence was 
required to act as a real estate agent in Queensland. 31 The 
parties chose Hong Kong law to govern their contract. 
Should the relevant Act be ignored or upheld? 
There are a number of possible solutions. First 
however the judge must just decide that the law in question 
is mandatory or obligatory. Although he is considering 
forum law this is still not necessarily an easy question 
to answer. Given that he decides a law is mandatory he 
can do any of the following: 
1. He may have a direct confrontation with the choice 
of law clause. Hoare J. for example in the Golden 
Acres decision decided the choice of Hong Kong law 
was made to avoid application of the Queensland 
legislation, that this was not a bona fide choice 
and that it was contrary to publ policy. Thus 
the choice of law clause was set aside and Queensland 
law applied. 
2. Before any question of law arises a court may, and 
some say should,32 determine whether any statute or 
common law rule of the forum applies of its own force 
(rather than by virtue of a choice of law rule) to the 
case in hand. The approach was taken by Menzies J. 
in Freehold Land Investments Ltd. v. Queensland Estates 
pty. Ltd. 33 The first question was whether the 
claimant acted as a real estate agent in Queensland, 
, 
30[1969] St. R. Qd. 378 
3lBy virtue of Section 23 of the Auctioneers, Real 
Estate Agents, Debt Collectors, and Motor Dealers Acts 
1922-1961. 
32See D. St. L. Kelly. International Contracts & 
Party Autonomy. (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 701 et seq. 
33(1970) 123 C.L.R. 418 at p.425. 
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not what was the proper law of the contract. On the 
facts Menzies J. held that the conduct was not within 
the act. He was thus able to reach his decision 
without infringing the party autonomy rule. Even if 
the majority34 who did decide that the claimant was 
acting as a real estate agent were correct, if Men-
zies J.'s approach35 is adopted the Act applies but 
the choice of Hong Kong law is not completely invalid; 
it still applies subject to the Queensland Act. 
3. Another possibility, available in limited situations, 
is to hold that the question at issue is not properly 
classified as a contractual issue. For example in 
Queensland Estates pty. Ltd. v. Collas36 Campbell J. 
said that whatever the parties had intended concerning 
the choice of law the matter of the lodgment of 
caveats against dealings with the lands was the sole 
concern. Thus the proper law was not relevant. 37 
4. In general the proper law should apply rather than 
the mandatory rule. This is in 'harmony with the 
demands of justice as well as the requirements of 
established law."38 Parties expect their choice 
to be upheld and organise their affairs around 
34Barwick C.J., McTiernan J. and Walsh J. 
35See also Menzies J. judgment in Kay's Leasing Corp. 
Pty. Ltd. v. Fletcher & Another (1964) 116 C.L.R. 124 at 
p.146 in contrast to the majority Judgment and that of 
Kitto J. 
36(1971] St. R. Qd. 75 at p.81. 
37 See M. Pryles. Reflections on the E.E.C. Contract-
ual Obligations Convention. An Australian Perspective in 
Contract Conflicts. The E.E.C. Convention on the law 
applicable to Contractual Obligations. A Comparative 
Study. (ed. P.M. North) (1980). 
38Mann op. cit. supra n.l at p.392. 
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the chosen law. Judicial support for this view 
can be found in two decisions.39 As Mann notes 40 
the court in Monterosso Shipping Co. L~~ v. Inter-
national Transport Workers Federation4l clearly 
proves the applicability of an English Statute 
depends on the proper law of the contract being 
English, and "that, subject to statutory prohibition, 
illegality or public policy, a reasonable choice of 
law bona fide made overrides the mandatory rules of 
any other law and is the very essence of the doctrine 
of the proper law." 
The only exception would be where the statute or 
rule lays down its own conflicts rule which eliminates 
or restricts the parties' choice. 42 
39Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd. v. Pan American Air-
ways [1979] 1 Lloyds Law Rep. 19 . 
Monterosso Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Internat~onal Transport 
Workers Federation [1982] 3 All E.R. 841. 
40Mann op. cit. supra n.l at p.394. 
41[1982] 3 All E.R. 84l. 
42See Mann op. cit. supra n.1 at p.394. E.g. see 
S.27 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.) 
S.27. (1) Where the proper law of a contract is the law of 
any part of the united Kingdom only by choice of the par-
ties (and apart from that choice would be the law of some 
country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 
16 to 21 of this Act do not operate as part of the proper 
law. 
(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract 
term which applies or purports to apply the law of some 
country outside the united Kingdom, where (either or both) -
(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or 
arbiter to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the 
purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the 
operation of this Act; or 
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties 
dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually resident 
in the United kingdom, and the essential steps necess-
ary for the making of the contract were taken there, 
whether by him or others on his behalf. 
For example 8.9 of the Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1924-1973 
(Australia) provides that the Hague Rules shall apply to 
every bill of lading issued in Australia without any regard 
to any submission to a different system of law. 
The Statute would clearly have to be stating a con-
flict of law rule before a choice of law clause was 
overridden. 43 
A New Zealand example is Section 11A of The Sea 
Carriage of Goods Act 1940. 44 
The advantages of this last approach championed by 
Mann are considerable. Party autonomy is maintained with 
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all its attendance advantages. Secondly to disregard the 
For another important example see Art. VIII 2(b) of the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(I.M.F.) printed in full in K. Mettala. Governing Law 
Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project Fin-
ancing. (Winter 1986) Int'l Lawyer. 219 at pp.227-8. 
A court can on the basis of Art. VIII 2(b) refuse to apply 
any agreement, regardless of the law chosen by the parties, 
if the agreement is an 'exchange contract' contrary to the 
exchange control regulations of a member country and in-
volving its currency. Article 41 of the Convention on 
the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road (signed on 19th May 1956 at Geneva) which is scheduled 
to the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 (U.K.) holds 
"any stipulation which would directly or indirectly derogate 
from the provisions of this Convention shall be null and 
void." This may be seen as a special though limited con-
flicts rule. See Mann Ope cit. supra n.l at p.394. 
43 see Mann ibid, who points out that terms such as 
"the force of law' would not elevate an ordinary rule 
with an overriding rule. See Sec. 7 Carriage By Air 
Act 1967(N.Z.) 
44which states 
'New Zealand law and jurisdiction of New Zealand Courts. 
(1) All parties to any bill of lading or other document 
relating to the carriage of goods by sea from any place in 
New Zealand to any place outside New Zealand shall be 
deemed to have intended to contract according to the law 
of New Zealand; and any stipulation or agreement to the 
contrary or purporting to oust or restrict the jurisdiction 
of the courts of New Zealand in respect of such bill of 
lading or other document shall be of no effect. 
(2) Any stipulation or agreement whether made in New 
Zealand or elsewhere, purporting to oust or restrict the 
jurisdiction of the courts of New Zealand in respect of any 
bill of lading or other document relating to the carriage 
of goods by sea from any place outside New Zealand to any 
place in New Zealand shall be of no effect. 
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content of the proper law would in many, perhaps in most, 
cases lead to the exclusive control of the lex fori and 
therefore to unsatisfactory results, for it would neces-
sarily set aside the expectations of the parties. Thirdly 
this approach is in harmony with present English con ict 
of laws doctrine. The leading English decision remains 
the vita Food Products 45 case. The choice of law clause 
was upheld. The case has been interpreted in a number of 
ways.46 Some criticise the decision pointing out that 
the effect of the case was that the carrier was granted 
full freedom of contract although the country where the 
cargo was loaded/ the country of destination and the 
country where the litigation took place had all adopted 
mandatory Hague Rules enactments. 
Others 47 have suggested that it is "one of the great-
est cases in English law decided by one of the strongest 
jUdicial committees ever formed." 
45Vita Food Products Inc. v. linus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[1939] A.C. 277. 
46 see supra at p.34 et seq. and see Dicey & Morris 
at p.756; Morris at p.271 especially footnote 31; Mann 
Ope cit. supra n.1 at p.397; S. Braekhus. Choice of Law 
Problems in International Shipping. (1979) 111 Recueil 
des Cours 255 at p.328i and Morris Ope cit. supra n.l 
at p.66. 
47Mann , ibid. 
If one adopts Mann's views then the Vita Foods 48 
decision is acceptable, and The Hollandia49 decision is 
regrettable. 50 For as Mann 51 has stated 
"Take a bill of lading issued in Rio de Janeiro 
325 
under Brazilian law for a shipment from Rio to Ham-
burg and providing for the jurisdiction of the English 
courts or for arbitration in London. The carrier 
has no doubt calculated freight on the basis of his 
potential liability under Brazilian law. He has 
covered himself by insurance to the same extent. 
The conflict of laws was developed for the very 
purpose of protecting ... the contractual or other 
rights and obligations as created by the proper law. 
To override them cannot be readily supported." 
Conclusion 
Choice of law clauses should prevail over forum 
legislation or rules unless the particular law is expressly 
stated to override the choice of law clause, or its object 
clearly so requires. If this proposal was adopted party 
autonomy would be protected and yet Parliamentary intent 
(most of the rules are likely to be statutory) will not be 
thwarted. It appears to be a happy compromise. 
Foreign laws are considered only in so far as the 
forum's public policy is relevant. For example New Zeal-
and would not jeopardise its international relations by 
enforcing a contract which involved an illegal action 
by the lex loci solutionis. 
48Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] 
A.C. 277. 
49 [1983] A.C. 565. 
50 See the criticism by Mann op. cit. supra n.1 at 
pp. 397-8. 
5lMann op. cit. supra n.l at p.392. 
The proposed solution also overcomes the difficulty 
facing a judge who is a to uphold a choice of law 
clause which avoids some considered mandatory in 
the forum. If the mandatory rule is sufficiently im-
portant to constitute application of the public policy 
concept, then no real difficulty arises, and by applying 
the proposed solution the mandatory rule will have to be 
that important before it is considered overriding. The 
answer must be that there is no point in talking of man-
datory rules which 11 short of publ policy. To do 
so leads the judge into potentially very difficult areas 
of grey and could result in the unacceptable result that 
party autonomy is severely limited. 
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2. Public Policy 
"We now come to the last and most important 
limitation of all .... ,,52 
"What is public policy? Is it. a moral idea of a 
nation? A nation as an identically thinking unit 
does not exist, this conception of a nation is a 
fiction. Is it 'public opinion'? What is this? 
Usually an conceived by a few and artificially 
spread, always uncertain with regard to the number 
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of its supporters. Is it a notion springing from 
some mysterious source .... Or is it a rule generally 
used by the courts ... without any question whether 
'the public approve of it or no?,,,53 
Public policy may be considered in two ways. It 
may be seen as a general exception available to a court 
making any conflict of law decision. The general ex-
ception allows a court to reject another state's law 
because it is incompatib with the public policy of the 
forum state. A court looks only to the public policy of 
its own state in deciding whether to apply this 
exception. 54 
Alternatively the court can consider the public 
52W• L•M. Reese. Power of Parties to Choose Law 
Governing Their Contracts. 54 Proceedings Am. Soc. 
of Int'l La~. 49 at p.53 (1960). 
53 B. Starke. Conflicts on Public Policy (1953). 
39 Grotius 39 at pp.79-80. 
54 See generally A.G. Paulsen & M.I. Sovern. "Public 
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws. 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969 
(1956) . C.B. Nutting. Suggested Limitations on the 
Public Policy Doctrine. 19 Minnesota L.R. 196 (1935). 
L.C. James. The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties 
on the Validity of Conflict of Laws. "Illegal Contracts", 
Sunday Gambling, Lottery and Other Agreements. 8 The Am. 
Univ. L.R. 67 at p.68 footnote 3 (1959). James lists 
another 14 references besides the above two articles. 
D.C. Burger. Notes. Transnational Public Policy as a 
Factor in Choice of Law Analysis. 5 New York Law School 
J. of Int'l & Compo Law 367 (1984). 
policy of the foreign state when considering any given 
issue. 55 
Public policy may also be seen as an exception to 
party autonomy in so far as a court will not uphold a 
choice of law clause because of public policy considera-
tions. Both aspects of public policy are considered 
below in the context of New York and England. 
Public Policy in America 
"The courts are .not free to refuse to enforce a 
foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to 
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suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. 
They do not close the doors l unless help would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent concept of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal. 1156 ' 
Public P9licy has been evoked throughout the world 
as a fundamental principle of private international law. 
Generally speaking the public policy concept has a negative 
character I courts use it either to decline to entertain 
55 For example in A-G of New Zealand v. Ortiz [1982] 
2 W.L.R. 10 Staughton J. at p.31 said "if the test is one 
of public policYI ... there is every reason why the English 
courts should enforce Section 12 of the storic Articles 
Act 1962 of New Zealand. Comity requires that we 
should respect the national heritage of other countries, 
by according both recognition and enforcement to their 
laws which affect the title to property while is within 
their territory. The hope of reciprocity is an additional 
ground of public policy leading to the same conclusion!' 
The case involved a Maori carving that was to be put up 
for auction at Sothe by's. The above section provides 
that any articles exported in breach of the Act shall be 
forfeited to Her Majesty. The House of Lords [1984] 1 A.C. 
1 w unable to construe the legislation in a manner 
that would allow the carving to be returned to New Zealand. 
56Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York 224 N.Y. 99 
at p.111, (1918). 
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a suit or to refuse to apply the foreign law which has 
been selected by a rule of private international law. It 
has what Dolinger57 calls a "barrier effect, a rejecting 
role."58 Whilst public policy can function positively 
as "real international public policy,,59 the scope of the 
discussion on public policy here is limited to the effect 
the doctrine has on choice of law clauses. 
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) provides that 
"no action will be entertained on a foreign cause of action 
the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public 
policy of the forum." The same principle was applied 
in Section 612 of the First Restatement. The Restatement 
(Second) it will be recalled also acknowledges that foreign 
public policy deserves respect. Section 6 (2) (b) includes 
among the factors relevant in the choice of law process 
the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination 
of the particular issue. Likewise Section 187 (2) (b) 
provides that the law of a state chosen by the parties 
to govern their contractual rights will not be applied if 
"application of the law of the chosen state would be con-
trary to fundamental policy of a state, which has a mater-
ially greater interest than the chosen state in the deter-
mination of the particular issue which, under the rule of 
Section 188 would be the state of the applicable law in 
57 J . Dolinger. World Public Policy: Real Inter-
national Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws. 17 Texas 
Internat. L. Rev. 167 (Spr. 1982). 
58 Ibid at p.169. 
59 Ibid at p.177. 
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the absence of the ive choice of law by the parties.»60 
Courts have also used public policy in choice of law 
issues not so much out of dislike for the applicable ign 
law but rather in Cavers' terms, as a device to escape from 
the injustice or incongruity of applying the foreign law 
in a particular case. 61 
Turning to New York case law the effect of an other-
wise valid choice of law clause stipUlating foreign law 
may be limited by the public policy of New York if New York 
is the forum state. The difficulty is assessing what 
actually amounts to public policy in New York. It appears 
that the public policy must be of special importance to 
New York. 
In Reger's62 case the court said that the rule to be 
60See also Restatement (Second) Section 187 comment (g) 
at p.567. Prebble at p.512 considers this provision 
somewhat broad. He gives as example a contract made in 
East Berlin to smuggle a man to the West payment ex-
pressed to be governed by the law of New York. Should 
a New York court refuse to hear the c im because of the 
affront to East German public policy? Prebble concludes 
that the extent to which the forum applies the public 
policy of a second state should be at least qualified by 
the forum's own public policy. This would appear to be 
a valid argument. 
61 D. Cavers. A Critique of the 
47 Harv. L.R. 173 at pp.180-4 (1933). 
Publ policy Concept in the Conflict 
Rev. 508 at p.513 (1933) and see G.J. 
Policy Doctrine in Choice of Law: A 
older themes. 3 Washington Univ. L. 
(1974) . 
Choice of Law Problem. 
See also Note. The 
of taws. 33 Colum. L. 
Simson. The Public 
Reconsideration of 
Rev. 391 at p.393. 
6 
2d. 97 
v. Nat. Assn of Bedding Mfrs. etc. 372 N.Y.S. 
Ct. 1975). 
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applied is rather simple: in group insurance policies 
a choice of law provision should be given effect unless 
it contravenes this state's public policy. The court 
went on to define public policy as uvariableu63; Uit 
changes with the times through enactment of new laws and 
judicial pronouncements and generally means the law of 
the state as found in its constitution, statutes and 
judicial decisions. u64 
Other cases have used the words Ustrong public 
policy u65 and "strong countervailing public policy. 1I 66 
It seems that the contract must be such that its jUdic 1 
enforcement "would be the approval of a transaction which 
is inherently vicious wicked or immoral and shocking to 
the prevailing moral sense. u67 
63 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 97 at p.116. 
64 Ibid . See also M. Gutzwiller. Conflict on Public 
Policy (1953) 39 Grotius 39 at pp.78-9 for changes in 
English public policy. 
65Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc., 370 N.Y.S. 
2d. 338 at p.348 (Sup. ct. 1975). 
66Nederlandse Draadindustrie ND1. B.V. v. Grand 
Pre-Stressed Corp. 466 F. SUPR 846, at p.851 (E.D.N.Y.) 
1979) . 
67This was held in Intercontinental Hotels Corp. 
(Puerto Rico) v. Golden 238 N.Y.S. 2d. 33 (1963). 
The court held that New York should not deny a party an 
action to recover for gambling debts incurred in Puerto 
Rico and enforceable under Puerto Rican law. No govern-
ing law clause was involved. 
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Gruson68 suggests that whilst public policy is fre-
quently mentioned it rarely operates to defeat a choice of 
law clause. 69 If public policy is evoked it does not 
lead to the whole clause being held invalid; it only 
restricts its effects with respect to the issue to which 
the public policy is addressed. 70 
The public policy which may override an effective 
choice of law clause need not be the public policy of the 
forum. In Fricke: v Isbrandtsen Co. 71 for example the 
Court considered the public policy of Germany towards 
steamship tickets. Two other diversity cases likewise 
consider non forum public policy. (There appear to be 
no cases decided by New York courts which have considered 
non forum policy.)72 
In Southern Int'1 Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield 
73 Div. of A.M.F. Inc. it was held that the fundamental 
policy of Puerto Rico could not be circumvented by the 
stipulation that Indianian law was to apply. Likewise in 
68Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.375 cites two 
cases where public policy was strong enough to override 
a stipulated law. It interesting to note that he had 
to retreat into the past (by half a century) to find two 
cases to illustrate his point. 
69Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.375. 
70 Ibid at p.374 footnote 140. 
71 151 F. Supp. 465. 
72Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.377 footnote 149. 
73 410 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. N . Y. 1976). 
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.=B-=u::.;:s:..:i:.:n~e=-.cs=-=s--=Ic::.;n:..:c:...:e:..:n~t~l=.· v.::.....;;;:.e-=s---==-=-=-. v. Sony Co rp . 0 f Amer i ca 7 4 the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that New Jersey had a strong public policy in protecting 
the relatively powerless consumer or small bus ss man 
from more powerful commercial giants, and applied that law 
rather than New York law which had been chosen by the 
parties. 
Finally in the American context Gruson notes that as 
the Uniform Commercial Code section 1-105 does not mention 
a public policy limitation on party autonomy it is to be 
presumed that the general conflict of laws rule as to 
public policy would apply to choice of law clauses upheld 
by the Section. 75 
English Courts and Public policy76 
Public Policy Generally 
Public policy may also be used in England to avoid 
the application of a foreign law otherwise applicable. 
"Whenever the courts of this country (i.e. England) 
are called upon to decide as to the rights and 
liabilities of the parties to a contract, the effect 
on such contract of the public policy of this country 
must necessarily be a relevant consideration.,,77 
74 397 F. Supp. 63 (S. D. N. Y. 1975). 
75Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.379 and see supra 
at p.243. 
76 see generally Dicey & Morris at p.83 et seq.; 
Morris at p.42 et seq; Cheshire & North at p.145 et seq. 
77Dynamit Actien - Gesellschaftv. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd. 
[1918] A.C. 292 at p.302 per Lord Parker. 
Whilst "an English court will refuse to apply a law 
which outrages its sense of justice and decency,,78 once 
again the difficulty is in stating the boundaries of the 
doctrine. The text book writers agree that the concept 
is evoked more frequently on the Continent of Europe and 
they also agree that the public policy must be funda-
mental;79 from then on the tendency is to give a list 
of occasions when contracts valid by their governing law 
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have not been enforced. It is not enough that the foreign 
law contrary to some imperative rule of the common law 
which the parties to an English contract cannot disregard. 80 
The foreign law must be considered as a whole and its 
result in the actual case considered. 81 Only rarely 
will a foreign law itself be regarded as contrary to 
English public policy.82 
The lists given in the textbooks 83 yield little 
78 In the Estate of Fuld (No.3) [1968] P. 675 at 
p.690 per Scarman J. 
79 See Di~ey & Morris Rule 2 at p.83. 
80Thus an English court will enforce a contract made 
without consideration. See Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 394. 
81Dicey & Morris at p.84. 
82 Ibid . 
83Dicey & Morr at p.85; 
& North at p.145 et seq. 
Morris at p.44; Cheshire 
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principle84 and it has been suggested85 that Dicey & Morris 
play down the operation of public policy as a restricting 
element English law. 
It seems from reviewing these lists that few cases 
will be defeated by the use of public policy. This is 
perhaps due in part to the belief that public policy areas 
are a matter for the legislature rather than the courts. 
Since the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth 
century English judges have shown a marked disinclination 
to override the common law by considerations or public 
policy, a disinclination which has been carried over into 
the choice of law process. 
The attempt to keep forum publ policy within narrow 
limits may be illustrated by a number of recent cases. 
In Vita Food Products, Inc. v Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 86 
the Privy Council must have been aware of the Hague Rules 
and the strong policy of England, Newfoundland and the 
international community in having the Rules apply to all 
bills of lading in order to obtain uniformity in the world's 
84D. Jackson. Mandatory Rules & Rules of "Ord·re 
Public" p.69 Chapter 4 of Contract Conflicts. 
The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. A Comparative Study. Ed. P.M. North (1980). 
85 Ibid . 
86 [1939] A.C. 277. 
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laws relating to the carriage of goods by sea. However 
by upholding the English choice of law clause this policy 
was defeated. 
Likewise in Sayers v. International Drilling Co. N.V. 87 
the English public policy of protecting English employees 
was subjected to foreign law. An Englishman had signed 
a contract in England to work on the defendant's oil rig 
off the coast of Nigeria. The defendant was a Dutch com-
pany. The contract excluded the defendant's liability 
for personal injury which was valid by Dutch law but void 
by English law. 
The Court of Appeal applied Dutch law and so denied 
the Englishman any compensation. 88 
In the recent decision of Mi tsubishi Gorp. v. A1afo.u-
zos89 Mr. Justice Steyn stated that contractual disputes 
must be resolved in accordance with settled principles and 
rules of the law of contract but II 'exceptionally , the 
dictates of a recognised head of public policy, grounded 
on incontestable and fundamental moral considerations, 
operate to render defeasible what would otherwise be en-
forceable contractual rights. n90 
87 [ 19 71 ] 1 W. L . R. 11 7 6 , [ 19 71 ] 3 All E. R. 163. 
88For a criticism see L.J. Kovats. International 
Contracts of Employment. 121 New L.J. 734 (1971). 
89 [1988] 1 L10ydsLaw Rep. 191. 
90 Ibid at p.192. 
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On the facts of the actual case it was held that the 
"stringentH91 application of public policy was of first 
importance because commercial fraud was on the increase 
which made it imperative that the court should refuse to 
allow a party to rely on a contract which was designed 
to deceive third parties. 
Kahn-Freund92 suggests that a doctrine of relativity 
of public pol is applied by the courts. By this he 
means that the foreign law will be examined in the context 
of the case at bar in order to establish whether or not 
it will produce unacceptable results in the actual case. 
If this is in fact what courts do do then it a clear 
exception, as prebble 93 notes, to the usual rule of juris-
diction selection rather than rule selection observed by 
,English courts. 
Finally in the English context it must be noted that 
as with New York, courts will recognise foreign public 
policy and not merely consider the public policy of the 
forum. 
A well known case of deference to ign public 
91Ibid at p.194. 
920 . Kahn-Freund. Reflections on Public Policy 
in the English conflict of Laws, (1953) 39 Grotius, 39. 
93prebble at p.466. 
338 
policy is Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia Ltd. 94 a decision of 
the House of Lords. The case concerned a contract for 
the sale of jute sacks which were to be transported from 
India via an Italian port to South Africa. Indian law 
prohibited the exportation jute to South Even 
though the parties had that English law would govern 
the defendant's refusal to perform the contract was held 
justified by the House of Lords. Viscount Simonds stated: 
"Just as public policy avoids contracts which offend 
against our own law, so it will avoid at least some 
contracts which violate laws of a foreign state, 
and will do so because public policy demands that 
deference to international comity.n95 
The case can of course be interpreted as applying the 
English public policy consideration which is not to 
judice good relations with foreign powers. Indeed it 
possible to interpret Viscount Simonds dictum above 96 to 
suggest that it is ultimately the forum's public policy 
that is being applied. 'International comity' can be 
emphasised rather than the foreign public pOlicy. 
94 [1958] A.C. 301. 
95 Ibid at p.319. 
- 96 Ibid . 
Public Policy as an Exception to the Principal of Party 
Autonomy in England 
"English law accords to the parties to a contract 
a wide liberty to choose the proper law ... The 
English courts will give e to their cho 
unless it would be contrary to public policy to 
do so."97 
It is difficult to know here what amounts to public 
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policy. Considerations noted above are relevant, however 
there are very cases which consider this ific point. 
Golden Acres Ltd. v. Queensland Estates pty98 may be cited 
here. The court said that 
"whilst appreciating that public policy can be an 
unclear concept, generally speaking it would be con-
trary to public policy for the legislative intention 
to be stultified by parties to a contract, of which 
the proper law would be Queensland, selecting some 
other law for the pU9~ose of avoiding the application 
of Queensland land." 
General Conclusion 
In both English and New York courts publ policy has 
been stated to be a limitation on party autonomy. However 
it is very infrequently used either of the two juris-
dictions to feat a choice of law clause. It is a concept 
which is very difficult to fine in anything but very 
general terms. "One of the frustrating:, but at the same 
time fascinating, aspects conflict of laws is that so 
97compagnie Tuniesienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie 
d'Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] A.C. 572. 
98 ( 1969 ) St. R. Qd. 378. 
at pp.384-5. 
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many of its areas are as yet comparatively unexplored. "100 
However perhaps its inherent greyness may be useful in 
this area of choice of law. The matter is taken up 
further below. l At this point it may be concluded that 
public policy exists as a potential tool to limit or over-
ride a choice of law clause which in all the circumstances 
greatly offends the forum in some way and for some reason. 
As a safeguard it seems an appropriate concept to employ. 
It is sufficiently general to be applicable in any situation 
that might arise and provided the concept is not abused 
(and there is no evidence that this has happened in England 
or New York or why it should in New Zealand) it should be 
used as an exception to party autonomy. Indeed one writer 
considers that "it is no use trying to exorcise public policy, 
it will, like nature, always come back, even if you drive it 
out with a pitchfork ..... ,,2 
It is however suggested that only forum public policy 
should be considered. Cases such as Southern Intern. Sales 
v. Potter & Brumfield Diva of A.M.F. Inc. 3 which consider the 
public policy of a state which has not been chosen ·aRd which 
is not the forum make for uncertainty by widening the appli-
100 . W.L.M. Reese. Power of Part~es to 
Governing their Contract. 84 Proceedings. 
Int'l Law 49 at p.55 (1960). 
1See infra at p.485 et seq. 
Choose Law 
Am. Soc. of 
2 Kahn-Freund op. cit. supra n.92 at p.81. 
3 410 F. Supp. 1339 (1976). 
341 
cation of the concept beyond an acceptable degree. 4 
4This is considered in greater detail the context 
of mandatory rules and the Europrean Economic Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) 
discussed infra at p. 400 et seq. 
3. The English Limits on Party Autonomy 5 
Whilst this has received much academic interest 
there is no direct English authority on this matter. 
There has however been much incidental discussion. 6 
If any general principle emerges from these cases it is 
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that the parties' choice is subject to the qualifications 
of legality, bona fides and public policy. 
It has been argued that the requirements of legality 
begs the question,7 and the term bona fide is not free 
from doubt. The importance of the public policy require-
ment is discussed below. The first matter to consider 
are the words 'bona fide' and 'legal'. 
Bona fide and legal limitation 
It is stated in England that the choice must be 'bona 
fide and legal,8 although 'connection with English law (i.e. 
the chosen law) is not as a matter of principle essen-
5see supra at p. 35 et seq. 
6R . v. International Trustee for the Protections of 
Bondholders Akt [1937] A.C. 500. Vita Food Products Inc. 
v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] A.C. 277; Mount Albert 
Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance & General Mutual 
Life Assurance Society Ltd. [1938] A.C. 224; Re Helbert 
~ [1956] Ch. 323; Boissevain v. Weil [1949] 1 K.B.482; 
The Fehrman [1938] 1 W.L.R. 159; Tzortis v. Monarch Line 
AlB (1968] 1 W.L.R. 406; James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. 
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970J A.C. 583; 
Cie Armement Maritime S.A. v. Cie Tunisienne de Navigation 
S.A. [1971] A.C. 572. 
7J . H. Beale. What Law Governs the Validity of a 
Contract? 23 Harv. L.R. 1 at p.260 (1909-1910), and 
Morris & Cheshire. The Proper Law of a Contract. (1940) 
56 L.Q.R. 320 at pp.335-5. 
8Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] 
A.C. 277 at p.290 per Lord Wright. 
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tial' .9 Precisely what is meant by bona fide and legal 
is not clear. Whatever the intended scope is, it must 
be seen as a limit on party autonomy. Possibly Lord 
Wright merely meant that the choice should be reasonable 
and not evade some important law that would otherwise 
apply. Graveson10 suggests that a 'bona fide' choice 
is one that is normal in the type of business transaction; 
he has also pointed out that in England there is no general 
doctrine of evasion of law)l Today there are still no cases 
where the court has held that the choice of law has been 
evasive. 12 Should the s intend to apply a law in 
order to evade some mandatory provisions of that legal 
system with which the contract is most closely connected 
then Dicey & Morris 13 contend that no English court would 
uphold the choice. They consider that the 'bona fide 
and legal' requirement is IIfundamental ll and means much 
more than that a flmerely 'eccentric' or 'capricious' choice 
of law is of no effect. fl14 The explanation they give to 
10 R. H. Graveson. The Proper Law of Commercial 
Contracts as Developed in the English Legal System in 
Le9tures on Conflict of Laws and International Con-
tracts 1, (U. Mich. Law School Summer Inst. on the 
Int'l & Compo L. ed. 1949) at p.24. 
11R. H• Graveson. The Doctrine of Evasion in the 
Law of England & America. (1937) 19 J. Compo Leg. 21. 
12"An evasive choice of law is unreal and unreason-
able and therefore without effect." Dicey & Morris at 
p.756. 
13Dicey & Morris at p.755. 
14 Ibid . 
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the words 'connection with English law is not as a matter 
of principle essential' is that Lord Wright was merely 
referring to England's importance as a commercial nation 
and the fact that parties often wish English law to govern 
their dealings, and so Lord Wright considered it reasonable 
in this situation to stipulate English law to govern. Thus 
it may be argued that the significance of the Vita Food 
case is restricted to those situations in which the parties 
have chosen a law connected by practice and tradition 
with the type of transaction into which they have entered. 15 
Dicey & Morris argue that whilst Vita Foods is not authori-
ty for the selection of a law other than English law16 
there is no reason in principle why it should not apply 
to an express and reasonable choice of e.g. French law as 
the proper law of a contract not visibly connected with 
France. 17 
In New York the problem of evasion would presumably 
not arise, because on Dicey & Morris's definition of an 
evasive choice, it would be unreasonable and would there-
for fail on the reasonable relation18 test which at present 
is part of both New York common law and the New York 
15Ibid • 
16Dicey & Morris at p.757 point out that whilst the 
law of Nova Scotia and not that of England was the lex 
fori, the conflict of laws principles were in substance 
those of English law and that Lord Wright thus merely 
expressed a view of the choice of English law to be taken 
by a judge applying English conflicts rules. 
17 Ibid . 
18See supra at p.220 et seq. and pp.271-2. 
uniform Commercial Code. 
It may be argued that if a choice was evasive it 
could be struck down on grounds of policy which is dis-
cussed below. 19 
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Finally in the English context is the putative proper 
law doctrine. This is a limit on party autonomy. It 
will be recalled20 that in the eyes of its exponents the 
concept simply means that any express choice is to be 
disregarded and the applicable law is to be determined 
by reference to the third rule of the Proper law. 
Fortunately the putative proper law has not been 
taken up by the courts; judges have not employed the 
concepti Lord Diplock went so far as to consider it 
"confusing" in one decision. 21 
It is suggested that if the parties have made a 
choice of law decision then that law should determine both 
the question of where a contract is made and whether the 
contract is validly concluded. There is nothing illogical 
19See infra at p. 485 et seq. 
Under Title 14 discussed supra at p.257 which does 
not have a reasonable relation test a non New York court 
could possibly consider a choice of New York law as evasive 
if it had the affect of avoiding an otherwise applicable 
law although of course the party relying on New York would 
always contend the choice was not unreasonable as he wanted 
to rely on the sophistication of the New York legal system. 
20supra at p. 73 et seq. 
21Mackender v. Feldia[1967] 2 Q.B. 590 at p.603. 
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in referring these matters to the law chosen by the par-
ties. The forum allows the parties to choose a law to 
govern their contract. It seems reasonable to say to 
parties that this is the law you have chosen; as the 
forum, we allow you your choice and we shall now judge 
the issues by your choice of law. If the result is that 
there is not a valid contract this is unfortunate; the 
parties should have considered the implication of their 
choice beforehand and if the matter is being litigated 
one party presumably will be pleased that the contract is 
not valid. 
To allow party autonomy makes for certainty and sim-
plicity, to add requirements (of legality and bona fide) 
merely confuses. 
suffices. 
Public policy as discussed below22 
22See infra at p. 489 et seq. 
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4. Reasonable Relationship Limitation 
This is a requirement that sts in New York by 
virtue of the Uniform Commercial Code and pursuant to 
common law. It does not apply to large commercial trans-
actions. 23 The disadvantages of this limitation have been 
discussed elsewhere. 24 Whilst New York may consider it 
a necessary requirement in order to control the amount 
of litigation coming before its very busy courts this would 
not be an argument that applies in New Zealand. Because 
of disadvantages, and because it is not a logical 
limitation on party autonomy and as there are no pract 
advantages for adopting such a limitation it is considered 
an inappropriate limitation for this country to adopt. 
A closely allied stion is whether the parties 
will permitted to choose the law of a state which has 
no connection with the contract. English law requires 
no such connection and despite some earlier academic views 
to the contrary;6 the Restatement (Second)27 and New York 
case law28 clearly take view that convenience and 
23Discussed supra at p.257 et seq. 
24Discussed supra at p.289 et seq. 
25Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. 
A.C. 277 at p.290 per Lord Wright. 
[1939] 
26E . g . Cheshire writing in the 1940's. See Cheshire 
at p.39 et seq. 
27Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. S.187 
Comment f at p.566-567. 
28 see cases cited supra at p.270 et seq. 
good sense require this view. 
Thus neither a reasonable relationship requirement 
nor a connection with the chosen law is advocated. 
5. The Contract must be connected with two or more 
jurisdictions 
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Party Autonomy as used in this thesis is a doctrine 
of conflict of laws. It can therefore have no appli-
cation in a completely domestic contract. Unless two 
or more jurisdictions are involved the parties cannot 
choose a foreign law to govern their obligations; they 
may of course incorporate foreign rules law into their 
transaction but this is a question of construction. It 
is not a conflict of laws problem. 
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6. Third Parties not Generally Affected 
Generally speaking the rule is that choice of law 
clauses may only affect the parties to the contract. 
The Uniform Commercial Code 1-105(1) uses the words 
'the parties' and 'their agreement'; and the areas 
which Section 1-105(2) exclude from the party autonomy 
of Section 1-105(1) are those in which a third party 
is like to become involved. 
This is another limit on party autonomy. In England 
and New Zealand the doctrine of privity would apply to 
achieve the same result in situations where English or 
New Zealand law was the proper law of the contract, and 
the burden aspect of privity was involved. 29 
Th s New York law and English law are similar in 
this respect. 
29Third parties could be affected if the benefit 
aspect of privity was involved. See e.g. Section 4 
The Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 (N.Z.) 
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7. Constitutional Limitations on Party Autonomy 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
the constitutional limits on party autonomy in the 
United States. Much obviously has been written on the 
subject in America. However the problems in this area 
are not relevant to New Zealand and except for brief 
reference to the problem in connection with Title 14 
above 30 the matter is not considered further. 
30supra at p. 262 et seq. 
8. Meaningless choice of law clauses will be 
disregarded or altered 
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This limitation on party autonomy may be illustrated 
by the House of Lords decision of Compagnie D'Armement 
Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. 31 
The case involved a contract for the transport of 
oil between two Tunisian ports. Clause 13 of the agr.ee-
ment provided that "this contract shall be governed by 
the laws of the flag of the vessel carrying the goods ... " 
However it transpired that a number of boats were used 
involving the flags of France, Liberia, Norway, Sweden 
and Bulgaria. 
Lord Reid32 said that in the circumstances clause 
13 must be regarded as having failed in its purpose to 
determine the proper law of the contract. Therefore the 
parties' intentions were no longer a matter of concern 
and he applied the third rule to find the proper law of 
the contract, and held that French law was the system of 
law which was most closely connected with the contract. 
This approach of disregarding a meaningless choice 
may be contrasted to the judgments of Lord Diplock33 and 
Lord Morris 34 . These two judges construed Clause 13 to 
31[1971] A.C. 572. 
32 Ibid . 
33 Ibid at p.601. 
34Ibid at p.504 
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give effect to the parties' intenti Lord Diplock held 
that Clause 13 meant "this contract shall be governed by 
the law of the flag of the vessels of the ownors, except ..• 
etc." Lord Morris pointed out that it would be the 
owner's vessels which would primarily be the vessels 
carrying the oil. This latter approach of Lords Diplock 
and Morris has the great advantage of not destroying Lar-
gains, although on the facts of the case both approaches 
had the result of applying French law as the governing 
law. 
It is suggested that only clauses that can be given 
no sensible meaning whatsoever should be ignored; this 
is in keeping with the general principle that party auto-
nomy must and should prevail. 
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9. Limitations on Choice of Jurisdiction 
After a period of uncertainty35 it now seems clear 
that English courts require the parties to choose a 
definite municipal system of law to govern their contract. 36 
Thus parties may not choose public international law to 
govern nor the Ilgeneral principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations. "37 
Whilst Wood, writing at the beginning of this decade, 
thought that pub~ic international law could be chosen38 
the recent House of Lords decision of Amin Rasheed Shipping 
35See D.G. Past Formation Choice of Law in 
Contract. (1987) 50 M.L.R. 170 at pp.190-1. 
36Pierce ibid and see Webb & Brown at p.332 n.4. 
M. Wolff. Pr International Law. (2nd edit.) (1980) at p.417. 
37For a contrary view see P. Wood. Law and 
In International Finance (1980) at p20. and P. Wood. Ex-
ternal Governing Law. Either a Fortress or a Paper House. 
(July 1982). Internat. Fin. L.R. 11. Wood cites a number 
of decisions which hold that the "general principles of 
civilised lawll can be chosen. In B.P. v. Libya (1.L.R.) 
297 (1979) it was held that the general principles of law 
recognised by c lised nations" was valid. In Petro 
Development (Trucial Coast) Limited v. _T_h_e __ ~~ __ ~~~ __ 
Dhabi (1.L.R. 1951) (Case No. 37). Lord 
the IIprinc rooted in the good sense 
tice of the rality of civilised nations" (described 
Wood at p.21 as a IIsort of modern law of nature"). 
For other examples see Wood, ibid at p.21. 
38wood supra n.37 at p.20 et seq. 
354 
Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance co. 39 would seem to have settled 
the controversy.40 Lord Diplock pointed out that contracts 
are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. 
"They"" are" mere pieces of papers devoid of all 
legal 8Liect unless they are made by reference to 
some system of private law which defines the ob-
ligations .... ,,41 
The House of Lords explicitly rejected the notion of 
the "internationalised contract" governed by a set of 
general principles derived from public international law. 
In view of the difficulties in proving this type of 
international law party autonomy should be limited to a 
choice of a municipal system of law. 42 
It has been suggested43 that parties are not at 
liberty to subject their contract to a legal system which 
is no longer in force or to a draft of a foreign code or 
to a system which they have freely invented. Thus to 
39 [1984] A.C. 50. 
40Cf . Deutsche Schachbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft 
mhhv. Ras Al Khaimah Oil Co. Ltd. & Shell International 
petroleum Co. Ltd. [1987] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 246 at p.254. 
41[19U4] ~.C. 50 at p.65. 
42Alternatively it has been suggested that a supra-
national law exists in so far as, for example, the Treaty 
of Rome, established the E.C.C. which has led to the 
establishment of a new type of international law. 
See U.P. Toepke. Legal Aspects of International Investment. 
Section 25. Handbook of Ihternational Business. 
43Wolff"op. cit. supra n.36 at p.417. 
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subject one's contract to the laws of Moses and Israel is 
unacceptable. 44 
In one American ca 5 the court explained that if 
the parties chose the Code of Hammurabi 46 to govern their 
contract the court would not uphold it because it would 
have no value as a precedent. The court explained that 
the production of precedent was a major function of judicial 
decision making and that courts may disregard stipulations 
by litigants concerning the content of the law for failure 
to promote this judicial function. 47 
Webb & Brown note that to allow the parties to invent 
their own law would be 'tantamount to giving them the 
authority of sovereign legislatures,48 and the practical 
disadvantages of allowing the other possibilities above 
are obvious. The difficulties of establishing and apply-
ing any of these 'laws' could far outweigh any possible 
advantages. However against this it must be remembered 
that the parties can include any terms they want in a con-
tract,49 and statutes can in general be contracted out of, 
44Hurwitz v. Hurwitz 215 N.Y.S. 184 (2d. Dept. 1926). 
45Lloyd v. Loe ler 694 F. 2d. 489 (7th Cir. 1982). 
46 Ibid at p.495. The Code of Hammurabi was a set of 
laws prepared by a Babylonian king and was amongst the 
earliest bodies of law in human history. Blacks Law 
Dictionary 644 (1979) (5th edit.) at p.644. 
47 Ibid . 
48webb & Brown at p.332 n. 4. 
49Subject to some general exceptions such as public 
policy. 
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which in effect means that parties are making their own 
law. If the parties can establish with sufficient 
clarity the terms of the contract there is no reason 
why these terms should not prevail. The Code of Hammurabi 
could be applied. 
A related question is whether parties may freeze the 
law at the time of contracting in so far as it affects 
their contract. Some writers 50 and the cases 51 suggest 
that in England this is not possible. It does follow 
logically that if one cannot choose a defunct system then 
one cannot freeze the law because to do so would involve 
applying a law that had become defunct. Repealed or 
amended rules are. no longer part of the law of a sovereign 
state. Such 'freezing' clauses have also been criticised 
because they show distrust in the ability of the country 
whose laws are 'frozen,.52 
Similarly in New York the applicable law changes with 
changes in that law, however there are cases suggesting 
that it is possible to freeze the law. 53 
50Wolff op. cit. supra n.36 at pp.416-7. 
51 The cases generally cited are Re Chesterman's Trust 
[1923] 2 Ch. 466. In re Helbert Wagg & Co. [1956] 1 Ch. 323 
and Cummings v London Bullion Co. [1952] 1 K.B. 327. 
See Prebble at p.520, Wolff op. cit. supra at p.417 and 
Webb & Brown at p.332 note 4. 
52See K. Mettala. Governing Law Clauses 
Agreements in International Project Financing. 
20 Int'l Lawyer 219 at p.235. . 
of Loan 
(Winter 1986) 
53Brown v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. 53 N.Y.S. 2d. 
760 (Sup. Ct. 1945). 
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Mann54 has suggested that the reason for limiting 
party autonomy to the choice of a living body of law has 
arisen because 
"Every system of private international law ... even 
the idea of the autonomy of the part sexists 
only by virtue of a given system of municipal law." 55 
If a clause has to be enforced it is by virtue of a muni-
cipal law that this happens. Therefore it is only logical 
that if one is making a choice of law decision one limits 
one's choice to a living law that will be able to resolve 
contractual issues. 56 Lord Diplock in the Amin Rasheed 
decision has given judicial support to this view. 57 
54 . F.A. Mann. Lex Facit Arb~trum in International 
Arbitration, Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (ed. P. Sanders) 
(1967) at p.157 and pp.159-60. 
55 Ibid . 
56 Some writers especially in Europe hope for the 
development of some international trade law. Discussed 
by Pr8bble at p.517 et seq. 
57Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 
[1984J A.C. 50 at p.65. See supra at pp.353-4. 
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10. Party Autonomy Limited to the Substantive law of the 
Chosen JUrisdiction. No Renvoi. 
When parties stipulate a law to govern their contract 
they could intend that the substantive or domestic law of 
the chosen state govern or they could be intending that the 
whole law operates and this includes the relevant state's 
choice of law provisions. 
Usually parties would only consider the former for 
"It would clearly be absurd to argue that where the 
parties have intended application of a foregin law 
they have also intended application of those rules 
of the 'whole' foreign law which deny their own 
applicability by referringto another law. Such 
reasoning would deny effect to the very intention 
that it invokes."58 
However in so far as some parties may have had the 
whole law in mind the fact that renvoi has no place in 
contract conflict of law can be seen as a limit on party 
autonomy. The English and New York law on this point is 
considered separately. 
The English View 
In England renvoi has no role to play in contract 
law. 59 This was recently affirmed by Lord Diplock in 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 
58A. A. Ehrenzweig. Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. 
(1962) at p. 338. 
59Lord Wright in Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping 
Co. Ltd. [1937] A.C. 277 at p.292 could conceivably have 
been attempting to introduce renvoi into contract cases when 
he said "Hence English rules relating to conflict of laws 
must be applied to determine how the bills or lading are 
affected ... " However no subsequent English case or academic 
has suggested that the Vita Foods case is authority for 
the existence of renvoi in England. See Morris & Cheshire . 
The Proper Law of a Contract. (1940) 56 L.Q.R. 320, at 
pp.333-4, and J.D. Falconbridge. Renvoi in New York and 
elsewhere. 6 Vand. L. Rev. 708 (1953). In 1960 
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when he said60 
"It is the substantive law of the country which the 
parties have chosen as that by which their mutually 
legally enforceable rights are to be ascertained, 
but excluding any renvoi, whether by remission or 
transmission that the courts of that country might 
themselves apply if the matter were litigated before 
them. ,,61 
New York View 
New York case law62 following the Restatement (Second) 
Confl of Laws 63 comes to the same conclusion as that 
held in England. 
However academic writers are not united against the 
application of renvoi as they are in England. Whilst some 64 
consider the introduction of renvoi as not only "impractical ll 
but "preposterous" others consider it a possibility65 and 
one wr considers it lessential".66 
the English Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed In re 
united Railways of the Havana v. [1960] 
Ch. 52 that renvoi did not apply. 
6°[1984] A.C. 50. 
61 Ibid at p.62. 
62 E . G. Reger v. National Association of Bedding Manu-
facturers etc. 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 97 (1975). The United 
States Court of Appeal likewise rejected renvoi in Siegel-
man v. Cunard White Star Ltd. 221 F. 2d. 189. (2d. Cir. 1955). 
63Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws Sec.187(3) 
(1971) and Comment n to Section 187(3) at p.569. 
64M. J . Levin. Party Autonomy: Choice of Law Clauses 
in Commerc Contracts. 46 Georgetown L.R. 260 at p.261. 
(1957-58). See generally Falconbridge op. cit. supra n.59. 
65 H. E . Yntema. "Autonomy" in Cho 
Compo Law. 341 at p.356 (1952). 
of Law. 1 Am. J. 
66 J . D. The Essential Role of Modern Renvoi in 
the Government Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law. 
54 Temple L.Q. 237 (1981). 
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If interest analysis is being used by a court there 
is an argument for considering the whole law of all the 
concerned jurisdictions in order to ascertain all the 
relevant policies. 67 This has been recognised and a 
"new renvoi" has emerged. 68 Section 8 comment k of the 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws states that 
"An important objective in choice of law is to 
accommodate insofar as possible interests of 
the states involved .... An indication of the 
existence of a state interest in a given matter, 
and of the intensity of that interest, can sometimes 
be obtained from an examination of that state's 
choice of law decisions." 
This section allows an "unashamed perusal and assess-
ment,,69 of the choice of law rules of other jurisdictions 
when interest analysis is being employed to resolve a 
choice of law issue. 70 
67 See generally R. Cramton & D. Cur.rie. Conflict 
of Laws, Cases - Comments - Questions (1960) at p.163. 
A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman. The Law of Multistate 
Problems: Cases & Materials on Conflict of Laws (1965) 
at pp.509-552. 
68prebble at p.709. 
69 Ibid . 
70Renvoi and '8k Renvoi' differ in two respects. 
8k Renvoi automatically considers each state's conflict 
of laws provisions in each case. Renvoi is only con-
sidered if the other jurisdiction's law refers back to 
the forum or on to another forum. Secondly renvoi is 
considered when a choice of law has been made (by the 
parties or court) whilst the 8k Renvoi Approach should 
be considered before the forum formulates its choice of 
law rule for the case. See A. Von Mehren. The Renvoi 
and Its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice of 
Law Problem in xxth Century Comparative & Conflict Law. 
(1961) 380 a.t p.390. 
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This 8k renvoi only has applicability if interest 
analysis is ing applied by both the forum and the other 
jurisdiction. Prebble71 points out that if the other 
jurisdiction does not have as its approach interest 
analysis then it seems that no meaningful information 
as to that jurisdiction's interest in the matter can be 
found by reference to its choice of law rules. 
Conclusion 
It is sugges that New Zealand could do well to 
follow the English approach to the question of renvoi. 
The parties should limited to choosing only the 
domestic law of a given legal system. This promotes 
certainty and predictability. For example in the 
siegelman72 decision the court stated when considering 
the scope of the choice of law provision that 
"We think the provision must be read as re ing 
to the sUbstantive law alone, for surely the major 
purpose of including the provision in the ticket 
(the contract of ) was to assure Cunard 
of a uniform result litigation no matter where 
the ticket was issued or where the litigation arose, 
and this result might not obtain if the 'whole' 
law of England was re to."73 
Secondly it has been pointed out74 that this approach 
71prebble at p.710. 
72siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd. 221 F. 2d. 
189 (2d. Cir. 1955). 
73 Ibid at p.194. 
74Gruson Governing Law s at p.369. 
saves the court from the "added burden" of determining 
the validity of a governing law clause under two legal 
systems. 
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Finally it may be argued that by restricting the 
parties' choice in this way no great exception to party 
autonomy emerges. It is very difficult to envisage a 
situation where parties would want to refer to the whole 
law of the chosen jurisdiction. One would assume that 
the overwhelming majority of persons entering contracts 
would not consider anything beyond the substantive law 
of a jurisdiction. 
If the parties to a contract really did want 
to refer to the whole of law of another jurisdiction no 
great injustice is done if this wish is ignored. In 
Amin Rasheed Lord DiploCk75 gave the example of a contract 
that was made in England but which had a choice of law 
clause specifying that French law was to apply. The 
English court would apply French substantive law to it 
notwithstanding that a French Court applying its own 
conflicts rules might accept a renvoi to English law as 
the lex loci contractus if the matter were litigated 
before it. 
Had the parties really wanted French law to apply 
they could have, and indeed should have considered the 
75 (1984] A.C. 50 at p.62. 
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consequences of their choice. By choosing French law 
the parties can be seen as really wanting English law 
to apply (given that they have considered the consequences 
of choosing French law). This being so they should have 
simply chosen English law in the first place. 
Rather than hope that a court will embark on the 
difficult task of renvoi the parties should state which 
law they really want to actually apply in their fact 
situation. Thus in the example above had the parties 
really wanted English law (via French law) this should 
be chosen otherwise it seems eminently reasonable for 
the forum to simply apply the law stated in the contract, 
which in this example will be the substantive law of 
France. 76 
76 In passing it may be noted that the only English 
case where the court interpreted the parties' choice of 
law clause as stipulating an express choice of renvoi the 
court admitted that its judgment probably defeated the 
intention of the parties. See Ocean Steamship Co. v. 
Queensland state Wheat Board [1941] 1 K.B. 402 at p.412. 
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11. Choice of Law Limited to Certain Issues 
Party autonomy does not apply in the field of capacity 
to contract in English law. It will be recalled77 that 
the parties may not arrange their affairs in such a way 
as to confer capacity upon themselves by a choice of law 
clause. The prevailing English view is that this would 
be unrealistic. 
However the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 
section 198(1) and 198(2) states that the capacity of a 
party to contract is determined by the law selected by 
application of the rules of sections 187-188, and lithe 
capacity of a party to contract will usually be upheld 
if he has such capacity under the local law of the state 
of his domicile." 
This rule means that prima facie parties may obtain 
contractual capacity for themselves by a choice of law 
clause. However the public policy limitation may well 
playa greater role here than for other issues. 78 
The practical reason for not allowing party autonomy 
to prevail is that a party could confer capacity upon 
himself by choosing a certain system of law. From a 
theoretical point of view one may argue that contractual 
capacity is a factor determining the validity of a contract 
77prebble at p.675. 
78 see supra at p. 97 et seq. 
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and should be judged according to contract law rather than 
viewed as a question of a person's status. 
Party autonomy should be upheld subject to a statute 
expressly stating that it was to apply rather than the 
parties' choice of law or was interpreted to necessarily 
imply such. If one may not enter . into a contract 
until one is 21 years of age in RuritaniJ 9 then if New 
Zealand is the forum it could uphold party autonomy and 
allow the choice of Ruritanian law if on the facts this 
appeared acceptable. Alternatively if the facts were 
such that it appeared that the Ruritanian should be held 
to his contract New Zealand legislation could be applied 
to the question of capacity. The choice of Ruritanian 
law would still be upheld for 1 other issues. In the 
latter situation the New Zealand legislation on minors 
would be seen as "overriding. HBD The Act would be inter-
preted as requiring application no matter what the parties' 
choice of law was. This should however be the exceptional 
situation. Party autonomy in general should prevail. 
Whilst there appears a marked divergence here between 
England and New York in this matter it might well be that 
the Restatement approach is closer to the English law than 
would first appear. The proviso in comment b B1 to 
79 An altered example of Morris' example 1 on p.286. 
The Ruritanian in question should be under 21 years of age 
and the contract contain a choice of law clause specifying 
Ruritanian law to govern. 
80Discussed supra at p.311 et seq. An overriding 
statute is one which applies or overrides all else. 
8lAt p.632. 
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section 198 of the Restatement (Second) makes the point 
that rules of capacity frequently embody a sufficiently 
strong policy to warrant their application under the 
circumstances stated in Section 188 to the "sacrifice of 
that choice of law principle which favours application of 
a law which would uphold the contract in order to protect 
the justified expectations of the parties." 
Thus one may state that in England capacity is an 
area where the parties may not make a choice and in America 
whilst general contract conflict of rules apply a choice 
of law clause conferring contractual capacity may well 
be scrutinised more carefully than in other areas. 
It is suggested that there is no reason why party 
autonomy should not prevail in this area of law, subject 
to overriding statutes in force in the forum, nor why the 
lex fori should not prevail absent such choice. 82 
82This was discussed supra at p. 98 et seq. 
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12. Parties may not choose a law to govern procedure 
Par s may not choose a law to govern procedure. 
These questions are universally governed by the lex 83 
It would be quite impractical to allow otherwise. 
83 H.E. Yntema. Autonomy in cho of Law. 1 Am. J. 
of Compo Law 341 at p.353 (1952). For England see Morris 
at p.453 et seq. 
For New York see M. Gruson. Legal Aspects of International 
Lending in Handbook of International Business, ("1982) at 
.1(3'0 
13. The Parties must both agree on the choice of law 
Cl 
(The Problem of Adhesion Contracts and Party 
Autonomy) 
with the advent of modern legislation designed to 
protect the weaker party84 a problem ses with party 
autonomy and so called adhesion or standard form con-
tracts. 85 
"While parties should not be precluded from seeking 
predictability and uniformity by stipulating their 
choice of law, unilaterally imposed provisions ... 
should not be enforced unless the party urging en-
forcement provided the other ... with knowledge of 
what was intended."86 
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If courts do not uphold governing law clauses because 
the contract is one of adhesion then party autonomy is 
severely limited. 
Fricke v. Isbrandtsen87 may be used to illustrate 
the problem. Should the German plaintiff be bound by 
84 See generally P.S. Atiyah. The Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract. (1979). J.G. Sauveplanne. Consumer 
Protection in Private International Law (1985)32 Nether-
lands Int'l L.R. 100. 
85Fricke v. Isbrandtsen 151 F. Supp. 465 at p.468 
(1957) . 
86Contracts of adhesion have been defined as "agree-
ments to which one party's participation consists in his 
mere adherence unwilling and often unknowing, to a document 
drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually 
a power enterprise." A.A. Ehrenzweig. Adhesion Con-
tracts in the Conflict of Laws. 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072 
at p.1075 (1953). A 'Standard Form' Contract is the 
equivalent English term. Standardised Contracts is 
another term employed. 
87 151 F. Supp. 465 (1957). A 'ticket' case. A 
German plaintiff bought a ticket printed in English, a 
language she could not understand. She later suffered 
injury at sea. 
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a choice of law clause which had the result of barring 
her action when the terms of the contract were in English? 
Although she had time to get the contract translated she 
did not avail herself of this possibility. However the 
court did not give effect to the governing law clause. 
The case has been interpreted in a number of ways88 
which itself suggests that a number of solutions exist 
here. 
One solution advocated by some American writers 89 is 
to divide contracts into two groups. Party autonomy 
could apply to non-adhesion contracts whilst special rules 
could apply to all other contracts. For example the 
European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obliqations (1980) 90 singles out certain types of adhesion 
contracts for special treatment with the object being to 
protect the weaker party. 
88prebble at p.513 et seq. notes that the court did 
not say that the clause was invalid, he considers that 
the court simply ignored the choice of law clause. 
Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.359 et seq. analyses 
the case in terms of public policy. 
See also Note. Determining the Scope of Choice of Law 
Provisions in Steamship Tickets: Adhesion Contracts 
and the Conflict of Laws. 65 Yale L.J. 553 (1956). 
Note, Party Autonomy Limited by strong Public Policy of 
State of Dominant Interest. 58 Colum. L.R. (1958). 
89 E . g . Ehrenzweig & Yntema. 
op. cit. supra n.83 at p.353. 
See supra Yntema 
90Articles 5 and 6. See Appendix A pp.551-552. 
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Yntema91 has produced what he considers to be a non 
exhaustive list of illustrations which include contracts 
of insurance and employment. The list concludes with 
"other types of transactions" which illustrates the diffi-
culty inherent in classifying contracts intograups. 
The approach is not recommended because there will 
always be a number of contracts which are borderline 
cases. Classifying contracts into groups is just too 
difficult to be of practical use. 
The Restatement (Second) Section 187 comment b 92 
suggests that choice of law clauses in contracts are 
usually respected but that the forum will scrutinise such 
contracts with care and not enforce a clause if to do so 
would result in SUbstantial injustice to the adherent. 
This a more general test, it is not too vital to make 
a distinction between adhesion and non adhesion situations. 
Rather party autonomy may be seen as the rule with a 
public policy limitation applying. 
A very similar approach has been to consider govern-
ing law clauses as valid generally in all contracts absent 
"fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power. "93 
91Yntema op. cit. supra n.83. 
92At p.562. 
93 h . d T e Un~te States Supreme Court had applied this 
test to forum selection clauses in The Bremen v. Zapata 
Offshore Co. 407 U.S. 1 at p.12 (1972). 
Gruson supports this approach. See Gruson Governing 
Law Clauses at p.360. 
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This approach has the advantage of retaining party 
autonomy yet provides an escape avenue for contractual 
victims who for one reason or another are to be absolved 
from their bargains. 
One other approach has the same satisfactory con-
sequence. This approach emphasises the consent aspect 
of contract law. The parties must agree to a choice of 
law clause. If one party is unaware of the choice of law 
clause and is not negligent 94 or if he has been induced 
to enter the contract by fraud, undue influence or over-
weening bargaining power it may be argued that he has not 
in fact agreed to a choice of law clause. 95 This approach 
has been criticised on the grounds that few adhesion con-
tracts involve consent defective according to traditional 
criteria of contract law. 96 On the other hand this 
criticism can be seen as an advantage of the approach. 
The general rule should be in favour of party autonomy 
and only in exceptional circumstances should a party be 
able to convince a court that the choice of law clause 
should not apply. He should be able to show that his 
lack of consent was defective according to the criteria 
94A non est factum situation. 
95This argument was considered in the context of the 
New York Uniform Commercial Code discussed supra at p.239. 
96prebble at p.516. Prebble would thus favour the 
previous approach which hinged on policy considerations. 
Prebble, ibid, suggests that any choice of law clause 
that produces socially offensive results should be struck 
down as contrary to public policy. 
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of contract law pertaining in the forum. 97 
Either of these two approaches would overcome any 
difficulty in resolving adhesion contracts in a legal 
system that advocated party autonomy. 
However by way of conclusion it is argued that this 
problem is not as grave as perhaps some writers would 
suggest. The English courts have yet to throw out a 
single transnational contract on the ground that there 
has been an abuse of bargaining power. This could 
possible be due, in part, to a changing attitude towards 
such concepts as unequal bargaining power and unconscion-
ability which has arisen since contract law has been 
analysed in economic terms. 98 
Posner argues that many contracts are on a 
take it or leave it basis and that this is only "sinisterU99 
if one party does so because he knows that the other party 
has no choice but to accept. On an economic analysis 
of law the standard form is explicable on grounds of 
convenience and lack of cost. Unless one party has a 
monopoly then the other party has an option not to enter 
97 For example, in both America and England if the 
choice of law clause is obtained by fraud then it is 
unenforceable. See Nakhleh v. Chemical Constr. Corp. 
35 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
Freedman v. Chemical Constr. Corp. 43 N.Y. 2d. 260, 
401 N.Y.S. 2d. 176, (1977). 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of laws Section 187 Comment 
c at p.563 (1977). 
98For example see R.A. Posner. Economic Analysis 
of Law. (1977) (2nd edit.) at p.84 et seq. 
99 Ibid at p.85. 
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into the contract and this applies to all ~ypes of adhesion 
contracts. The plaintiff in Fricke v. IsbrandtsenlOO 
could have gone on another operated by a different 
company. The Isbrandtsen company was not the only liner 
operating between Germany and America. l 
Posner suggest~ there ,that the concept of "unequal 
bargaining power ll is neither fruitful nor meaningful. He 
continues by saying that if unconscionability means that a 
judge may nullify a contract because of inadequate con-
sideration or otherwise one-sided terms then the basic 
principle that courts are not to be judges of business 
matters is compromi 
IIEconomic analysis ... reveals no ground other than 
fraud, incapacity or duress (the last narrowly 
defined) for lowing a party to repudiate the 
bargain that he made in entering into the contract.,,2 
Likewise a party should not be able to repudiate his 
choice of law c unless fraud, incapacity or duress 
is involved. The duress could be e::::onomic duress, low-
ing general contractual principles. If any of e 
situations ex there will be lack of consent and there-
fore no true agreement on a choice of law clause. Alter-
natively the choice could be rejected on public policy 
grounds. 
100151 F. SUpp. 465 (1957). 
lMrs. Fricke could have chosen the Cunard White Star 
Line, as did the Siegelmans. 
2posner Ope cit. supra n.98 at p.87. 
Conclusion 
Contracts should not be divided into adhesion con-
tracts and non adhesion contracts. Parties must truly 
agree on a choice of law clause. If fraud, undue in-
fluence, overweening bargaining power or duress is in-
volved when the choice of law clause decision is made 
then the parties do not agree. Such a choice could be 
struck down on public policy grounds. Before a New 
Zealand court refused to uphold party autonomy the 
ground for acting so would have to amount to lack of 
consent according to domestic contract law. 
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" the drafting of this clause appears to con-
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template that the proper law of the contract may 
float until exercise of an option by the insured. 
But this is not a concept to which an English court 
could give effect, since the rights and obligations 
of contracting parties crystallize when a contract 
is made (subject to consensual variation thereafter) 
and contracts can only crystall{ze with reference to 
an existing proper law since they cannot exist in a 
legal vacuum. 113 
English courts 4 will not enforce a governing law 
clause whereby the law chosen is made to depend upon 
some future event. 5 For example in The Iran Vojdan 6 
the choice of law clause stated that at the option of 
the carrier either Iranian law or German law or English 
law could govern the contract. Bingham J. held that 
3Du Pont v. Agnew [1987] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 585 at 
p.592 per Bingham J. 
4E . g . see Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Alger-
ienne d'Assurance et Reassurance [1980] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 
450. Black Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-
Aschaffenburg A.G. [1981] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 446, Dubai 
Electricity Co. v. Islamic Re ublic of Iran Shi in Lines 
The "Iran Vojdan") (1984 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 380, Cantieri 
Navali Riuniti Spa v. N.V. Dmne Justitia (The Stolt 
Marmaro) [1985] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 428. 
5See generally V. Danilowicz. 'Floating' Choice 
of Law Clauses & their Enforceability. (Summer 1986) 
20 The Internat. Lawyer 1005. 
D.G. Pierce. Post-Formation Choice of Law in Contract. 
(1987) 50 M.L.R. 176. 
A. Briggs. The Validity of "floating" choice of law and 
jurisdiction clauses. (1976) Lloyds Maritime & Commercial 
L.Q. 508. 
6Dubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines (The Iran Vojdan) [1984] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 
380. 
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as a matter of English law it was " c l ear and not disputed 
that this clause in the bill of lading is bad insofar as 
it envisages what may be called a 'floating proper law' ."7 
Bingham J. based his conclusion on The Armar8 where the 
English Court of Appeal had pointed out that there must 
be a governing law for every contract at the time of its 
making. 
Megan L.J. in the latter case stated: 
liThe governing law cannot fall to be decided, retro-
spectively, by reference to an event which was an 
uncertain event in the future at the time when the 
obligations under the contract had already been under-
taken, had fallen to be performed, and had been per-
formed. Nor is it, I think, an attractive, or a 
possible, concept of English private international 
law that the governing law, initially being, say the 
law of Algeria, should thereafter change into the 
law of England. 119 
It is however unclear whether the law of the forum 
or the proper law of the contract determines the validity 
of a floating law clause. 10 There appear to be no reported 
cases on either side of the Atlantic in which this issue 
has been raised. The judge in The Iran Vojdanll appeared 
to consider that the proper law of the contract applied, 
however there are arguments 12 in favour of the lex fori 
7Ibid at p.385. 
8Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Algerienne 
d'Assurance et Reassurance [1980] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 450. 
9Ibid at p.455. 
10See Briggs op. cit. supra n.5 at pp.509-11 and 
p.517. 
llDubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines 1984 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 380. 
12Briggs op. cit. supra n.5 at pp.510-11. 
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determining the matter. Very briefly it can be stated 
that party autonomy is allowed within limits, and a cho 
of a floating law clause falls outside acceptable limits, 
or that such a clause so confusing it must be struck 
down. Alternatively, there is no reason why the object-
ive proper law (the third of the Proper law) should 
not determine the validity of a clause which delays the 
selection of a governing law. Briggs 13 conclusion would 
appear to be as definite as one can be in this situation. 
He says that the result of the cases is that where the 
proper law is English a floating choice of law will be 
struck down. I An English court regards a contracts proper 
law as something to be determined by reference to existing 
facts and any election made under a floating choice of law 
clause will be disregarded as facts arising after the 
making of the contract. Thus the proper law will be 
determined by the third rule of the proper law. Once 
the proper law is thus determined it determines the valid-
ity of the floating law unless it is accepted that the 
English lex fori treats floating law clauses as inherently 
void and strikes them down initially. 
A somewhat easier issue concerns the choice of two 
laws to govern a contract. 
The parties may expressly or by implication provide 
for two proper laws, one to be applied in one event and 
l3 Ibid at p.5l7. 
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the other if that event was negatived. 14 This has 
been considered to be good commercial sense. 15 
It has been pointed out16 that it is incorrect to 
criticise these 'floating law' clauses on the ground that 
they create a vacuum in so far as there is no initi 
governing law. The point is that the governing law 
at any point in time could have been determined by apply-
ing the third rule of the proper law doctrine. It has 
also been suggested that a choice of law clause specify-
ing say, three national laws to choose from "is clearly 
less uncer"tain than one which makes no choice of law at 
all." 17 Pierce concludes therefore that post-formation 
choice of law will not lead to uncertainty. 
Given that it is correct to say that all contracts 
have a governing law from their inception by virtue of the 
court being able to determine it by the third rule of the 
14Astro Venturoso Compania Naviera v. Hellenic 
Shipyards S.A. (liThe Mariannina") [1983] Lloyds Law 
Rep. 13. The parties had chosen arbitration in London 
pursuant to English arbitration law but if it were ruled 
by a competent authority that this choice was unenforce-
able then Greek law was to apply. The court concluded 
that reference to arbitration in London coupled with the 
desire for English arbitration law to apply indicated that 
English law was intended as the substantive law. 
15Ibid . 
16Pierce op. cit. supra n.5 at p.189. 
17 Ibid at p.200. 
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proper law the only remaining problem is,whether parties 
having chosen one governing law)may subsequently change 
this law for another. The Armar18 decision is unfortunate 
in this respect. If party autonomy is allowed in making 
an initial choice of law why not when it is made later? 
Article (3) (2) of the European Conventio~ on the Law 
~pplicable to Contractual Obliqations (1980) allows the 
parties to indicate a choice of governing law "at any 
time.,,19 This freedom is made subject only to the quali-
fication that such choice does not prejudice formal valid-
ity or the rights of third parties. This approach is in 
harmony with the concept of party autonomy and as such 
preferable to the view expressed in The Armar. 20 
Finally it should be noted that it is open to the 
parties to agree that one aspect of the contract shall 
be governed by the law of one country (e.g. the country 
where it was made) and another aspect by the law of another 
country (e.g. the country where it is to be performed) .21 
This is called depecage by the French, splitting the 
contract in England and has been variously described in 
the United States as 'picking and choosing,22 'onion 
18Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Argerienne 
d'Assurance et Reassurance [1980] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 4. 
19 See infra at p.416. 
20Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Algerienne 
d'Assurance et Reassurance [1980] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 4. 
21Dicey & Morris at pp.748-9. 
22C.Wilde. Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law. 
41 So. Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1968). 
pee ,23 There must be very clear intention by the 
part s that they do wish to split the governing law of 
their contract. 24 
The fact that depecage is permitted in English law 
adds force to the argument above. If more than one law 
can govern the various parts of a contract then why, as 
pierce25 asks should .not more than one law be lowed 
to govern different stages of a contract? 
Conclusion 
The limitations discussed under this heading which 
380 
exist in English conflict of laws should not be encouraged. 
They are an unnecessary limitation on party autonomy. 
Whilst the clause in The Iran Vojdan26 is admittedly 
"extremely unattractive"27 in so as it introduced 
"maximum complexity and difficu into what could and 
should be a s matter," it is nevertheless the court's 
duty, (as Bingham J. noted28 ) to give a meaning to the 
choice of law provision if at all possible. The courts 
23 R. J . Weintraub. Beyond o6p6cage. A "New Rule" 
Approach to Choice of Law in Consumer Credit Transactions 
and a Critique of the Territorial Application of the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 25 Case Western Reserve 
Law. Rev. 16 at p.18 (1974). 
240icey & Morris at p.749 and author cited in 
footnotes 10-12. 
25Pierce Ope cit. supra n.5 on p.375 at p.199. 
260ubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines [1984J 2 Loyds Law Rep. 380. 
27 Ibid at p.385 
28 Ibid . 
Bingham J. 
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should endeavour to uphold the parties' choice of law 
clauses because this makes for certainty and fulfils the 
parties' expectations. If no possible meaning can be 
given to a choice of law clause then the lex fori should 
apply on the grounds that no choice exists. This should 
however have to be done rarely as parties generally make 
intelligible choice of law decisions. 
Finally it may be noted that the American approach 
tends towards the views of the European Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) rather 
than current English law. Parties may choose a law 
subsequent to the execution of the contract29 and depecage 
is permissible. 30 
29 See T. Brown. Notes. Choice of Law Stipulations 
by Litigants. 43 Washington & Lee L.R. 141 at p.141 et 
seq. (Winter 1986) and cases cited therein. 
Danilowicz op. cit. supra n.S 
30Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971) Section 
187, Comment i at p.S70. However the Restatement's 
paragraphs on specific contracts (paras 189-97) favour 
the application of a single law. 
Conclusion to Limitations on Party Autonomy in 
England and New York 
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Some of the limitations discussed are inappropriate in 
the New Zealand setting31 and others are unlikely to be of 
any significance from a practical point of view. 32 Other 
limitations are clearly not necessary33 or add confusion34 
to what should be a straightforward situation. Some are 
necessary. 35 Of the fourteen limitations listed above 
only two are obvious. Renvoi has no place in international 
contracts and public policy must be a tool available to 
the courts to strike down a choice of law clause in an 
exceptional circumstance. 
Adhesion contracts and so called overriding statutes 
of the forum can be accommodated within the party autonomy 
rule. Parties must agree on a choice of law clause; it 
cannot be unilaterally imposed. Secondly legislation 
exists today which plainly states that it is to take pre-
cedence over choice of law decisions. This must be res-
. pected. However un ss an enactment expressly states it 
is to apply rather than a governing law clause or its very 
object requires such an interpretation the basic rule of 
party autonomy should prevail. 
31Constitutional limits on party autonomy. 
32very few parties will want to subject their con-
tract to the laws of Moses. 
33 Such as the reasonable relationship requirement. 
34 The bona fide and legal requirement. 
35 That procedure must be governed by the lex fori. 
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PART D 
Some Other possible Solutions 
The point has now been reached where the law relating 
to choice of law issues for interstate and international 
contracts has been stated and criticised in the English 
and New York jurisdictions. 
Before coming to any conclusions as to what New 
Zealand should do some other possible 'solutions' are 
considered. If interest analysis is too general and 
uncertain perhaps mechanical rules should return. Thus 
the lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis theories 
are critically considered. 
Next the lex validatis is discussed as a possible 
rule to govern this area of conflict law. This rule 
has been chosen as it produces a contrast to the lex loci 
contractus and lex loci solutionis theor~es and because it 
has received academic support on both sides of the At-
lantic .. 
Finally a legislative example has been deemed 
appropriate for inclusion. Many specific pieces of 
legislation, actual or pending, could be discussed here. 
The European Economic Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (1980) has been chosen because 
it is legislation which has been designed to resolve all 
choice of law issues whether or not a choice of law 
clause exists. It is very likely to become law in 
England. It is considered in some detail and its 
merits and disadvantages cons 
This convention contains both rules and 
specific rules and is a contrast to the approaches 
considered in the American context. 
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1. THE LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS THEORY 
This theory that the lex loci contractus or the 
law of the place of contracting should determine the 
choice of law issue is first defined and considered 
very briefly from a historical viewpoint. 
Secondly the advantages of the theory are Ii 
and criticisms of these alleged advantages noted. 
Thirdly the disadvantages of the doctrine are 
considered and its decline in popularity on both sides 
of the Atlantic noted. 
Fourthly the lex loci contractus theory is illus-
trated by reference to E. Gerli v. 1 
a New York decision chosen c and 0 quoted 
pronouncement of the lex loci contractus theory. 
148 F. 2d. 115 (1931). 
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Lex Loci Contractus Theory Defined 
The lex loci contractus theory emphasises the place 
where the contract is made; it is the law of this juris-
diction which is applied to determine any matter which 
might arise in an international or interstate contract. 
Beale, probably the strongest and most influential 
advocate of this theory, suggested in his famous article2 
that the place of contracting may mean either the place 
of making the contract or alternatively the place of 
performance of the contract, thus bringing the rule which 
applies to the law of performance within the general 
principles that the lex loci contractus governs. 
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However it would seem that the more usual interpreta-
tion is that given by such writers as Weintraub3 who has 
stated that the lex loci contractus is the "geographical 
location where, according to the law of contracts, the 
acceptance of the offer to contract becomes effective, 
or more accurately .... would be effective if the choice 
of law problem were resolved in favour of the validity 
of the contract." 
Historical Note 
This theory was very popular in both the United 
States and England. Until 1865 the law of the place 
2J . H• Beale. What Law Governs the Validity of a 
Contract? 23 Harv. L.R. 1 (1909-1910). 
3R. J • Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contracts. 54 
Iowa L.R. 399 at p.401 (1968). 
of contracting appears to have been used more frequently 
than any other law to apply to international contracts 
in England. 4 It survived as the dominant theory for 
a longer period in the United States due probably to the 
influence of Beale,S however the law of the place of con-
tracting was finally abandoneo by the New York Court of 
Appeals in the 1950 1s. 6 
Advantages of the Theory 
Like any mechanical rule the lex loci contractus 
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theory may be said to promote certainty and predictability 
both of which are obviously of great importance in the 
commercial world. Another practical advantage given for 
this theory is that the country in which a contract is 
formed is that in which the parties can most easily ob-
tain legal advice. 7 
At the root of this theory is the concept of terri-
toriality. According to its proponents only the country 
in which acts occur can attach legal consequences to them. 8 
Beale and other advocates of this theory considered that 
the lex loci contractus theory was sound in terms of the 
4The law of the place of contracting was abandoned by 
the Privy Council in P. & o. Stearn Nayigation Co. v. Shand 
(1865) 300 Moo P.C. (N.S.) 272 and by the Exchequer Chamber 
in Lloyd v. Guilbert (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 115. See Morris 
at p.266 et seq. 
5The lex loci contractus had been adopted in the 
Restatement, Conflict of Laws S.332 (1934) due to Beale1s 
influence. Discussed supra at p~22 et seq. 
6See Auten v. Auten 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
72 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) at pp.1091-2. 
8Ibid and see H. Goodrich. Conflict of Laws (1949) 
(3rd edit.) at p.54. 
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territorial concept of conf of laws. 9 Critics 
question this theoretical premise lO and Beale's emphasis 
on the ease of application the theory has been queried. 
Beale had taken the view that "there can only be 
one p in which a contract is made and what that place 
is can never be subject to serious doubt" as "the act of 
contracting is a momentary act, and the contract must 
arise at some particular moment as the result of an act 
done some one State."ll This is now "demonstrably 
untrue. n12 This may be illustrated by Madame pallavicini13 
on her flight between California and New York. Neither 
Madame Pallavicini nor the Chairman of hotel syndicate 
which hoped to buy the hotel in Mexico would have had 
any idea over which state they were flying when the alleged 
contract was made. 
Disadvantages of the lex loci contractus theory 
Beale did himself admit that the place of contracting 
could be fortuitous but he argued that if the parties did 
in fact contract a state that was completely fortuitous 
they would most ly be physically present in that state 
and would seek legal advice in that same state. The 
9Ibid . 
10 E.g. E. Rabel. 
A Comparative Study. 
See 2 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws. 
(1958 -19 6 4) (2nd edit.) at p. 360. 
341 
llBeale op. cit. supra n.7 at p.27l. 
l2Morris at p.266 note 6. 
v. International Tel. & Telegraph Corp 
(1973) .. 
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Pallavicini case would suggest otherwise. Critics14 have 
made similar observations about the difficulty of establish-
ing the actual place of contracting. It has also been 
suggested that the place of contracting may be fraudulantly 
selected in order to give validity to an otherwise invalid 
contract. 15 Furthermore it may be impossible to determine 
the place of contracting until the contract concluded, 
and finally it may be impossible to determine the place of 
contracting without arguing in a circle, as when an offer 
is posted from London and an acceptance from Hamburg and a 
telegraphic revocation of the offer reaches the offeree 
before the letter of acceptance reaches the offeror. 16 
These considerations reduce the force of the predict-
ability argument almost to vanishing point. However, the 
law of the place of contracting was, as noted above, the 
law that was most usually relied upon by English courts 
until 1865, and whilst it may still have been a realistic 
choice when Beale wrote in the early part of this century 
it would seem to be a rigid test "more congenial to primi-
tive days than to the far flung activities of modern 
commerce. ,,17 
l4E . g . see E.G. Lorenzen. Validity and Effects of 
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws. 30 Yale L.J. 655 at 
p.673 (1921); Morris at p.266 et seq.; Cheshire at p.10. 
l5Morris at p.266. 
l6See supra at p.73 et seq. 
l7Cheshire at p.ll. 
The Decline in Popularity of the Lex Loci Contractus 
Theory 18 
From about 1840 international trade flourished 
rapidly and the next decade saw the development of postal 
and telegraph services. The activities of banks also 
increased through the use of new forms of credit. IIAll 
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this broke up the unity of the place and time in the making 
and the performance of the contract. Now both these acts 
were done by each party at dif places and at diffe,rent 
times.,,19 
Thus as a rule of automatic application the loci 
contractus declined in popularity on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
20 
.;:::I:.:;l::..;;l:..;u::..;s::..:t.::;.r=a-=t;.::i::..;;o;.;;:n:.......;o::..:f::..--=t=.:h:.;:e:........:T:..:h.:.;e::..;o::..;r=-y"'-.:..:_--=E::..;.=--G:::.e=r=l=i v. Cunard S. S. Co. 
The 1931 New York Court of Appeals decision illustrates 
the application of this theory_ The contract involved 
the shipment of bales of silk from Italy to New York. The 
bill of lading contained a limitation of liability clause 
and so specified that the contract should be "governed 
by English law.,,21 Learned Hand the Circuit Judge~ in 
considering the validity of the limitation clause said: ) 
18Dicey & Morr at pp.750-1. 
190 . Lando. The Proper Law of Contract. (1964) 
8 Scand. Studies in Law 107 at pp.117-8. 
20 48 F. 2d. 115 (2nd Cir. 1931). 
21 Ibid at p.117. 
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"Had bill been drawn in England ... the validity 
of the clause would depend upon British law. In 
fact, it was drawn and de in Italy, and is 
the law of that kingdom by which alone the question 
is to be decided .... People cannot by agreement 
substitute the law of another place. n22 
22 Ibid . 
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2. THE LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS THEORY 
Introduction 
As with the lex loci contractus theory the lex loci 
solutionis is first defined and the advantages and dis-
advantages of the theory are then considered. The early 
English decision of Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Tele-
graph Co. Ltd23 is given to illustrate the operation of 
the lex loci solutionis; being a clear text book example 
of the theory working in practice. 
23 [1891] 1. Q.B. 79. 
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Lex Loci Solutionis Defined 
Pursuant to this doctrine, the law of the place 
where the contract is to be performed is the law which 
is to be applied. Mr. Justice Story phrased the rule 
as follows: 
II [W]here the contract is, either expressly or 
tacitly, to be performed in another place, then 
the general rule is in conformity to the presumed 
intention of the parties that the contract, as to 
its validity, nature, obligations and interpretation, 
is to be governed by the law of the place of perform-
ance. u24 
Advantages of the Lex Loci solutionis 
Lord Esher, M.R. in a nineteenth century decision25 
considered that this was the conclusion that bus ssmen 
would come to using their "business sense. 1I26 Any other 
result could produce the II s trange conclusion ll27 that one 
could enter a contract to be carried out in a country con-
traty to the laws of that countrYi such an intention he 
considered to be IIhardly conceivable ll28 therefore the 
parties must have intended that the lex loci solutionis 
prevail. 
The great advantage of this approach, says Morris,29 
24 J . Story. Conflict of Laws. S.280 (1883) (8th edit.) 
25Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. Ltd. 
[1891] 1 Q.B. 79. 
26 Ibid at pp.82-3. 
27 Ibid . 
28 Ibid . 
29Morris at p.266. 
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is that it is based on an internal or substantial connec-
tion between the contract and governing law instead of 
on an external and fortuitous one. Whatever else the 
place of performance may be, it is not fortuitous. 30 The 
theory also has the advantage of being certain in so far 
as it is a mechanical rule. 
Disadvantages of the Doctrine 
Whilst the arguments in its favour are, according to 
the adherents of the rule, "undoubtedly very weighty ll3l 
there are obvious disadvantages in the doctrine. F tly 
the law of the place of performance provides no solution 
if the contract is bilateral, as indeed most commerc 1 
contracts are, and each party has to perform in a dif 
country which is a typical conflict of laws situation. 
Secondly the law of the place 9f performance furnishes no 
solution if the place of performance optional as when 
an international loan secured by debentures is repayab 
at the debenture ho 
London. 32 
's option either in New York or 
Another disadvantage which has been cited33 is that 
any attempt to make the law of the place of performance 
govern the act of contracting is an attempt to give to 
30 Ibid at p.267. 
31 E . G. Lorenzen. Selected Articles on the Conflict 
of Laws. (1970) at p.289 and see Lorenzen Ope cit. supra 
note 14 at p.644-6. 
32Beale Ope cit. supra n.7 at p.1086 et seq. 
33Ibid . 
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that law extraterritorial effect. Beale gave the example 
of an agreement being valid where made but the performance 
is forbidden where it is to be performed. Here, if the 
performance was forbidden from the word go, then the con-
tract would be found to be invalid even by the law of the 
place of making. This illustrates how the rule can have 
extraterritorial effect. In other words it enables one 
state to extend its laws over the territories of another. 
A further objection, according to Beale, is that 
difficulty might arise in obtaining expert legal advice at 
the time when the formation of agreement is under considera-
tion. A legal expert can, Beale points out, really only 
give advice on the law of his own state and is liable to 
make mistakes when advising on another law. To study 
this other law is of course time consuming for the legal 
adviser concerned. 34 
Other schools object to this theory or rule because 
of the rigidity which it shares with the lex loci con-
tractus view. 
Illustration of the lex loci solutionis: 
Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. Ltd. 35 
A decision of the English Court of Appeal illustrates 
the application of this rule. The plaintiff, a Brazilian 
34Against Beale it equally arguable that lawyers 
specialising in C:onflict of Laws do gain expertise in the 
subject and can always calIon foreign expert witnesses. 
Still admittedly time consuming and expensive, but an in-
evitable consequenceof the subject itself. 
35[ 1891] 1. Q.B. 79. 
subject, executed in Brazil, in the Portuguese language 
a power of attorney in favour of a broker resident in 
London empowering him to buy and sell shares on the 
plaintiff's behalf. The broker accordingly sold 
certain shares and the plaintiff subsequently alleged 
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that the sale was not authorised by the power of attorney. 
On the tr I of a liminary issue to determine whether 
the construction of the power of attorney was to be 
governed by Brazilian or English law, Lord Esher, M.R. 
held that the lex loci solutionis governed " .... [T]he 
law has said that if the contract is to be carried out in 
whole in another country, it is to be carried out wholly 
according to the law of that country.lu6 Applying the 
lex loci solutionis to the facts Lord Esher M.R. concluded 
that if it appeared from the power of attorney that the 
contract was to be performed in Braz then Brazilian law 
would apply; alternatively if it was to be performed 
in England English law would apply. Thus the construc-
tion to be put on the document would be the same whatever 
countries were involved, the one meaning being "I give 
an authority which if carried out in England is to be 
carried out according to the law of England, if in France 
according to the law of France.,,37 
36 Ibid at p.83. 
37 Ibid . 
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Lord Esher M.R. considered that this must have been 
what the par s had meant and whilst the effect would be 
to apply the authority in different ways different 
countries it effected the parties' intentions. 
Lex Loci Contractus and Lex loci solutionis 
Conclusion 
Whilst these two rules may have worked in former 
times neither are sat factory in a world of instant 
communication where many contracts can be said to be 
truly international. Even if they only applied absent 
party choice both are s 11 unsuited to the twentieth 
century as the cases illustrate. Persons negotiate 
on board aircraft which make it difficult to state where 
the contract is made, telex is widely used, and many 
contracts leave the place of performance open. Thus 
the two rules are inappropriate in the commercial world 
today. 
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3. A RULE OF VALIDATION: THE LEX VALIDATIS 
"The object of a governing law clause is to facilitate 
the consummation of the intent of the contractual 
parties. In a sense it is an inco~poration by 
reference into contracts of the innumerable eventual-
ities that could be spelled out ad nauseam. Such 
incorporation and simplification most certainly 
should be encouraged. Consequently any stipulation 
of otherwise applicable law that clearly frustrates 
the intent of the parties should be disregarded."38 
It has been suggested39 that it should be a basic 
choice of law principle that contracts are prima facie 
valid. This is what the parties intend and the law of 
contract should give effect to party intention. The 
exponents of this view argue that with an international 
contract one should take the contract as valid and enquire 
whether any grounds exist for applying an invalidating 
rule. 40 This idea has been expounded by various writers 
38 C. E . Maw. Applicable Law and Conflict Avoidance 
in International Contracts. 25 The Record of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York. 365 at pp.374-5 
(June 1970). 
39A. J . E . Jaffey. Essential Validity of Contracts 
in the English Conflicts of Laws. (1974) 23 I.C.L.Q. 1. 
A.J.E. Jaffey. The Foundation of Rules for the Choice of 
Law. 2 Oxford J. of Legal studs. 368 (1982). 
D. Trautman. The Relation between American Choice of 
Law & Federal Common Law. 41 No. 2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
105 (Spring 1977). 
R.J. Weintraub. Choice of Law in Contracts. 54 Iowa 
L. Rev. 399 at p. 430 (1968). 
R.J. Weintraub. How to Choose Law for Contracts and How 
Not to: the E.E.C. Convention. Texas Internat. L.J. 17 
at pp.155-6 (Spring 1982). 
40Jaffey defines an invalidating rule as "any rule 
which l if applicable to the international contract in 
question will preclude a party seeking to enforce it or 
allowing it doing SOl in whole or in part~ Ibid 
at p.378. 
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since the 1930's.41 
One English writer 42 considers that a choice of law 
clause which has the effect of invalidating the contract 
should be disregarded as parties do not intend to in-
validate their contracts when making a choice of law 
decision. 43 
Jaffey, one of the leading English exponents of this 
rule, suggests that the purpose of contract law is to 
achieve justice between the parties. He sees justice 
at the domestic level and justice at the choice of law 
level. Domestic rules, the function of which is to do 
justice between the parties, have as their object the 
provision of a fair solution to the dispute. The diffi-
culty, Jaffey says, is that different countries allow 
different views of what is and the function of the 
41Heilman writing in the 1930's considered the 
"vital matter" of what he termed "the maximum enforce-
ability of contracts." If a choice of law existed one 
should choose the law which "WOUld attach 'validity' or 
the maximum enforcement or ef to the promise." 
See R.J. Heilman. Judicial Method & Economic Objectives 
in Conflict of Laws. 43 Yale L.J. 1082 at p.1100 (1933-34.) 
42Jaffey op. cit. supra n.39 at p.3. 
43 This is not however the English position. See 
Ocean S.S. Co. v. land State Wheat Board [1941] 
1 K.B. 402. 
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choice of law rules is to decide which country's standards 
are to be ied. 
Jaf states that the English position is not he 
ful. Instead of holding that an international contract 
is governed by its proper law, (subject of course to im-
portant exceptions) the rule should be one that tells us 
where an invalidating rule of a domestic legal problem 
will apply. He suggests that an invalidating rule of 
a dome system will be applicable if that domestic 
system is the proper law of the contract. 44 
If the normal approach to international contracts 
was to view such transactions as valid then has been 
suggested45 that it is a manageable and understandable 
task to see if any invalidating rules exist. 
Weintraub, an American adherent to the rule of vali-
dat considers that the rule can be stated "very simply.,,46 
"A contract is valid if valid under the law of the 
settled place of business or residence of the party 
wishing to enforce the contract unless the settled 
place of business or residence of the other party 
has an invalidating rule designed to protect against 
cdntracts of adhesion.,,47 
He agrees with Jaffey that governing law clauses which 
invalidate the contract should be ignored. 48 However he 
44See generally Jaffey op. cit. supra n.39. 
45Trautman op. cit. supra n.39. 
46Weintraub op. cit. supra n.39. 
47 Ibid . 
48 Ibid at p.156. 
maintains that one should approach each contract with a 
presumption of validity. 49 
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Weintraub considers that five situations ex where 
the invalidating law should be viewed favourably.50 These 
are as follows: 
1. The invalidating ru reflects the growing concern 
for protection of the party in the inferior bargaining 
position. 
2. The invalidating rule differs in basic policy, rather 
than minor detail from the validating rule; 
3. The parties should have foreseen the sUbstantial 
interest that the state with the invalidating rule 
would have in controlling the outcome. 
4. The context of the contract is non commercial. 
5. The courts of the state with the validating rule have, 
in similar interstate cases, deferred to the policies 
underlying the foreign invalidating rule. 
The presence of anyone or more of these five factors 
would result in application of the invalidating rUle. 51 
The idea of a lex validatis has proved popular with 
other American writers; Ehrenzweig in particular favours 
such an approach. "The rule of validation (lex validatis) 
is in accord with the general principle, prevailing in 
many other areas including the conflicts of law of wills 
and trusts that 'if the court has a reasonable choice ... 
betwe~n applicable systems of law, should choose the 
one that results in legal validation. ,"52 
49Weintraub op. cit. supra n.39 at p.410. 
50Weintraub is only concerned with questions of 
validity. 
51 Ibid at p.430. 
52A. A. Ehrenzwe Conflicts in a Nutshell. (1970) 
(2d. edit.) 165 quoting A. Corbin. Contracts S.548 n.9 (Supp. 1964). 
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Ehrenzweig whilst favouring a general rule of vali-
dation does however argue that the law chosen by the par-
ties should be applied even if it invalidates their con-
tract. He thus limits his approval of the rule to con-
tracts which contain no express choice of law clause. 53 
Justification of the Lex Validatis Rule 
One writer54 has argued that absent a choice of law 
clause the lex validatis should apply because it is 
justified if not mandated by the commerce clause of the 
united states Constitution, a fundamental goal of which 
would seem to be the promotion of business convenience. 
There are three general grounds for justifying the 
lex validatis. First and most obvious is the argument 
that parties intend that their contract be governed by 
a valid law. However the parties may not have considered 
the choice of law issue at all (hence the existence of 
the third rule of the proper law in England and a similar 
test in the United States) . 
The second argument suggests that a presumption in 
favour of validity is so obvious, that it differs in kind 
53A. A. Ehrenzweig. Contracts in the Conflict of 
Laws. (Pt. 1). 59 Colum. L. Rev. 937 at pp.991-2 (1959). 
It will be recalled that the Restatement (Second) Conflict 
of Laws S.187 Comment e at p.190 considered that in such 
a situation the chosen law would not be applied as to do 
so would defeat the parties' expectations. It must be 
assumed that the parties made a mistake. 
54 H. H. Horowitz. The Commerce Clause as a Limit-
ation on State Choice of Law Doctrine. 86 Harv. L.R. 
806 at p.822 (1971). 
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from other types of presumptions. Weintraub 55 for 
example said "Unless [the parties] are engaged in some 
ridiculous charade, their intention is that every promise 
they have made in a contract be enforceable." 
Another rationale for a presumption in favour of 
the lex validatis may be that application of the validating 
law "better serves[s] business convenience."56 
However in reply to these arguments it may be suggested 
that once litigation is pending one party no longer wants 
or expects the contract to be validated. 
Criticism of the Lex Validatis 
The rule of validation has its critics. Cheshire 57 
considers that Heilman's theory is unacceptable. "It 
would be difficult to devise a method more calculated than 
this to import doubt and confusion into mercanti deal-
ings."58 
It is difficult to see exactly when the presumption 
of validity will be displaced despite guides such as 
weintraub gives. 59 
55Weintraub op. cit. supra n.39 at p.406. 
56prebble at p.659 quoting G. Stumberg. Principles 
of Conflict of Laws. (1963) (3rd edit.) at p.239. 
57cheshire at p.12. 
58 Ibid . 
59supra at p.402. 
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Prebble 60 notes that English courts cannot rationally 
consider a sumption of validity for cases being deter-
mined pursuant to the closest connection theory. This is 
because the court is theoretically not concerned with the 
content of competing rules. He goes on to say that 
American courts do not face the same difficulty quite so 
acutely under their rule-selection approach. Nevertheless, 
the validation theory poses problems. "When a court is 
employing the significant contacts test, it has ex hypothesi, 
determined that the parties had no expressed or inferable 
intent as to the choice of law issue. 
Gruson 61 has pointed out that as a general matter it 
is not correct to say that validation always saves the 
interests of the parties. Wherever the validity of a 
contract is at issue in litigation, one party must have 
concluded that its interests were not served by the 
validity of the contract. 
Possibly the strongest argument against adopting 
a rule of validation in the absence of party choice is 
that such a rule conflicts with the trend of modern legis-
lation. Modern socially protective legislation often 
invalidates contracts in order to protect the weaker party 
and this state affairs seems incompatible with a general 
rule of validation. 62 However it has been used in limited 
60prebble at p.662 et seq. 
61Gruson New York Approach at p.220. 
62prebble at p.663 makes this point. 
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situations. This may be illustrated by reference to the 
New York Law of Usury. 
New York Usury Law: 
In determining the applicability of a particular 
state's usury law to a transaction New York applies the 
rule of validation. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of laws states the rule as follows; 
Section 203. "The validity of a contract will be 
sustained against the charge of usury if it provides 
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a 
state to which the contract has a substantial relation-
ship .•... II 
The rule has been followed in both New York State 
courts and federal courts. 63 There are two requirements 
that must be satisfied for the rule to operate. The first 
is that a link must be established between the validating 
state and the transactions and the second requirement con-
cerns the need for good faith. 64 
The law becomes less clear when the question is 
whether the validation rule would prevail if a governing 
law clause in an agreement stipulated the applicability of 
a law under which the agreement would be invalid as being 
usurous. 65 
63 E . g . Crisafulli v. Childs 307 N.Y.S. 2d. 701 (1970). 
64 See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 274 U.S. 403 
(1927) . 
65compare the views of Ehrenzweig supra at p.403 who 
would have the choice of law clause prevail with Maw who 
would not. See Maw op. cit. supra n.38 at pp.374-5. 
See also R.A. Sedlar. The Contracts Provisions of the 
Restatement (Second). An Analysis and a Critique. 72 
Colum. L. Rev. 279 at p.292 (1972). 
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Regrettably there appear to be no decisions directly 
on this point. However Gruson is probably correct in 
suggesting that under New York law a governing law clause 
would be upheld even if the contract was invalid under 
the chosen law. 66 
A Note on the English position 
In England choice of law clauses that have the effect 
of invalidating a contract are upheld. The English rule 
of validation is only, at most, a presumptio~ to take into 
account. The authority for this is Ocean S.S. Co. v. 
Queensland State Wheat Board. 67 
This ru considered "fairly draconian" by some 
is accepted by others. 68 The Wheat Board decision is 
however the logical result of the general English approach 
which is jurisdictional rather than result orientated. 
Similarly with contracts involving no choice of law clause 
it is not the practice of English courts to apply a general 
rule of validation despite some dicta to the contrary. 69 
66Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.361. 
67[1941] 1 K.B. 402. 
68 See Prebble at p.530. In favour see R.H. Graveson. 
The Proper Law of Commercial Contracts as Developed in the 
English Legal System in Lectures on the Conflict of Laws 
in International Contracts 1 at p.28 (U. Mich. Law School 
Summer Inst. on Int'l & Compo Lawed. 1949). 
69 In Coast Ltd. v. Hudig & Veder Chartering N.V. [1972] 
3 W.L.R. 286. Lord Denning suggested that it was an accept-
ed princip that a contract is, if possible, to be con-
strued so as to make it valid rather than invalid. This 
may be seen as a tendency towards favouring a lex validatis 
approach. 
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As choice of law clauses are becoming increasingly 
used the lihood of parties choosing an invalidating 
law are ased. 70 In a survey carried out in New York71 
130 out of 161 law firms usually or always employed a 
stipulation of governing law. The findings revealed 
that most New York lawyers were members of the "rubber 
stamp" or "what-have-we-got-to-lose" school of thought. 
They have a standard choice of law clause stipulating that 
the law of their j sdiction is to govern and they include 
this clause in contract which they draft unless the 
other party objects. 72 
If choice of law c are often boilerplate then 
there is a real risk that the parties could find that in-
advertently their choice law clause would result in part 
or all of the contract being invalid. 
70 In 1968 Weintraub considered choice of law clauses 
were becoming "ubiquitous boilerplate" in commercial con-
tracts. See Weintraub op. cit. supra n.39 at p.4l0. 
71J . R. Lowe. Choice of Law Clauses International 
Contracts: A Practical Approach. 12 Harv. Int. L.J. 1 
(1971). 
Lowe does not actually say that his sample was limited to 
New York, however he is a member of the New York and 
his discussion is limited to New York; it would thus seem 
reasonable to conclude his survey was of New York firms 
only. 
72 Lowe makes the point that this is only a 
observation; his survey was limited to lawyers sent-
ing powerful and wealthy clients dealing constantly with 
international contracts. This finding might not apply to 
small firms who might regard international contracts as 
unusual. Lowe ibid at p.2 et seq. 
409 
To employ a rule of validation in these circumstances 
(and thus not enforce the cho of law clause) only en-
courages parties and lawyers to continue this lackadaisical 
trend (if in fact it exists) . If party autonomy was up-
held then parties and advisers might give more 
serious thought to the content of their agreements. Thus 
a rule of validation is not considered to be .an acceptable 
exception to party autonomy. Nor is such a rule suitable 
as a general rule to apply to all contracts that do not 
contain a choice of law issue. However as a general 
presumption it could be a useful tool in a system that 
employed interest analysis. As interest analysis is not 
deemed an appropriate choice of law theory to use in New 
Zealand the rule of validation must likewise be discarded 
in favour of application of the lex fori when no governing 
law clause exists. 
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4. A SLATIVE EXAMPLE 
The European Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations 1980 
Introduction 
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
ob1igations73 was signed in Rome on June 19, 1980 by seven 
of the then nine member states of the European Economic 
Community. 74 The Convention developed in two stages. 
First a preliminary draft Convention on the law applicable 
to both contractual and non-contractual obligations was 
completed in 1972. 75 This draft was the starting point 
for the Convention's second stage. Negotiations took 
between 1975 and 1980 the culmination of which was 
the sent Convention. At the request of the British 
delegation, the provisions on non-contractual obligations 
were deleted to be dealt with by a subsequent Convention. 
It was felt that the E.E.C. was in of such a 
Convention. 76 Although all of the member states of the 
73 In this Part hereinafter called the Convention. 
74 In this Part hereinafter abbreviated to E.E.C. 
75 For a survey of the Preliminary Draft of the Con-
vention see L. ColI Contractual Obligations - the 
\ 
E.E.C. Preliminary Draft Convention on Private International 
Law. (1976) 25 I.C.L.Q. 35, and see Harmonisation of 
Private International Law by the E.E.C. (ed. K.Lipstein) 
(1978) . 
76 p . Lagarde. The European Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations. An Apologia. 
22 No.1 Virginia J. of Internat. Law 91 at p.92 (1981). 
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E.E.C. today allow parties to a contract to choose the 
law that will govern their contract, dif methods of 
determining the applicable law are used in the absence of 
such a determination by the parties themselves. 77 Har-
monising the conflict of law rules within the E.E.C. would 
it was said also prevent 'forum shopping', and increase 
1 certainty. 78 
The Convention will not come into effect until seven 
states of the E.E.C. have ratified it. 
77 Ibid . Lagarde notes for example that in Italy 
the contract is governed by the national law of the parties 
if is common to both. Otherwise it is governed by the 
law the state where the contract was concluded. In 
Germany the court looks for an implicit or a hypothetical 
intention. If this search is fruitless, the contract is 
severed and each obligation sing from it is governed 
by the law of the country in which it is performed. In 
France the courts try to ascertain the "localisation" of 
the contract relying in particular on the place of 
ance and in the domicile of party who is to carry out 
the characteristic performance of the contract. 
Ibid footnote 9. 
78 See The Introduction to the Explanatory Report 
which accompanies the Convention by Guiliano and Lagarde 
O.J. 1980 C. 282/4 (hereinafter referred to as the Report). 
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Main Features of the Convention 79 
The Convention is world wide effect. In other 
words it does not just provide choice of law rules for 
contracts with an E.E.C. connection. It provide$ rules 
for any international contract where an E.E.C. state is 
the forum. 
The basic rules of the Convention follow the pattern 
of English law. Normally party autonomy is allowed and 
in the absence of choice the proper law will be the law 
of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected. There is a presumption however that the 
closest connection is to be found where the party who is 
to ef the performance which is "characteristic of the 
contract" has his habitual residence, or in the case of 
a company I its central administration. There are other 
presumptions and there are also detailed rules applying 
to certain consumer and employment contracts. These 
rules tend to be of a protective character. Finally 
the concept of mandatory rules are employed in the Con-
vention which can override the otherwise applicable law. 
Obviously an enormous amount has been written on the 
Convention and its history both in English and other 
European languages. What follows is a discussion on 
the main provisions of the Convention from an English 
point of view with emphasis being placed on the differences 
79 The Convention is summarised by Lagarde op. cit. 
supra n.76 and also by Morris at p.298 et seq. 
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the Convention will make on English Conflict of Laws. 
The Convention is considered from a New Zealand stand-
point in so far as its provisions could affect New Zealand-
ers or could be advantageously adopted in this country. 
The Scope of the Convention80 
The Convention is divided into three partsj the first 
title concerns the scope of the Convention. 81 
The scope of the Convention is wide. 82 It covers 
all contractual obligations except those mentioned in 
Article 1. 83 The most notable exceptions relate to 
family law,84 arbitration agreements and agreements on 
the choice of the court. 85 Certain insurance contracts 
80For the full text of the Convention see Appendix A 
p. et seq. The text is published in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities for 9 October 1980. O.J. 
1980 L. 266/1. 
81The second title relates to the Uniform Rules and 
the third part entitled Final Provisions is a somewhat 
miscellaneous collection of Articles. 
82See generally Contract Conflicts: The E.E.C. 
Convention on the law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
A Comparative Study (ed. P.M. North) (1980). th. 1- (herein-
after cited as North.) 
Lagarde op. cit. supra n.76 at p.94 ~t seq~ _ 
and P. Lagarde. The Scope of the Applicable Law in the 
E.E.C. Convention in North Ch 3 at p.49 (hereinafter 
cited as Lagarde. 
83 See Appendix A p.548. 
84Article (1) (2) (b). 
85 Ibid. 
Appendix A p.548. 
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are likewise excluded. 86 
Article 187 states that "The rules of the Convention 
shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation 
involving a choice between the laws of different countries." 
Thus once a contract contains a choice of law clause even 
in what is otherwise a purely domestic case that choice of 
a foreign law brings the Convention into operation because 
the issue has arisen as to whether the lex fori or the 
chosen law applies. 88 
Secondly may be noted that the Convention is world 
wide in effect as it applies to all contracts having a 
foreign element whether or not they have any connection 
with the E.E.C. Thus new Zealanders choosing an E.E.C. 
state as their forum would have the Convention law applied 
to them (once of course the Convention is in operation.) 89 
The fact that the Convention shall apply "in any 
situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
countries" has been criticised on the ground that it makes 
the application of the Convention depend on the forum 
chosen. 90 Lagarde91gives~ for example~a purely French 
contract which would be excluded from the scope of the 
548-9 
86Article (1) (3) and Article (1) (4). Appendix A pp. 
S7Appendix A pp.548-9. 
88North op. cit. supra note 82 at p.9. 
89Article (2) Appendix A p.548. 
90Lagarde op. cit. supra n.76 at p.94. 
91 Ibid . 
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Convention if the forum were a French court. However if 
the forum chosen were an English court the agreement would 
be decided by the rule of the Convention. 
Party Autonomy 
The main rule of the Convention is embodied in Article 
3 92 which provides that "[aJ contract shall be governed 
by the law chosen by the parties. II 
The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case. 93 In the Report94 it 
is noted that whilst the choice will often be express 
the court could find that the parties had made a "real 
choice u95 although they have not expressly stated so in 
the contract. 96 However the Report97 states quite cate-
gorically that this article does not permit a court to 
infer a choice of law that the parties might have made 
where they had no clear intention of making a choice. 
92See Appendix A pp.549-50 'and 'l'he Report. 
93Article (3) (1). 
94The Report. 
95 Ibid . 
96The Report. Article 3 gives the example of a 
standard form contract known to be governed by a particular 
system of law even though there is no express statement to 
this effect~such as a Lloyds policy of marine insurance. 
97 Ibid . 
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This situation is governed by another article. 98 
The extent of the freedom allowed to the parties is 
wide. No link is required by the Convention between the 
contract and the law selected. Nor is there any formal 
requirement that the choice be bona fide or legal. 99 
/ ' Dep~cage is allowed as the parties "select the law 
applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract."100 
Thus Article 3(1) implicitly recognises that the parties 
may choose one law for one part of the contract and a 
different law for another part. 
The ~onvention gives the parties considerable freedom 
with respect to when their choice of law can be made. The 
choice of law may be made at any time, even after the time 
that legal proceedings have begun. 1 Furthermore the 
parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to 
a law other than that which previously governed it. 2 A 
change in the law at a later date must not prejudice 
98Article 4. 
990ther Erovisions of the Convention prevent fraudu-
lent choices from being made. See Article 5(2) and 6(1) 
and other provisions concerning mandatory rules in Article 
3(3) and Article 7. 
100Article 3(1). 
lLagarde Ope cit. supra n.76 at p.96. 
2Article 3(2). 
formal validity3 or adversely affect the rights of third 
parties. 4 
As the ReportS points out, this freedom to change 
the governing law and the liberal approach to when a 
choice may be made is quite logical given the initial 
premise that freedom of contract has been accepted. 6 
As to the way in which the choice of law can be changed 
"it is quite natural that this change should be subject 
to the same rules as the initial choice.,,7 
This ability to change the proper law has been the 
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subject of criticism; one writer considers that Article 
3(2) is an "infelicitous aberration." B 
These commentators argue that contracts cannot be 
born in a vacuum. A contract exists by virtue of some 
legal system and its effectiveness depends upon that legal 
system. Thus any attempt to alter the identity of the 
Proper law must be referred in the first instance to the 
law which, for the time being, constitutes the very fons 
et origo of the contract as a legally operative agreement. 
3Pursuant to Article 9. 
4Article 3(2). 
SThe Report Article 3. 
6As indeed it has in all E.E.C. states. See Report. 
Article 3. 
7Ibid . 
BI . F • Fletcher. Conflict of Laws and European Com-
munity Law: With Special Reference to the Community 
Conventions on Private International Law (19B2) at page 
1S9 (hereinafter cited as Fletcher) . 
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Thus Fletcher would argue that if the original proper law 
of the contract would refuse to recognise the effectiveness 
of the parties' attempt to modify their contract it 
cannot be but an "act of aggression,,9 by the lex fori 
to interpose the validity of what the parties have pur-
ported to accomplish. 
Fletcher concludes that the validity any change 
in the choice of law should be referred first to the law 
which constitutes the original choice of law in order to 
see whether accepts the efficacy of the parties' attempt 
to modify the contract. Secondly the change should be 
referred to the substitute law in order to confirm the very 
same question. Only if both laws would allow the change 
should such a change be allowed to occur.10 
As noted abovel1 the parties may choose a law un-
connected with the contract. However, the parties do 
choose a foreign law when the contract is otherwise en-
tirely connected with one country, then Article 3(3) 
provides that such choice shall not prejudice the appli-
cation of mandatory rules of the law of that country. 
"Mandatory rules" are defined asrules "which cannot be 
derogated from by contract." 
9See also Collins Ope cit. supra n.7S at p.44et seq. 
Fletcher at p.160. 
10Fletcher at p.161. 
Ilsupra at p.416. 
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North12 gives the following example: an action is 
brought France, because of an agreement to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the French courts,13 but the contract, 
which relates to the consumer sale of goods, is wholly 
connected with England, both parties being resident there. 
Any exemption clause in the contract is regulated by the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.) but the parties 
choose German law as applicable to the contract. The 
French court, whilst accepting the choice of German law 
in general, must apply the controls on exemption clauses 
contained in the 1977 Act because they cannot be evaded 
by choice of a foreign law,14 i.e. they are mandatory 
in that they cannot be derogated from by contract. 
The only other limitation on party autonomy within 
Article 3 is contained in Artic 3(4) which states that 
the existence and validity of the consent1S of the parties 
as to the choice of the applicable law shall be determined 
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 8, 9 and 11. 
Conclusion 
The wide freedom of choice allowed by the convention 
is completely consistent with party autonomy and we would 
do well to allow such a freedom to apply in New Zealand 
12North Ch. 1 at p.13. 
13Under Article 17 of the 1968 Convention on JUris-
diction and Enforcement of Judgments. 
14unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 S.27(2) (U.K.) 
lSSee Appendix A p.SSO. 
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conflict of laws. The requirement stating that the 
proper law must be reasonably certain is especially 
useful. Acceptance of the principle of implied selection 
would have created a blur between the main rule of party 
autonomy and the subsidiary rule which provides for the 
applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties. 16 
Given that party autonomy is allowed it is quite 
logical that depecage be permitted and a change in choice 
allowed. If such a change is permissible then it is 
completely reasonable that this change can be made at any 
time. Finally the fact that the choice need not be 
specifically stated but must nevertheless be very obvious 
is again illustrative of the Convention's commitment to 
party autonomy. 
There are however further restrictions on party 
autonomy and these may be summarised as follows •. 
l6Article 4(1). 
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Limitations on Party Autonomy 
1. Freedom to se ct a law implies a freedom equal to 
both parties. The Convention cons that this 
freedom is illusory in respect of some contracts. 
There are therefore special rules relating to certain 
consumer and employment contracts. 17 
2. A forum may decide that some rules are so fundamental 
that they must be applied even though the contract is 
international. The Convention has a specific pro-
vision on forum mandatory rules. 1S 
3. The forum may reject the parties' choice of law if it 
is "mani stly incompatible with the public policy 
('ordre public') of the forum.'il9 
4. Parties may not subject their contract to the whole 
chosen law including its confl of laws provisions. 
In other words renvoi is excluded. 20 
5. Although it may at first that only Article 10 
de s with the scope of the applicable law many 
other provisions of the Convention must be considered 
in this context. 
Article 7, the most controversial article of Con-
vention, empowers the forum to apply the mandatory 
17Articles 5 and 6. Appendix A p.551. 
ISArticle 7 (2) Appendix A p.552. 
19Article 16. Appendix "A p.555. 
20Article 15. Appendix A p.555. 
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rules of a state with a close connection to the 
transaction if that state's law requires the appli-
cation of those rules, regardless of what the appli-
cable law may be. This provision is a substantial 
modification, not only on party autonomy but also 
of the subsidiary choice of law rules to be applied 
in the absence of choice by the parties. 21 
Whilst these limits are limits on party autonomy 
they are, where appropriate, also limits on the applicable 
law which is the law applied in the absence of choice 
because it is closely connected with the contract. 22 
The scope of the applicable law23 and the concept 
of mandatory rules require further discussion. 
Scope of the Applicable Law: 
Article 10 24 defines the scope of the applicable 
law. The first matter considered is that of interpre-
tation. 25 
21See Lagarde op. cit. supra n.76 at p.103. 
22Article 4. Discussed infra at p.450 et seq. 
23 The term 'applicable law' is used in the following 
pages to denote both an express choice of law and the law 
chosen by the court in the absence of such choice. In 
English terminology the applicable law is the proper law. 
24Article 10 (1) (b) . 
25Article 10 (1) (a) . 
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Interpretation and Performance 
Interpretation and performance are governed by the 
applicable law of the contract. 27 The Convention thus 
sanctions cases such as Jacobs v. Cr§dit Lyonnais 28 where 
the facts were that the seller, having agreed to deliver 
goods in Algiers was unable to escape liability for non 
performance by pleading an excuse permissible by French 
law but not by English law when the proper law was English 
law. However in the manner of performance "regard shall 
be had to the law of the country in which performance 
takes place." 29 The precise scope of this would seem 
unclear. It was apparently included because it was a 
restriction which was frequently imposed by national laws 
and by several international conventions. 30 The Report 
states that it is for the lex i to determine what is 
meant by the "manner of performance." 
Remoteness still governed by the applicable law. 
On the other hand, the English rule according to which the 
measure of damages is a question of procedure will be 
slightly affected by the Convention. The Convention 
generally does not exclude the possibility that the ca 
culation of damages - in other words, the quantification 
of the damage in terms of money - may be governed by the 
lex fori. But, if the proper law of the contract deals 
27Articles 10 (1) (a) and 10 (1) (b). 
28 ( 1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589. 
29Article 10(2). 
30 See The Report. Article 10. 
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with this issue by a rule of law, this rule is to apply, 
because its existence shows that the question is one of 
substance not of mere procedure. 3l For example if the 
applicable law limited the amount of compensation, as in 
matters of transport, the debtor must not be charged with 
an amount of compensation higher than that provided by 
the proper law, even if the lex fori does not limit com-
pensation. Any other solution would frustrate the ex-
pectations of the parties. In return, if the creditor 
has stipulated in the contract that the debtor ought to 
pay him a lump sum in case of breach of contract, the 
validity of this provision depends on the proper law. 
In the same way, if, according to the applicable law, 
damages should be paid in a lump sum and not by means of 
periodic payments, this law applies, because it lays down 
on this issue a "rule of law". liOn this point, common 
law countries and civil law systems met each other half 
way." 32 
The applicable law also governs presumption and 
limitation of actions,33 and nullity.34 
In English law limitation of actions (though not 
presumption) is characterised as a procedural issue 
and hence governed in England by 
3lSee Lagarde at p.55 et seq. 
32 Ibid at p.56. 
ish law as the lex 
33See generally Dicey & Morris at p.92l et seq. 
34North. Ch. 1 at p.16. 
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fori. The rule has been criticised by the Law Commission 
and if not changed before the United Kingdom implements 
the Convention it will be as and when the Convention law 
comes into force. 
The consequences of nullity are governed by the 
applicable law pursuant to Article 10(1) (e). 
North35 suggests, that the difficulties with Article 
10(1) (e) are both theoretical and practical. As the 
Convention is limited to contractual obligations it is 
arguable that such matters as the right to recover money 
paid under a void contract is a matter of quasi contract 
or relates to the law of restitution. 
North gives the example of a contract that is for 
the sale of a car. The parties are Englishmen and they 
choose French law as the applicable law. The car is to 
be delivered in France. The buyer pays the price; the 
contract is for some reason void; the car is never de-
livered and the buyer seeks the return of his money. There 
has been no factual connection with France as the money 
was paid in England and credited to the seller's English 
bank account. French law is only relevant because, not-
withstanding the voidness of the contract the choice of 
law clause is good by virtue of Article 8. 36 North concludes 
35Ibid . 
36Article 8 allows the validity of any term to be 
determined by the law which would govern it under the Con-
vention if the contract or term were valid unless this 
would be unreasonable and then the concept of habitual 
residence becomes important. See Articles 8(1) and 8(2). 
that "it seems quite inappropriate for French law now 
to determine the extent to which the buyer is able to 
recover the money that he has paid under the void con-
tract.,,37 
One must remain unconvinced; delivery was to take 
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place in France and there had been a definite intention 
that French law apply otherwise the Englishmen would not 
presumably have had a choice of law clause to that effect 
in their agreement. The Convention gives a reasonable 
answer. To apply the lex fori in this situation does 
not give effect to the parties' intention and merely serves 
to weaken the concept of party autonomy by undermining its 
application. 
37North Ch.l at p.16. 
Material Validity 38 
According to Article 8 the existence and validity 
of a contract is to be determined by the applicable law 
of the contract. 39 
"The objection which has been made in the past 
concerning this solution that this is a vicious 
circle, is not conclusive. There is no contra-
diction in having the law chosen by the parties 
determine whether or not the contract that the 
parties are to enter into according to that law 
is valid.,,40 
This rule that the applicable law is to govern is a 
general rule. There are however special rules for 
specific topics. For example, the rule dealing with 
consent is found in Article 8(2). This paragraph pro-
vides that a party may rely upon the law of the country 
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in which he has his habitual residence to establish that 
he did not consent, if it appears from the circumstances 
that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect 
of his conduct in accordance with the law of the contract. 
This rule does not concern the validity of consent 
(mistake, misrepresentation, duress), but only the exist-
ence of consent. The problem is to determine whether 
the parties to an alleged contract reached an agreement. 
The negotiators of the Convention had particularly in 
38 See generally K.H. Nadelmann. Impressionism and 
Unification of Law: The E.E.C. Draft Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obli-
gations. 24 Am. J. Compo Law 1 at p.8 (1976) and see 
D. Cavers. The Common Markets Draft Conflicts Convention 
on Obligations: Some Preventive Law Aspects. 485. Cal. 
L. Rev. 603 at p.609 (1975). 
39 See Appendix A p.552 and The Report. 
40Lagarde at p.49. 
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mind the question as to whether silence can be treated as 
a manifestation of assent. But the rule can also apply 
to questions related to offer and acceptance. Suppose X, 
in country A, sends an offer to contract to Y, in country 
B, and the offer contains the proposal that the contract 
should be governed by the law of country A. Y does not 
reply to this letter, or he sends a letter of acceptance 
which is lost in the post. It may be that, by the law 
of country A, Y is bound, but by the law of country B he 
is not. Were these issues to be governed by the applicable 
law of the alleged contract, the law of country A, Y would 
be bound despite the fact that he would not have been bound 
under the law of his social and legal environment. 
a result would seem to be unjust." 41 
nSuch 
In the event of such silence, two laws are accumula-
ting applicable to the question of consent: the law of 
the contract and the law of the country where the silent 
party has his habitual residence. 42 
This provision may be criticised. 
In the above example it is not unjust if the letter 
is lost. Two possibilities exist here. If Y knows that 
by the law of country A acceptance is complete on posting 
then when he posts the letter whereby he accepts the gov-
erning law clause he knows his acceptance is complete. 
4l Ibid at p.50. 
42See also Lagarde op. cit. supra n.76 at p.10l. 
The fact that the letter is lost is irrelevant. He is 
bound by the law of country A. Nothing is unjust about 
this situation. 
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In the second situation Ydoes not know that by the 
law of country A acceptance is complete on posting. Thus 
when letter is lost he thinks he is not bound. It 
is not unjust to hold him to the contract because he 
accepted the law of country A to govern. He should have 
familiarised himse with its rules before so doing. There 
is no need to have a special rule in this lost letter 
situation. Party autonomy should apply. 
If Y does not reply then if the forum was England 
there would be no contract. Again 
lex fori can de the matter. 
is not unfair. The 
The second point to make with respect to the scope of 
the applicable law is that the applicable law does not 
necessarily determine the formal validity of the contract. 
Formal Validity 
Article 9 43 provides that the contract is formal 
valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of either 
the applicable law or the law of the country where it 
was concluded. This applies if the parties are in the 
same country when the contract is concluded. 
If parties are in different countries the contract 
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"is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements 
of the law which governs it under the Convention or the 
law of one of those countries."44 
Whilst this may be seen as an "extreme limit of 
favor validatis u45 the Article does provide two limit-
ations. 46 In consumer contracts and in contracts 
relating to immovable property the formal validity is 
governed respectively by the law of the consumer's .habitual 
residence 47 and by the law of the country where the immov-
able property is located. 48 
Conclusion 
The scope of the applicable law wide. The basic 
rule is that the parties' choice of law decision governs 
43Article 9(1). See Appendix A p.SS3. The Report. 
44Article 9(2). 
45Lagarde at p.53. 
46 In Articles 9(5) and 9(6). 
47Artic1e 9(5). 
48Article 9(6). 
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the various contract issues that could arise. If the law 
is chosen by the court the same consequences flow. 
If one is going to have a general rule then obviously 
that rule should apply as often as possible. This was a 
criticism of the proper law doctrine in England. 49 If 
the court had gone to an enormous amount of bother by 
establishing the proper law by say, the third rule of the 
proper law, it could be quite likely that the proper law 
then might not apply but rather some other concept be 
utilised to resolve the issue. The case law is so scant 
for specific topics that it cannot be certain that the 
proper law would determine the issue under consideration. 
The Convention on the other hand does allow the appli-
cable law to be omnipotent. The issue of capacity is 
perhaps the only important area where the Convention does 
not allow the applicable law to dominate. This would 
appear to be as good a place as any to consider this con-
tractual issue. 
49See supra at p. 70 et seq. 
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Capacity 
The Convention makes no provision for capacity50 
except to the limited extent of Article 11. 51 This 
provides that if the parties are in the same country, a 
natural person can only invoke his capacity under some 
other law, for example that of his domicile or nationality 
if the other party was or ought to have been aware of it. 
This provision does not apply to persons other than 
natural persons and both parties must be in the same 
country. A further limitation cited in the Report 52 is 
that this article is only to be applied where there a 
conflict of laws. The law which governs the question of 
capacity of the person claiming the disability must be 
different from the law where the contract was concluded 
and furthermore that person must be deemed to have full 
capacity by the lex loci contractus. Finally the burden 
of proof lies on the incapacitated party; it is he who 
must establish that the other party knew of his incapacity 
or should have known of it. 53. 
As the Report points out54 the effect of Articles 1 
and 11 is that each contracting state will continue to 
apply its own system of private international law to con-
50 See Article 1(2) (a) and 1(2) (e) Appendix A pp.548-9. 
51See Appendix A p.554. 
52See Report. Article 11. 
53 Ibid . 
54 Ibid . 
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tractual capacity. Capacity can be seen as a personal 
issue and thus governed by the parties' national law. 55 
Thus uniformity is not to be achieved by the Convention in 
matters concerning capacity. The exclusion of these 
questions appears to be bound up with a reluctance to have 
the Convention deal with any matters relating to corporation 
law! perhaps in the light of the discussions on the 1968 
Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and 
Bodies Corporate. It is not! however! by any means certain 
that a general rule as to capacity of corporations would 
have encroached upon corporation law! but the consequence 
is that an important part of the law relating to contractual 
matters in the conflict of laws will remain regulated by 
a combination of the 1968 Convention and non-uniform rules 
of private international law. 56 
To' Conclude 
In relation to party autonomy the Convention's 
provisions as discussed so far allow a wide freedom of 
choice and this choice is then applied to resolve most 
issues. The plan is excellent! however the concept 
of mandatory rules dulls this excellence. 
rules that must be next considered. 
55Collins at p.2l1. 
56 Ibid . 
It is these 
The Concept of Mandatory Rules 57 
The Convention refers in a number of places to 
mandatory rules 58 but they are only defined "casually,,59 
in one place. 
Article 3(3) defines mandatory rules as "rules of 
law of a country which cannot be derogated from by con-
tract." 
These rules are used in four different situation. 
1. The term is used in certain consumer and employment 
contracts. This may be referred to as an Article 
5 & 6 situation. 60 
2. The term is used in Article 3(3} which states that 
"the fact that the parties have chosen a foreign 
law ... shall not, where all the other elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice 
434 
57 S"ee generally D. Jackson. Mandatory Rules and Rules 
of Ordre Public, North Ch. 4 at p.29 et seq (hereinafter 
cited as Jackson). 
A. Philip. Mandatory Rules, Public Law (Political Rules) 
and Choice of Law in the E.E.C. Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations. North Ch. 5 at 
p.81 et seq. (hereinafter cited as Philip). The Report. 
Collins at p.205 et seq. 
C.G.J. Morse. Contracts of Employment and the E.E.C. Con-
vention on Contractual Obligations. North Ch. 7 at p.143 
et seq. For Mandatory Rules and Employment Contracts. 
T. Hartley. Consumer Protection Provisions in the E.E.C. 
Convention, North Ch. 6 at p.lll et seq. for Certain 
Consumer Contracts and Mandatory Rules. 
58Articles 3(3}, 6, 7 & 9(6} respectively. 
59Jackson at p.65. 
60See also Section 9(6}. 
435 
are connected with one country only prejudice the 
application of .... mandatory rules." Thus Article 
3(3) situation requires a choice of law decision by 
the parties and all the relevant contacts (save the 
actual choice itself)topoint to another jurisdiction. 
This other jurisdiction could be the forum or a third 
state presumably. 
3. Article 7(2)61 states that"[n]othing in this Conven-
tion shall restrict the application of the rules of 
the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable 
to the contract. 11 This Article 7(2) situation permits 
mandatory rules to be used if they are the forum's 
mandatory rules whether or not a choice of law clause 
exists. 
4. Finally mandatory rules are used in a situation where 
the contract has a close connection with a given 
country irrespective of the chosen law. Article 7(1)62 
states "when applying under this Convention the law of 
a country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules 
of the law of another country with which the situation 
has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the 
law of the latter country those rules must be applied 
whatever the law applicable to the contract ... " 
In this situation a law may have been chosen by the 
parties or have been decided by the court in the ab-
sence of such choice. 
61 See Appendix A p.55~. 
62 Ibid 
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Both North63 and Jackson64 have pointed out that the 
meaning of the concept differs within these four situations. 
Jackson suggests the term 'mandatory' is used in the 
domestic law sense to mean that a rule cannot be derogated 
from by contract. This is how the term is defined in 
Article 3(3), and this is the meaning to be given to the 
concept in an Art les 3(3Y or Article 5 or Article 6 
situation. The objective in these Articles is clear. 
The parties cannot evade the application of any of the 
mandatory rules of their domestic law by a choice of law 
clause. 65 
However in a situation pertaining to Article 7(1) the 
concept is used in a conflict of laws sense to mean that 
such a mandatory rule overrides the process,66 it must 
be applied by the 
ever the law applicab 
system of which it is part what-
to the contract might be. In 
this sense the mandatory rules are applied only "if the 
forum is of the view that the legal system of which the 
rule is part regards the rule as overriding the conflicts 
process."67 
North's68 conclusion is that if one reads Article 
63North Ch. 1 at p.19 et seq. 
64Jackson at p.65 et seq. 
65North Ch. 1 at p.19. 
66Jackson at p.65. 
67Jackson ibid at p.66. 
68North Ch. 1 at p.19. 
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3(3) and 7(1) together then 
" .•.. a judge in England concerned with a contract 
whose proper law is French, but which is closely 
connected with Denmark, may apply Danish mandatory 
rules, i.e. rules which cannot be contr~cted out of, 
provided that, under Danish law, those rules are 
internationally mandatory, i.e. applicable in Denmark 
notwithstanding a foreign (here French) applicable 
law. 11 
There appears to be a choice between Article 3(3) 
and Article 7(1). If the court finds that all the con-
tacts (save the choice) point to another jurisdiction the 
forum can decide that this other jurisdiction's mandatory 
rules apply without considering how this other juris-
diction would view the issue. In North's example if 
the judge finds all the contacts to be Danish he may then 
apply Danish mandatory rules to the contract even if it 
was a situation where Danish 1aw would not apply such 
rules. This could easily arise if the states involved 
were not all members of the E.E.C. It is an Article 
3(3) situation. 
On the other hand if the judge decides that the con-
tract has only a close connection with another juris-
diction (as opposed to a total connection) he must con-
sider what that other jurisdiction would do and he may 
only apply the mandatory rules of that other jurisdiction 
if that other jurisdiction would do so. 
This interpretation of mandatory rules is supported 
by viewing the objectives of such rules. These have 
been summarised as follows: 
"The purpose of the rules which apply the term 
'mandatory rules' differs. The purpose of Article 
3(3) and Articles 5 and 6 is to restrict party 
autonomy in certain cases. The purpose of Artic 
9(6) is to replace the otherwise applicable law, 
whether chosen by the parties or the result of an 
objective choice of law, by the law of the situs. 
And the purpose of Artic 7 is, in certain cases, 
to permit the application of a law other than the 
lex causae, be it the law of the forum or the law 
of a third country.u69 
The Effect of Mandatory Rules 
In all the situations discussed above the court is 
given a discretion whether to apply the mandatory rules 
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or not. Certain conditions must be met be the court 
may consider their applicability. For example Article 
7(1) states three conditions: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the situation must have a close connection with the 
laws of that other countrYi 
under the laws of that other country, the man-
datory rules must be applied whatever the law 
applicable to the contracti 
regard shall be had to the nature and purpose 
of the mandatory rules and to the consequences 
of their application or non-application. 
Once these conditions are fulfilled then Article 7(1) 
provides that effect "may" be given to the mandatory rules, 
and in considering whether to give effect to these manda-
tory rules, regard shall be had to (a) their nature, 
(b) their purpose, (c) the consequences of their appli-
cation and (d) the consequences of the non-application. 
Elements (c) and (d) were added to elements (a) and (b) 
69philip at p.81. 
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at a comparatively late stage. According to the Report,70 
the addition of these elements was intended to define, 
clarify and strengthen the rule, although it is extremely 
difficult to see in what way they did so.71 The authors 
of the Report go on to say 72 that the expression 
"~ffect may be given" imposes on the court the extremely 
delicate task of combining the mandatory provisions with 
the law normally applicable to the contract in the par-
ticular situation in question, and it was the novelty of 
this provision and the fear of the uncertainty to which 
it could give rise, that led delegations to ask for the 
power to make reservations in respect of Article 7(1). 
When the United Kingdom signed the Convention the 
right not to apply the provisions of Article 7(1) was 
therefore exercised. 73 
North74 suggests that the united Kingdom thought 
Article 7(1) was a "recipe for confusion, in that a judge 
might feel obliged to steer his way through three possibly 
mutually inconsistent sets of mandatory rules; for un-
certainty, an uncertainty which freedom to choose the 
applicable law is intended, in the business community, 
to avoid; for expense, in that proof of the mandatory 
70 See Report Article 7. 
71Collins op. cit. supra n.7S at p.213. 
72See Report Article 7. 
73 By virtue of Article 22. 
74North Ch. 1 at p.19. See Jackson at p.72 et seq. 
for a defence of Article 7(1). See also Philip at p.100 
et seq. 
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rules of all relevantly connected foreign laws might be 
called for; and for delay, in that Article 7(1) might 
provide the means of delaying litigation inordinately, with 
a that it might frighten potential arbitration and 
litigation away from the United Kingdom. n75 
To return to mandatory rules in general, the view has 
been advanced that "it may not be too extreme to say that 
the idea of mandatory rules overriding the choice of law 
process will come as a novel exper 
judiciary. ,,76 
to the English 
However at the end of the day the effect in England 
may be undramatic. 77 Articles 5 and 6 only apply to cer-
tain specific contracts and Article 3(3) can be seen as a 
clearer statement of Lord Wright's 'bona fide' requirement 
in the Foods case. 78 
-'-----'-"--.::.. 
Article 7(2) is arguable only 
as a reiteration of what the cases did via public policy, 
or characterisation etc. Finally, Article 7(1) has not 
been accepted by the United Kingdom. Even if it had been 
adopted, "it may be asked whether or not the discretion 
given by Article 7(1) goes far beyond current English 
practice and would impose upon the judge a discretionary 
power without giving the slightest guidance as to how it 
is to be exercised,~79 as at present occurs when the judge 
75 North, Ch. 1 at p.20. 
76Jackson at p.70. 
77See Jackson at p.71 for a contrary view. 
78Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. 
I1939] A.C. 277. 
79Collins Ope cit. supra n.75 at p.213. 
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is asked to apply the third ru of the pruper law. 
Also Artic 
would see it. 
7(1) may not be as revolutionary as some 
English courts have considered rules apply-
ing in jurisdictions which are neither the forum nor the 
proper law. For example in Ralli Brothers v. Compania 
Naviera Sota of Aznar80 Spanish law was applied although 
it was neither the lex fori nor the proper law. 
Criticisms of the concept of mandatory rules 
(1) Criticism of Article 7(1) 
Most criticism centred on this Article. One ob-
jection voiced against this provision is that it gives 
greater effect to a law of close connection than either 
the governing law or the law of the forum. 81 
Jackson points out that this is not a proper crit ism 
as this is the aim of the Article itself. The Article is 
designed to operate in a situation where the mandatory 
rules of another jurisdiction are so important that they 
must be applied despite the governing law or lex fori. 
A second criticism of Article 7(1) is that it will 
create uncertainty.82 Legal advisers will not know how 
to advise clients and the judiciary will find it difficult 
to judge. Jackson 83 merely emphasises the view that 
8°[1920] 2 K.B. 287. 
81Jackson at p.73. 
82Ibid , and Philip at p.107. 
83Jackson at pp.74-5. 
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what is or is not a mandatory rule should D0t be too hard 
to determine. However this not the point. It is 
the discretion which is conferred on the judge and the 
vague criteria provided by Article 7(1) that makes for 
the uncertainty.84 One can also disagree with Jackson 
concerning the ease of establishing what is a mandatory 
rule in any given jurisdiction. He says that in so far 
as the rules are legislative, the responsibility is on 
the lature to declare its view and in so far as they 
are judge-created rules they will be exceptional and will 
be c articulated as. mandatory. This would seem 
an over optimistic view. Domestic statutes usually ignore 
the subject of conflict of laws and the common law does not 
have a heritage of classifying rules into mandatory and 
non-mandatory rules. To decide whether one's own law is 
or is not mandatory in any given situation is likely to 
be a difficult task; to decide the same of a foreign 
statute could be a Herculean undertaking. 
A re problem concerns the difficulty of intro-
ducing the concept of mandatory rules of a state which 
is not the forum nor the state which has had law 
chosen by litigants. Jackson85 points out that it is 
for the party who wants the mandatory rule to apply to 
84By introducing a form of interest analysis Article 
7(1) may be seen as having all the disadvantages of st 
analysis generally (discussed in the American context above.) 
See supra at p. 300 et seq. 
85Jackson at p.75. 
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convince the court that such a rule should be given effect 
to. However if mandatory rules are so important that they 
should be allowed to override an express choice of law 
clause then there should be some mechanism for bringing 
them to the court's attention in the first place. It 
would seem quite unsatisfactory to leave their appearance 
to the whim of a litigant. 
In North's illustration above 86 if one party would 
still like the French choice of law clause to apply and 
the other would like the lex fori to resolve the issue 
how is the court even going to consider Danish law? This 
is a likely fact situation given that one party could well 
have chosen the English forum because he wanted the lex 
fori to apply, seeing the advantages of having English 
law govern his argument and likewise it is very likely 
that given a choice of law clause existed initially only 
one party will subsequently want to escape its consequences, 
the other being quite content to abide by the original 
provisions. 
This last criticism is not unique to Article 7(1). 
It may be equally well argued in the context of the 
other mandatory rules. 
(2) The second major argument concerning mandatory rules 
relates to the question of their desirability. 
Any limitation of this nature on party autonomy can 
be seen as highly undesirable. Mandatory rules could 
86Supra at p. 437. 
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undermine the whole concept of party autonomy if frequently 
applied and they would introduce uncertainty into what 
should be an area of certainty. 
Parties choose a law to govern their contract for 
at least two reasons. First a choice of law clause 
makes for certainty. The parties know in advance by 
which law their actions will be judged in the event of a 
dispute. Secondly and equally importantly, the parties 
together choose a law that will suit their particular 
circumstances. They could write out verbatim all the 
contractual terms necessary to govern any situation that 
might arise; they could also incorporate some provisions 
of a foreign law if they wished. 87 However it is eas 
to state a law to govern if one can be found that 
both parties, as a choice of law clause is a shorthand 
way of expressing one's wishes as to what is to happen 
in a given event. As a general statement it is true 
to say that a contract is 'created' by the parties and 
that pursuant to general contract law princ in 
common law countries the parties may contract out of 
most legislation. The parties may do more or ss what 
they want. So if two Danes choose French law to govern 
their contract and one of them subsequently chooses 
England as the forum to resolve a dispute, why should 
an English judge apply some mandatory rule Danish law 
to the I gants before him? 
87 For the difference between incorporation of a 
foreign law and choice of law clauses see Morris at p.274. 
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Given that the parties are of equal bargaining power 
they should not be haunted by some mandatory rule which 
they had avoided by a choice of law clause. There is 
nothing inherently wrong about wanting to avoid some rule 
of law. If the Danes are always going to be ensnared by 
Danish law88 they might just as well call it a day and 
not make a choice of law decision at all. 
The desirability of mandatory rules of the lex fori 
applying in certain situations may also be questioned. 
Again there is the problem of ascertaining such rules 
but even if this can be done one wonders if such rules 
should be applied. Mandatory rules of the lex fori are 
designed to apply to domestic contracts. If the only 
connection between the contract and the forum is that 
one party has chosen the forum in which to litigate it 
is not particularly appropriate to apply forum law when 
the parties have expressly chosen another law to apply 
to their contract. If the mandatory rule was of a pro-
tective nature then to apply it to parties in equal 
bargaining positions who have clearly rejected such pro-
tective rules (by choosing another law to govern) is to 
overmother in an inappropriate situation. 
If the only cont act is the choice of forum then 
the only ground that the forum can have in interfering 
in an international contract containing a choice of law 
clause is if it is asked to uphold some rule which is 
manifestly incompatible with its own public policy. 
The situation becomes a little different if the 
parties are doing something within the forum state that 
88'supra- at p. 437. 
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natives of the forum could not do. If in Denmark one 
must pay the government a fee for acting as a real estate 
agent then it is asking too much of a Danish forum to 
uphold French law89 and thus allow the Danish parties to 
escape payment and the same conclusion would apply if the 
Danes were Englishmen. So the Danish rule to be 
considered mandatory? 
It has become a Golden Acres 90 situation. One could 
argue that party autonomy applied subject to an overriding 
provision in the Danish/Queensland legislation. The 
result is the same whether one uses the terminology of 
mandatory rules or overriding statutes of the forum. 
Mann's views above91 are to be preferred in this area 
of law. Party autonomy should prevail. 
The conclusion thus far is that mandatory rules 
of a state which is neither the forum nor the governing 
law state should not be considered. Article 7(1) is 
not a good provision. 
Furthermore, in general Article 7(2) is not needed as 
a public policy exception will suffice in most situations 
where Article 7(2) would apply. However fact situations 
could occur where although not of a nature to evoke public 
policy the forum cannot be expected to totally uphold 
party autonomy. Perhaps it is simpler to state that 
party autonomy is limited by overriding statutes of the 
89Which let us suppose has no such requirement. 
90Golden Acres Ltd. v. Queensland Estates Ltd. [1969] 
st. R. Qd. 378. 
91Supra at p.311 et seq. 
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forum rather than suggest mandatory rules of the lex i 
dominate. The result is the same, the choice of law 
clause is still valid save where it conflicts with the 
statute or mandatory rule. 
Given that it has been argued that specific contracts 
should not be singled out for separate treatment there 
can be no virtue in favouring Articles 5 & 6 and their 
mandatory rules. 
With Article 3(3) if the country most closely con-
nected is neither the forum nor the country of the chosen 
law then the conclusion drawn above in the context of 
Article 7(1) would still apply. If the closely connected 
country was the forum then the conclusion drawn for 
Artic 7(2) would apply. 
Finally it should be noted that the Convention does 
not state that the mandatory provisions of the governing 
law operate. s is obvious. If one chooses a law 
to apply to one's contract instead of applying 
/ / depesage to avoid unwanted consequences then the 
mandatory rules of the chosen law should and will apply. 
From a New Zealand viewpoint the concept of manda-
tory rules appears to have 1 to offer. From the 
English point of view so long as Article 7(1) is elimina-
ted the rules may well have 1 effect. They are 
optional and judges may be loath to embark upon an enquiry 
that is time consuming and can be resolved by other means. 
European litigants not wishing to have mandatory rules 
apply to their contracts may simply avoid the Convention's 
provisions by the use of arbitration and choice of forum 
clauses. 92 It all seems an enormous anticlimax. 
92Article 1. 
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The Applicable Law in the Absence of Choic8 93 
The Applicable law in the absence of choice the 
law of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected. This rule is contained in Ie 4(1). Thus 
far the rule is the third rule of the proper law doctrine. 94 
However the Convention attempts to make this general 
principle more precise by use of presumptions 95 the most 
important of which is that of characteristic performance. 96 
However the presumption of characteristic performance 
does not apply if it cannot be determined97 and the 
other presumptions shall be disregarded "if it appears 
from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is 
more closely connected with another country."98 
93 See generally J.C. Schultsz. The Concept of 
Characteristic Performance and the Effect of the E.E.C. 
Convention on Carriage of Goods. North Ch. 8, at p.185 
et seq. 
Lagarde Ope cit. supra n.76 at p.97. 
The Report Article 4. 
94 The term 'country' rather than 'the system of law' 
is, however, used. See infra at p.550. 
95Article 4(2), 4(3) and 4(4). See Appendix A p.55U. 
96 In Article 4(3) it is presumed that the contract is 
most closely connected with the country where immovable 
property is situated if the subject matter of the contract 
is a right in immovable property. 
97Article 4(5). 
98 Ibid . 
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The Concept of Characteristic Performance 
Article 4(2) states that " .... it shall be presumed 
that the contract is most closely connected with the 
country where the party who is to effect the formance 
which characteristic of the contract has, at the time 
of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or 
in the case of a body corporate or un incorporate its 
central administration .... 99 
The Convention does not define the term beyond this 
and the Report merely cites examp s of what amounts to 
the presumption. For example the Report100 suggests 
that the payment of money is not the characteristic per-
formance of a contract for the supply of goods or services, 
rather it is the performance of the obligation which 
payment due, i.e. the provision of the goods or services. 
This means that there a presumption in favour of the 
seller's law. At the end of the day, however, this is 
only a presumption which may be displaced1 if the contract 
is more closely connected with another country. IlThe 
end result is much the same as that achieved by present 
English law, but by a more complex route. 1l2 
It has.been suggested that "calling the supply of 
goods or services more 'characteristic' than the payment 
99Article 4(2) see Appendix A p.SSO. 
100See The Report Article 4. 
1By Article 4(S). See Appendix A p.SSl. 
2Morris & North at p.466. 
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of money provides a verbal agreement for preferring the 
law of the supplier's home state or business establishment 
over that of the payer. "3 Diamond4 contends that there 
is no empirical evidence to support such "extravagent 
claims" and t;.he concept has been criticised by a number of 
't 5 6 wrl ers as "arbitrary" and "bound to disappoint the hopes 
of certainty it raises."7 
Collins considers that the Report tends to gloss over 
the problem of characteristic performance by emphasising 
that in bilate or reciprocal contracts one of the parties 
usually merely has to pay money, and the characteristic per~ 
formance of the contract is not the payment of money, but 
the performance for which payment is due (e.g. provision of 
3F . K. Juenger. The E.E.C. Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations: An American 
Assessment. Ch. 13 North p.295 at p.301. 
4A•L . Diamond. Conflict of Laws in the E.E.C. (1979). 
32 Current Legal Probs. 155 at p.159. 
5E . g . Juenger op. cit. supra n.3. at p.301. 
Diamond op. cit. supra n.4 at p.30). 
J. d'Oliveira. "Characteristic Obligation" in the Draft 
E.E.C. Obligation Convention. 24 Am. J. Compo Law 303 
at pp: 309 -13 (1977). 
6 Ibid . 
7Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 at p.301. 
a service or delivery of goods) which usually constitutes 
the centre of gravity and the socio-economic function of 
the contractual transaction. 8 However with certain con-
tracts such as distribution contracts " can hardly be 
said that it is necessarily the case that the obligation 
of the producer and not the distributor comprises the 
essential characteristic of the contract."9 
Other writers make similar observations,lO and con-
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clude that lithe more complex a transaction the less helpful 
the criterion becomes." 11 
"Furthermore, the concept of characteristic perform-
ance capriciously confers a choice-of-Iaw privilege 
upon those who engage in a consistent course of conduct 
to supply goods or services. These are often the 
very parties best able to evaluate the risk of doing 
business internationally and to hedge against it by 
means of choice-of-Iaw and forum-selection or arbi-
tration clauses."12 
8Co1lins op. cit. supra n.75 at p.209. 
9rbid at p.210. For example see Evans Marshall 
& Co. v. Bertol~ [1973] 1 W.L.R. 349 (concerning the 
distribution of sherry in England). Under Article 4(2), the 
contract would be governed by Spanish law (the law of both 
the central administration and the place of business of the 
Spanish company) if the production and delivery of the 
sherry reflected the performance which was characteristic 
of the contract, and by English law (the law on the dis-
tributor's central administration and relevant place of 
business) if the acceptance and promotion of the sherry 
was regarded as the performance characteristic of the 
contract. 
10Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 p.451 at p.301. 
11 rbid . 
12r" . d 
.01 • 
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The concept also clashes with Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Convention which favour economically disadvantaged 
parties. 
Northl3 points out that the main purpose of this 
presumption is to provide a compromise - a compromise 
between those who seek certainty and predictability in 
the determination of the applicab law under Article 
4(4) and those who, I English lawyers, see merit in 
the flexibility of the general rule and see little virtue 
in presumptions and believe that, if there are to be pre-
sumptions, they must be rebuttable, (which however can 
defeat their very object) • 
Whilst some writers consider that the adoption of 
the concept is "a praiseworthy exercise 6f the draftsman 
to try to formulate a rule which should give more certainty 
than the closest connection test,"14 others15 suggest 
that all in all, the Convention's attempt to localize 
contracts by means of a "mysterious, almost a mystical, 
concept 11 16 like earlier proposals having a similar thrust, 
is but another "unconvincing production of divination 
13 North, Ch.1 at p.15. 
14Schultsz op. cit. supra n.93 at p.186. 
15 E . g • Diamond. 
16Referring to Diamond op. cit. supra n.4 Dn p.451 
at p.169. 
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rather than inquiry.H17 Since it focuses on the horne 
state law of one of the parties, rather than on their 
common concerns, the test cannot easily be reconciled 
with the proper law approach is meant to clarify. 
It may be asked whether Article 4 does more than 
resurrect the presumption that the law of the place of 
performance is to govern although in English law, pre-
surnptions are now whether for good or for ill out of 
fashion and rejected. 
Given that rule 3 of the proper law has been criticised 
in the English setting nothing further need be said here 
about Artic 4 except that the concept of characteristic 
performance would probably be as unsatisfactory as ru 3 
of the proper law is itself. If presumptions are to be 
used then they must be capable of precise application. 
For example the presence of an arbitration clause could be 
seen as a clear presumption that can easily be applied to 
assist in the determination of the proper or applicable 
law . The concept of characteristic performance is simply 
. too inherently vague to provide the court with any clear 
assistance. 
Finally and as a minor matter it would have been 
preferable if the term 'system of law' had been used 
instead of 'country'. Contracts with a country emphasis 
geographic contracts which are often fortuitous. 1S 
17Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 on p.45lat p.302. 
lS See P.R. Williams. 
Applicable to Contractual 
1 at p.14 et seq. 
The E.E.C. Convention on the Law 
Obligations. (1986) 36 I.C.L.Q. 
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Effects of the Convention and Some Conclusions 
Finally a note on the effects of the Convention. It 
seems that amongst English writers "there is general agree-
ment that adoption of the Convention will effect no funda-
mental changes in English law." 19 and "it will be rare for 
a court to reach a result on the Convention rules different 
from that which it would reach today."20 Specific 
articles have been criticised and on a wider scale the 
Convention has been condemned because it has not incorpor-
ated theories considered desirable. 21 At an even more 
general level the Convention has been attacked for usurping 
the Hague Conference's territory: 
"The common Market has apparently chosen to pre-empt 
for itself codification of the rules of conflict of 
laws, thus blocking the Hague Conference from doing 
the job for which it was created. This is a heavy 
responsibility. Having the Conference operate at 
the Market's pleasure, to pick up crumbs here and 
there is not likely to appeal to the other Member 
States." 22 
19Collins at p.215. 
20Morris & North at p.466. 
21 E . G. R.J. Weintraub. How to Choose Law for Contracts 
and how not to: the E.E.C. Convention. 17 Texas Int. L.J. 
155 at pp:I55-6 (Spr. 1982) criticised the Convention for 
having no general rule of validation. 
22K. H. Nadelman. Clouds over International'Efforts 
to Unify Rules of Conflicts of Laws. (1977) 41 Law and 
Contemp. Probs. 54 at p.71 and see F.A. Mann. Book Review 
of Contract Conflicts. (1983) 32 LC.L.Q. 265 at p.266. 
"Harmonisation throughout the E.E.C. leaves the rest of 
the world out of account." 
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Many American writers see similarities between the 
Convention and "American ideas." 23 Ehrenzweig for 
example was the first to differentiate between ordinary 
and consumer contracts. 24 Article 7 has been seen as 
introducing a form of interest analysis 26 and Leflar's27 
views may be seen as acceptable by the Convention. Cavers 28 
has stated that the Convention pursues objectives that 
are contained in his 'principles of preference' and 
Juenger 29 has listed a number of matters where the Con-
vention and Restatement are similar or identical. 
It would appear correct to conclude that many 
scholars see the Europeans with their E.E.C. Convention 
as having gone a long way down the road of the American 
conflicts revolution. But at the same time it must be 
recalled that whilst similarities may be seen between the 
23 E . g . Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 on p.451 at p.302. 
et seq. 
P. Lagarde. The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations. 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 91 (1981). 
D. Cavers. The Common Market Draft Conflicts Convention 
on Obligations. Some Preventative Law Aspects. 48 
So, Cal. L. Rev. 603 at p.613 (1975). 
24Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 on p.451 at p.302. 
Ehrenzweig made this distinction in an article published 
in 1953. See A.A. Ehrenzweig. Adhesion Contracts in 
the Conflict of Laws. 53 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1953). 
seq. 
25Article 5. 
26Lagarde op. cit. supra n.76 at p.91. 
27See supra at p.438 et seq. 
28cavers op. cit. supra n.38 at p.613. 
29Juenger op. cit. supra n.3 on p.451 at p.302 et 
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Restatement (Second) and the Convention differences do 
exist. 30 Furthermore it may be stated that the goals 
and aims of interest analysis are very general and could 
be seen as applying in all situations where the choice 
of law problem exist. Finally it must be remembered 
that the Convention and Restatement serve very different 
purposes. The Convention is directed to the future 
whilst the Restatement (Second) purports to state the 
law. 31 
However to the extent that the Convention has 
similarities with interest analysis it may be said to 
share the criticisms of that approach. Lack of certainty 
is probably the greatest criticism that can be levelled 
at the Convention,32 and this lack of certainty results 
from the introduction of mandatory rules and the concept 
of characteristic performance which in no way assists 
an already uncertain test. 
By way of conclusion one may contrast the views of 
North and Mann. The latter considers the convention 
30See Juenger Ope cit. supra n.3 on p.451 at p.297. 
et seq. 
3lReese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) 
does however call it a IItransitional document- that was 
"written during a time of change and chaos where there 
was little indication of the direction that would be 
taken by future developments in choice of law ... " 
W.L.M. Reese. American Trends in Private International 
Law: Academic & Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law 
Rules in Tort Cases. 33 Vande L. Rev. 717 at p.734 
(1980) • 
32see R.J. Weintraub. 
Choice of Law for Contracts. 
Cours 243 at p.285. 
Functional Developments in 
(1984) (iv) Recueil des 
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"one of the most unnecessary, useless and, indeed, un-
fortunate attempts at unification or harmonisation of the 
law that has ever been undertaken"33 and "fervently" hopes 
that no British Government will ratify it and that no 
British Parliament will be prepared to adopt it. He 
alludes to the hazards of statutory interpretation and 
suggests that the Convention may allow certain E.E.C. 
countries to improve their law at the expense of Britain 
which "is expected to sacrifice one of the most satisfactory 
indigenous bodies of law.,,34 
North on the other hand suggests that "at the end 
of the day the result of implementation of the Rome Con-
vention in England will be that the choice of law rules in 
contract are put on a clear, firm, statutory basis. There 
will be no great substantial change in the rules which 
have worked well for a long period. But there will be 
the benefit of substantial harmonisation throughout the 
E.E.C. in an area of law of real significance for the free 
provision of goods and services within the Community. ,,35 
Both writers may be seen as partially correct. The 
Convention by Artic 3 clearly supports party autonomy 
and clarifies certain related .. matters and by being put on 
a firm statutory basis the Convention should work well 
33 Mann Ope cit. supra n.22 at p.266. 
34 Ibid at p.266. 
35North. Ch. 1 at p.23. 
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with respect to party autonomy. However Mann may be 
seen as correct in considering the Convention "useless" 
when there has been no choice of law decision made by 
the parties. 
"Perhaps the main advantage to the English lawyer 
will be that he will be able to find the relevant 
law in a relatively short and succinct piece of 
legislation rather than have to embark on a tortuous 
investigation into the often ambiguous, often con-
flicting case law."36 
From a New Zealand perspective the Convention has 
little to offer by way of new concepts. ~ts general 
characteristic of supporting party autonomy may however 
be seen as sound. 
As Williams notes above37 the Convention will make 
the law easy to find. Legislation in New Zealand would 
have the same effect. It must be preferable to find our 
conflict of laws provisions for choice of law and inter-
national contracts set out clearly in a statute rather than 
have to 'hunt about I as is the present situation. 38 
36williams op. cit. supra n.lS 911 p.454 at p.3l. 
37 Ibid . 
3S0n the difficulties facing New Zealand lawyers 
see infra at p.463. 
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PART E 
NEW ZEALAND CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
Chapter I Introduction and some preliminary 
matters preceding slation. 
Chapter II 'The Solution' 
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Chapter I. 
NEW ZEALAND CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
Introduction 
Traditionally English and Commonwealth Conflict of 
Laws for contracts have been regarded as the same. Hence 
lIit is therefore more acceptable to cite commonwealth 
authority in English conflict of laws cases, and vice 
versa, than in other fields of law. 1l1 Other than the 
very occasional case cited by way of illustration it has 
been possible to state the New Zealand conflict of laws for 
international contracts by reference to English law alone. 2 
The criticisms that were levelled at the English Proper 
Law Doctrine apply equally in the New Zealand setting. 
With England being a member of the European Economic 
Community its ties lie more with Europe than elsewhere. 
This is especially so since the European Economic Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) 
has started to influence the approach to choice of law in 
1Broken Hill Proprietary Co. v. Latham [1935] 1 Ch. 
373 at p.399 per Maugham J. See also Prebble p.436 note 
6 and R. Graveson. The Judicial Unification of Private 
International Law in De Conflictu Legum. 154 Neth. Int'l 
L. Rev. (1962). 
2For other New Zealand decisions see P.R.H. Webb & 
F.M. Auburn. New Zealand Conflict of Laws - a Bird's 
Eye View. In Contemporary Problems in the Conflict of 
Laws. Essays in Honour of John Humphrey Carlile Morris. 
(1978) at p.27l et seq. 
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contract in European Economic Community countries. 3 
English conflict of law for contracts which will become 
European Economic Community Conflict of Law for Contract 
is no longer automatically appropriate for New Zealand 
to follow. 
Furthermore domestic contract law both in England 
and New Zealand has been the subject of legislation in 
recent years. This has had the effect of producing a 
divergence in the domestic contract law of both countries. 
There could be said to be a parting of the ways in so far 
as the respective domestic contract law is concerned in 
the two jursidictions and that this divorce will make 
its way into conflict of laws contract law. 
The time has come for New Zealand to have its own 
Conflict of Laws rules for international contracts. The 
following points would indicate why change is now needed 
and why legislation is required. 
1. It is no longer appropriate to automatically follow 
the law of a member of the European Economic Commun-
ity. 
3In Compagnie Europlene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor 
Nederland B.V. (1983) 22 1.L.M. 66 at p.69, the Hague 
District Court held that 'although this Convention has not 
(yet) been ratified by the Netherlands, its Article 4 
should already be applied as valid in Netherlands private 
international law." C. McLachlan. The New Hague Sales 
Convention and the Limits of the Choice of Law Process. 
(1986) 102 L.Q.R. 591 at p.611 note 77, suggests that a 
similar situation is understood to apply in Denmark. 
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2. The Proper Law Doctrine in England could nevertheless 
be retained if it was a useful solution to the choice 
of law dilemma. As it is not, this is a suitable 
time to start afresh and adopt rules which avoid the 
problems inherent in the English approach. 
3. International contracts are on the increase in New 
Zealand yet the subject of conflict of laws is not 
a compulsory subject for a law degree New Zealand. 
There are no comprehensive New Zealand text books on 
the subject nor are there that many articles written 
which would help a practising lawyer. The law is 
thus hard to find. It may also be noted that New 
Zealand's major trading partners such as Japan may 
have very different laws from that of New Zealand. 
New Zealand statutes concerning contract law are far 
from helpful in conflict of law matters. 4 Webb for 
example has asked if the Parliamentary Counsel could 
not bear in mind, for the future, that there is such 
a subject as the conflict of laws when drafting 
statutes pertaining to contract law. S Not only are 
our contracts statutes unhelpful for New Zealand 
lawyers, they are also a potential nightmare for 
overseas lawyers. 6 Our standing in the international 
community requires the law to be reasonably easy to 
find and equally easy to apply. 
Finally it may be noted that legislation is becoming 
increasingly common in conflict of laws. Thus any 
New Zealand legislation would not be out on a limb 
4See P.R.H. Webb. Heaven Help the Overseas Conflict 
Lawyers. (1979). N.Z.L.J .. 442 and see infra at p.480 et 
seq. 
SIbid at p.444. 
6Ibid . 
4. 
as far as world trends are concerned. 7 
Legislation is necess because of: 
(i) The unsatisfactory present English situation 
especially with regard to the third rule of 
the proper law doctrine. 
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(ii) The rising importance of international contracts 
in New Zealand and in the world in general. 
In many respects the average New Zealand lawyer 
can be seen as being in an in~idious position 
in comparison to his English or American counter-
part in so far as he does not deal daily with 
international contracts. It is important that 
such lawyers, who may never have studied the 
conflict of laws be able to find and apply the 
law with certainty. This is especially so as 
international contracts become increasingly 
common in New Zealand. 
(iii)The decided lack of cases reported in both New 
Zealand and England make legislation necessary. 
International trade is developing at a pace that 
requires immediate action. Development by case 
law is too slow to cope with the situation. 
7It was said in the Preface to the First Edition of 
Cheshire & North's Private International Law that one of 
the fascinations of private international law s in the 
fact that "it has been only lightly touched by the para-
lysing hand of the Parliamentary draftsman." The Preface 
to the tenth edition notes that the fascination remains 
"but the paralysis creeping, if not yet all pervading" 
and that many of the changes between the latest edition 
and its predece~sor relate to legislation. 
. . 
Legislation on an international level has also become 
an acceptable phenomenon. Whilst only the European 
Economic Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (1980) has been considered many other important 
recent conventions could have been discussed. See 
example the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (1986) and 
discussion by McLaughlin Ope C • supra n.3 at p.59. 
et seq, and so by M. Gilmore. International Trade 
(1987) 28 Harv. Int'l Law J. 526. 
Some Preliminary Matters Preceding Legislation 
The following matters need to be considered before 
any legislation is proposed. 
1. The Ultimate Goal 
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The ultimate goal, probably unattainable, must be to 
have one body of substan.tive law to govern all international 
contracts. Any national legislation on the part of New 
Zealand should therefore endeavour to follow general world 
trends such as, for example, party autonomy. Change 
should not be sought for change's sake. 
2. Compatibility with Existing Legislation 
The proposed legislation should as far as possible 
also be compatible with our domestic contract statutes. 
This requires a brief consideration of the characteristics 
of our contracts acts including any choice of law provisions 
that may be suitable for retention. 
3. Need to avoid present defects in the law 
Any proposed legislation should be considered in the 
light of the present defects in the proper law doctrine. 
It is important that the criticisms levelled at the proper 
law doctrine do not apply to any alternative solution. 
Likewise any advantages in the American solution or academic 
opinions discussed above should be borne in mind. 
4. Goals of the Conflict of Laws must be furthered 
The proposed legislation should consider and not 
thwart generally accepted conflict of laws goals for 
contract. This requires a brief consideration of the 
goals and aims themselves. 
5. Rules versus approaches 
An initial decision has to be made concerning the 
model to be chosen for the proposed legislation. The 
problem of whether rules or approaches provide the best 
model for this branch of the law must be discussed. 
, 466 
Only when these matters have been considered may the 
actual proposals be forwarded and tested against these 
criteria. 
It is proposed to consider the last mentioned matter 
of rules versus approaches first. A consideration of 
goals follows. Thirdly New Zealand contract legislation 
is discussed. The remaining two matters (points 1 and 3 
above) are considered after the proposed legislation has 
been outlined. 
RULES VERSUS APPROACHES 
The European Economic Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (1980) provided an example of 
a convention applying both general and specific rules. 
The general rule of allowing party autonomy contrasts 
with the specific rules for certain types of consumer 
and employment contracts. The Convention (in so far 
as Section 7 provides a kind of interest analysis) may 
also be seen as endorsing the "approach" system to 
conflict of laws. 
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It is often considered8 that the main question facing 
conflict of law scholars is whether rules or approaches 
are appropriate. 
A 'rule' may be defined as a phenomenon found in 
most areas of the law t namely a formula which t once applied t 
will lead a court to a conclusion. Approach refers to a 
system which does no more than note what factor or factors 
should be considered in arriving at a conclusion. 9 
Interest analysis was cited as an approach. The 
difficulties inherent in such an approach, (and interest 
analysis can be said to be typical of approaches in gen-
eral) have already been canvassed. Approaches are diffi-
cult to apply inpractice, they can lead to uncertainty and 
confusion, increased litigation results, as does the length 
of time each case takes to be decided. Costs mount. The 
only advantage of using an approach such as interest 
analysis is that ultimately rules will emerge out of the 
chaos. 10 
8 W.L.M. Reese. Choice of Law. Rules or Approaches. 
57 Cornell L.R. 315 (1972). 
9Ibid . 
lOReese ibid. Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws for example considers that courts 
should progressively refine the principles of interest 
analysis so that eventually specific rules emerge. He 
would like to see a relatively large number of narrow 
rules each of which would be concerned with a particular 
issue or a group of closely related issues. 
Thus some writers suggest that this rules versus 
approaches debate may be seen as moving in a circle. 
Beale's rules were over some decades annexed by the 
"free-wheeling dispensers of doctrinal and judge-made 
theory,,,ll and now the trend is back to rules. 12 
"Modern" states such as New York are seen as rapidly 
building up a body of new case law and as this develop-
ment progresses, it is seen as inevitable that what is 
a mere theory or approach today becomes the rule of 
tomorrow. 13 
The critics of rules tend to emphasise the lack of 
flexibility inherent in rules. 14 
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"International contracts which hold such unpredictable 
combinations of fact and such a surprising variability 
in their local connections and relationships cannot 
be rstrait-jacketed into fixed rules. l "lS 
However rules may be divided into rules designed to 
apply in only a given situation or rules which are of 
general applicability. An example of the latter would be 
that the lex fori determine all choice of law issues. 
There is no reason why a number of rules could not apply. 
For example it is argued that the party autonomy rule 
should apply to all contracts which contain a choice of 
11R. B. Schlesinger. Book Review. 16 Am. J. Compo 
Law 608 at p. 612. ( 1968) . 
12A. A. Ehrenzweig. Private International Law. A 
Comparative Treatise. (1967) at pp.89-90. 
13Schlesinger op. cit. supra n.11 at p.612. 
14 E.g. J.R. Leathers. Erie and its Progeny as Choice 
of Law Cases. 11 Houston L. Rev. 791 at p.823. (1974). 
lSIbid. 
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law clause and the lex fori determine all contracts where 
the parties have not made an express choice of law decision. 
Two general rules can cover the entire area of choice of 
law for international contracts. 16 Two general rules 
avoid the uncertainties inherent in approaches and avoid 
the difficulties which exist in specific rules. It is 
the problems that are associated with specific rules that 
must now be considered. 
Jaffey17 has provided a number of specific rules 
which are presumably intended to be of general applicability. 
These may be summarised as follows: 
1. If a governing law clause invalidates the contract 
then it should be disregarded. 
2. A party should not be held liable to a greater extent 
than he is liable by the law of the country where 
he acted. 
3. The party whose performance is the most complicated 
should have his law applied. 
4. In the event of unequal bargaining power the weaker 
party should have his law applied. However where 
a transaction is entirely domestic as regards one 
party that party should not be placed in a worse 
position than he would be under his own law. 
5. Where no considerations of justice or convenience 
seem to point to one party's law rather than the 
other then the lex fori applies. 
6. Public policy must always be considered. No foreign 
rule which grossly offends English standards of 
justice should be applied. 
16Subject of course to certain qualifications dis-
cussed infra at p. 485 et seq. 
17 . ff A.J.E. Ja ey. 
Choice of law. (1982) 
p.382 et seq. 
The Foundation of Rules for the 
2 Oxford J. of Legal Studs. 368 at 
18 In the words of the European Economic Convention on 
the law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980), it 
is the person who is to render the "characteristic performance." 
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The difficulty with these rules is that they are easy 
to state but di cult to apply. How does a court dec 
which party has the nlost complicated requirements to perform 
and when are ies in unequal bargaining positions? 
Areas of grey are bound to exist. Such rules make the 
law too dif to apply. 
The same may be said for developing specific rules 
for speci situations. Not only do the specific rules 
have to be determined the specific situations also have 
to be established. Again areas of grey are likely to 
arise and again the law becomes complicated and di cult 
to apply. 
The only viable answer is to have the two general 
rules as suggested above. 
These two general rules will however require some 
qualification. This would be in line with established 
models. It is not possible for a legislator to 
all situations and combination of facts therefore is 
need some "escape device".19 
19Cavers in reviewing European Choice of Law legis-
lation suggests there are models emerging legis-
lation namely 
(a) the "classic model" a short seemingly simple provision 
designed to do duty over a wide spectrum of choice of law 
cases. 
(b) the "succinct basic rule" to which is attached a 
br escape clause or concept designed to allow judicial 
discretion. 
(c) a set of rules igned with particularity to the 
points at which departure from the basic rule will be per-
mitted, chosen with a view to alleviating some of the 
situations in which the basic rule has given se to com-
plaint. 
See D. Cavers. Legislative Choice of Law: Some European 
Examples. 44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 340 at p.360 (1971) and 
D. Cavers. The Common Market's Draft Conflicts Convention 
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An escape clause can save legislation from the changes 
of petrification and help to meet the demands of Judge 
Cardozo 20 who said that 
liThe law, like the traveler, must be ready for the 
morrow. It must have a principle of growth." 
It would therefore appear that two general rules with 
qualifications or 'escape devices' are an appropriate 
way to determine choice of law issues for international 
contracts. 
on Obligations: Some Preventative Law Aspects. 48 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 603 at p.626 (1975), and see generally 
F. Vischer. Drafting National Legislation on Conflict 
of Laws: The Swiss Experience. (Spr. 1977) 41 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 131. 
20 B.N. Cardozo. The Growth of Law (1924) at p.20. 
GOALS 
It has been said that 
" ... the pursuit of harmony is the principle task 
of those who make it their concern to think about 
private international law." 2l 
The 'Ideal' 
Ideally international trade and the international 
community would be served best by a truly international 
set of substantive laws which were uniformly interpreted 
by all jurisdictions. This would be the ideal. 
'the-ideal is unattainable. All ideals are. 
Never shall we see the day when all countries 
But 
will apply the same law to the same situation. 
This does not mean that we should give up pursuing 
the ideal .... "22 
If this the ultimate goal any changes in the 
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present conflict of laws for choice of law and international 
contracts should attempt to follow general world trends and 
adopt rules which are in harmony with both the goals and 
objects of current conflict of law ideas and contract law 
generally. It therefore becomes necessary to briefly 
consider the accepted goals in this field of law. 
Predict~bili~y and certainty 
All would agree that predictability and certainty 
210 . Kahn-Freund. General Problems of Private 
International Law (1976) at p.323. 
22 Ibid . 
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are necessary.23 The disagreement is over the question 
of whether these goals are poss in a situation where 
a contract has contacts equally divided amongst states. 
Predictability and certainty are achieved if party 
autonomy is respected. 
Justice 
A further goal, often discussed, is that of justice. 
This concept can mean no more than that the parties' 
expectations are given e ct to or alternatively 
can have a more profound connotation. 24 
Uniform Solutions 
Another goal that is 
of uniform solutions. 25 
ted relates to the attainment 
23 See generally R.J. Bauerfeld. Notes. Effectiveness 
of Choice of Law clauses in Contract Conflict Laws. 
Party Autonomy or Objective Determination. 82 Colum. 
L.R. 1659 at p.1669 (1982). 
L. James. Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on 
Conflict of Laws Contracts. 36 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 34, 
at pp.56-8 (1959). 
M.J. Levin. Party Autonomy Choice of Law Clauses in 
Commercial Contracts. '-46 Geo. L.J. 260 at pp.263-4 (1957). 
F. Vischer. The Antagonism Between Legal Security and 
the Search for Justice in the field of Contracts. (1974) 
11 Recueil des Cours 1. 
24see Jaffey op. cit. supra n.17. 
R. Graveson. Philosophical Aspects 
flicts of Laws. (1962) 75 L.Q.R. 337 at 
See also 
the English Con-
p.355. 
25See Reese's opinion. Supra at p.467 note 8. 
"In international transactions, particularly on 
commodity markets where the same shipment of goods 
may be bought and sold many times before delivery 
of the actual goods to the last buyer, it is of 
great commercial convenience that all the contracts 
relating to such sales should be subject to the 
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same proper law, spective of the place of shipment 
or discharge, the residence or nationality of the 
parties or the place where the contract is made."26 
The proponents of this view argue that it is highly 
unsatisfactory if a case were to be decided according to 
different rules depending on whether it was brought before 
the courts of country A, B or C. This is because one 
tends to think of the s' rights and duties as some-
thing that exist and which are of definition. 
Perhaps in truly international situations this is just 
not so and that despite Lord Diplock's views in Amin 
Rasheed27 'internationalised' contracts are coming into 
existence, which are not automatically subject to any 
particular legal system and which fore require special 
international rules to govern them. If under the present 
English system it is really impossible to say which law 
is most closely connected to the contract, as indeed the 
Amin Rasheed case illustrates, then such cases are in a 
vacuum until some arbitrary decision as to which law is 
to govern, is made. 
26Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie 
Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. [1971] A.C. 572 at p.600 
per Lord Dip10ck. 
27Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait 
Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50 at p.55. 
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To Uphold Bargains 
One object contract law is to hold people to their 
bargainsi 28 this is part the economic function of 
law. Efficiency seen as important. One economic 
purpose of contract law is to facilitate exchange,29 
another to reduce the complexities and cost of dealings. 
Party autonomy is compatible with the economic analysis 
of law. 
Wider Goals 
Finally at a more general level are goals of wide 
concern. One has in mind the object of much consumer 
protection legislation in.protecting the weaker party, 
and laws that cut across contract law. Laws relating 
to gambling and Sunday closing, for example, promote the 
wider goals society in maintaining peace and order 
whilst some legislation, the Statute of Frauds for example, 
concern both the parties to a contract and the wider 
interests of society in general in ensuring that fair 
play results. 
Many other goals could be considered. 30 The diffi-
culty is to decide where to draw the line. Goals of 
28 See generally H.E. Yntema. The Objectives of 
Private International Law. (1957). 35 Can. Bar Rev. 721. 
and R. A. Posner. Economic Analysis of Law ('1977) 
(2nd edit.) at p. 67. 
The following goals or aims apply equally to domestic 
contract law generally. 
29Posner ibid at p.69 et seq. 
3rrEase of judicial application, the goals of providing 
rational and functional decisions. 
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con ict of laws general as opposed to those relating 
to contract con of laws could be cons likewise 
the goals of domestic contract law are similarly potentially 
relevant. An enormous amount has been written on the 
subject. 3l Obviously academic writers tend to emphasise 
the goals that enhance their own particular theory.32 
Conclusion 
It is possible to draw two conflicting conclusions 
from these 0 stated goals. 
First, one may argue that these aims, goals or 
policies can be classified into two general categories. 
The first aim is to strengthen certainty. This avoids 
unjust resu and fosters predictability and party expec-
tation. Whatever rules are adopted must thus foster this 
goal, and party autonomy does just this very thing. 
However the wider concerns of soc cannot be 
ignored. This leads one to the problem of the limitations 
that must be considered when the applicable law to govern 
31See for example A. Von Mehren. Choice of Law and 
the Problem of Justice. 41 No. 2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
27 (Spr. 1977). For a summary of the goals that are 
advanced by party autonomy see T. Brown. Notes. Choice 
of Law Stipulations by Litigants. 43 Washington & Lee, 
L.R. 141 at p.144 (Winter 1984). 
See also A. Shapira. "Grasp All, All." On Restraint 
and Moderation in the Reformulation on Choice of Law 
Policy. 77 Colum. L. Rev. 248 (1977). 
See also the considerations stated by Yntema, Cheatham 
and Reese etcetera discussed in the context of interest 
analysis supra at p. 188 et seq. 
32Jaffey for example would emphasise justice, as 
would Cavers. See Choice of Law pr.ocess (1965) at 
pp. 31-2, 66-7, 89. 
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a contract is chosen. Overriding statutes of the forum, 
mandatory rules, and public policy considerations all 
must be considered. 
The alternative conclusion is that the generally 
accepted goals of contract conflict of laws are irrecon-
cilable. 
"If one were to fuse together all the goals of 
and suggested approaches to choice of law, the 
result would be an overpowering and equally baffling 
edifice of assorted policy abstractions, ranging 
from the transcendental to the pragmatic. 1133 
A choice of law clause can be upheld thus certainty 
vis a vis the parties themselves are concerned ca~ be 
achieved or one can ignore the choice of law clause and 
obtain uniform results and predictability at a general 
level. It is a fault of the eternal and eternally insol-
uble dilemma of certainty of the law against fairness in 
the individual case. Flexibility, another oft cited 
conflicts goal, promotes fairness but it will always 
impa predictability. 
This second conclusion does appear to be the more 
realistic. One is therefore left to choose the goal 
or goals that do not conflict with each other and formulate 
rules which enhance ?ome goals but ignore others. Here 
again, it is very difficult to decide which goals must 
give way. Is Morris· view, that individual wishes must 
give way to nationally adopted international conventions 
33 shapira op. cit. supra n.3l at p.255. 
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ferable to the opinion of Mann who would consider 
party autonomy as the prevailing goal? Is it possible 
to have one set of goals covering all international con-
tracts? The goal of upholding expectations is 
not really pertinent to situations where parties have 
not made a choice of law decision. 
It has been suggested34 that instead of approaching 
the subject in terms of polic s and goals it would be 
preferable to consider I guideiines. One such 
guideline would be the ru of simplicity.35 Kahn-
Freund points out that international law is 
intellectually fascinating and asks if this is not in 
fact its main curse. "It is 'interesting' ~ it lends 
itself to many and highly complicated technical discuss-
ions. Is not law which is intellectually interesting 
almost always in need of reform?"36 
that the law should be simple. 37 
He therefore argues 
34Kahn-Freund op. cit. supra n.2lat p.320 et seq. 
Another guideline would be realism. See at p.321 et seq. 
35This of course can be considered as a goal. See 
Shapira op. c . supra n.31 at p.253. 
36Kahn-Freund op. cit. supra n.21 at p.320. 
37If 'simple' is to be equated with ease of adminis-
tration then some, such as Shapira, op. cit. supra n.31 
at p.253 would contend that "The endeavor to create ease 
of administration in a legal field which is not endowed 
with the virtue of simplicity can only confusion 
and frustration." 
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Whether one calls them goals, policies or guidelines 
it would seem that a vast number exist, many of which are 
incompatible. The ideal would be to have no need for the 
subject of conflict of laws. Given that this unobtain-
able any proposed rules or laws should for preference 
consider general world trends, enhance as many generally 
accepted goals as possible and strike a balance between 
inflexible rules and unfettered judicial discretion. 38 
Before any changes can be suggested the conflict of 
laws provisions in our contract Acts should be considered 
to see if they contain any conflict of law rules which 
are worthy of retention. Also the general characteristics 
of New Zealand domestic law need tOI be briefly considered. 
If the recent legislation works well at a domestic level 
it is possible that it could be modified to assist in the 
conflict of laws dilemma. Pr.oposed rules should as far 
as possible be in harmony with not only world trends but 
blend with domestic rules of New Zealand. At the end 
of the day the transaction is a contract and this should 
not be lost sight of when considering contracts which 
contain an international element. 
38shapira op. cit. supra n.31 at p.251. 
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New Zealand Contract Legislation 
The br fest review of our domestic contract39 Acts 
reveals a lack of conflict of laws provisions. Webb 40 
has discussed how unsatisfactory the legislation is in 
this regard for both New Zealand lawyers and litigants 
and their overseas counterparts. The only conclusion 
that may be drawn from our contract statutes is that they 
provide no useful guides or laws from a conflict of laws 
point of view for international contracts. As the legis-
lature has seen fit to ignore, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, the subject of international contracts, 
any proposed legislation in this field will not cut across 
any existing provisions. The proposed legislation can 
therefore ignore the New Zealand statutes from a conflict 
of laws point of view. 
When the contracts acts are considered from a general 
point of view it may be said that our legislation gives 
the judge a wide discretion once it is established that the 
parties come within the orbit of the Act concerned. 41 
Thus our legislation contains rules 42 as well as giving 
39The Frustrated Contracts Act 1944. 
The Minors Contract Act 1969. 
The Illegal Contract Act 1970. 
The Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. 
The Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and 
the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 
40 See Webb Ope cit. supra n.4 at p.442 et seq. 
41See for example Section 9 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979. 
42See for example Section 6 of the Illegal Contracts 
Act 1970. 
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the judge a discretion. The proposed legislation is in 
harmony with this approach. Party autonomy may be seen 
as the rule t the public policy exception the discretion. 
The scheme of the contracts acts has worked satisfactorily 
in New Zealand at the domestic level, there is no reason 
why it should not work in an equally acceptable manner 
for international contracts. If the rule that party 
autonomy prevail subject to a public policy exception be 
adopted the disadvantage of detailed rules would be 
overcome and the problems inherent in an unfettered 
discretion curtailed. 
'The court shall give effect to a choice of law 
clause in an international contract I is a general rule 
that is easy to apply and not particularly open to a 
variety of interpretations. However a judge no doubt 
would feel obliged to resort to a strained interpretation 
if he felt the circumstances so warranted it. 43 
If a proviso were added that this general rule of 
party autonomy was subject to the public policy of the 
forum the judge would be able to do directly and openly 
that which he would otherwise have to do indirectly. 
There would be no advantage in defining public policy 
because any definition which limits public policy might 
have to be redefined by the judge for a certain unforeseen 
43As judges have done when interpreting section 7 
of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970. See Harding v. Coburn 
[1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577, Ross v. Henderson [1976] 2 N.Z.L.R. 
589, Broadlands Renta,ls Ltd:'" v. R.D. Bull Ltd. [1976] 
2 N.Z.L.R. 595. 
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situation. The judge faced with a general rule and 
an unfettered discretion can do directly and simply that 
which he would otherwise do by an indirect method. Legal 
fictions and tortious reasoning would be avoided. From 
the parties' point of view they know in advance the rule. 
Lawyers can advise clients and predict an outcome. The 
result is no longer the luck of the draw as can occur at 
present. 
Thus it can be concluded that the proposed legislation 
does not conflict with any existing legislation and indeed 
may be seen as in harmony with general contractual prin-
ciples. 
Compatibility with current conflict of law 
theory and general contract theory. A Note. 
Very br fly and very generally it may be said that 
present conflicts theory is towards a rational functional 
approach to choice of law questions. Any rules that are 
to be adopted should be in harmony with this practical 
approach. 
If general contract theory is considered,then J 
at the risk of oversimplification there may be said to 
be two views about the relationship of contract to the 
law. One view, which Atiyah calls the 'will theory' 
places primary emphasis on the fact that the parties 
44p .~ h h' 11 f h d 
.S. Atlya. T e Rlse & Fa 0 t e Free om 
of Contract. (1979) at p.405. 
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have made an agreement. "The autonomy of the free choice 
of private parties to make their own contracts on their 
own terms was the central feature of contract law.,,45 
The role of the court was to effect the parties' intention. 
The idea that the court had an independent role to play 
as a forum for the adjustment of rights, or the settlement 
of disputes was inconsistent with this approach. Another 
view may be called the 'delegated legislation theory'. 
Pursuant to this idea a contract exists only becQ.u..se a 
particular legal system provides that, subject to certain 
conditions, a contract may exist. 46 The proposed rules 
are not inconsistent with either theory. Both these 
theories assume that all contracts must be linked to a 
domestic system of law. The rules suggested below would 
continue to link international contracts with specific 
domestic systems of law. The proposed 'solution' may 
therefore be seen as erring on the cautious, one which 
in no way asks for revolutionary ideas to be adopted. 
It may be argued that international trade and the inter-
national community would be better served if a timely 
international set of substantive rules or laws was 
developed47 but this, it is suggested, is for the future. 
45 Ibid at p.408. 
46 See McLachlan op. cit. supra n.3 at p.593 et seq. 
47See I.F.G. Baxter. International Conflict of Laws 
& International Business. (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q. 538, who 
argues that international business today is of such import-
ance and volume that it needs laws and theory that are 
designed for it. He considers that it is not adequate 
to treat international conflict of laws in the area of 
multinational business as "interstate law in international 
garb. II Ibid. 
Some immediate alternative to the present system of the 
proper law doctrine is needed now in New Zealand. 
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Chapter II 
THE SOLUTION 
Need for Two 
International contracts which contain a governing law 
clause cannot be treated in the same manner as international 
contracts which do not contain such a clause. 
It has been argued that to divide contracts into 
different types of contracts is doomed to difficulty.l 
However this initial division should not lead to problems. 
The only possible grey areas are in cases such as Compagnie 
d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navi-
gation S.A.2 where it will be recalled3 the chosen law 
was the law of the flag but a number of vessels had been 
used making the choice of law clause somewhat difficult 
to ascertain. If such a clause can reasonably be given 
a meaning then should be classed as an international 
contract containing a choice of law clause and dealt with 
as such. Only if no meaning can be attributed to the 
words whatosever should it be treated otherwise. 
lSee the discussion on adhesion contracts supra 
at p.368 et seq. 
2[1971] A.C. 572. 
3See supra at p.35l. 
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The definition of 'international' contracts given at 
the beginning of this thesis 4 should except for one detai1 5 
} J 
be applied to contracts with and without a choice of law 
clause. An international contract should be defined as 
one which has 'significant elements connected with more 
than one jurisdiction."6 
International Contracts which contain a choice of 
law clause. 
Party Autonomy prevails 
"The simplest solution, undeniably would be if all 
courts were allowed to apply their own laws, laws 
with which they are intimately familiar. One could' 
then completely dispense with this troublesome 
discipline called private international law. When 
we wish, all the same, to require a judge to apply 
foreign law, he ought to be able to cite positive 
reasons for such action."7 
4See supra at p.5. 
5The term 'jurisdiction' is preferable to the term 
'country' as the latter tends to emphasise geographic 
contacts as discussed supra at p.64 et seq. 
6This is a very wide definition, only a wholly 
domestic contract that contained a choice of law clause 
, would not be included because although a choice of law 
clause could be seen as one significant element there 
would be no others, and the definition 'requires a 
minimum of two significant elements. 
7S . Braekhus. 
national Shipping. 
at p.268. 
Choice of Law Problems in Inter-
(1979) 111 Recueil des Cours, 255 
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A judge should apply foreign law when the parties 
exercise their option to choose such a law to govern their 
contract. It is not proposed to reiterate in detail the 
advantages and reasons for such a course of uction. It 
is hopefully apparent that party autonomy makes for cer-
tainty and predictability. It upholds the parties' ex-
pectations. It is generally recognised in all conflict 
of law systems.~ It should be as absolute as possible 
and whilst Cheshire would turn in his grave, a Brazilian 
who sells coffee to a Japanese may provide that the con-
tract shall be governed by Danish law. 9 
Party autonomy is in accord with recent international 
legislation. IO 
It would seem common, indeed the norm, in large com-
mercial transactions with transnational or international 
connections to automatically include a choice of law clause. 
The larger, the more complicated, the more truly inter-
national the contract the more likely is the presence of 
a choice of law clause specifying the law of some sophisti-
cated commercial centre such as New York or London to apply. 
8 . b R.J. Welntrau. Functional 
of Law for Contracts. (1984). iv 
at p.289 suggests that it would be 
to try and halt the vogue of party 
Developments in Choice 
Recueil des Cours 243 
tilting at windmills 
autonomy. 
9Cheshire viewed such an idea with horror. See 
Cheshire at p.36 note 2. 
10 E • g . Section 3. The European Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980). See also 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sales of Goods. The autonomy principle is considered by 
R.D- Kearney. Developments in Private International Law. 
81 Am. J. of Compo Law 724 at p.728 (1987). 
488 
The various limits on party autonomy were discussed 
above. These should be kept to the barest minimum. 
Commercial convenience requires such a course of action. 
Parties must be able to rely on the court upholding their 
choice. Thus parties should be free to choose a law at 
/ / 
any time, depe~age should be lowed,ll a choice could 
'float', and parties could change their choice at any 
time. 12 The European Economic Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) law in this 
respect could be adopted. 
If an invalidating choice of law clause has been made 
this should likewise be upheld. Thus the present English 
position should be maintained. 
By allowing complete and unfettered party autonomy 
two consequences should emerge. Upholding choice of law 
clauses will promote their use. The aim should be for 
all written contracts to contain such a clause. Secondly 
by always upholding such clauses efficiency will result 
in so far as certainty and predictability will be achieved. 
Parties seeing these advantages will therefore be more 
inclined to use such a clause. 
Party autonomy is in line with current conflicts 
theory. It is a common sense practical solution. It is 
11This is in harmony with recent English cases. See 
Libyan Bank v. Bankers Trust [1988] Vol. 1 Lloyds Law Rep. 
259 at p.271 where Staughton J. said "It is possible, 
although unusual, for a contract to have a split proper 
law." See also Vesta v. Butcher[1986] Lloyds Law Rep. 
179 at p.193 where Hobhouse J. said "It has been recognised 
for a long time that parties may choose that different 
parts of the contract should be governed by different laws." 
12Subject to the same limitations as apply in the 
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also compatible with the general idea of contract law 
that persons should be held to their bargains. A choice 
of law clause is part of the contract; it should be upheld 
in the same manner as any other term of the contract. 
There appears to be only one difficulty, and this 
relates to the conflict between party autonomy and all its 
attendant advantages and the wider interests of society 
as a whole. Two situations or areas of conflict are 
involved. A judge could be faced with a choice of law 
clause which would apply a law contrary to the public 
policy of the forum. Alternatively some law, usually 
a legislative law of the forum, or another state, could 
apply to the contract. Is the judge to uphold the party 
autonomy or the otherwise applicable rule? 
The first situation will cause little difficulty. 
The proposed legislation should be drafted in such a way 
as to allow a public policy exception to party autonomy. 
English and New Zealand courts have, traditionally, 
been diffident about applying public policy unless some 
fundamental standards of morality, justice or welfare 
are involved or human rights are at stake. 13 
New Zealand judges are only likely to evoke such 
a principle in those cases where objection to the foreign 
European Convention on the Law Applicable to contractual 
Obligations, 1980. See supra at p.410 et seq. 
13F . A. Mann. Uniform Statutes in English Law. (1980) 
99 L.Q.R. 376 at p.399 and see also R. Graveson. The 
Ihequality of the Applicable Law. (1980) B.Y.B.I.L. 231 
at p.236. 
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law is not technical or trivial but very serious and sub-
stantial. One could employ the term "manifestly incom-
patible with New Zealand public policy"; but this would 
not probably be necessary. 
Carefully used, as it is suggested it would be used by 
New Zealand judges, public policy could be an 'escape de-
vice' in that very rare case where the judge did not wish to 
keep the parties to their bargain. Whilst one cannot think 
of many examples it should not be discounted on the prin-
ciple that one cannot foresee and anticipate every situation 
which will occur. Illegal contracts are the obvious group 
of contracts that will be affected by the public policy limi-
tation and these should be relatively infrequent. 
It was suggested abovel4 that choice of law clauses 
should prevail and the choice of law applied rather than 
any mandatory rule in force in the forum or existing in a 
third state. The only exception to this basic rule would 
arise when the relevant legislation expressly stated that 
the rule was to apply in preference to the parties' chosen 
law or it was a necessary implication that such should 
occur. Foreign mandatory rules unless concerning New 
Zealand public policy were to be ignored. This solution 
is in harmony with present English law and was seen as a 
happy compromise. Party autonomy is preserved and yet the 
legislative intent is not ignored and the judge is not 
faced with the difficult problem of determining what con-
stitutes a mandatory rule. As party autonomy is still 
paramount all the innumerable advantages accompanying the 
doctrine are retained. 
14See supra at p.434 et seq. 
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Some Grey Areas 
The aim is to promote and encourage the use of choice 
of law clauses. The rules developed should foster this 
goal. Thus parties who do not take advantage of ir 
existence should not be encouraged in their attitude. For 
this reason it is suggested that the court should not en-
quire into the parties' intentions if they had not made an 
express choice of law decision. To do so would leave the 
parties believing that there was no need to actually include 
a choice of law clause because the court would do that 
them anyway. Hence contracts should be strictly divided 
into those containing ss choice of law clauses and 
those that do not. This leaves the problem of contracts 
which contain no choice of law clause but nevertheless in-
. clude a choice of forum clause and/or an arbitration clause. 1S 
It is suggested that a choice of forum clause 
should be equated with a choice of law clause (unless 
of course a choice of law clause is present anyway) . Thus 
a valid choice of forum clause will result in the forum's 
law being applied. The advantage of this approach is 
that certainty, ease of application and party expecta-
tions are achieved. It could be an irrebutable pre-
sumption. The only disadvantage that is obvious is that 
the use of a sumption is introduced which is contrary 
ISInternational commerc arbitration has become 
very common, especially in major centres such as London, 
New York and s. There are said to be over 7000 new 
international commercial arbitrations yearly in London, and 
a clause for arbitration is to be found in a great many 
shipping and transnational contracts. 
I.F.G. Baxter. International Business and Choice of Law 
(1987) 36 Part 1. I.C.L.Q. 92 at p.96. 
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to current ideas. 16 However this would be an irrebuttable 
not a rebuttable presumption. 
Likewise the choice of arbitration in a particular 
forum should, absent an accompanying choice of l&~v clause, 
be viewed as a definite choice of that country's law. 
This would also achieve certainty, ease of application 
and party expectation. Commercial convenience and prac-
tice would seem to require such a course of action. 
Th.e disadvantage (which applies to both forum selec-
tion clauses and arbitration clauses) is that if such 
clauses are equated with choice of law clauses parties 
will not be encouraged to use the latter device. Perhaps 
however parties will see the advantages of including both 
a forum selection clause and a choice of law clause. 
The use of such documents as a Lloyds standard form 
policy however should not be taken to mean that English 
law was intended. This would reintroduce the unaccept-
able second rule of the proper law. The use of such or 
similar forms without an accompanying choice of law clause 
would mean that the contract would be decided by the lex 
fori, as a case falling within the category of contracts 
that do not contain an express choice of law clause. 
However these types of standard form contracts do generally 
contain choice of law clauses, so the problem should arise 
but rarely.17 
l6 See supra at p.60. 
17See however Vesta v. Butcher [1986) 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 
179 and Du Pont v. Agnew [1987) 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 585. 
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Another problem concerns the situation where more 
than one contract is involved in the transaction. If 
one contract specifies a governing law and another closely 
related contract is silent on the matter the courts tend 
to hold that the chosen law governs both or all of the 
contracts. 18 
In two recent decisions 19 the court applied the 
second rule of the proper law to arrive at this con-
clusion. Both cases also concluded that had the third 
test or rule of the proper law been applied the same result 
would have been achieved. 
Obviously if the fori is going to apply in the 
absence of a stipulated choice of law then a different 
result will obtain unless the contract specifying a 
governing law had chosen forum law. 20 For example in 
J .. M.L. Contractors v. Marples Ridgway21 the main contract 
was subject to Iraqi law whilst the sub-contract contained 
no choice of law provision. Mervyn Davies J. considered 
18J~~.L. Contractors v. Marples Ridgway (1985) 
31 Build. L.R. 100. 
Dimskal Shipping Co. S.A. v. The International Transport 
Workers Federation (The "Evia Luck") [1986J Vol.2 Lloyds Law 
Rep. 165. vesta v. Butcher [1986J Vol.2 Lloyds Law Rep. 179. 
19J . M. L . Contractors v. Marples Ridgway 
31 Build. L.R. 100 and The 'Evia Luck" L1986] 
Lloyds/Law Rep. 165. 
(1985) 
Vol. 2. 
165. 
20As in the "Evia Luck" [1986J Vol. 2, Lloyds J..Ji1'Yl.Rep. 
21(1985) 31 Build. L.R. 100. 
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that "one is virtually obliged to impute an intent that 
the sub-contract is to be governed by Iraqi law,,22 but 
that even if the third rule of the proper law applied 
Iraqi law would still be the law most c ly connected 
with the sub-contract. The reason for this was that the 
sub-contract was expresssly linked with the main contract 
and the main contract was governed by Iraqi law. 23 
This type of reasoning will mean that virtually all 
transactions that contain more than one contract will 
result in the chosen law being applied to the other con-
tract or contracts. This can provide difficulties. In 
sta v. Butcher24 for example the original insurance con-
tract was, on the closest and most real connection test 
governed by Norwegian law. Hobhouse J. 2S initially con-
cluded that the reinsurance contract was also governed by 
Norwegian law and then noted that "there remains something 
surprising and improbable about the conclusion that the 
Lloyds ship and the Lloyds policy is governed by anything 
other than English law. 26 He resolved the dilemma 
II ingeniously" 27 ./ " by the use of depecage. 
If the lex fori applied in the absence of party choice 
Hobhouse J. Vesta ~ Butcher28 would have avoided any 
22 Ibid at p.l1S. 
23 Ib id. 
24[1986] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 179. 
2S Ibid at p.193. 
26 Ibid . 
27All E.R. Annual Review 1986 at p.67. 
28[1986] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 179. 
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difficulties. Both contracts would have had English law 
to govern, and the plaintiff would have 29 Hob-
house J. considered it "commercially unrea stic for 
reinsurers to rely on our English law consequence which 
forms no part of the scheme of insurance which is being 
provided .... ,,30 However once again the point must be 
made that the insurers and reinsurers could have included 
a choice of law provision. Secondly English law could 
equally have been chosen as the law most closely connected 
with the reinsurance contract, Hobhouse J. admits "powerful 
arguments,,31 were advanced in favour of English law. Thus 
one party's expectations would be thered by application 
of English law. 
Simi ly in J.M.L. Contractors v. Marples Ridgway32 
it would not be unsatisfactory to have Iraqi law govern 
the main contract and English law the sub-contract. Again 
the par s could have chosen a law themselves, they could 
have specified English law and indeed the plaintif ad-
vanced a number of reasons why English law should be re-
garded as the proper law. 33 The use of an arbitration 
29 The plaintiffs soyght an indemnity under the rein-
suranGe contract. The defendants repudiated liability 
alleging breach of one of the conditions of insurance. By 
Norwegian law, breach of that condition was not a defence 
to liability, but by English law it was. 
30 Ibid at p.194. 
31 Ibid at p.192. 
32(1985) 31 Build. L.R. 100. 
33 Ibid at pp.109-10. 
clause 34 requiring disputes to be determined by the 
President for the time being of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers could be considered a presumption in favour of 
English law. 35 
To summarise, the application of the chosen law 
or the lex fori does not produce unacceptable results 
when applied to actual fact situations. Furthermore 
these rules make for certainty and predictability which 
at present is absent.in the law. 
Conclusion 
It is recommended that an Act be passed in New 
Zealand to implement the choice of law provisions dis-
cussed above. The Act could be entitled The Conflict 
of Laws (Contracts) Act. It is recommended that inter-
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national and interstate contracts be defined in the manner 
suggested above. 36 The basic provision should be drafted 
in the following or like manner. 
Parties to an international37 contract may agree upon 
a law to govern their contract or any part thereof. 
A New Zealand court shall apply the law thus chosen by 
the part sunless: 
34Ibid . 
35 Discussed supra at p.49 et seq. 
36 Supra at p.5. 
37 The definition is wide enough to include an inter-
state contract. 
(a) to do so would result in application of a law 
which is repugnant to public policy in New 
Zealand or 
(b) an enactment expressly provides or its object 
clearly requires application of a different 
law. 38 
Either the use of the words "the parties must agree" 
could be sufficient to deal with adhesion contracts 
or a clause (c) could be inserted to read: 
or 
(c) The choice of law clause was obtained by fraud, 
undue influence, overweening bargaining power 
or duress. 
In the event of any of the abovementioned situations 
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occurring to defeat application of the chosen law the court 
will require to know what law to apply in its place. This 
can only be the lex fori. It is a law of last resort and 
hopefully will have to be used with increasing infrequency. 
Application of any other law has greater disadvantages; 
the lex loci contractus and solutionis are not suitable 
and the difficulties in establishing the law most closely 
connected with the contract is too difficult and quite 
often pointless anyway. The relevant clause could read: 
38 The use of the word'enactment' suggests common 
law rules are not included. Common law rules will be 
caught in paragraph (a). Secondly the use of the term 
'an enactment' as opposed to any New Zealand enactm~nt' 
allows the judge to consider foreign legislation should 
he so wish. The use of the term 'their contract' suggests 
third parties are not affected. This is in conformity 
with current conflicts thinking. 
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A New Zealand court shall apply the domestic law of 
New Zealand to any contract to which subsections 
(a) (b) or (c) above apply. 
Other possible c 39 would include: 
1. A choice of the laws of a jurisdiction shall 
be read as a reference to its internal laws 
excluding s conflict of laws rules. 
2. A New Zealand Court shall always apply the 
laws of New Zealand to matters of procedure 
and evidence. 
These two c s are reasonable limitations on the doctrine 
of party autonomy. 
International Contracts which do not contain _a 
Choice of Law Clause. 
lilt is a source of never-ending surprise to me 
that businessmen experienced in international trade 
as well [as] their legal advisers frequently enter 
into complex agreements with multitudinous inter-
national ramifications and involving large sums of 
money without taking the simple precaution of choosinq 
the law which they wish to govern their transaction. 1140 
39This thesis has only dealt with international con-
tracts generally. It was considered to be beyond the 
scope the thesis to include speci types of contracts. 
Obvious specific rules will have to apply to certain 
speci contracts. For example the lex situs, the law of 
the 5 of the immovable could apply to contracts con-
cerning immovable property. types of specific 
rules could be incorporated into a general conflict of 
laws statute or left to common law development. 
40 C. Forsyth. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 
Choice of Law in Contract, Characterization and a New 
Attitude to Private International Law. (1987). v. 104(1) 
S. . L.J. 4 at p.14. 
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The Lex Fori Applies 
International contracts which do not contain a choice 
of law clause represent the hard cases. Hopefully with 
time, their number will decrease as more and more parties 
become aware of the advantages of choosing a law to govern 
their dealings. However there will always be a need for 
a rule to govern in the absence of choice. 
Again it is not intended to reiterate all the dis-
advantages of the present and proposed laws but rather to 
suggest a possible solution that could be adopted in New 
Zealand. There can be no ideal solution in this area, 
the attempt can only be to choose the best amongst a number 
of possibilities. 
New Zealand could continue with the third rule of 
the proper law but the disadvantages of this have been 
shown to be considerable. The European Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) suggests 
an alternative possibility.4l Again this test would be 
difficult to apply and contains exceptions which could 
easily reduce the test to the third rule of the proper law. 
Interest analysis is another possibility open to New 
Zealand to adopt but again the disadvantages far outweigh 
any benefits which could result from its adoption. A 
return to the lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis 
would obviously not be appropriate in today's commercial 
world. 
41Article 4. 
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If an alternative method is to be adopted the goals 
and objectives of contract conflict of laws must be con-
sidered. Some academic writers take the view that parties 
will still want to know what law will govern their con-
tract thus emphasising party expectation and predictability.42 
It was argued above 43 that if the parties have not exer-
cised their option by choosing a governing law then their 
wishes could be ignored. They had their opportunity: 
is too late now to complain if a choice is made for them. 
The solution needs to be commercially convenient or 
expedient. A rule which is easy to apply is call~d for, 
one which all concerned will be able to use to predict 
which law will govern the contract. The only possible 
rule is that the lex fori should determine the matter. 
Application of the Lex Fori in Absence of Party Choice 
Justification 
"Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the 
stranger as for one of your own country.»44 
If the lex fori applies commercial convenience and 
predictability are stered. Justice is also achieved 
it 
42 E . g . A.J.E. Jaffey. Choice of Law in Relation to 
Ius Dispositivum with Particular Reference to the E.E.C. 
Convention on the law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
North. Chapter 2 at p.33. 
43supra at p.129 et seq. 
44Leviticus. 24:22. 
The governing law can be identified with certainty. 
The lex fori approach has been justified upon a 
number of grounds. 45 
1. General Importance 
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First the general importance of the lex fori can be 
emphasised in the conflicts process as a whole. 
Four points may be made here: 
(a) Matters of 
fori. 46 
according 
matter. 47 
procedure are determined by the lex 
What amounts to procedure may vary 
to the jurisdiction deciding the 
To this extent one can say that 
choice of forum also amounts to a choice of 
law with regard to questions of procedure. 
(b) The lex 'fori determines the connecting factor,48 
and the connecting factor determines the lex 
causae. 49 50 In other words the forum deter-
mines which law governs the agreement; the 
lex causae is determined in accordance with the 
rules of the lex fori. 
45See generally Ehrenzweig views considered supra 
at p.185 et seq. 
A. Shapira. "Grasp All, Lose All" On Restraint and Moder-
ation in the Reformulation on choice of law pOlicy. 77 
Colum. L.R. 248 (1977). 
Jaffey op. cit. supra n.42 R.A. Sedlar. Babcock v. 
Jackson in Kentucky. 56 Kentucky L.J. 27 at p.85 et 
seq. (1967-1968). See also the views of Currie and 
Cavers discussed supra at p.168 et seq. 
46 See supra at p.367. 
47For example the Statute of Frauds 1677 could be 
considered as procedural or sUbstantive. See Leroux v. 
Brown (1852) 12 C.B. 801. 
48Morris at p.lO. See also O. Kahn-Freund. General 
Problems of Private International Law. (1976) Chapter X 
at p.242 et seq. 
49 Ibid . 
50 The connecting factor is the legal concept which 
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(c) Characterisation is a matter of the lex fori. 51 
A matter must be characterised or classified 
or defined as, for examp1e,contractua1 be 
the relevant conflict of law rules can apply. 
Considering the importance of the question it 
is surprising that there are not more reported 
decisions on this matter. prebb1e52 suggests 
that the main grey area is between contracts 
and torts. 53 
(d) Generally a court considers the content of 
foreign law a question of fact which must be 
proved by the litigant relying on it. 54 If 
determines what is to be the lex causae, and the lex 
causae is the law which governs the actual issue. See 
Morris at pp.9-10. 
51See Morris at p.481 et seq. and see Laconian 
Maritime Enterprises Ltd. v. Agromar Lineas Ltd. 1986 
(3) S.A. 509 (D. & C.L.D.) 
52prebb at p.454. 
53Riverstone Meat Co. Pty v. Lancashire Shipping 
Co. [1961] A.C. 87 provides a good example of the 
problems of characterisation. The House of Lords held 
a Hague Rules carr responsible faults committed 
by a shipyard which had had a vessel for repair. The 
faults had made the vessel unseaworthy and resulted in 
damage to the cargo. Braekhus at p.329 notes that the 
English courts saw the case as a question of construction 
of the Hague Rules whilst by Scandinavian law the same 
problem would most likely be seen as a question of the 
scope of the shipowner's vicarious liability. Lord Keith 
of Avonholm said "The question .... is not one of vicarious 
liability at all." [1961] A.E. 807 at p.871. 
This is answered by general rules of maritime law; it is 
not dealt with by the Hague Rules. See Braekhus op. cit. 
supra~n.7 at p. 329 et seq. 
~4For English authority see Morris at p.37 et seq. 
For New York law regarding judicial notice of foreign 
law see N.Y. Civ. Prac. R. Rule 4511 (McKinney 1963). 
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the party does not prove the foreign law it is 
taken to be the same as the domestic law of the 
lex fori. The lex fori is therefore applied 
by default,as it were. 55 
2. Ease and Simplicity 
Secondly the lex fori is easy and simple to apply in 
comparison with application of foreign law. However 
to apply the lex fori is considered parochial by many 
who consider the aim is to obtain an 'international' 
result for a contract containing a foreign element. 
Baxter56 has pointed out that the present English 
system does not achieve this. The court either 
applies the law of one of the parties or foreign law. 
In the former situation all that can be said is that 
one party is subject to a domestic rule which is not 
his own - hardly an international result. If the 
court decides to apply foreign law, then a whole 
host of difficulties arise. 
The foreign law must be pleaded and proved, often at 
considerable inconvenience and expense. There may 
be more than one expert thus involving the court with 
a conflict of testimony. The point of law involved 
may be doubtful in the foreign law, it might even be 
a novel point of law yet the forum court has to elicit 
the rule of decision. 
55Suisse At1antfque Soci~te d'Armement Maritime S.A. 
v. N.V. Rotterdamische Ko1en Centrale (1967] 1 A.C. 361 
is explicable on this ground. See supra at p.49. 
56Baxter op. cit. supra n.15 at p.109 et seq. 
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In Vesta v. Butcher57 for example Hobhouse J. pointed 
out that the witnesses on Norwegian law were handi-
capped by the fact that there was very little estab-
lished Norwegian law on reinsurance. They were 
therefore each having to express opinions on questions 
untested by any judicial decision. 58 
Furthermore there is always the likelihood that a 
forum judge will examine a foreign legal system 
through and under the influence of his own legal 
system,59 and will fail to appreciate the different 
methods of working of foreign courts and lawyers. 60 
The whole process may therefore be described as 
'hit and miss. ,61 
57[1986] 2 Lloyds Law Rep. 179. 
58 Ibid at pp.186-7. 
59Braekhus op. cit. supra n.7 at p~293 gives the 
example of the attitude of the English judges towards 
American legislation in the period before England adopted 
its Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924. See in re 
Missouri Steamship Company 42 Ch.D. 321 (1889). England, 
at this period, had complete freedom of contract. In 
Massachusetts legislation would have prevented the carrier 
from limiting his liability. Braekhus points out that 
English judges were reluctant to employ such mandatory 
rules in their own jurisdiction. 
60Baxter op. cit. supra n.15. See also A.A. 
Ehrenzweig. Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence (1971) at p.140. 
61Baxter ibid at p.110. 
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Thus it may be argued that is easier to apply 
the lex i and any attempt beyond this is likely 
to result application of a foreign law that is 
forum coloured. 
3. Natural Preference for the Lex Fori 
Thirdly there is a natural tendency to prefer one's 
own law. II the judicial tendency to apply 
the judge's own law has always been strong ... All 
over the world, judges are inclined to apply the 
own law wherever they can .... " 62 This has been 
observed to exist on both sides of the Atlantic. 63 
prebble 64 considers that the difference between 
two jurisdictions lies in the that American 
judges tend to be more open about than their 
English counterparts. 
62 0 • Kahn-Freund. The Growth of Internationalism in 
English Private International Law. (1960) at p.13. See 
also Shapira op. cit. supra n.45 at p.255 whu likewise 
suggested that courts everywhere have always displayed an 
instinc inclination to resort to local law even in cases 
entailing foreign ingredients. 
63 See J.R. Lowe. Choice of Law Clauses in Internat-
ional Contracts. A Practical Approach. 12 Harv. Int'l L.J. 
1 at p.6 (1971). See also Prebble at p.474. Also O. Kahn-
Freund. Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict 
of Laws. (1953). 39 Grotius 39 at p.45; Baxter op. cit. 
supra n.15 at p.109 footnote 54. 
64prebble ibid. 
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Prebble 65 makes the point that as the rules for 
finding the proper law are somewhat amorphous 
there is certain scope, here, if anywhere, "for 
judicial rationalization of an unexpressed prejudice 
favour of the lex fori."66 Furthermore the form-
ssness of the English contractual choice of law 
rules not only make it potentially easy for concealing 
forum favouring, also makes difficult to prove 
or disprove that any such hidden process exists. 67 
4. Achieves Justice 
Fourthly, the point has often been made that the 
interests of countries are. not involved in the 
decision of contractual disputes. 68 Rather it is 
the duty of the forum to determine the matter according 
to ideas of reason and justice and this will 
probably lead to application of the lex fori. 
5. Effects Legislative Intent 
Fifthly, it is also argued69 that there no reason 
to restrict legislative intent to wholly domestic 
65 Ibid • 
66 Ibid . 
67 It is therefore probably correct to say that 
English courts do apply English law in the majority of 
contract confl cases. Prebble ibid at p.475. 
68 See Jaf op. cit.supra n.42 at p.33 and 
Shapira op. cit. supra n.45 at p.256 
69shapira ibid at p.257. 
situations. Just because a situation involves a 
foreign element does not mean that the local rules 
cannot still apply.70 
6. Accords with Recent Legislation 
It may a be noted that all modern legislation 
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whether national or international has forum favoring 
aspects. The New York Uniform Commercial Code and 
the European Economic Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations (1980) for example both 
contain forum favoring tendenc s.71 Likewise 
interest analysis resorts to lex fori to a not 
ins ficant degree. 72 
70Sedler has suggested for example that the courts 
have misconceived the judicial function in conflicts cases. 
It is not necessary to adopt a for all cases, part 
ly not a comprehensive system of s designed to solve all 
conflicts problems that may arise. All that is necess 
is to decide whether the law of the forum should be dis-
placed the particular fact-law pattern before it. The 
lex should be displaced, Sedler argues, when the 
legitimate expectations of the parties demand it; policy 
and ss rather than abstract and analytical doctrine 
are to prevail. See R.A. Sedler. Interest Analysis and 
Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to 
the New Critics. 34 Mercer L.R. 593 (1982-1983). 
71See supra at p.217 the New York Uniform Com-
merc 1 Code and its forum favoring tendencies. The 
E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (1980) considers forum public policy and 
forum mandatory rules. See supra at p. 434 et 
See alGa G.R. Delaume. The European Convention on the 
Law Applic~ble to Contractual Obligations: Why a Con-
vention? 22 1. Virgo J. of Int'l L. 105 at p.111 (1981). 
72See supra at p.159 et seq. 
7. Fulfils Party Expectations 
If one takes a more benevolent view towards the 
litigants than that suggested above 73 there are 
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at ast two reasons why application of the lex fori 
is satisfactory from their point of view. 
First, if no choice of law clause exists then 
whichever party chose the forum could reasonably be 
taken to expect that the lex fori was likely to 
apply. The fori thus upholds at !~~ the expec-
tat ion of one party. 
Secondly, it may be noted that frequently the lex 
fori is the local law of one of the parties. It 
has been suggested74 that parties do not choose 
governing law clauses which give them the most 
advantage. This is a fiction; rather the parties 
prefer their 'own' law, the law of the jurisdiction 
in which they reside and do business. "This desire 
is usually not based on any deep knowledge of the 
law, but rather on a vaguely felt preference for 
dealing with what appears to be familiar rather than 
the unfamiliar.,,75 
73Supra at p. 127. 
74Gruson Governing Law Clauses at p.325 and L. Nurick. 
Choice of Law Clauses in International Contracts. 54 Pro-
ceedings - Am. Soc'y of Tnt'l Law 56 at p.57 et seq. (1960). 
75Gruson ibid. 
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Transferred into the no express choice category 
this will mean that if the parties had thought about 
the matter they might well have chosen the lex fori 
anyway. 
9isadvantages of the Lex Fori 
Three disadvantages are generally cited when considering 
this 'homeward' trend; this 'parochial', 'chauvinist' and 
'provincial' approach. 76 The first is that application 
of the lex fori promotes forum shopping and the second dis-
advantage given is that this rule does not make for uniform-
ity. Thirdly the rule is considered parochial. 
1. Uniformity 
The problem of uniformity may be considered first. 
"This favor legis fori will always stand in the 
way of international harmony or uniformity and will 
therefore be obnoxious to an academic lawyer's 
desperate sense of tidiness ... "77 
It is argued that it is unsatisfactory to apply the 
lex fori because different results could obtain depending 
on which forum is chosen. Jaffey78 notes that if the 
desire for uniformity excludes the lex fori as the govern-
ing law, it does not however indicate any particular law 
as the appropriate one to govern. "So long as uniformity 
76See Shapira op. cit. supra n.45 at p.25Q. 
77Kahn-Freund op. cit. supra n.62 at p.13. 
78Jaffey op. cit. supra n.42 at p.36. 
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is concerned any law will do, so long as the courts of 
enough countries will apply it. u79 This can only be 
achieved by means of international conventions. Further-
more it should be noted that if this lack of uniformity 
is to be a criticism of the application of the lex fori 
then it should be equally applied to situations where 
parties have included a choice of law clause. If one 
takes the example of a New Zealand company selling mutton 
to a New York company no objection would be made if the 
choice of law clause specified that New York law was to 
govern. If one takes another New Zealand company also 
selling mutton to a New York company no objection would be 
made if the choice of law clause specified that the law 
of New Zealand was to govern. Uniformity is not achieved 
any more than if the lex fori was applied. It is illogical 
therefore to criticise in one situation but not another. 
It may also be argued that to aim for the goal of 
'uniformity of result' is "misguided from the outset."SO 
The diverse material characterising conflict of laws 
problems is bound to defy any such attempts. 
2. Forum Shopping 
A further criticism levelled at application of the 
lex fori concerns forum shopping. Forum shopping has 
been defined as a "plaintiff by-passing his natural forum 
and bringing his action in some alien forum which would 
79 Ibid . 
80Shapira op. cit. supra n.45 at p.260 takes this 
view. 
give him relief or benefits which would not be available 
to him in the natural forum. 1I81 
The fear of forum shopping has played an important 
role in choice of law methodology. However the point has 
been made 82 that the actual possibilities of effective 
forum shopping have been exaggerated. Such non legal 
matters as long distance travelling and nO~l familiarity 
with foreign languages and customs for example act as 
a natural barrier to forum shopping. New Zealand's geo-
graphic isolation is particularly relevant here. 
Braekhus 83 makes the point that scholars view forum 
511 
shopping in a derogatory way whilst lI a ttorneys speak of the 
noble art of forum shopping." It is difficult to under-
stand why so many academic writers take exception to forum 
shopping and why attempts to limit it are canvassed. No one 
objects to forum selection clauses which are really only a 
form of forum shopping. Both parties agree that a par-
ticular forum shall be the venue for any litigation; they 
obviously choose a court that they consider will be the 
'best' from their point of view. If a ,party takes the 
same course after a dispute has arisen he risks being 
accused of forum shopping. The other party is hardly 
81BOYS v. Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356 at p.401 per Lord 
Pearson. See also R. Schuz. Controlling Forum-Shop-
ping: The Impact of MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd. 
(1986) 35 I.C.L.Q. 374 and A. Shapira. The Interest 
Approach to Choice of Law at pp.38 1 45 et seq. (1970). 
82shapira ibid at p.45 et seq. R. Kramer. Interest 
and Policy Clashes in conflict of Laws. 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 
523 at p.560 (1950). 
83Braekhus Ope cit. supra n.7 at p.266. 
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in a position to complain for (as with governing law 
clauses) he had his opportunity. He could have refused 
to enter the contract without the benefit of a choice of 
forum clause. Now he should have to accept the other 
party's choice of forum and its laws. 
3. Parochialism 
Besides the arguments concerning uniformity and 
forum shopping any reference to the lex fori is bound to 
lead to accusations of "parochialism, chauvinism or sloth.»84 
The retort must be that the overall characteristic of the 
proposed choice of law provisions for international con-
tract is far from adopting a mindless homeward trend. A 
New Zealand court will uphold autonomy; the lex fori is 
merely a last resort applying to those increasingly dimin-
ishing number of parties who, for one reason or another, 
fail to take advantage of the doctrine of party autonomy. 
Some conclusions 
1. ~~ Practical Solution 
To apply the lex fori is the only practical solution. 
All the alternatives that have been tried contain more 
difficulties and achieve less goals than otherwise. From 
a New Zealand viewpoint it is very likely that any action 
started in our courts will involve a contract containing 
some New Zealand aspects and for those who prefer to con-
84 J . A. Martin. An Approach to the Choice of Law 
Problem. 35 Mercer L.R. 583 at p.594 (1983-1984). 
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sider the choice of law ;issue in traditional terms, it 
is very likely that the court would have found the proper 
law of the contract to be that of New Zealand using the 
third rule of the proper law anyway. If the result is 
likely to be the same then how much better it is to 
state openly that the lex fori is being applied as a 
last resort rather than have to rely on a method which 
requires much time and effort, tortuous reasoning and 
other difficulties. 
Another point that may be made here is that the pro-
posed rule does not require any insurmountable changes. 
It would be interesting to formulate a body of substantive 
rules to apply internationally to all international con-
tracts, or even to formulate new concepts to assist the 
choice of law process. This is not however feasible. If 
such a body of international substantive law was to be 
formulated it would require the co-operation of many 
countries and obviously the appropriate instigator and 
organiser would have to be one of the major world trading 
communities, not a small geographically isolated country 
such as New Zealand. 
It is pointless to be over ambitious. What is 
required for New Zealand parties, lawyers and judges is 
a clear, easily found, readily applied rule or rules for 
international contracts. Overseas parties, lawyers and 
judges should be able to find out what our rules are 
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without the "help of heaven"85 as at present required. 
Compromises do exist. There is for example no 
suggestion that the present jurisdiction-selection approach 
should be abandoned despite the obvious disadvantage of 
"blind justice. II 86 It \vould again be unrealistic to 
expect our legal system to make radical changes which 
would be necessitated by adopting a system which was 
result-orientated. 
2. Results Certain and Satisfactory 
Not only the application of the lex fori in the 
absence of choice the only practical and reasonable solu-
tion; it makes for certainty and achieves directly the 
same result that judges obtained previously by a laborious 
route. 
When one considers the cases discussed under the third 
rule of the proper law, the second sentence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code of New York and the New York common law 
cases where no choice of law clauses exist a certain pattern 
emerges. 
On both sides of the Atlantic the overwhelming majority 
of cases apply the lex fori at the end of the day anyway. 
85webb suggests that such assistance is required when 
overseas lawyers contemplate the conflict of laws provisions 
of our contract statutes. See P.R.H. Webb. Heaven Help 
the Overseas Con ict Lawyers. (1979) N.Z.L.J. 442. 
8611Without taking the content of the conflicting laws 
into account, how could one know what would satisfy tbe 
demands of justice of the requirements of policy?1I 
D. Cavers. The Choice-of-law Process (1965) at p.9. 
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Of the decisions 87 considered in the context of New York 
common law only one would produce a different result if 
the lex fori had been applied and as that was not a com-
mercial contract it may be discounted. 88 The other 
decisions applied the law of New York for one reason or 
another. 
The trilogy of cases considered in the setting of the 
Uniform Commercial Code 89 likewise reveal a similar pattern. 
Again only one of the decisions 90 failed to apply New York 
law although New York law could equally have been applied 
if the New York contacts had been emphasised. 9l There 
would thus be nothing amiss if New York law had been applied 
as the lex fori. 
Turning to the English decisions the arbitration cases 92 
all applied English law and thus the same result obtains, 
and as was pointed out above two important decisions applied 
87 See supra at p.270. 
88Auten A t v. u en. 124 N.E. 2d. 99 (1954). 
89Bache & Co. Inc. v. International Controls Corp. 
339 F. Supp. 341 (1972). 
Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank N.A. 484 N.Y.S. 2d. 1000 
(City Ct. 1985). 
Windsor Industries Inc. v. Eaca International Ltd. 548 
F. Supp. 635 (1982). 
90Windsor Industies Inc. v. Eaca International Ltd. 
548 F. Supp. 635 (1982). 
91 The plaintiff was a New York Corporation; delivery 
was made in New York and the games were to be sold and 
distributed there. 
92See supra at p.49. 
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English law as the proper law93 and in a third94 the 
litigants ended up by applying an English statute anyway. 
There are of course examples of English cases where 
English law was not applied but these are the rarer cases. 
They need considering at this stage. If the lex fori is 
to apply (if no choice of law clause exists)it is important 
that it can be demonstrated that the lex fori would not 
work unsatisfactorily to cases decided in the past that 
did not apply the law of the forum. 
The facts of Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance 
co. 9S were given above when the case was used to demonstrate 
the applications of the third rule of the proper law. Two 
arguments may be put forward to support application of the 
lex fori. First it could be argued that no injustice is 
done to Mr. Rossano if English law is applied. English 
law had no embargo on paying Rossano any more than Ontario 
law had. 96 If either Ontario or English law was applied 
93James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street 
Estates {M.anchester} Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583 and Amin Rasheed 
v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 1984 A.C. 50. 
94 The Assu~zione [1954] p.1S0. 
95[1963].2Q.B.3S2. 
96supervening Egyptian legislation made payment on 
the insurance policies to Rossano without the consent of 
the Egyptian Exchange Control Authorities illegal. The 
question 'was whether the insurance company could insist on 
payment in Egypt or whether Rossano could require payment 
outside Egypt. 
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Rossano could be paid out in a country that was not Egypt. 
Secondly, having satisfied Rossano and worked no in-
justice to the insurance company97 it can be argued that 
the lex fori makes for certainty in a case such as Rossano's. 
Until the case was litigated there was no certainty which 
law was the proper law. Contacts existed with Egypt, 
Toronto, England and New York. Applying the law that 
had the closest and most real connection could equally have 
resulted in English law being applied,98 or that of New 
York. 99 One could argue that the contract was not par-
ticularly connected to any of the four jurisdictions. If 
it were known in advance that the lex fori was to apply a 
court case could probably have been avoided. 
If Mr. Rossano would be contented with English law 
applying to his contract Mr. Bonython would be equally 
pleased to find that the lex fori applied and that English 
law determined the meaning of the word 'pound' .100 
97Which presumably had not acted on the expectation 
that Egyptian legislation would be passed. 
98 Two of the policies were for a sum in sterling with 
the money payable in bankers' demand drafts on London for 
sterling. 
99 The third policy was for a sum in United states 
dollars to be paid in a bankers' demand draft in New York. 
100AC Inglis notes the contention that the stock 
holders be paid either one thousand pounds sterling or 
one thousand pounds Australian was not without "some moral 
merit." See B.D. Inglis. Conflict of Laws. (1959). 
The case referred to is Bonython V. Commonwealth of Australia 
(1951] A.C. 201. 
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Other cases 1 which applied a law other than English 
law could equally have applied English law on the grounds 
that it was the law most closely connected to the contract. 
In Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Petroleum co. 2 the English 
contacts arguably outweigh the Libyan contacts 3 and in 
Sayers v. International Drilling4 the same could be said. 5 
The only important case discussed in Part A that did 
not have as many English contacts as non forum contacts is 
the united Railways of Havana decision6 and even here "the 
view might have been taken that English law should be the 
proper law because the head office of the railway company 
was situated in England.,,7 If this is so then again from 
a practical point of view the lex fori might just as well 
have applied as the law of Pennsylvania. 
l E . g . Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Petroleum Co. [1983] 
2 All E.R. 434. E.g. Sayers v. International Drilling Co. 
N.V. [1971] 3 All E.R. 163. 
2Ibid . 
3Summarised by Webb at p.35. 
4 [1971] 3 All E. R. 163. 
5Lord Denning held that if he had to decide the proper 
law of the contract (apart from the tort) he would "be 
inclined" to say that it was English. Ibid at p.166. 
6Tomkinson v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. 
[1961] A.C. 1007. 
7Webb at p.36. 
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The conclusion is that courts tend to apply their own 
law when no choice of law clause exists. The tendency 
is understandable, it ~s easy to apply one's own law; often 
it may be considered inherently preferable to some foreign 
law, and it can be seen as eminently reasonable for liti-
gants to choose the forum and its laws rather than some 
other foreign law. 
Secondly in the cases considered in Parts A and B 
above no obvious disadvantages emerge from applying forum 
law. What is unsatisfactory is the present pract of 
applying the lex fori under the guise the third rule 
of the proper law or the centre of gravity approach. 
Given this second conclusion it appears that no 
exception need be applied to the proposed rule that the 
lex fori determine construction and validity of an 
international contract where the parties have failed to 
make a choice of law decision. 
3. No Need for any Exceptions to the Application 
of the Lex Fori 
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that no 
exceptions are required by way of an egcape device to 
application of the lex fori in the absence of party choice. 
The court will only be doing openly what it did before via 
a different rule. The cases show that the courts do in 
effect apply the lex i absent a choice of law clause. 
In none of the cases considered would it be unsatisfactory 
to apply the lex fori openly as the applicable law in 
cases which do not contain a choice of law clause. 
Conclusion 
It is recommended that the proposed Conflict of Laws 
(Contracts) Act contain a provision that reads: 
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties 
a New Zealand court shall apply the domestic law 
of New Zealand to any issue arising from the 
contract. 8 
Conclusion to Part E 
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" ... 1 cursed the clients. I had told them a dozen 
times that if they wanted to save confusion and expense 
they should say specifically in any contract they made 
with foreigners that English law governed. After a 
good deal of searching and puffing and blowing, I came 
to the conclusion that English law governed which was 
a relief because it meant that there was some chance 
of me knowing what I was talking about."9 
It is recommended that New Zealand adopt a legislative 
solution to the choice of law issue for international 
contracts and that an Act entitled The Conflict of Laws 
(Contracts) Act be passed. The main provisions of such 
an enactment would be as follows: 
8This will make it clear that the lex fori will 
govern all aspects of construction and validity of the 
contract. 
9From "Lawyer Heal Thyself" by B. Mortlock. (The 
Autobiography of a Solicitor) (1959) at p.169.cited by 
Webb & Brown at p.301. 
1. An international contract is a contract that has 
significant elements connected to more than one 
jurisdiction. 
2. Parties to an international contract may agree upon 
a law to govern their contract or any part thereof. 
A New Zealand court shall apply the law thus chosen 
by the parties unless: 
(a) to do so would result in application of a law 
which is repugnant to public policy in New 
Zealand, or 
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(b) An enactment expressly provides or its object 
clearly requires application of a different law. 
or 
(c) The choice of law clause was obtained by fraud, 
undue influence, overwhelming bargaining power 
or duress. 
A New Zealand court shall apply the domestic law 
of New Zealand to any contract to which sub-
sections (a) (b) or (c) above apply. 
3. In the absence of a choice of law by the parties a 
New Zealand court shall apply the domestic law of 
New Zealand to any issue arising from the contract. 
4. A choice of the laws of a jurisdiction shall be 
read as a reference to its internal or domestic 
laws excluding its conflict of laws rules. 
5. A New Zealand court shall always apply the law of 
New Zealand to matters of procedure and evidence. 
In the last few decades there has been a dramatic 
rise in the volume, range and complexity of international 
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business both in this country and overseas. This trend 
will probably continue. New commercial and financial 
techniques have arisen and many more countries participate 
on a regular basis on the world market than was the case 
fty years ago. Disputes can arise in countries having 
radically different legal systems and conflicting ideas 
about the function and interpretation of their agreements. 
It is no longer appropriate to consider that inter-
national contracts have a 'proper' law as such, indeed 
many contracts can be seen as truly international with 
no particular links with any domestic systems of law. 
Yet in New Zealand judges and lawyers, litigants and 
businessmen have to rely on rules that were developed in 
less commercially sophi cated times. The law is often 
di cult to find and di cult to apply. 
The time has corne for New Zealand to adopt a legis-
lative solution. The law will thus be easy to find. The 
rules proposed are easy to state and easy to apply; they 
will be of service to all. 
Party autonomy with its limited exceptions suits 
today's international business operations. At the other 
end of the spectrum the lex fori will work well in situa-
tions where the litigants are not sophisticated businessmen 
but ordinary persons who have, possibly unknowlingly, en-
tered a contract that is international in character. 
All participants in international transactions would 
benefit by the proposed legislation and New Zealand would 
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be unique in COIT@on law countries in haviny a satisfactory 
law to determine one aspect of a subject that has long been 
termed a 'quaking quagmire' ,10 
- 0 -
10The term is Prosser's from selected Topics on 
the Law of Torts (1953) at p.89. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 
(80/934/EEC) 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, 
Anxious to continue in the field of private international law the 
work of unification of law which has already been done within the 
Community, in parti~ular in the field of jurisdiction and enforcement 
of judgments, 
Wishing to establish uniform rules concerning the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
TITLE 1 
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
Article 1 
Scope of the Convention 
1. The rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual obligations 
in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
countries. 
2. They shall not apply to 
(a) questions involving the status or legal capacity of natural 
persons, without prejudice to Article 11; 
(b) contractual obligations relating to: 
wills and succession, 
rights in property arising out of a matrimonial 
relationship, 
rights and duties arising out of a family relationship, 
parentage, marriage, or affinity, including maintenance 
obligations in respect of children who are not legiti-
mate; 
(c) obligations arlslng under bills of exchange, cheques and 
promissory notes and other negotiable instruments to the 
extent that the obligations under such other negotiable 
instruments arise out of their negotiabl~ character; 
(d) arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of 
court; 
549 
(e) questions governed by the law of companies and other 
bodies corporate or unincorporate such as the creation, 
by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal 
organization or winding up of companies and other bodies 
corporate or unincorporate and the personal liability of 
officers and members as such for the obligations of the 
company or body; 
(f) the question whether an agent is able to bind a principal, 
or an organ to bind a company or body corporate or incor-
porate, to a third party; 
(g) the constitution of trusts and the relationship between 
settlors, trustees and beneficiaries; 
(h) evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Article 14. 
3. The rules of this Convention do not apply to contracts of 
insurance which cover risks situated in the territories of the 
Member States of the European Economic Community. In order to 
determine whether a risk is situated in these territories the 
court shall apply its internal law. 
4. The preceding paragraph does not apply to contracts of re-
insurance. 
Article 2 
Application of law of non-contracting States 
Any law specified by this Convention shall be applied whether or not it 
is the law of a Contracting State. 
TITLE II 
UNIFORM RULES 
Article 3 
Freedom of Choice 
1. A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances 
of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law 
applicable to the whole or apart only of the contract. 
2. The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a 
law other than that which previously governed it, whether as 
a result of an earlier choice under this Article or of other 
provisions of this Convention. Any variation by the parties 
of the law to be applied made after the conclusion of the con-
tract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 9 
or adversely affect the rights of third parties. 
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3. The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law, whether or 
not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, 
where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are connected with one country only. prejudice 
the application of rules of the law of that counlry which cannot 
be derogated from by contract, hereinafter called 'mandatory 
rules'. 
4. The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to 
the choice of the applicable law shall be determined in accord-
ance with the provisions of Articles 8, 9 and ii. 
Article 4 
Applicable law in the absence of choice 
i. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not 
been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of the contract which 
has a closer connection with another country may by way of ex-
ception be governed by the law of that other country. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it 
shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected 
with the country where the party who is to effect the performance 
which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of con-
clusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or in the case 
of a body corporate or unincorporate, its central administration. 
However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that 
party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country 
in which the principal place of business is situated or, where 
under the terms of the contract the performance is to be effected 
through a place of business other than the principal place of 
business, the country in which that other place of business is 
situated. 
3. Notwithstanding the prOV1Slons of paragraph 2 of this Article, 
to the extent that the subject matter of the contract is a 
right in immovable property or a right to use immovable property 
it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected 
with the country where the immovable property is situated. 
4. A contract for the carriage of goods shall not be subject to 
the presumption in paragraph 2. In such a contract if the 
country in which. at the time the contract is concluded. the 
carrier has his principal place of business is also the country 
in which the place of loading or the place of discharge or the 
principal place of business of the consignor is situated, it 
shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected 
with that country. In applying this paragraph single voyage 
charter-parties and other contracts the main purpose of which 
is the carriage of goods shall be treated as contracts for the 
carriage of goods. 
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5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance 
cannot be determined, and the presumption in paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances 
as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with 
another country. 
Article 5 
Certain consumer contracts 
1. This article applies to a contract the object of which is the 
supply of goods or services to a person ('the consumer') for 
a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that 
object. 
2. Notwithstanding the provlslons of Article 3, a choice of law 
made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the 
consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules 
of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence: 
if in that country the conclusion of the contract was pre-
ced~dby a specific invitation addressed to him or by ad-
vertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps 
necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or 
if the other party or his agent received the consumer's 
order in that country, or 
if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer 
travelled from that country to another country and there 
gave his order, provided that the consumer's journey was 
arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the 
customer to buy. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to which 
this Article applies shall, in the absence of choice in accord-
ance with Article 3, be governed by the law of the country in 
which the consumer has his habitual residence if it is entered 
into in the circumstances described in paragraph 2 of this 
Article. 
4. This Article shall not apply to: 
(a) a contract of carriage; 
(b) a contract for the supply of services where the services 
are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country 
other than that in which he has his habitual residence. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4, this Article shall 
apply toa contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for 
~ combination of travel and accommodation. 
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Article 6 
, 
Individual employment contracts 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, in a contract of 
employment a choice of law made by the parties shall not have 
the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded 
to him by the mandatory rules of the law which would be applicable 
under paragraph 2 in the absence of choice. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract of employ-
ment shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, 
be governed: 
(a) by the law of the country in which the employee habitually 
carries out his work in performance of the contract, even 
if he is temporarily employed in another country; or 
(b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in 
anyone country, by the law of the country in which the 
place of businesss through which he was engaged is situated; 
unless it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country, in which 
case the contract shall be governed by the law of that country. 
Article 7 
Mandatory Rules 
1. When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect 
may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country 
with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so 
far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must 
be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In 
considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, 
regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the con-
sequences of their application or non-applica~ion. 
2. Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the 
rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract. 
Article 8 
Material validity 
1. The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a 
contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern 
it under this Convention if the contract or term were valid. 
2. Nevertheless a party may rely upon the law of the country in 
which he has his habitual residence to establish that he did not 
consent if it appears from the circumstances that it would not 
be reasonable to determine t'he effect of his conduct in accord-
ance with the law specified in the preceding paragraph. 
Article 9 
Formal Validity 
553 
1. A contract concluded between persons who are in the same 
country is formally valid if it satisfies the formal require-
ments of the law which governs it under this Convention or 
of the law of the country where it is concluded. 
2. A contract concluded between persons who are in different 
countries is formally valid if it satisfies the formal 
requirements of the law which governs it under this Convention 
or of the law of one of those countries. 
3. Where a contract is concluded by an agent, the country in 
which the agent acts is the relevant country for the purposes 
of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4. An act intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or 
contemplated contract is formally valid if it satisfies the 
formal requirements of the law which under this Convention gov-
erns or would govern the contract or of the law of the country 
where the act was done. 
5. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not apply to a 
contract .to which Article 5 applies, concluded in the circum-
stances described in paragraph 2 of Article 5. The formal 
validity of such a contract is governed by the law of the 
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence. 
6. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, a contract 
the subject matter of which is a right in immovable property 
or a right to use immovable property shall be subject to the 
mandatory requirements of form of the law of the country where 
the property is situated if by that law those requirements are 
imposed irrespective of the country where the contract is con-
cluded and irrespective of the law governing .the contract. 
1. 
Article 10 
Scope of the applicable law 
The law applicable to a contract by virtue of Articles 3 to 6 
and 12 of this Convention shall govern in particular: 
(a) interpretation; 
~) performance; 
(c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by 
its procedural law, the consequence of breach, including 
the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by 
rules of law; 
(d) the various ways of extinguishing obligation, and pre-
scription and limitation of actions; 
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(e) the consequences of nullity of the contract. 
2. In relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be 
taken in the event of defective performance shall be had 
to the law of the country in which performance t~kes place. 
Article 11 
Incapacity 
In a contract concluded between persons who are in the same country, 
a natural person who would have capacity under the law of that country 
may invoke his incapacity resulting from another law only if the other 
party to the contract was aware of this incapacity at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract or was not aware thereof as a result of 
negligence. 
Article 12 
Voluntary assignment 
1. The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a voluntary 
assignment of a right against another person '('the debtor') 
shall be governed by the law which under this Convention applies to 
the contract between the assignor and assignee. 
2. The law governing the right to which the assignment relates 
shall determine its assignability, the relationship between 
the assignee and the debtor, the conditions under which the 
assignment can be invoked against the debtor and any question 
whether the debtor's obligations have been discharged. 
Article 13 
Subrogation 
1. Where a person ('the creditor') has a contractual claim upon 
another ('the debtor'), and a third person has a duty to satisfy 
the creditor, or has in fact satisfied the creditor in discharge 
of that duty, the law which governs the third person's duty 
to satisfy the creditor shall determine whether the third person 
is entitled to exercise against the debtor the rights which the 
creditor had against the debtor under the law governing their 
relationship and , if so, whether he may do so in full or only 
tq a limited extent. 
2. The same rule applies where several persons are subject to the 
same contractual claim and one of them has satisfied the 
creditor. 
Article 14 
Burden of proof, etc. 
1. The law governing the contract under this Convention applies 
to the extent that it contains, in the law of contract, rules 
which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of 
proof. 
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2. A contract or an act intended to have legal effect may be proved 
by any mode of proof recognized by the law of the forum or by 
any of the laws referred to in Article 9 under which that con-
tract or act is formally valid, provided that such mode of 
proof can be administered by the forum. 
Article 15 
Exclusion of renvoi 
The application of the law of any country specified by this Convention 
means the application of the rules of law in-force in that country 
other than its rules of private international law. 
Article 16 
'Ordre public' 
The applications of a rule of the law of any country specified by this 
Convention may be refused only if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy ('ordre public') of the forum. 
Article 17 
No retrospective effect 
The Convention shall apply in a Contracting State to contracts made 
after the date on which this Convention has entered into force with 
respect to that State. 
Article 18 
Uniform interpretation 
In the interpretation and application of the preceding uniform rules, 
regard shall be had to their international character and to the 
desirability of achieving uniformity in their interpretation and 
application. 
Article 19 
States with more than one legal system 
1. Where a State comprises several territorial units each of which 
has its own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations' 
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each territorial unit shall be considered as a country for the 
purposes of identifying the law applicable under this Convention. 
2. A State within which different territorial units have their own 
rules of law in respect of contractual obligatious shall not 
be bound to apply this Convention to conflicts solely between 
the laws of such units. 
Article 20 
Precedence of Community law 
The Convention shall not affect the application of provisions which, 
in relation to particular matters, lay down choice of law rules re-
lating to contractual obligations and which are or will be contained 
in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in national 
laws harmonized in implementation of such acts. 
Article 21 
Relationship with other conventions 
This Convention shall not prejudice the application of international 
conventions to which a Contracting State is, or becomes, a party. 
Article 22 
Reservations 
1. Any Contracting State may, at the time of signature, rati-
fication, acceptance of approval, reserve the right not to 
apply: 
(a) the provisions of Article 7(1); 
(b) the provisions of Article 10(1)(e). 
2. Any Contracting State may also, when notifying an extension of 
the Convention in accordance with Article 27(2), make one or 
more of these reservations, with its effect limited in all or 
some of the territories mentioned in the extension. 
3. Any Contracting State may at any time withdraw a reservation 
which it has made; the reservation shall cease to have effect 
on the first day of the third calendar month after notification 
of the withdrawal. 
TITLE III 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 23 
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1. If, after the date on which the Convention has entered into 
force for a Contracting State, that State wishes to adopt any 
new choice of law rule in regard to any particular category of 
contract within the scope of this Convention, it shall communi-
cate its intention to the other signatory States through the 
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Communities. 
2. Any signatory State may, within six months from the date of the 
communication made to the Secretary-General, request him to 
arrange consultations between signatory States in order to reach 
agreement. 
3. If no signatory State has requested consultations within this 
period or if within two years following the communication made 
to the Secretary-General no agreement is reached in the course 
of consultations, the Contracting State concerned may amend its 
law in the manner indicated. The measures taken by that State 
shall be brought to the knowledge of the other signatory States 
through the Secretary-General of the Council of the European 
Communities. 
Article 24 
1. If, after the date on which this Convention has entered into 
force with respect.to a Contracting State, that State wishes 
to become a party to a multilateral convention whose principal 
aim or one of whose principal aims is to lay down rules of 
private international law concerning any of the matters governed 
by this Convention, the procedure set out in Article 23 shall 
apply. However, the period of two years, referred to in para-
graph 3 of that Article, shall be reduced to one year. 
2. The procedure referred to in the preceding paragraph need not be 
followed if a Contracting State or one of the European Communi-
ties is already a party to the multilaterial convention, or if 
its object is to revise a convention to which the State concerned 
is already a party, or if it is a convention concluded within 
the framework of the Treaties establishing the European communi-
ties. 
Article 25 
If a contracting State considers that the unification achieved by this 
Convention is prejudiced by the conclusion of agreements not covered 
by Article 24(1) that State may request the Secretary-General of the 
Council of the European Communities to arrange consultations between 
the signatory States of this Convention. 
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Article 26 
Any Contracting State may request the revision of 'this Convention. 
In this event a revision conference shall be convened by the President 
of the Council of the European Communities. 
Article 27 
1. ThisConvention shall apply to the European terrotories of the 
Contracting States, including Greenland, and to the entire 
territory of the French Republic. 
2. notwithstanding paragraph 1: 
(a) this Convention shall not apply to the Faroe Islands, 
unless the kingdom of Denmark makes a declaration to 
the contrary; 
(b) this Convention shall not apply to any European territory 
situated outside the United Kingdom for the international 
relations of which the United kingdom is responsible, unless 
the United Kingdom makes a declaration to the contrary in 
respect of any such territory; 
(c) this Convention shall apply to the Netherlands Antines, if 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands makes a declaration to that 
effect. 
3. Such declarations may be made at any time by notifying the 
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Communities. 
4. Proceedings brought in the United Kingdom on appeal from courts 
in one of the territories referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall 
be deemed to be proceedings taking place in those courts. 
Article 28 
1. This Convention shall be open from 19 June 1980 for signature 
by the States party to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval by the signatory States. The instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Communities. 
Article 29 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of 
the third month following the deposit of the seventh instrument 
of ratification, acceptance or approval. 
2. This Convention shall enter into force for each signatory State 
ratifying, accepting or approving at a later date on the first 
day of the third month following the deposit of its instrument 
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of ratification, acceptance or approval. 
Article 30 
1. This Convention shall remain in force for 10 years from the 
date of its entry into force in accordance with Article 29(1) 
even for States for which it enters into force at a later 
date. 
2. If there has been no denunciation it shall be renewed tacitly 
every five years. 
3. A Contracting State which wishes to denounce shall, not less 
than six months before the expiration of the period of 10 or 
five years, as the case may be, give notice to the Secretary-
General of the Council of the European Communities. Denunciation 
may be limited to any territory to which the Convention has been 
extended by a declaration under Article 27(2). 
4. The denunciation shall have effect only in relation to the 
State which has notified it. The Convention will remain in 
force as between all other Contracting States. 
Article 31 
The Secretary-General of the Council of the European Communities 
shall notify the States party to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community of: 
(a) the signatures; 
(b) the deposit of each instrument of ratification, acceptance 
or approval; 
(c) the date of entry into force of this Convention; 
Cd) communications madein.pursuance of Articles 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
and 30; 
(e) the reservations and withdrawals of reservations referred to 
in Article 22. 
Article 32 
The Protocol annexed to this Convention shall form an integral part 
thereof. 
Article 33 
This Convention, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, 
English, French, German, Irish and Italian languages, these texts 
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 
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Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities. The 
Secretary-General shall transmit a certified copy thereof to 
the Government of each signatory State. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) 
S.186. Applicable Law 
Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties 
in accordance with the rule of S.187 and otherwise by the law 
selected in accordance with the rule of S.188. 
S.187 Law of the State Chosen by the Parties 
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular 
issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an 
explicit provision in their agremeent directed to that issue. 
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the 
particular issue is one which the parties could not have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed 
to that issue, unless either 
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the 
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties' choice, or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has 
a materially greater interest than the chosen state 
in the determination of the particular issue and which, 
under the rule of S.188, would be the state of the appli-
cable law in the absence of an effective choice of law 
by the parties. 
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the 
reference is to the local law of the state of the chosen 
law. 
S.188 Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the 
Parties 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue 
in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, 
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship 
to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated 
in S.6. 
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(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties 
(see S.187) the contacts to be taken into account in applying 
the principles of S.6 to determine the law applicable to an 
issue include: 
(a) The place of contracting. 
(b) The place of negotiation of the contract 
(c) The place of performance 
Cd) The location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation 
and place of business of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of 
performance are in the same state, the local law of this 
state will usually be applied except as otherwise provided 
in S.189-199 and 203. 
APPENDIX C 
New York Uniform Commercial Code S.1-105 
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) 
Section 1-105 Territorial Application of the Act; Parties' 
Power to Choose Applicable Law. 
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(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a trans-
action bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to 
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law 
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall 
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this 
Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to 
this state. 
(2) Where one of the following prOV1Slons of this Act specifies the 
applicable law, that. provision governs and a contrary agreement 
is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including 
the conflict of laws rules) so specified: 
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 2-402. 
Applicability of the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections. 
Section 4-102. 
Bulk transfers subject to the Article on Bulk Transfers. 
Section 6-102. 
Applicability of the Article on Investment Securities. Section 
8-106. 
Perfection provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions. 
Section 9-103. 
OFFICIAL COMMENT 
Purposes: 
1. Subsection (1) states affirmatively the right of the parties to 
a multi-state transaction or a transaction involving foreign 
trade to choose their own law. That right is subject to the 
firm rules stated in the six sections listed in subsection (2) 
and is limited to jurisdictions to which the transaction bears 
a "reasonable relation." In general, the test of "reasonable 
relation" is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court 
in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47 S.Ct. 
626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927). Ordinarily the law chosen must be 
that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of 
the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs. 
But an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take effect as 
a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters 
governed by their agreement, even though the transaction has no 
significant contact with the jurisdiction chosen. 
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2. Where there is no agrement as to the governing law, the Act is 
applicable to any transaction having an "appropriate" relation 
to any state which enacts it. Of course the Act applies to 
any transaction which takes place in its entirety in a state 
which has enacted the Act. But the mere fact tllat suit is 
brought in a state does not make it appropriate to apply the 
substantive law of that state. Cases where a relation to the 
enacting state is not "appropriate" include, for example, those 
where the parties have clearly contracted on the basis of some 
other law, as where the law of the place of contracting and the 
law of the place of contemplated performance are the same and 
are contrary to the law under the Code. 
3. Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state which 
has enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the 
question what relation is 'appropriate' is left to judicial 
decision. In deciding that question, the court is not strictly 
bound by precedents established in other contexts. Thus a 
conflict-of-laws decision refusing to apply a purely local 
statute or rule of law to a particular multi~tate transaction 
may not be valid precedent for refusal to apply the Code in an 
analogous situation. Application of the Code in such circum-
stances may be justified by its comprehensiveness, by the policy 
of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a refor-
mation and restatement of the law merchant and of the under-
standing of a business community which transcends state and 
even national boundaries. Compare Global Commerce Corp. v. 
Clark-Babbitt Industires, Inc., 239 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir.1956). 
In particular, where a transaction is governed in large part 
by the Code, application of another law to some detail of per-
formance because of an accident of geography may violate the 
commercial understanding of the parties. 
4. The Act does not attempt to prescribe choice-of-Iaw rules 
for states which do not enact it, but this section does not 
prevent application of the Act in a court of such a state. 
Common-law choice of law often rests on policies of giving 
effect to agreements and of uniformity of result regardless 
of where suit is brought. To the extent that such policies 
prevail, the relevant considerations are similar in such a 
court to those outlined above. 
5. Subsection (2) spells out essential limitations on the parties' 
right to choose the applicable law. Especially in Article 9 
parties taking a security interest or asked to extend credit 
which may be subject to a security interest must have sure ways 
to find out whether and where to file and where to look for 
possible existing filings. 
